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Abstract 
Roberta Holanda Maschietto 
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF EMPOWERMENT PROMOTION THROUGH 
SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
Mozambique’s Peace and the ‘7 million’ Initiative 
Keywords: empowerment, power, peacebuilding, development, social 
engineering, Mozambique, Angoche, ‘7 million’, local councils. 
 
The concept of ‘empowerment’ has been widely used among development 
practitioners since the early 1990s. This thesis aims to contribute to the 
literature on empowerment by developing an analytical framework that 
incorporates: (a) the dialectical nature of power, (b) multiple levels of analysis, 
and (c) the subjectivities of power that different actors have and that affect the 
way they respond to policies. The model is applied to the analysis of 
Mozambique’s transition to peace and the study of a national initiative called 
District Development Fund, known as the ‘7 Million’, which aims to promote 
empowerment by reducing poverty and promoting local participation in the rural 
districts.  
The analysis focuses, on the one hand, on the ‘7 million’ policy formulation, 
stressing the power struggles that shaped its final outcome and, on the other 
hand, the policy implementation in the district of Angoche, where I conducted 
extensive fieldwork. I argue that, even though the ‘7 million’ had some positive 
aspects – including providing a discourse that underlines the relevance of the 
districts and the local community in matters of governance – its effects in 
promoting local empowerment have been far below its potential. One of the 
reasons for this is to be found in the dynamics of power-to and power-over that 
take place at the local level and that partly reflect structural aspects linked to 
the Mozambique state formation and peacebuilding process. More generally, 
the case illustrates the limitations and contradictions of policies that aim 
promoting ‘bottom-up’ empowerment from the ‘top-down’.  





















Emancipate yourself from mental slavery 
None but ourselves can free our minds 
(Bob Marley) 
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The famous ‘7 million’… The ‘7 million’, everybody knows what’s 
going on, but no one has the courage to tell… 
(Civil servant, Nampula) 
 
The present research was born out of a personal quest to understand what 
kinds of changes peace brings to ordinary people, the vast majority of whom 
live at the margins of the political system and are often unheard and not fully 
taken into account when a peace accord is signed, when a new state is 
reshaped and new development policies are designed and implemented. More 
specifically, this quest has focused on the long-term changes produced by 
peace related, in particular, to the expansion of people’s power to pursue a 
better life. As such, it was based on the understanding of peacebuilding as a 
long-term and complex social process not encapsulated in the immediate post-
war years or in the life of UN peacebuilding missions. 
At the heart of this quest was a more general concern with power and its 
different manifestations during war and peace. Taking into account that war is a 
violent expression of power contestation, it seemed relevant to ask the extent to 
which power changes with peace, and, in particular, if post-war democracy and 
development policies are indeed vehicles to redistribute power between 
different actors within a state, or if they constitute mechanisms to prevent the 
rise of violence whilst maintaining significant social power asymmetries. These 
questions and my concern with ordinary people led me to the concept of 
empowerment as a vehicle to understand these long-term peace changes. 
Empowerment has become a catchword since the early 1990s being 
progressively incorporated into the language and agendas of international 
institutions. In its current use, it indicates these institutions’ commitment to the 
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incorporation of the local agents’ inputs into their policies mostly through 
participatory approaches. It also encapsulates the idea of capacity building as a 
means to increase local people’s abilities and power to pursue their own 
objectives. In this regard, it reflects a soft approach to social engineering aimed 
at remodelling societies (and states) following general precepts that conform to 
an abstract model of a liberal democratic state. Yet, before its 
institutionalisation, the concept of empowerment was mostly linked to social 
movements and different expressions of contestation of dominant models of 
social organisation. In this regard, it had a much more solid grassroots base, 
and a character of ‘demand’ instead of ‘supply’. Thinking of empowerment as a 
concept in order to understand peace-changes requires the examination of 
these conceptual transformations and their implications in terms of policy 
implementation and related outcomes in post-war contexts. 
This thesis has three general objectives. First, it aims to explore how the 
concept of empowerment has been understood in the academic and policy 
domains. Second, it aims to discuss the analytical usefulness of the concept by 
rescuing the ontological perspectives of power underneath it and by proposing 
a multilevel framework of analysis. Third, it aims to analyse how empowerment 
operates by focusing on a case study. All through the thesis empowerment is 
discussed through dual lenses: as a policy instrument, on the one hand, and as 
an analytical concept aimed at understanding change on the other hand. 
The choice of Mozambique as a country of study was based on several 
considerations. First, Mozambique has usually been presented internationally 
as a successful case of peacebuilding, in particular due to the political stability 
that endured in the post-war yeas,1 but also because of the economic recovery 
demonstrated by the achievement of good macro-economic indicators. At the 
                                            
1 Since 2012, the country has faced some turbulence as the former rebel movement, 
and main political opposition party, Renamo, has resumed arms and conducted a 
series of localised attacks in the region of Sofala. A new peace agreement was signed 
in September 2014 just before the country’s general election. At the time of writing, 
even though hostilities have ceased, there is tension regarding the election results, 
which have not been accepted by the opposition. 
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same time, and paradoxically, the country remains one of the poorest in world 
with very low human development indicators, which shows the limitations of the 
peace dividend distribution. More fundamentally, because it has been stable for 
at least 20 years after the signing of the peace agreements, the country 
provides a good platform to analyse change in the long-term, in particular, the 
changes in the lives of ordinary people. As such, on the one hand, this thesis 
examines the macro changes related to the process of democratization and 
post-war development policies — and their effects on people’s empowerment. 
On the other hand, it takes into account a case study that looks more deeply 
into the local dimension and daily lives of ordinary people in the rural areas, and 
which is centred on a national initiative called the District Development Fund 
(FDD) popularly known as the ‘7 million’. 
The ‘7 million’ started in 2006, as a budget (7 million meticais at the time — 
hence the popular name) distributed to each of the 128 districts in Mozambique 
to be used for credit concession to the poor strata of those economically active 
in the rural areas, and it soon became one of the most popular policies of 
President Guebuza. The initiative has a strong empowerment appeal that 
includes its potential effect in reducing poverty in the rural areas as well as a 
procedural aspect related to the engagement of local councils in the process 
that leads to the allocation of the credit. Because of this participatory aspect, 
the ‘7 million’ is presented as a policy that places the local at the centre of the 
agenda. Despite of being a relatively small scheme in terms of budget (an 
average of 2% of the national budget), the ‘7 million’ has gained a strong 
political appeal, being presented as one of the main tools in the fight against 
poverty. More generally, the ‘7 million’ is connected to the wider network of 
institutional changes that have taken place in Mozambique since the peace 
agreements, and it is portrayed as a further step in the country’s process of 
decentralisation.  
Different from other initiatives that aim to promote local empowerment, including 
several micro-credit schemes, the ‘7 million’ is commonly portrayed as a 
‘Mozambican model’, an expression that highlights the government’s claim to 
national ownership regarding the initiative. In this regard, the analysis of the 
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case study also provides a basis to assess the extent to which a national 
(therefore endogenous) initiative is in any way more likely to generate local 
empowerment than an initiative led by donors. 
1.1 Research Overview 
The topic of this research crosses two distinct and interrelated fields of 
knowledge. On the one hand, the thesis is located in the field of Peace and 
Conflict Studies. The choice of a post-war country and the concern with the 
long-term effects of peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in Mozambique 
reflects the primary perspective of this research. On the other hand, and partly 
because of the relative absence of literature on empowerment in Peace and 
Conflict Studies, the research draws substantially on the academic and policy 
material on this issue within the field of Development. 
The incorporation of empowerment in the development agenda in the early 
1990s has contributed to the emergence of a significant literature on the topic. 
Notably, empowerment has been studied in the arena of gender studies and 
here is where some of the most important contributions to the concept may be 
found (Rowlands, 1997; Sen, 1997; Kabeer, 2001; Batliwala, 2007). Next to 
gender, empowerment has been analysed in the context of poverty reduction 
and development (Friedmann, 1992; Narayan, 2002; Alsop, 2004; Stern et al., 
2005; Alsop et al., 2006; Eyben et al., 2008). As will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, with few exceptions, this literature is largely policy-oriented and 
empowerment is usually perceived as a policy outcome and not necessarily as 
an analytical conceptual tool. Also, there is a tendency to focus on the micro-
level of analysis, where policies are implemented and/or on the institutional 
aspects of governance as the locus of the sources of disempowerment. 
In Peace and Conflict Studies, empowerment has entered the agenda following 
a general concern with the legitimization of external interventions, notably 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding related activities (Lederach, 1997; 
Ramsbotham et al., 2007; Donais, 2009 and 2012; Francis, 2010). In spite of 
the sporadic use of the word empowerment, here the discussion has privileged 
the term local ownership, used as an indicator to stress the extent to which local 
actors own the reforms promoted after violent conflicts (ibid.; Chandler, 2006; 
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Richmond, 2011 and 2012; Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). Here we may 
broadly identify two strands of literature that touch on empowerment and 
ownership. On the one hand, there is the literature on conflict resolution, which 
tends to emphasise the relevance of participatory processes in order to ensure 
peace from below alongside the more formal and diplomatic channels of peace 
negotiations (Lederach, 1997 and 2003; Ramsbotham et al., 2007; Papagianni, 
2008). The logic behind this is that the way the process is designed affects the 
legitimacy and long-term aspects of peace which include manifold dimensions 
such as justice, reconciliation, or more generally, cultural peacebuilding 
(Ramsbotham et al., 2007). On the other hand, there is a strand of literature 
that addresses the limitations of the liberal peace project. This critical body of 
literature may be further divided according to the types of critiques they raise, 
and which, according to Chandler (2011), would be the ‘ideas-based’ critiques 
and the ‘power-based’ critiques. The first group includes more conservative 
critiques, predominant in International Relations, linked to the problem of the 
universalising assumptions of the liberal policy discourse and the mechanisms 
used for statebuilding and peacebuilding policies (e.g., Paris, 2004). 
Conversely, the ‘power-based critiques’ include many scholars engaged in 
Peace and Conflict Studies and take into account the problem of power in the 
analysis of peacebuilding. Here, the critiques vary from structural neo-Marxist 
expressions (Cramer, 2006) to Foucauldian approaches (Duffield, 2001 and 
2006), to approaches driven by Critical Theory (Pugh et al., 2011) and 
emancipatory concerns (Richmond, 2005 and 2011). 
These ‘power-based’ approaches are particularly important in this thesis as one 
of the central problems discussed in the following pages is precisely the need to 
reflect on power and power dynamics when discussing empowerment as a 
concept and, especially, in policy making and practice. It is also within this 
strand that we find the literature on hybridity and the everyday in peacebuilding 
(Brown et al., 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Mac Ginty and 
Richmond, 2013), which offers an important platform for the analysis of 
empowerment as it allows for the exploration of the micro levels of analysis — 
something usually ignored in the more traditional literature of International 
Relations. In this regard, this thesis’ contribution to the literature in Peace and 
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Conflict Studies lies precisely in the further exploration of certain aspects 
present in the ‘power-based’ critiques, in particular by exploring local power 
dynamics, while making a bridge with the more detailed literature on 
empowerment that exists in the field of Development studies. 
CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
According to Phillips and Pugh (1994: 61-62, quoted in Silverman and Marvasti, 
2008: 93), originality can mean “making a synthesis that hasn’t been made 
before; using already known material but with a new interpretation, bringing new 
evidence to bear on an old issue (and) adding to knowledge in a way that hasn’t 
been done before”. Taking this into account, this thesis’ value added (Dunleavy, 
2003: 31) is twofold. First, the thesis contributes to the existing literature on 
empowerment. In this regard, it bridges the existing literature in Development 
Studies with parallel debates in Peace Studies, therefore, contributing to the 
expansion of the debate in the latter field. Also, different from the dominant 
literature in Development, this thesis not only assesses empowerment as the 
(expected) output of a specific policy, but it traces a parallel between how the 
policy is formulated, including what are the assumptions underlying the policy 
rationale of empowerment, and the policy implementation and effectiveness on 
the ground. In this regard, it blends the analysis of the policy discourse — and 
the extent to which this incorporates general assumptions on empowerment — 
with analysis of the policy operationalisation at the local level. By doing this, the 
thesis also rescues the political aspect of empowerment, distancing itself from 
the mainstream technical approaches to the topic, as discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2. These aspects are captured in the proposed framework of analysis 
developed in Chapter 2 and which incorporates aspects that are under-
problematised in the literature on empowerment, notably, the consideration of 
combined multiple levels of analysis, a dialectical perspective of power, and a 
strong focus on actors’ subjectivities. In the case study, these aspects are 
further analysed taking into account the historical context that led to the policy 
creation and which also explains part of the limitations of its implementation. 
Second, the thesis contributes to the understanding of the initiative examined in 
the case study by presenting a large amount of new data on a topic that has 
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been widely referred to in Mozambique but on which very little reliable data is 
available (see discussion on methodology, below). Indeed, there are only a few 
studies that provide an in-depth and thorough analysis of the functioning of the 
‘7 million’ (Forquilha, 2010; Orre and Forquilha, 2012), and they are, as a rule, 
restricted to specific districts and refer to the initial years of the policy. Also, and 
even though the government is presented with trimestral reports from the local 
levels, more comprehensive and critical national in-depth studies on the matter 
are also lacking. In spite of this, the policy has been widely publicised, 
nationally and internationally, as a major success. This study, therefore, is an 
important instrument of verification of this discourse. Moreover, because the 
case study is placed within the broader context of state reforms that followed 
peace in Mozambique, it also contributes to the long-term assessment of peace 
itself and its (potential) empowering effects in the lives of the ordinary 
Mozambicans. 
According to O’Leary (2004: 116), while a case study may not be generalisable, 
it can still contribute to knowledge by bringing new variables into light, as well 
as be used, at a later stage, collectively with other cases to form the basis of a 
theory. On this, the narrow scope of this project and the selection of a 
circumscribed case study, while not allowing for generalisations, provide the 
opportunity to draw some lessons that may be transferable to other cases 
where similar policies take place. In this regard, the use of the empowerment 
framework developed in Chapter 2 in the analysis of the case study is expected 
to highlight the role that specific variables play in the understanding of 
empowerment as a general phenomenon. As experiments with local councils — 
which are at the core of the ‘7 million’ functioning — also take place in other 
African countries, the case study may also contribute to the general 
assessment of parallel initiatives in similar contexts of post-war governance 
reforms. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The thesis responds to the following research questions: 
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1. Considering its empowering ambition and the current Mozambican 
political and economic context, how aligned with local conditions is 
the ‘7 million’ initiative? 
2. What are the effects of the ‘7 million’ on rural people’s 
empowerment? 
3. What lessons can be drawn from the case study that could contribute 
to the theoretical literature on empowerment and better policy 
planning for empowerment promotion? 
The argument developed in the thesis is that, even though the ‘7 million’ had 
some positive aspects – including providing a discourse that underlines the 
relevance of the districts and the local community in matters of governance – its 
effects in promoting local empowerment have been far below its potential and, 
at times, even counter-productive. One of the reasons for this is to be found in 
the dynamics of power-to and power-over that take place at the local level and 
that, to a certain extent, reflect structural aspects linked to state formation in 
Mozambique and the power dynamics that take place at the 
national/governmental level. In consequence, existing power dynamics at the 
local level are often reinforced by the ‘7 million’ initiative instead of contributing 
to their change. These poor results also reflect the misalignment between some 
basic assumptions about the empowering potential of the policy and the way 
power dynamics actually operate at the local level. This misalignment, in turn, 
also reflects power dynamics that take place in the upper levels of the policy 
spectrum and that reveals important conflicts of interest regarding what the ‘7 
million’ should be. More generally, the ‘7 million’ does not address the actual 
sources of local disempowerment, focusing instead on small scale issues that 
cannot compensate for the bigger structural problems that cause 
disempowerment in the districts in the first place. Bringing the case into the 
wider context, the implementation of ‘7 million’ points towards the contradictions 
in promoting ‘bottom-up’ empowerment from the ‘top-down’. This, in turn, 
reflects the limitations of social engineering attempts at social transformation 
that are not demand-driven. 
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1.2 Epistemological Perspective  
This thesis’ epistemological perspective is fundamentally critical and relies 
largely on the sociological perspective of Pierre Bourdieu and Critical Theory 
also taking into account insights from Historical Materialism and other post-
Marxist writings. 
As a starting point, the thesis embraces a strong concern with historical patterns 
and their effect in present developments. The logic of dialectics is particularly 
relevant to the extent that it highlights the contradictory aspects of historical 
processes instead of accepting a supposed linearity towards progress 
(Sztompka, 1993). The role of tensions inherent in the system and the idea that 
opposite aspects of phenomena coexist (Holloway, 2010), instead of rejecting 
each other, is particularly explored in the analysis of power and empowerment 
as well as in the discussion of the state reforms that followed the Peace 
Accords in Mozambique, and it helps us understand part of the difficulties of 
promoting change in post-war contexts. Yet, it should be noted that this thesis 
does not share the Hegelian perspective of dialectics pointing towards an 
ultimate telos, or a final stage of evolution (Sztompka, 1993). Although there is 
a concern here with mechanisms for change and means of social improvement 
towards human betterment (or emancipatory concerns), I disagree that this is 
an inevitable path. Instead, any improvement is here assumed as contingent on 
historical circumstances and human action that is, in turn, contingent on the 
way agency and structure interact. 
In Critical Theory, the weight attributed to agency and structure in the 
explanation of events often varies. On the one hand, following Marx, Critical 
Theory stresses that “society is the product of the activities of its members” 
(Stirk, 2000: 35). At the same time, it recognises several constraints to action, 
some of which are not clearly identified by agents, making it difficult for deeper 
changes to occur. It is relevant, in this context, to uncover the mechanisms that 
make individuals adapt to their roles in the system and bring them to light and 
criticism instead of accepting them as ‘natural’ (ibid.; Horkheimer, 1937). This 
logic is related to the normative drive of Critical Theory which is the struggle for 
emancipation (ibid.; Bauman, 2000; Booth, 2007) and the need to overcome 
‘false consciousness’. 
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In a similar vein, according to Bourdieu, the task of sociology should be to 
unveil hidden dimensions of power relations that perpetuate patterns of 
domination. In the words of Swartz (1997: 10), “Since, according to Bourdieu, it 
is the misrecognition of those embedded interests that is the necessary 
condition for the exercise of power, he believes that their public exposure will 
destroy their legitimacy and open up the possibility for altering existing social 
arrangements”. What is notable in Bourdieu’s analysis is his attempt to bridge 
agency and structure pointing to their dialectical relationship (ibid.). As such, 
and even though he recognises that every human action is situated, he 
acknowledges the possibility of change in such a way as to reduce patterns of 
domination. More fundamentally, he reaches for the origins of the dominant 
structures that condition actors’ behaviours. His theory of practice, in this 
regard, reflects his effort to understand the dialectics of internalization of 
externality and of externalization of internality or, as he also refers to, the 
processes of incorporation and objectification (Bourdieu, 1977: 72). 
Bourdieu’s (1977: 72) concept of habitus captures this complex relationship 
between agency and structure. Accordingly, habitus is:  
. . . a system of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures 
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles of 
the generation and structuring of practices and representations which 
can be objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the 
product of obedience to rules, objectively adapted to their goals without 
presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the 
operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively 
orchestrated without being the product of the orchestrating action of a 
conductor. 
The concept of habitus reinforces the historical dimension of the constitution of 
social structures and, at the same time, because of Bourdieu’s concern with 
different arenas of social interaction, it is not reduced to the economic domain 
(capitalism), but it includes the concern with culture and symbolic interests 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 233). It is, therefore, flexible and comprehensive and may be 
used to understand different levels of analysis. This perspective is particularly 
important in order to comprehend empowerment dynamics, and, in particular, 
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how people in traditional societies react to empowerment promotion policies, 
which is at the core of this research. In fact, when it comes to empowerment, 
one of the big challenges for policy-makers is to grasp the symbolic dimension 
at play in local contexts and how this may interact with new power dynamics 
that are supposed to be created by these policies. As Bourdieu (1977: 167) 
says, “what is essential goes without saying because it comes without saying”, 
and that is where things such as informal social practices, local tradition, 
religion, and culture stand. Focusing on subjectivities, as this thesis does, 
means, therefore, making an effort to grasp what seems invisible at first sight 
but which may jeopardise specific policies because of the clashing of different 
values’ systems. 
The concept of habitus is, therefore, particularly relevant in order to understand 
empowerment, especially actors’ power subjectivities, since what agents 
consider ‘reasonable’ or ‘unreasonable’, or what Freire (1996) would call limit-
situations, stem from habitus (Swartz, 1997: 103). At the same time, while 
recognising the dimension of structures and their effects in shaping 
subjectivities, the concept of habitus distances itself from the idea of ‘false 
consciousness’, which by definition seals the opposition between ‘false’ and 
‘true’. Habitus is more flexible in this regard and contains the idea that all 
human action is situated, including academic research, another key aspect to 
this thesis. 
Indeed, this thesis has a critical stand towards positivism and has a strong 
concern with the subjective aspects of social practices. In line with several 
critical and post-modern approaches, this thesis rejects positivist claims that a 
value-free perspective is possible in the first place (Horkheimer, 1937; Stirk, 
2000; Delanty and Strydom, 2003; O’Leary, 2004; Grbich, 2007). Instead, it 
recognises the relevance of the context in which knowledge is produced, and 
how academic research is, in itself, a result and a source of power. Yet, while 
acknowledging that a value-free research is ultimately unattainable, the thesis 
does not embrace the rejection of the truth but assumes that any theoretical 
model will always only be able to grasp facets of the ‘truth’ and provide partial 
views of reality. At the same time, the thesis adopts a sceptical stance towards 
the attainability of the emancipatory project envisaged in Critical Theory — in 
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particular, its commitment to objectivity — and it acknowledges the problematic 
understanding of what emancipation entails, especially when it comes to 
academic research (see discussion in Chapter 2).  
Bourdieu’s attempt to bridge subjectivism and objectivism is, therefore, key in 
the analysis presented here. As noted by Bourdieu (1987), focusing only on 
individuals’ accounts may be misleading to understand reality as it fails to grasp 
the patterns of hierarchy that shape peoples’ ways of thinking, which means 
that human action is situated and has to be understood as such. At the same 
time, however, because structures are constantly reified by agents’ behaviour, it 
is fundamental to understand the way they think in order to observe where the 
possibility of change may lie. He stresses, therefore, the dialectical relationship 
between objectivism and subjectivism (Bourdieu, 1987: 232) and the need to 
understand both the subjective aspects underlying actors’ behaviour as well as 
the context that influences their thoughts and actions. 
Linked to that is Bourdieu’s concern with the relational method, which means 
paying attention to what is invisible at first sight, and the location or positioning 
of actors in a specific context, that is where they stand in relation to others. 
When it comes to power, this alerts us to the fact that very often, what is behind 
people’s behaviours is not directly visible because it is the result of a matrix of 
positions in a specific field. However, if we want to understand choices, we 
need to grasp this matrix and the way to do this is by understanding the 
relationship between the material and the symbolic dimensions of social life 
(Bourdieu, 1987: 233-234; Swartz, 1997: 65).  
Different from analytical schemes that assume individuals as rational actors, 
Bourdieu uses the concept of “strategy” as a central aspect in order to 
understand agents’ behaviour. Strategy is used as a means to emphasise the 
role of everyday practices. Whereas he acknowledges that every action is 
interest-oriented, Bourdieu rejects the idea of rational calculation as a driver for 
actions. Instead, he posits that most choices occur from “practical dispositions 
that incorporate ambiguities and uncertainties that emerge from acting through 
time and space” (Swartz, 1997: 100). There is a concern, therefore, with 
“practical knowledge” (see also Giddens, 1979), which is intimately related to 
habitus, or “history turned into nature” (Bourdieu, 1977: 78). In other words, 
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actors act based on previous experiences making rather intuitive estimates of 
their chances of success based on these reiterated practices, which, in turn, 
tend to reinforce habitus itself. In Bourdieu words, “The habitus is the 
universalizing mediation which causes an individual agent’s practices, without 
either explicit reason or significant intent, to be nonetheless ‘sensible’ and 
‘reasonable’” (Bourdieu, 1977: 79). 
This interpretation helps us understand why specific structural social patterns 
tend to endure in time. To a certain extent, the idea of habitus resemble post-
Marxist discourses on hegemony and active consensus (Gramsci, 1971; 
Mouffe, 1979; Holub, 1992); however, it goes beyond it as it extends the 
problem of domination to the internal level of individuals, therefore, 
transcending the idea that consciousness is the tool to overcome domination 
(Hernandez, 2012). It is because of this acknowledgement that Bourdieu also 
engages in an extensive discussion regarding the ethical aspects of academic 
research and its practical limitations in terms of producing a totally unbiased 
knowledge. 
Indeed, according to Bourdieu, a reflexive practice is imperative in order for an 
academic to produce good science (Swartz, 1997: 271-274). A reflexive 
practice means that the researcher needs to be constantly aware of three major 
biases while conducting research: first, she needs to control the values and 
practices that she brings from her social background to the object of inquiry; 
second, she needs to be aware of her field location, that is the position that the 
researcher holds in her specific field of production; third, she needs to 
constantly examine her epistemological and social conditions in order to assess 
her ability to make scientific claims.  For Bourdieu, a reflexive practice will not 
fully eliminate the problem of bias, nevertheless, it may largely reduce the bias 
as the researcher is placed under critical analysis as much as the object of 
research (ibid.). 
In its original project, this research was fundamentally based on an 
emancipatory perspective of science based on Critical Theory. The change in 
the epistemological perspective was the result of a series of reflections during 
the main fieldwork in 2012, which forced me to confront several of my own 
biases and realise that by sticking to the previous epistemological framework I 
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would eventually distort the data by trapping the policy under analysis and the 
data gathered in a dichotomic emancipatory/oppressive classification. As I 
progressively reconsidered my stand and tried to understand the positioning of 
the different types of actors, it became clear that the power dynamics I was 
observing were far more complex than I had anticipated. As discussed below, 
as much as possible, I tried to minimise the perceived biases by working with 
different actors and using different material in the analysis of the case study. 
1.3 Methodology 
This thesis is based on a case study. According to Yin (2003: 9), a case study 
strategy is suitable when “a ‘how’ or ‘why’ question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control”. 
A case study is, accordingly, an empirical inquiry that “investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real–life context, especially, when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly identified” (ibid.: 
13). 
The main purpose of the thesis is to provide new insights into the concept of 
empowerment and how it is operationalized in the context of policy 
implementation. In addition, empowerment is also used as an analytical tool — 
not only as a policy objective — in order to explore the different power 
dynamics observable within this process as well as the actors’ subjectivities and 
how they affect policy implementation and its potential for social change. The 
choice of Mozambique and the ‘7 million’, therefore, provides the context in 
which these analytical aspects are examined. Because the thesis is concerned 
with depth and aims to uncover subjective aspects that are not measurable 
through quantitative analysis, a case study approach focusing on a qualitative 
analysis presents itself as the most suitable research strategy. 
Case studies may serve different purposes in terms of contribution to 
knowledge. This research offers an instrumental case study, which means that 
“a case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to revise a 
generalisation. Although the case selected is studied in depth, the main focus is 
on something else” (Stake, 2000: 436-7, quoted in Silverman and Marvasti, 
2008: 164). In this regard, the focus is the contribution to the discussion of 
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empowerment as an analytical tool as well as to the exploration of the long-term 
effects of peace in Mozambique. 
This case study is based on two main analytical tools. First, it relies on 
document analysis taking into account the existing regulation on the ‘7 million’ 
as well as the official reports available on the subject. The objective here is to 
understand the empowering assumptions behind the initiative as well as the 
several changes that have taken place since its inception. Other non-official 
documents are also used as complementary material in the assessment of the 
initiative (see below). Second, and more fundamentally, the research is based 
on a critical ethnography (O’Leary, 2004; Grbich, 2007: 46-47). According to 
O’Leary (2004: 144), an ethnography can be described as “the exploration of 
cultural groups in a bid to understand, describe and interpret a way of life from 
the point of view of its participants”. A critical ethnography “adds a political 
agenda of exposing inequitable, unjust, or repressive influences that are acting 
on ‘marginalized’ cultural groups, in a bid to open up alternate, more liberating 
possibilities. Critical ethnography works towards conscientization, 
empowerment, and liberation of the ‘marginalized’ through in-depth critical 
analysis of underlying social fabrics” (O’Leary, 2004: 144). 
As O’Leary (2004: 145-6) has stated: 
Critical ethnography explores and critiques existing systems in a bid to 
serve the interests of the ‘marginalized’ groups. There is thus an 
assumption that the dominant or existing system is indeed repressive or 
unjust, and needs to be exposed in order to open up possibilities for 
change. Critical ethnography attempts to expose the political nature of 
knowledge and unmask the dominant forces that shape our view of the 
world. By critical examination of worldviews, ideology and power, critical 
ethnography attempts to contextualize the current situation in a larger 
socio-historic framework that offers, and encourages others to engage in, 
critical reflection. 
One of the drivers of this research is precisely to understand the dynamics of 
power embedded in the ‘7 million’ and how they affected its empowering 
potential regarding the ordinary Mozambicans at the end of this chain — that is, 
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those who are the official targets of these policies, the very poor in the rural 
areas. The research is, therefore, based on the assumption that this situation of 
exclusion and social asymmetry exists and has been produced historically. 
Nevertheless, the position here taken is that the idea of conscientisation should 
be analysed carefully. As noted in the previous section, opposing this concept 
to the idea of false consciousness limits the scope of the analysis of 
empowerment as it traps the discussion into a dichotomic view that does not 
explain power dynamics in a satisfactory way. Therefore, by using the term 
‘critical’ here, I retain the concern with the unveiling of power dynamics that 
influence behaviours but that does not entail the assumption that a ‘solution’ 
exists that may fully lead to a state of emancipation. Instead, conscientisation 
may instead be equated to the constant development of critical awareness — or 
the increased capacity to question one’s position in society (or the habitus) and 
her/his ability to change things (see Chapter 2). This dimension is explored in 
the analysis of the ‘7 million’ by taking into account the views of the different 
types of participants regarding the power dynamics embedded in the initiative 
and its implementation. 
UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
One of the crucial issues in the design of a case study is the definition of the 
unit of analysis. One of the main purposes of this research is precisely to 
understand empowerment through multiple levels of analysis. In this regard, on 
the one hand, the thesis discusses several processes that take place at the 
national level including the ‘7 million’ policy formulation. On the other hand, in 
order to explore policy implementation, the research focuses on the district 
level, which is, here, the representation of the local. In the thesis, Chapters 3, 4, 
and 5 focus predominantly on the national level, namely the central government 
level, as they explore the historical context that sets the stage for the ‘7 million’ 
as well as the domain of policy formulation. While focusing on the national level, 
these chapters also consider the influence of international factors. Chapters 4 
and 5 also descend to the provincial level, which may be perceived as an 
intermediary level between the national and the local. Chapter 6 explores policy 
implementation at the local level in detail. 
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Making sense of the ‘local’ 
For the purpose of this thesis, the local level refers to the district and all that is 
comprised under the district administration authority, including the district sub-
units (administrative posts or APs, localities, and villages) as well as its 
communities. Whereas it is common in current approaches to peacebuilding to 
oppose the local to the external (e.g., Manning, 2003; Donais, 2012; Mac Ginty 
and Richmond, 2013), making the former sound often homogeneous, by taking 
the district as the local level of analysis and by considering its sub-units and 
actors, I am taking a stand that highlights, instead, the differences within this 
unit. As such, whereas the level of analysis is ‘local’, this thesis considers the 
existence of a plurality of often very different local actors. This emphasis on 
heterogeneity derives from one of the drivers of this research, which is precisely 
to acknowledge the power dynamics within each level of analysis, which, in 
Mozambique (as generally in Africa), are influenced by a mix of formal and 
informal sources of authority (see Chapter 6; Manning, 2002; Boone, 2003) as 
well as different aspects related to the predominant local culture. 
Figure 1.1: Administrative Structure of the District 
 
In terms of formal administration, each district in Mozambique has four echelons 
of territorial organization as shown in Figure 1.1.  Each of these echelons has a 
formal government chief, namely the chief of the administrative posts (APs), the 
chief of the locality, and the chief of the village. It should be noted that, even 
though the villages (povoações) were established as legal territorial 
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administrative echelons in 2003 (Rep. Moz., Law 8/2003), the rules regarding 
their governance (in particular, their formal administrative chiefs) were not 
defined until 2012. Instead, all through these years, the villages were informally 
governed by local community authorities.2 Only in 2012 was a law approved 
(11/2012) which determined that the chiefs of the villages were to be 
designated by the provincial government, thus, centralising this level of 
governance in a similar way to the localities, the APs, and the district 
administration (Nuvunga, 2013: 44; see also Chapter 5). 
The issue of tradition in the Mozambican context is extremely complex and has 
led to a polarised debate between those who perceive tradition in a 
‘romanticised way’ — something that preceded colonialism — and those who 
perceive it as something that was distorted by colonialism — thus not the 
original representation of local culture (Weimer, 1999: 3-4; Buur et al., 2007: 
11). The debate was further polarised after the Decree 15/2000, which blurred 
the distinction between traditional leaders (those that existed before 
colonialism) and leaders that were created during colonialism (e.g., the régulos) 
or during the first years of Frelimo’s rule after independence (e.g., the 
secretários de bairro, originally created within the Frelimo dynamising groups) 
(Araújo, 2010: 8; Nuvunga, 2013: 44). If we think purely in terms of tradition, in 
the case of the Makua people — the predominant ethnic group in Nampula 
province — key social power figures are the Mwene (who is the highest male 
authority) and the Apwyiamwene (the most important woman in the village, who 
exerts the important role of counsellor) (Martínez, 2009: 61-65). Yet, when it 
comes to governance matters, we find that the régulos play a fundamental 
(perhaps predominant) role, which means that, even though these authorities 
were framed together in the legislation as ‘community authorities’, in practice, 
their origins and functions differ. 
                                            
2 According to Decree 15/2000, approved by the Council of Ministers, and which 
introduced the term ‘community authorities’, these would include, among others the 
régulos (see Chapter 3 for the origins of these actors), the secretários de bairro 
(neighbourhood secretaries), and a series of other ‘traditional authorities’ such as 
mambos and fumos. Chapter 5 discusses this issue further. 
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The way these different sources of authority interact and affect local behaviours 
is difficult to capture and would require a different kind of research than the one 
presented here, most probably one based on a long-term ethnography at the 
level of the village. For the purpose of this thesis, and considering its specific 
focus on the ‘7 million’ and the concern with a multilevel analysis, I only 
consider here those actors formally included in the policy’s regulation. In this 
regard, it should be noted that the local councils, a fundamental pillar of the ‘7 
million’, should by definition include at least 40% membership of ‘community 
authorities’ (Rep. Moz., MAE/MPD, 2009), but, as discussed in Chapter 6, there 
are several other factors beyond tradition that influence this process. As such, I 
did not define a priori which kinds of ‘community authorities’ to interview. 
Instead, my sample took into account whoever was a member of the local 
councils (see Access and Sampling, below). 
THE SELECTION OF THE DISTRICT OF ANGOCHE 
Mozambique has a total of 128 districts3 and 43 municipalities distributed within 
11 provinces. The criteria for selection of the district for this research was based 
on the history of the ‘7 million’ discussed in detail in Chapter 5. First, I selected 
the province of Nampula due to its history of experiments with decentralised 
planning that have taken place since the early 1990s. Second, I took into 
account the districts where some of these earlier experiments had been tested, 
in particular, during the implementation of the Nampula Local Development 
Programme led by the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and 
which included the creation of the first district consultative councils. These were 
the districts of Mecubúri, Malema, and Angoche. Initially, my project 
contemplated the comparative study of the districts of Mecubúri (in the interior) 
and Angoche (in the coast). Later, taking into account the limited resources 
available for the fieldwork, the suggestions of the examiners during my PhD 
transfer, and the contacts that I had established in Nampula and which tailored 
                                            
3 In 2013, a new law was passed creating 13 new districts and transforming all 
provincial capitals in districts. As such, the total number of districts existing at the time 
of writing is 151 (AIM, 21 Mar. 2013). This number is, nevertheless, not contemplated 
in the research, as the fieldwork took place before this change. 
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my accessibility to the districts, I decided to concentrate my efforts in Angoche 
only. By selecting a district that had a history of participatory planning several 
years before the ‘7 million’, in a province considered a successful example of 
participatory governance, I assumed that the chances of success of the ‘7 
million’ would be higher and its empowering effects more visible than in other 
provinces/districts. 
Figure 1.2: Nampula Province and its Districts 
 
Source: on the left, based on map by the United Nations Cartographic Section; on the 
right, map available at ECIAfrica, 2004, p. 3. Selection added. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
This research relies on a variety of primary data which include a series of 
documents from official and non-official sources related to the ‘7 million’ as well 
as information obtained in interviews and focus groups conducted during the 
fieldwork. 
The documents used in the analysis include: 
• The legislation, presidential discourses, and intra-ministerial documents 
related to the ‘7 million’ and the functioning of the local councils. Some of 
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these documents are available online on the Government of 
Mozambique’s website and related Ministries. Others were obtained 
during the fieldwork directly from the interviewees. They are listed in 
Chapter 5 in the section that discusses the initiative and its 
empowerment rationale. 
• Reports prepared by civil society organisations (CSOs), development 
agencies, and consultancy firms. These were taken into account in the 
assessment of the ‘7 million’ and its history. Some of these were 
obtained online, while others were gathered through contacts established 
during the fieldwork. The academic institution Centro de Estudos da 
Democracia e Desenvolvimento (Democracy and Development Studies 
Centre, CEDE) had some short briefings of field visits related to a 
monitoring project of ‘7 million’ projects in selected districts (including 
Angoche), which I photocopied and used as supporting evidence along 
with my findings. The briefings regarding other districts were used in the 
final assessment of the initiative in the last chapter. 
• Press articles were used in order to discuss selected topics. For the 
purpose of this research I did not make a detailed analysis of all the 
articles available in the press about the ‘7 million’. This could constitute 
the topic of another thesis as press reports on the matter abound and 
include both supportive as well as critical opinions. An extensive 
selection of articles on the matter were reviewed before the fieldwork and 
the final project design in order to provide a general understanding of 
how the theme had been discussed in Mozambique. Because of the 
ethnographic character of this thesis, however, and the large amount of 
primary data obtained, I decided to leave aside an in-depth analysis of 
the press using news articles mostly as a complementary source in 
specific instances. 
• District documents regarding the implementation and evaluation of the ‘7 
million’ and local councils, obtained directly in the Angoche District 
Administration. These included several Excel sheets with data related to 
the amount of money disbursed per projects, lists of distribution of the ‘7 
million’ per district sub-units, as well as Word documents containing lists 
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of members of local councils, reports regarding these bodies’ 
reconstitution, and assessment of some projects funded by the ‘7 million’. 
As will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, the quantitative data obtained in the 
central and district governments, while referred to in the analysis, were not 
considered reliable due to the problems of definition of variables and the 
mechanisms of data collection. In fact, the qualitative analysis undertaken in 
this research helps reveal the limitations behind the evaluations available on the 
topic by deconstructing the process that led to the development of this data in 
the first place. 
THE FIELDWORK 
For the purpose of this research, I went to Mozambique three times. In August 
2010, I conducted a two-week pilot trip in order to establish contacts (both in 
Maputo as well as in Nampula), assess the costs and feasibility of the fieldwork, 
assess the relevance of the topic in question, and verify any other studies on 
the subject taking place at the time. The main fieldwork took place between 19 
March and 18 June 2012, when I spent one month in Maputo, two weeks in 
Nampula city, and 6 weeks in the district of Angoche. During this period, I also 
had the chance to go to the district of Moma, also in Nampula province, where I 
conducted additional focus groups and interviews with people from Moma and 
Mogovolas districts in order to have a comparative view of the functioning of the 
local councils and the ‘7 million’. Finally, thanks to the opportunity linked to a 
Marie Curie scholarship,4 I went back to Mozambique in April 2013 for a month. 
This last trip was not initially envisaged in the project; however, it gave me the 
opportunity to undertake additional interviews and present my preliminary 
research results and discuss them with some of the participants, including civil 
servants in Maputo, civil society organisations and civil servants in Nampula, as 
well as some members of the technical commission of the district administration 
in Angoche. This process was particularly important in order to validate my 
results and confirm my previous findings. 
                                            
4 The scholarship was part of the European Union 7th Framework and the SPBUILD 
Network. 
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Following customary practices in Mozambique, and in order to ensure my ability 
to conduct the research in the district, I opted to start my fieldwork from the top-
down and then move back to the top. Thanks to the invaluable help of a friend, 
the first person I met in Maputo in 2012 was the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs 
who linked me directly with the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Planning and 
Development and the previous vice-Minister of Planning and Finance. Before 
heading to Nampula, I had the opportunity to interview the Minister of Planning 
and Development, Aiuba Cuereneia, who presented me with the official view of 
the ‘7 million’ and gave me a collection of basic documents related to the latter 
published in 2009. I also conducted additional interviews in the Ministry of 
Development and Planning with actors who were engaged in the very early 
stages of the policy formulation. 
Once in Nampula, backed by these first encounters, I divided my research 
strategy into two. First, I interviewed several civil servants in the provincial 
government, some of whom had been engaged in the first experiments of 
participatory practices in the province, including the above-mentioned UNCDF 
project. Second, I connected with several members of CSOs that worked with 
different projects in the districts. My connection with CSOs in Nampula was 
fundamental in facilitating my research in the district. 
After reading my research summary, the director of a local NGO called 
Akilizetho ADS,5 Pedro Carvalho, offered this NGO’s institutional support during 
my stay in the province. The work of Akilizetho is well known in Nampula, in 
particular, due to their political impartiality and active engagement on issues of 
local governance. Overall, Akilizetho’s work consists on promoting local 
development and training local communities in activities that include 
participatory practices in the domain of local governance. Since the early 
2000s, they have taken over work initially driven by the Dutch NGO SNV6 which 
                                            
5  ADS stands for Associação para Desenvolvimento Sustentável (Association for 
Sustainable Development). 
6  SNV stands for Stichting Nederlandse Vrijwilligers (Foundation of Netherlands 
Volunteers), as established in 1965. Since 1993 its official name is SNV Netherlands 
Development Organisation. 
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involved helping with the creation of the so-called local development 
committees (LDCs)7 and fora, which represent the best expression of a local 
civil society in the rural areas in Nampula. While doing so, they also worked in 
partnership with several district governments offering capacity development 
workshops to the local councils in selected locations.  
Akilizetho’s partnership was crucial to the completion of my research. It was 
through one of their employees in Angoche that I was formally introduced in the 
district administration. This medium of introduction was important, as local 
authorities request credentials from researchers before consenting to their 
activities in the villages. As Akilizetho had worked with the district government 
on several occasions, and I was going to have the direct help of its local 
employee, local authorities felt more comfortable with the idea of having a 
stranger conducting research in the district. 
The top-down character of this process and the need to respect certain scales 
of authority in the district should not be underestimated. On more than one 
occasion, when I presented my introduction letter from Bradford University and 
the NGO credentials, they practically ignored the former. In fact, had I not 
obtained the institutional support from Akilizetho, I would have needed a letter 
from the provincial government before being able to start any fieldwork activity. 
Having the chance of being linked with an NGO had several advantages 
compared to the other option not least of which was detaching my image from 
any political project. At the same time, because Akilizetho is well known and 
positively perceived in the communities, this also facilitated my ability to gain 
trust from the participants. 
At the same time, aware that this would constitute a bias in my fieldwork, I also 
took several steps in order to minimise this problem. First, I worked with 
different partners in the district besides Akilizetho. Second, as Akilizetho only 
works in selected locations of the district, I ensured I was able to visit those 
places where the NGO was not present and, therefore, where local actors were 
not familiar with its work. 
                                            
7 In Portuguese, Comitês de Desenvolvimento Local (CDL). 
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Regarding other partners, in 2012, I also relied on the collaboration of a local 
employee from CEDE (see above). Having worked with CEDE for several 
years, this person was also very knowledgeable about the ‘7 million’ and knew 
many beneficiaries and their projects. In 2013, I further relied on a third kind of 
collaboration. As my previous partner at Akilizetho was not in the district at the 
time of my fieldwork, she provided another connection to a trusted colleague of 
hers. This colleague was originally from Angoche, but, as a reformed ex-soldier, 
he had left the country in the early 1990s having returned at the time of my 
fieldwork. He was less familiar with the ‘7 million’, but knowledgeable of the 
region. 
In summary, these different collaborations were important in order to minimise 
any bias related to my formal link with Akilizetho. Also, as each of these 
individuals had a very different background, they also helped me see the ‘7 
million’ from a different angle contributing, therefore, to my ability to constantly 
question my initial views of the findings and my understanding of local 
subjectivities. Finally, even though I relied on collaborators in several instances, 
in particular when it came to convening focus groups, on many occasions, I also 
worked on my own in the district, in particular, while interviewing members of 
the district government and members of the local council at the district level but 
also while interviewing some beneficiaries (as long as they spoke Portuguese). 
Access and Sampling 
Taking into account the multilevel dimensions of this research and the 
understanding that the ‘local’ is also heterogeneous, the activities in the district 
aimed to cover all types of actors involved in the implementation of the ‘7 
million’ and which included the District Administrator, all members of the District 
Technical Commission (the body in charge of assisting the local councils and 
monitoring the policy), members of the local councils, direct beneficiaries of the 
‘7 million’ (those who obtained the loan), members of the community (indirect 
beneficiaries), and individuals who tried but did not obtain the loan. 
The guiding principle for sampling regarding the beneficiaries, members of the 
local councils, and communities was the district’s geography. Angoche is one of 
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the 18 districts of Nampula province.8 It had a population of 276,471 people in 
2007, as of the last census (INE database, access 1 July 2014),9 that is 6.9% of 
the total population of Nampula province,10 which makes it one of its most 
populous districts. The district is divided in four APs and 14 localities, which, in 
turn, contain over 45 villages. 
 














Sangage Catamoio Muchepua Mepapata 
Mutucuti Ciretene Naiculo Gelo 
  Napruma  
  Parta  
Note: in italics, the localities that I was able to reach. 
As much as possible, I tried to cover the four APs. Despite several access 
limitations (the distances between each AP are very long, the roads available 
are mostly in bad conditions, public transport is scarce and does not cover all 
the district, and renting a vehicle is extremely expensive), I was able to reach at 
least some villages of each AP as well as each AP administrative office 
location. Figure 1.3 shows the amount of activities per AP and number of 
locations visited. 
The discrepancy in the number of activities per locality is justified by the 
limitations mentioned above. Besides, as visible in the map, Boila-Nametoria is 
                                            
8 Angoche also contains a municipality that shares territory with the AP of Angoche 
Sede. 
9 As of 2012, the estimated population was 311,241 people. 
10 This is not taking into account the three new districts created in Nampula in 2013. 
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also the biggest AP and has the largest population of the district, therefore, the 
larger number of activities in this area. 
The access limitations highlighted also affected my ability to pre-schedule the 
interviews and focus groups. Indeed, I was only able to do that in the locations 
that I accessed mediated by my local partner from Akilizetho, mostly in the APs 
of Nametoria and Aúbe and, on one occasion, in the AP of Namaponda, thanks 
to my partner from CEDE. In other cases, activities were carried on ad hoc, 
reaching the communities directly and inviting people to talk as well as asking 
about members of the LCs and beneficiaries of the ‘7 million’ and how to locate 
them. In each AP, before I was able to conduct research, I had first to reach 
and obtain the authorisation of its respective chief. Once I had crossed this 
boundary, people were usually extremely open to talk and receptive. 
Figure 1.3: Angoche District, Overview of Fieldwork Activities 
 
Source: Map obtained in the district administration. Boxes with activities added by the 
author. ‘LC’= local council; FGs= focus groups. 
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As much as possible, I conducted separate focus groups for women and men. 
This was based on the fact that, in the rural areas, women tend not to speak as 
much in front of men. At times, due to distance and time factors, I had to work 
with mixed groups, but when this happened, I always took time at the end to 
speak exclusively with women and offer space for additional comments and 
questions. Also, as much as possible, I tried to balance gender representation 
in all activities. This was easier in the case of the focus groups and much less 
so in the case of the beneficiaries — not least of all because only a small 
number are women. 
Table 1.2 details all activities conducted during the fieldwork per type of actor, 
including at the central government and provincial level, as well as the activities 
conducted in the district of Moma. In total, the thesis relies on 23 focus groups 
(those with the community had between 5 to 15 people each; those with 
beneficiaries and local council members varied between 3 and 17 participants), 
58 interviews,11 and one non-participant observation. 
Research Methods 
The research methods used in the fieldwork were mainly semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups. These were used due to the qualitative approach 
of this research and its aim to understand the subjective aspect of 
empowerment, i.e., how people perceive their own power and how they 
perceive the benefits of the ‘7 million’ and of the local councils. Focus groups 
were used mostly with the communities in order to grasp the collective 
perspective on empowerment related to the ‘7 million’.  
  
                                            
11  I am considering activities with two participants as interviews; such interviews 
happened three times. 
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Table 1.2: Fieldwork Activities per Type of Actor12 




(Maputo) 8  9 
UNDP advisors 2  2 
Nampula Provincial 
Government 7  7 
Angoche District 
Government 8  9 
NGOs/Civil Society 
members 10  10 
People from the 
community 
(Angoche) 
 12 128 
Women   62 
Men   66 
Beneficiaries 
(Angoche)* 10 8 23 
Members of local 
councils 
(Angoche) 
6 7 21 
Women   6 




5  5 




2  2 
People from the 
community (other 
districts) 
 2 33 
Women  1 12 
Men  1 11 
* Note that 23 refer to 'beneficiaries' in terms of projects. The total number of 
individuals amounts to 39 because many were members of the same association and 
were interviewed in focus groups. 
** These authorities (chiefs of PA and localities, the district administrator) are also 
members of the LCs, but I am placing them in a separate category because of their 
formal link with the government. 
*** This does not include the several non-beneficiaries present in the community focus 
groups many of whom shared their stories of attempts to obtain the ‘7 million’. 
                                            
12 Note that some participants belonged to different categories of actors. For instance, 
some members of LCs were also beneficiaries. In this case, in one interview I covered 
both roles, therefore in the table these actors are place in both categories. 
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As noted by Flick (2006), while interviews offer depth, and are not embedded in 
the community hierarchical structure, enabling the interviewee to speak more 
freely, the focus groups offer the advantage of bringing part of the community 
together. In focus groups, opinions are open for ‘checks and balances’, and it 
can be easier to assess which elements are more consensual and which ones 
are not. In other words, if there is a ‘community’ understanding of 
empowerment, this is the place where it should be more evident. One 
disadvantage of focus groups is the reduced degree of control of the process 
and of the group hierarchies and power relations. It was bearing this in mind 
that I opted for the separation between men and women. 
Focus groups with the community ranged from between 5 to 15 participants. In 
the case of non-pre-scheduled focus groups, it sometimes happened that I 
started with 5 individuals and during the process others approached the group 
and participated or observed. This was inevitable as activities were generally 
conducted outdoors. When this took place, I took into account only the number 
of those who actually spoke and actively participated during the interaction time, 
that is, the number was lowered in order to keep the data validity. 
The adoption of semi-structured interviews took into account the possibility that 
new variables/topics could arise in the interactions that I had not previously 
considered. Since I was interested in local subjectivities and different 
perceptions of power, I used my initial interview schedules (previously approved 
by the Bradford University Ethics Committee) in order to retain the focus on the 
general subjects I intended to study and main variables related to the 
empowerment framework, but I also gave plenty of space to let new issues 
arise and also change/remove certain questions as I realised they did not fulfil 
the expected purpose. 
Besides interviews and focus groups, this research also took into account a 
non-participant observation of the Provincial Development Observatory in 
Nampula (see details in Chapter 4), which is a semestral meeting between the 
provincial government, the district administrators, and several members of civil 
society; and also relied on several field notes written on a regular basis during 
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my stay in Mozambique. The fieldwork diary was particularly important in order 
to keep the analysis on-going all through the process of data collection (see 
Silverman and Marvasti, 2008: 199). It also allowed me to take notes of 
interactions with participants that were not captured orally as well as to write 
down informal interactions, such as talks with people while taking public 
transport, which I also used in order to understand some community dynamics 
and subjectivities. Even though the field notes are not directly quoted in the 
thesis, they have informed the data analysis that followed the fieldwork. 
Unfortunately, because of calendar issues, I was not able to take part in any 
local council meetings. Usually, the ordinary meetings of the district consultative 
council (DCC) take place early in the year and again at the end around 
December (although there are extra-ordinary meetings as well). When I arrived 
in the district, the ‘7 million’ projects had already been approved, and most of 
the ‘7 million’ issues revolved around the disbursement of the money. Even 
though there were meetings at the district sub-levels, because of the distance 
and communication limitations, it was not possible for me to know about them in 
advance and attend them. I tried to compensate by interviewing several 
members of councils from different levels in order to get a broad picture of the 
process as well as all the members of the district Technical Commission, who 
often participate in these meetings at different levels. 
Local Language and Use of Interpreters 
Even though Mozambique is officially a Portuguese speaking country, and 
Portuguese is my mother tongue, at the very local level many people do not 
speak Portuguese but local languages. In Angoche district (as well as in 
Nampula province), the predominant language is Macua, except in Angoche 
Sede in the coast zone, where the dominant population is Coti. Therefore, in 
order to conduct the focus groups and some of the interviews with beneficiaries 
and members of the LCs I relied on the help of my partners (see above) who 
worked as interpreters. 
It should be noted that, in most focus groups at least some individuals spoke 
Portuguese, therefore, often, I had situations where the communication was 
mixed. As well, often the conversation in Macua used Portuguese words, which 
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allowed me to at least have an idea of how participants were responding before 
the translation. Mostly, however, I relied on the ability of the translators who 
were used to working as interpreters and were, therefore, familiar with the best 
way to translate certain concepts and words. 
This did not completely avoid certain limitations that are inherent to any 
translation process. Having taken part in several activities of Akilizetho, in their 
work with the LDCs, and speaking to several of their employees who worked as 
interpreters, I became aware of several difficulties they faced considering the 
different nature of and the different vocabulary existent in Portuguese and 
Macua. For instance, many words did not translate directly, so they had to 
rephrase the concept. As I became aware of this limitation I rephrased some of 
my original questions in order to make them easier to translate and more 
accessible to participants. 
Interpreters were not required in the case of all other interviews, including those 
with civil servants in general (in the district, province, and central government). 
In these cases, interviews were usually much longer, in some cases up to two 
hours, as the interviewees were willing to explore the details of their experience, 
and I was able to ask additional questions in order to clarify some of their 
answers. In some cases, I was also able to do a follow-up interview, although in 
this thesis I included follow-up interviews in the same reference, focusing on the 
actor instead of the number of encounters. 
DATA ANALYSIS 
The document analysis started long before the fieldwork although it was based 
initially on a limited number of documents. This first stage of analysis was more 
superficial and focused on learning the general history of the ‘7 million’ and its 
architecture. A new analysis of these and additional documents was carried out 
at a later stage after the fieldwork. At this stage, I focused on the details of the 
prescriptions regarding the functioning of the local councils and of the ‘7 million’ 
as well as with tracing the assumptions regarding empowerment promotion both 
in terms of the initiative’s procedural aspects as well as in terms of expected 
outcomes (see Chapter 5). 
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Regarding the interviews, the choice of this technique for data collection 
reflected the concern of the research both with facts (how the ‘7 million’ has 
been implemented) as well as with the different understandings of its effects in 
terms of empowerment outcome. As pointed out by Kvale (2007: 11), the 
meaning level of interviews is more difficult to grasp as it involves ‘reading 
between the lines’. This depends on the ability of the interviewer to conduct the 
interview in such a way as to clarify the meanings while the interviewee speaks. 
Following the guidelines found in Grbich (2007), I started the preliminary 
fieldwork data analysis concurrent with the fieldwork. As a general rule, after 
each interview, I completed a template document recording my first impressions 
as well as the general context of the activity and any visual information deemed 
relevant. I also used my interview notes to extract basic information that would 
help me verify the extent to which the interview schedules were successful or 
needed amendment, the main information coming out of the interviews and my 
ability to understand the information and relate it to my research object. I was 
also able to transcribe some of the recorded interviews in Mozambique, which 
helped me anticipate any gaps while I was still in the field. 
The main data analysis followed the fieldwork. The analysis consisted of the 
following stages: 
1. Records transcription. I personally transcribed all recorded focus groups 
and interviews. Of all the activities, only on seven occasions did 
participants prefer not to be recorded. One of the main advantages of 
doing the transcription myself was the opportunity it provided to 
recapture the moment of the activity and re-check my diary notes as well 
as the pre-analysis written in each interview template. In rare cases, I did 
not transcribe the interview in full leaving aside any digression unrelated 
to the research. However, the vast majority of the interviews were very 
focused and the answers extremely valuable to the purpose of the thesis. 
A second advantage was the possibility to use the transcription as a tool 
for analysis. During this process, I relied extensively on Kvale (2007) and 
Grbich (2007) taking into account what kind of information I was 
confronting (perception or fact that needed verification), the answers’ 
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meaning in the context of the research, and also thinking of how I could 
classify information in analytical terms. 
2. Classification of the data according to ‘types of actors’ and ‘themes 
identified’. The following step was a combined approach where I took into 
account (1) the types of actors interviewed and (2) the sub-themes of 
each interview. I worked with three column-tables where I identified (a) 
themes and sub-themes, (b) the related transcription parts, and (c) my 
comments and interpretation. Some of the themes, in particular the more 
general ones, had already been pre-determined by the interview 
questions according to the variables chosen for the analysis of 
empowerment. Nevertheless, many more appeared during the 
interviews, as well as several sub-themes, which were added to the 
table. The division per type of actors was intended to help identify any 
correlation in terms of subjectivities (e.g., if most civil servants in the 
provinces had similar opinions about certain topics). This option was also 
linked with the multilevel framework as each type of actor was classified 
within a specific level of analysis. 
3. Document analysis, second round. Once I had analysed all the 
interviews, I went back to the documents collected. During the 
reconstitution of the history of the ‘7 million’, I merged the documents’ 
analysis with the interviews. One of the objectives in this process was to 
understand the very constitution of some of the official documents and 
their changes. Another objective was to correlate some of these 
documents (in particular, those assessing the ‘7 million’) with the data 
obtained in the district fieldwork. 
It should be noted that, towards the end of this process, I went back to 
Mozambique. Having the opportunity to discuss my findings, I produced a 25-
page report that I shared with selected actors at all levels (central government, 
province, and district, as well with CSOs in Nampula). In Nampula, I even 
presented the report at a meeting with several actors from CSOs and from the 
provincial government. The overall feedback was very important in order to 
validate the findings. First, many actors appreciated my feedback and noticed 
that, even though they ‘knew’ by experience many of the issues reported, they 
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acknowledged the lack of documentation on the matter, which made my 
contribution very relevant. Second, I was also able to verify the existence of 
different opinions regarding certain aspects of the fund including different 
interpretations regarding its regulation (see Chapter 5). Finally, there were also 
reactions that pointed towards the lack of policy recommendations on my side. 
Even though this was not an intended output of the research, this observation 
was important and made me reflect on my own epistemological stance and my 
critical commitment as well as the utility of my research as it relates to policy-
making. Following the comments, I made an effort to add some 
recommendations in the report. Moreover, during the writing-up stage that 
followed, I made a conscious effort to be not only critical but also more open-
minded and grounded and consider the practical potential of the initiative and/or 
the possibility of concrete alternatives in order to promote local empowerment. 
1.4 Ethical Issues 
This research takes into consideration the University of Bradford Ethics Policy 
for Research Involving Human Participants, Data and Tissue (Sture, 2010) and 
the principles of good research practice. The fieldwork was conducted after the 
project’s approval by the University Ethics Board Committee in early 2012. 
A basic principle taken into account in this research was that of neutrality. 
Considering its epistemological stand, the thesis openly problematizes the 
concept of objectivity — a positivist assumption that stems from the idea that it 
is possible to separate observed and observer — and, instead, embraces 
subjectivity and the need to acknowledge the pre-existing bias that frames any 
research. In this process, neutrality represents the constant effort to reflect on 
one’s own bias during the research process as a means to avoid biased 
conclusions (O’Leary, 2004: 58). Neutrality, in this regard, is understood as the 
constant commitment to reflexivity and on-going re-evaluation of one’s own 
interpretation of the data. 
Perceived in this way, the commitment to neutrality presupposes an 
acknowledgment and awareness of the different roles played by a researcher 
during the research process. In the words of Flick (2006: 114): 
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You as a researcher and your respondent and your communicative 
competencies are the main ‘instruments’ of collecting data and of 
recognition. Because of this, you cannot adopt a neutral role in the field 
and in your contacts with the persons to be interviewed or observed. 
Rather you will have to take – or you will be allocated – certain roles and 
positions (sometimes vicariously and/or unwillingly). 
During the fieldwork, I dealt with different groups of people and had to take into 
account these differences while presenting myself and explaining the basis of 
my research. In Maputo and Nampula, my main identification was with the 
University of Bradford. As I contacted the potential participants, I also presented 
a summary of my research, explaining the topic, who I was, what their 
participation would consist of, and a consent form (see appendix II). In the 
district, it soon became evident that this protocol was counter-productive; 
therefore, as noted above, even though I explained to each and every 
participant that I was an independent researcher, I had to emphasise my links 
with Akilizetho. That was also necessary as my access to participants was 
initially facilitated by the NGO and they related to Akilizetho, whereas, the 
University of Bradford was something very distant from their realities. 
This factor also influenced the issue of informed consent and how I dealt with 
confidentiality and anonymity. As pointed out by Miller and Bell (2005: 53), 
“’informed’ consent is problematic if it is not clear what the participant is 
consenting to and where ‘participation’ begins and ends”. Despite my personal 
wish to be fully transparent and clear with all participants about my research, 
with each group I had to take into account what was the best way to explain my 
research as well as what would be their incentives to take part in it. In the upper 
levels (central government and province) as well as within the realm of the 
district administration, I could usually be very direct and focus on the academic 
aspect of my research as well as indicate my willingness to maintain contact 
and give feedback once I had the research results. These issues were mostly 
addressed in the consent form that I asked the participants to read before the 
interview. The form also included the option of having the conversation 
recorded or not. After reading it, the participant would have a few minutes to 
clarify any doubts and ask additional questions before signing the form. As my 
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topic was dealing with a national policy that is very popular and also widely 
criticised, most participants in this group expressed interest in the research, and 
I currently maintain contact with some of them. 
In the lower levels (district and sub-units), these kinds of interactions and the 
commitment to provide feedback were mostly impossible, not least because in 
the rural context, the only way to provide feedback is by going back in person. 
As such, I discussed the basic aspects of the consent form including verifying 
their willingness to be recorded and clarifying my commitment to anonymity. I 
further explained that any results of the research would be shared with 
Akilizetho but that the research was not part of a policy project although the 
data obtained could be used to improve the information available on the ‘7 
million’. It should be stressed that all activities in the fieldwork were conducted 
on a voluntary basis and without any kind of reward or payment to participants. 
In the case of focus groups, I offered beverages and a snack as an expression 
of gratitude for their time. 
Regarding anonymity and confidentiality, as a general practice, I offered both to 
the participants. The consent form clarified that, unless expressed otherwise, 
names and means of identification would be suppressed from the thesis. In 
practice, on the one hand, many participants indicated they were comfortable 
with the quoting of their names. Notably, official public figures such as the 
Ministers and the Administrator, spoke as public persons presenting, therefore, 
what could be termed as ‘official views’. On the other hand, some participants 
preferred to speak without being recorded and only expressed some opinions 
because of the confidentiality/anonymity accord; therefore, these were 
important tools in order to gain the participant’s trust and increase the chances 
of having honest responses (Sieber, 1992:45). 
In this thesis, as a general rule, names are not quoted, with the exception of the 
Ministers interviewed and those who explicitly indicated they were comfortable 
with the use of their names. The basic means of reference is the number of the 
interview/focus group, which is accompanied by the place and date on which it 
took place. In the case of the beneficiaries and members of the LCs, in order to 
facilitate the narrative, I have used pseudonyms in the text. In the case of the 
focus groups, participants were not identified during the interaction. In sections 
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of the thesis where the participant could be identified through the interview 
number, and in connections with other parts of the thesis, I have intentionally 
deleted the interview reference in the text. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is organised into six chapters besides this introduction. Chapter 2 
discusses the concept of empowerment. It first considers the emergence of the 
concept in the international policy discourse in the agendas of development and 
peacebuilding starting in the early 1990s. Next, it discusses the debate 
surrounding the concept, in particular, the different ways it may be interpreted 
— as a radical emancipatory concept, on the one hand, and as a technical 
instrument linked with capacity building on the other hand. This discussion is, 
furthermore, connected to the rescue of the different ontological understandings 
of ‘power’ that underlie the concept. Taking into account the under-discussed 
features of empowerment in the literature, the chapter concludes by proposing 
a multilevel framework of analysis that includes a dialectical perspective of 
power, a concern with power dynamics between and within the different levels 
of analysis, and a focus on the relationship between actors’ subjectivities, their 
actions, and capacity. 
Chapter 3 explores the historical background of Mozambique, taking into 
account general dynamics of empowerment and disempowerment that have 
shaped the constitution of the Mozambican state. The chapter initially discusses 
the colonial period and its legacy as well as the different manifestations of local 
resistance that pervaded this period. It then assesses the socialist experiment 
that followed independence, noticing the contradictions between the Frelimo 
discourse that privileged emancipation and the traces of authoritarianism that 
ultimately shaped the party’s policies. Lastly, the chapter discusses the war that 
followed independence stressing its complex character and its mixed effects in 
terms of affecting people’s empowerment. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the peace that followed the 1992 accords. It pays 
attention, in particular, to the reforms in the fields of democratization and 
development and the extent to which these reforms have contributed to 
people’s empowerment. More generally, the chapter examines the quality of 
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peace achieved centring on the question ‘what has changed for the ordinary 
Mozambican after the end of the war?’ In this regard, I argue that, in spite of the 
several institutional reforms that have taken place technically aimed at 
redistributing power, in practice, spaces for change have remained limited due 
to the parallel existence of mechanisms that have helped to maintain the status 
quo. The chapter, therefore, sets the institutional context for the analysis of the 
case study in the following two chapters. 
Chapter 5 introduces the ‘7 million’ initiative taking into account the upper levels 
of analysis, in particular, the national level. First, the chapter offers an overview 
of the process of decentralisation in Mozambique to which the initiative is 
customarily linked. Second, taking into account official documents and a series 
of interviews, the chapter recounts the origins of the initiative and its changes 
over time. Here, particular attention is paid to the power dynamics within the 
institutional domain of the state and the decision-making process. Also, the 
empowering rationale of the initiative and its expected outcomes are analysed 
in detail. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the bottom level of analysis, namely, the district of 
Angoche and its subunits. The focus is, therefore, on policy implementation and 
its de facto contribution to the empowerment of the local population. This 
assessment considers, first, the role of the local councils and their 
representation of local interests; second, the process that leads to the selection 
of projects that will obtain the ‘7 million’; and, finally, the empowering outcomes 
resulting from these processes both in their material and subjective aspects. 
The analysis takes into account the relation between subjectivities, capacity and 
agency/patiency, detailed in the proposed framework of analysis in Chapter 2. 
The chapter also compares the results of the research in Angoche with 
available studies on other districts in order to assess the extent to which 
Angoche was a unique case or whether the limitations encountered there reflect 
broader problems related to the policy itself and the national context. 
Chapter 7 brings the pieces together going back to the research questions and 
objectives of this research. First, it discusses the empowering effects of the ‘7 
million’ considering the two perspectives of empowerment analysed in Chapter 
2. Second, it examines the different lenses through which the limitations of the 
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‘7 million’ can be assessed pointing, in particular, to the problem of promoting 
bottom-up empowerment from the top-down. Third, the chapter discusses the 
lessons learned from the ‘7 million’ regarding empowerment that could be 
useful in other settings of policy making. Finally, the chapter highlights the 
contribution of the thesis to the literature on empowerment taking into account 
the empowerment framework developed and its utility in the case study. The 
conclusion also acknowledges some limitations as well as future directions 
arising from this research. 
  




We can legitimately say that in the process of oppression 
someone oppresses someone else; we cannot say that in the 
process of revolution someone liberates someone else, nor yet 
that someone liberates himself, but rather that human beings in 
communion liberate each other. 
(Freire, 1996) 
 
Whilst empowerment is often advocated as a liberating process 




The word ‘empowerment’ has become a buzzword in the international arena in 
the last twenty years (Fielding, 1996; Moore, 2001; Alsop, 2004; Cornwall and 
Brock, 2005; FRIDE; 2006; Batliwala, 2007; Chandler, 2013). The term has 
been used by virtually all development agencies and is increasingly 
incorporated into the peacebuilding agenda. More generally, empowerment is 
part of a global discourse that also includes similar terms, such as participation, 
bottom-up practices, partnership, and ownership.13 This general discourse is 
                                            
13 Note that very often these terms are used interchangeably. However, I concur with 
the authors that emphasize differences between each of them. Empowerment has to 
be understood as a change in power. Participation refers to a method or technique that 
may or may not lead to empowerment. Ownership tends to stress the national control 
of a process and it is usually linked to the transfer of responsibilities. Bottom-up has a 
more spatial aspect and stresses the place where the policy is generated. As with 
participation, there is no guarantee that a bottom-up process will lead to empowerment. 
For differences and commonalities, see Sen (1997: 5-6); Lopes (2002: 124); Chambers 
(2005: 210); FRIDE (2006: 5). 
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based on a consensus that empowerment is good, needed, and therefore it 
should be promoted. These assumptions are taken for granted and contribute to 
a political function, which is to legitimize these policies. 
Looking deeply into the discourse, however, it is notable that this general 
consensus hides a complex range of interpretations regarding what 
empowerment is, how it should promoted, by whom, and who should be 
empowered in a specific social setting. It is also the case that very often 
empowerment is used by international actors without being defined and while 
still performing an important discursive function. 
This chapter discusses the concept of empowerment by emphasising the 
historical context that has shaped its meaning, as well as by discussing its 
different theoretical contours. In order to do that, it first traces the origins of the 
discourse (or discourses) on empowerment, stressing how its dominant 
meaning has changed over time and why. Second, the chapter explores the 
theoretical literature on power, pointing to the fundamental differences in those 
approaches and anticipating how each mode of interpretation may lead to 
different understandings of the nature of empowerment. The third section takes 
this reflection forward, by discussing the literature on empowerment and 
proposing a dual typology of empowerment approaches that helps us 
understand some of the policy implications related to those different 
understandings. The fourth section explores three important and yet under-
discussed features of empowerment, which will then converge in the final part 
of the chapter with the proposition of a framework of analysis that will be used 
in the examination of the case study. 
The argument put forward is that the current dominant approach of 
empowerment is inadequate for policy making because it emphasises its 
technical character at the expense of a more complex, dialectical approach to 
power. In practice, this bias tends to produce contradictory effects, often 
enhancing disempowerment instead of promoting social transformation. 
Whereas post-modernists could explain that this is so because the actual aim of 
these policies is not social transformation, and that the discourse is simply a 
way to legitimate the maintenance of the status quo, I suggest that the power 
dynamics that shape those policies are far more complex, as the intentions of 
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policy makers often differ, and, moreover, the results do not necessarily reflect 
the original intentions or expected outcomes related to policy planning. 
The framework proposed in this thesis tries to address this complexity by 
combining three aspects that are poorly explored in the empowerment 
literature. First, it offers multiple levels of analysis (global, national, sub-national, 
community) that include not only the domain of policy intervention but also the 
domain of policy formulation. Second, the framework emphasises the power 
dynamics that exist within and between each level, portraying power as a 
dialectical concept, where both its conflictual and consensual dimensions play a 
fundamental role. Finally, the framework stresses the role of the actors’ 
subjectivities and how these affect decisions at all levels of policy 
implementation. 
2.1 Empowerment Discourse(s) 
The fact that ‘empowerment’ may translate differently in different languages14 
makes it difficult to precisely locate its origins. A publication from FRIDE (2006: 
6), for instance, states that etymologically, the root of the word ‘empowerment’ 
dates back to the middle of the 17th century when it referred exclusively to the 
legal sphere, meaning “giving power to another person who acts as 
representative; authorise”. Batliwala (2007: 557-558), quoting an unpublished 
briefing from Gaventa, mentions that the term was already used during the 
Protestant Reformation in Europe reverberating through the centuries in Europe 
and America via the Quakers, Jeffersonian democracy, early capitalism, and 
the black-power movement. 
A general point of agreement in most of the literature, however, is that the term 
became popular during the 1970s and 1980s, influenced mostly by the feminist 
movement and the idea of popular education, the latter developed by Brazilian 
pedagogue and activist Paulo Freire (Liamzon, 1997: 5-9; FRIDE; 2006; 
Cornwall and Brock, 2005: 6; Luttrell and Quiroz, 2009: 2-4). Other important 
influences were the black power movement, the theology of liberation 
                                            
14 See several examples and problems related to translation in Luttrell and Quiroz, 
2009: 2-3. 
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developed in Latin America, as well as the alternative development movement 
and the subsequent development of participatory research (Ibid.; Friedmann, 
1992: 1-13). 
These social movements did not always use the word ‘empowerment’, but they 
stressed the need for change in the way policies were shaped and emphasised 
the need for popular inclusion in decision-making as well as the review of 
priorities in national and global politics. They presented a radical and political 
connotation of empowerment, reflecting a discourse of contestation of dominant 
power structures at several levels, whether on the basis of patriarchy (gender), 
race, or economy. As noted by Batliwala (2007: 559), in this early phase, 
regardless of the differences, “all efforts to conceptualise the term more clearly 
stressed that empowerment was a socio-political process, that the critical 
operating concept within empowerment was power, and that empowerment was 
about shifts in political, social and economic power between and across both 
individuals and social groups”. In this regard, the term resembled the Marxist 
idea of ‘emancipation’. 
The proximity of ‘empowerment’ and ‘emancipation’ in this early phase may 
raise the question of why the former term became the popular one and not the 
latter. As will be discussed below, ‘emancipation’, while also subject to 
disagreements regarding its definition, is a concept tied to a strong theoretical 
body of literature that stresses precisely the need to revisit power issues at the 
systemic level. A possible explanation for the preference for empowerment at 
this stage could be the fact that ‘empowerment’ explicitly encapsulated ‘power’, 
which was the core issue for many practitioners at the time. Moreover, whereas 
many social movements came from a Marxist perspective that emphasised 
capitalism as the root of the social problems they addressed, others highlighted 
instead other dimensions of power asymmetries, such as gender and race.15 In 
this regard, ‘empowerment’ provided a strong and yet more neutral connotation 
                                            
15 The literature on emancipation actually acknowledges the theoretical challenges 
arising from the recognition of other domains of oppression beyond capitalism and how 
they push for the redefinition of what emancipation entails. See, e.g., Wood (1988) and 
Pieterse (1992). 
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compared to ‘emancipation’, making it more flexible to be used in fields of 
knowledge and practice as different as education, psychology and, later on, 
management. 
Regardless of the reasons behind the choice of the terms, empowerment slowly 
gained ascendance and by 1980 it was frequently used in the academic and 
policy literature, in particular in the field of gender (women’s empowerment), but 
also in relation to black political empowerment16 as well as in health studies and 
public policy (Lincoln et al., 1999). 
As these different social movements grew and got stronger, their call for 
empowerment became louder and also their ability to pressure for change. 
Ironically, their partial success in influencing the system also contained the 
seeds of their own demise. In as much as social movements succeeded in 
influencing the work of international agencies, and the latter started to adopt 
participatory approaches and pro-empowerment policies, ‘empowerment’ 
changed its status — from a contestation concept that denied the status quo, it 
eventually became an official institutionalised discourse, now part of the status 
quo (Friedmann, 1992; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Batliwala, 2007; Pieterse, 
2010). 
Multiple factors contributed to this turn of events. Besides the many efforts of 
these movements to influence the system, several strategies adopted by 
development agencies in the ‘third world’ proved socially catastrophic. The 
famously intrusive and top-down structural adjustment plans implemented by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank during the 1980s 
were probably the most infamous ones. Their perverse social effects led to 
political turmoil in many countries and by the early 1990s it was clear that these 
institutions needed to find alternative strategies to engage with developing 
countries (Friedmann, 1992; Rowlands, 1997; Abrahamsen, 2000). 
A similar trend happened in the global security arena. With the increase in the 
number of UN peace operations in the early 1990s, the general dissatisfaction 
with externally imposed models (in this case, models of state and governance) 
                                            
16 Already in the 1970s several academic articles were published using the term 
‘empowerment’ (see examples in Lausch, 2011). 
	   46	  
also called into question the methods used by Western countries to promote 
social transformation in their non-Western counterparts (Krause and 
Jütersonke, 2005; Chandler, 2006; Duffield, 2007; Donais, 2009 and 2012; 
Francis, 2010). Increasingly, academics and practitioners started to stress the 
need to rethink approaches to peace operations, by including more space for 
dialogue with the ´locals’ and consolidating a sustainable peace (ibid., 
Lederach, 1997; Ramsbotham et al., 2007; Richmond, 2011; Pugh et al., 2011). 
The change in the discourse was therefore a response to a series of correlated 
events and forces coming from different directions. At the same time, the 
change was not smooth or equal in all agencies. Within the UN system, the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP) was one of the most important 
agencies to embrace the idea of empowerment and work towards a 
comprehensive review of the meaning of development itself. In 1990, the 
agency released the first Human Development Report (HDR), a publication that 
was to become annual and have a significant impact on development policies 
worldwide. In the report, they formally introduced the concept of ‘human 
development’ shifting the focus of development from the state to the human 
being. Here, and in the following reports, the UNDP stressed that one of the 
core elements for development was the focus on the expansion of individual’s 
and groups’ capabilities (or freedoms), so that development could be not only 
sustainable but also just (UNDP, 1990, 1995, 1997 and 2000). 
The term empowerment appeared regularly in the subsequent reports used 
either in association with specific domains, e.g. ‘women’s empowerment’ 
(UNDP, 1995) or more generally linked to poverty and human rights (e.g., 
UNDP, 1997 and 2000). In the commemorative edition of 20 years of the HDR 
(UNDP, 2010), empowerment was one of the top concepts, presented as being 
at the core of development along with equity and sustainability. It was also one 
of the three components of human development next to well-being and justice. 
Accordingly, conceptually empowerment is “loosely associated with 
participation: the possibility for all people, including poor and marginalized 
people, to have their voices heard and to participate meaningfully in shaping 
debates that affect their lives” (UNDP, 2010: 115). It is further related to the 
expansion of people’s capabilities, “people’s ability to shape their own 
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destinies”, and entails both agency and “supportive institutional structures” 
(ibid.: 23). 
Looking at the UNDP discourse, it is notable that the radical tone present in the 
social movements is radically phased down. While recognizing the existence of 
social asymmetries, the UNDP does not aim at structural economic reforms that 
may contest neoliberalism in support of alternative models of social welfare. 
Indeed, the agency works closely with the state and tries to influence its 
governance structure, but not the economic system or the market. Its emphasis 
is mostly on governance aspects that are linked to the enhancement of 
democracy, decentralisation, and social policies. 
The UNDP’s approach to empowerment is very influential and captures several 
aspects that are core to the current mainstream empowerment agenda. 
However, since the early 2000s the international organisation that has had an 
even stronger voice in the empowerment debate has been the World Bank. The 
Bank’s publication of the 2000/2001 World Development Report, entitled 
Attacking Poverty was, in this regard, a watershed, as it had a whole section 
dedicated to the discussion of empowerment. The report relied on an 
unprecedented background study called Voices of the Poor17 and pointed to the 
feelings of powerlessness and voicelessness as a major issue for individuals in 
this context. Empowerment was one of the concepts addressed in the 
document along with ‘opportunities’ and ‘security’ (World Bank, 2000/2001). 
The two chapters that discussed empowerment focused, nonetheless, mostly 
on the need for institutional reform in order to reduce poverty. Empowerment 
was therefore depicted as a consequence of institutional reforms, which were 
perceived as instruments for increasing space for social representation. 
In 2002, the Bank released the Empowerment and Poverty Reduction 
Sourcebook. Here empowerment was defined as “the expansion of assets and 
capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, 
and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives” (Narayan et al., 2002: 
xviii). As much as the previous report, the sourcebook highlighted the 
                                            
17 This study was based on interviews with participants in 50 countries, inquiring about 
their own understandings of poverty. 
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dichotomy of state/society and justified empowerment on the basis of the need 
for people to get organised in order to put pressure on state institutions and so 
avoid problems such as corruption and lack of accountability. 
In 2004, another release from the Bank, Power, Rights and Poverty: Concepts 
and Connections, edited by Ruth Alsop, discussed the concept even further. 
Accordingly, empowerment was defined as “the process of enhancing the 
capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those 
choices into desired actions and outcomes”, and was portrayed as dependent 
on the interplay between agency and the opportunity structure (Alsop, 2004: 4). 
This dual framework was theoretically broader, and it was further developed in a 
2006 publication (Alsop et al., 2006). Nevertheless, whereas the World Bank’s 
empowerment team has contributed to the expansion of this debate, the Bank’s 
policies are still centred on the idea of ‘fixing [national] institutions’, and 
nowhere is there a discussion that questions the global institutions that also 
sustain poverty in developing (and developed) countries. 
The incorporation of the concepts of empowerment and participation in the 
World Bank’s agenda was taken by some critics as a symbol of how these 
terms have actually been corrupted in their meanings. Cornwall and Brock 
(2005: 6-7), for instance, noted that “What participation had come to mean to 
the mainstream has less to do with radical shifts in power than engaging 
communities in sharing the costs, and the burdens, of development” (Cornwall 
and Brock, 2005: 6-7). Batliwala (2007), more drastically, noted that: 
Empowerment was hijacked, in the 1990s, into increasingly bizarre 
locations, converted from a collective to an individualistic process, and 
skilfully co-opted by conservative and even reactionary political 
ideologies in pursuit of their agenda of divesting ‘big government’ (for 
which we read: the welfare state) of its purported power and control by 
‘empowering’ communities to look after their own affairs. 
If the idea of radicalism relates to changing the current structure, then, by 
default, if a concept becomes part of the mainstream it cannot be radical 
anymore. What makes some commentators disillusioned, however, is the fact 
that the incorporation of the concept, as well as other demands linked to 
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alternative development back in the 1980s have not fundamentally changed 
global economic structures (Friedmann, 1992; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; 
Pieterse, 2010). So there has been no radical change, rather a change of 
meaning of a radical concept. Even worse, the political connotation of 
empowerment was stripped from it, and now it has become a technical concept 
(Cornwall and Brock, 2005: 8). 
Whereas the empowerment call has been particularly strong in the development 
sector, it has also pervaded other arenas of policy practice, notably 
peacebuilding even if on a smaller scale. UN documents and security organs 
dealing with peacebuilding often use the term although they do not define it.18 In 
the academic debate, however, the term has become more popular, and it is 
often linked to critiques that call for more ownership in peacebuilding processes 
as well as approaches stressing an emancipatory call (Ramsbotham et al., 
2007; Donais, 2009; Richmond, 2009). 
In fact, the current use of the term in the peacebuilding context connects less to 
empowerment and instead connotes the concept of ownership. Ownership, like 
empowerment is also widely used in development discourses. It reflects the 
general concern with the ‘recipient’ of the intervention and the minimization of 
power asymmetries between the ‘external intervener’ and the ‘local’. 
Nevertheless, the term usually applies to the ‘local’ as national, in particular, 
national state institutions. As noted by Donais (2012: 1), “local ownership refers 
to the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political 
processes; in post-conflict contexts, the notion conveys the common sense 
wisdom that any peace not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely 
to fail”. Once the concept is fragmented and assessed in the political discourse, 
however, as in the case of empowerment, many imprecisions come to the 
surface (ibid.; Richmond, 2012). In particular, issues of control are left 
                                            
18  The word empowerment can be found in the UN Peacebuilding Commission’s 
reports (2005-2011) along with concepts such as participation, civil society, and 
stakeholders. Here, as in many development agencies, empowerment is often linked 
with specific target groups such as women and youth. In key UN documents reference 
to empowerment is scantier, although An Agenda for Peace (1992, par. 81) also refers 
to need to promote empowerment via institutional reform. 
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unaddressed; there is no clear differentiation between the ‘local’ as ‘elite’ and 
the ‘local’ as the ‘marginalised’; and ownership becomes equated with formal 
participatory practices (Francis, 2010; Donais, 2012; Richmond, 2012). 
To a great extent, the preference for ‘ownership’ in the peacebuilding 
institutional discourse reflects the primacy of statebuilding practices focused on 
institutional reforms over the concern with everyday changes in the lives of 
ordinary people. As such, even though it offers a potential space for the revision 
and discussion of power issues related to peacebuilding, ‘ownership’ is still 
embedded in the idea of ‘exporting a specific model of governance’, which 
characterises the mainstream approach to peacebuilding (Fukuyama, 2004; 
Richmond, 2009; Pugh et al., 2011).  
In practice, and despite the existing criticism, the increasing institutionalisation 
of empowerment (and similar concepts, such as ownership and participation) in 
mainstream development and peacebuilding agendas brings with it a series of 
issues that demand a re-examination of its radical aspect. First, this institutional 
capture of the concept means a de facto transfer of a ‘right to make demands’; 
if previously the call was made directly by those who wanted empowerment, 
now the institutions have absorbed this role putting themselves as mediators 
between the ‘disempowered’ and the state (which is held accountable for the 
‘disempowered’). So now, empowerment is something to be promoted and not 
demanded. The second issue worthy of review is how the solutions proposed 
tend to concentrate on the role played by the institutions themselves; they 
become primordial actors in the empowerment agenda, and the subjects of 
empowerment becomes the objects. Underlying this shift is the idea that ‘help is 
needed for empowerment to take place’, an assumption which is extremely 
problematic and that leads to the paradox of a local empowerment produced 
from the top-down (Turner et al., 2011). 
What seems to have been lost in these new mainstream empowerment 
discourses, is that empowerment is about power: power as a relational 
dimension that is present in every social interaction; power as the control of the 
world’s resource distribution; and power as the capacity to set agendas and 
control discourses. Taking this as a starting point, one of the central issues of 
this thesis is precisely to put power back into the discussion in order to better 
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understand empowerment as a conceptual tool for social sciences and, as 
such, as a better tool for policy design. Therefore, before I explore in detail the 
different conceptual and theoretical approaches to empowerment, I go back to 
the fundamental concept that precedes it — power. 
2.2 Power Theorising 
The subject of power has been extensively studied both in philosophy as well 
as in different disciplines of the social sciences, such as Sociology, 
Anthropology, and Political Science (e.g., Lukes, 1974; Bourdieu, 1977; 
Giddens, 1979; Boulding, 1990; Haugaard, 1997 and 2002). The variety of 
definitions and theories of how power operates makes the task of summarising 
this debate very challenging. As the main concern of this thesis is the debate on 
empowerment, I will highlight in this section those dimensions that affect 
empowerment theorising and empowerment policies more directly. 
As a starting point, it is worth noting that in spite of the many differences in 
these approaches, there is a basic assumption underlying the discussion on 
power, which is the understanding that power has a potential for transformation 
(Boulding, 1990: 15). At the most fundamental level, power is the capacity to 
change something/someone. How power manifests (its sources and forms), 
how it functions, and how we are able to perceive and measure it are the 
cornerstones of the debate. 
Table 2.1 gives some examples of common elements related to power in the 
literature reflecting these concerns. As we will see in the next section, the 
mainstream literature on empowerment, while being structured in a similar way 
(focusing on contents/sources, behaviours and results), tends to concentrate on 
some of these elements (e.g., generative power, exchange, creation) while 
minimising, sometimes ignoring others (zero-sum, domination, separation). Yet, 
it is precisely these minimised aspects that offer the potential to enrich the 
concept and its analytical utility. 
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Table 2.1: Common Features of Power in the Literature19 



















Get what one wants 
Achieve common ends 






Broadly speaking, the debate on power is divided in two strands: on the one 
hand, there are approaches that highlight the conflictual view of power; on the 
other hand, there are approaches that focus on its consensual aspect. 
Conflictual approaches have influenced much of the literature in Political 
Science and International Relations. Its general feature is the understanding 
that power relates to a situation characterised by a conflict of interests where 
one party exerts dominance over the other (power-over). The setting is that of a 
zero-sum game, where as much as one party increases power, the other will 
have it reduced. As an exercise, power is perceived as a relation of domination 
or form of influence often exerted coercively. In Political Science, such views 
have been concentrated in the analysis of political systems and the decision-
making processes associated with them, both in its formal setting (e.g., 
government democratic procedures) (Dahl, 1968), as well as in the form of 
mobilization of bias (that which happens behind the formal decision-making 
process) (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). Lukes’ (1974) radical approach to power 
                                            
19 The table was compiled taking into account the difference sources used in this 
section. 
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adds a third dimension to this conflictual quality, which is the capacity to prevent 
latent conflict to manifest. Accordingly, latent conflict “consists in a contradiction 
between the interests of those exercising power and the real interests of those 
they exclude. The latter may not express or even be conscious of their 
interests, but . . . the identification of those interests ultimately always rests on 
empirically supportable and refutable hypotheses” (Lukes, 1974: 24-25). 
Understanding this dimension of power requires broadening the focus beyond 
the behavioural dimension and extending it to the system that shapes the 
existing institutions and behaviours. 
Several thinkers have contested the conflictual views of power. Parsons, 
Arendt, and Barnes, for instance, are known for linking power with legitimacy 
and consent (Haugaard, 2002). Their common point of departure is that power 
is created through social interactions where consent plays a fundamental role. 
For Parsons power is socially constituted and sustained mostly through 
legitimacy. Indeed, whenever power is misused, it tends to decrease and vice-
versa (Parsons, 1963). Barnes (1988), on the other hand, uses the term ‘social 
power’ to highlight the fact that no power is possible outside a context of social 
order. For him, power is a capacity (alternatively known as power-to) that is only 
available because social interaction happens within a specific social order that 
functions through knowledge and self-validation, which is why power is linked to 
legitimacy and consensus. Seeing power as something generated in society 
reinforces the idea that power is not scarce; instead, it can be infinitely created 
or generated. The idea of power-with (Rowlands, 1997) may be placed here as 
well. Power-with is particularly used to understand cooperative processes, as it 
entails the idea that the whole is greater than the part (ibid.: 13). 
In the middle of the continuum between conflict and consent are those authors 
that emphasise the dual nature of power. Giddens (1979: 91), for example, 
states that power can be understood both as a transformative capacity (acts 
conducted by agents and not necessarily in opposition with others’ interests) as 
well as domination (where opposition and structural constraints prevail). What is 
central is that power is a relational concept and is substantiated in action. The 
extent to which power will be of one kind or the other depends on a series of 
factors, including how resources are distributed along the structure and how 
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they are used. Haugaard (1997: 137) builds on Giddens and states that most 
times power is both conflictual and consensual at the same time, because 
individual’s motives for action are complex and tend to have a dual aspect 
(goal-oriented and embedded in structural aspects). Boulding (1990) makes a 
similar point identifying three main types of power: threat power (or destructive 
power), love power (or integrative power) and exchange power (or productive 
power). The first can be understood as belonging to the idea of power-over and 
the conflictual strand of power, whereas love power and exchange power fall 
into a second category where consensus prevails. However, as he emphasises, 
none of them exist (or rarely exist) in a pure form. In fact, each of them contains 
some of the others. For instance, if we understand military force as a form of 
threat power, its own existence is only possible because at some point there 
was some kind of exchange power leading to arms production in the first place. 
This way of understanding power points to its dialectical aspect. As highlighted 
in the above debates, it is very common in the literature to separate types of 
power and take them as detached from the others. This reflects a normative 
bias where power-over is usually the ‘bad power’ that we should fight against 
and power-to (and power with) is the ‘good power’ that we should promote and 
legitimate (Holloway, 2010; Pearce, 2013). However, it could be argued that 
power-over in itself is neither good nor bad, but the way it is created and 
exercised is what makes it one or the other. Moreover, both types of power are 
not exclusive. Indeed, moving to a dialectical understanding of power enables 
us to think that both power-over and power-to are socially generated and that 
they are inextricably linked. By using the term dialectical I would like to 
emphasise the aspect of movement and contradiction of social processes and 
not necessarily the evolutionary and teleological aspects of the term (Sztompka, 
1993: 156-157; Holloway, 2010: 120-121). Perhaps a more helpful and less 
biased frame is the Chinese Taoist approach of nature represented in the 
popular image of yin and yang, which captures the complementarity of the 
opposites  (Fowler, 2005: 73). In this case we could think of power-over and 
power-to as inextricably related and in constant movement, not leading to any 
specific endpoint. 
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Figure 2.1: Power-To and Power-Over 
 
 
Seeing power-over and power-to as two sides of the same coin or as yin and 
yang leads to a different understanding of how to approach social life and, 
therefore, empowerment. For Holloway (2010: 28), for instance, power-over is, 
on the one hand, the opposite of power-to as it is only possible when some 
people “arrogate to themselves the projection-beyond (conception) of the doing 
and command others to execute what they have conceived”. Concurrently, 
power-over only exists because of power-to, even though it denies it. As he 
sees it, power-over is a distortion of power-to, so the solution to abolish the 
former is to pursue anti-power which is the constant contestation of power-over 
or an emancipated form of power-to (ibid.: 35-39). 
Jenny Pearce (2013) takes a similar stand but acknowledges the role played by 
legitimate power-over, which, along with power-to and power-with, constitute 
what she calls “non-dominating forms of power”. According to her, non-
dominating forms of power play a positive role in society. In fact, while they 
have the potential to transform themselves into forms of power-over, they can 
also prevent power-over arising as long as they function effectively. 
Holloway and Pearce, whilst recognising the relationship between different 
forms of power, pose a key question, which is how to avoid one kind of power 
that is socially more beneficial turning into a kind of power that is not beneficial. 
Using the yin-yang analogy, the key factor would be the balance between the 
opposites, in which case, I would posit that a legitimate power-over could exist 
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as long as it is balanced by an adequate amount of power-to. If power-over 
prevails over power-to, that is when domination would occur. At the same time, 
a dialectical perspective places emphasis on the constant movement of this 
interaction. In policy implementation, having a clear understanding of how these 
opposing aspects correlate may help avoid contradictory results. 
The above views, regardless of their conflictual/consensual/mixed emphasis, 
share important commonalities. First, they share the belief that it is somehow 
possible to influence the way power is exercised in society. Second, they have, 
overall, a normative aspect besides their analytical call. Foucault’s analysis of 
power, instead, transcends this debate and takes it to the level of the discourse. 
In this regard, it is perhaps the most radical view of all the above as he rejects 
any idea of truth. His analysis of power is based on the understanding that any 
given ‘truth’ is in fact a reflection of power; therefore, knowledge is power. He is 
not interested in what is power or the forms it takes, but focuses on how it 
operates (Foucault, 1994). According to him, “what defines a relationship of 
power is that it is a mode of action that does not act directly and immediately on 
others. Instead, it acts upon their actions” (ibid.: 340). These assumptions leave 
no room for any form of ‘good’ power to manifest. Instead, any form of power is 
a form of domination. As we will see in the next section, this rules out the very 
idea of empowerment. Nevertheless, his focus on the discourse may shed light 
onto the transformation of meaning of the concept described in the first part of 
this chapter. 
In his own fashion, Bourdieu shares some of Foucault’s assumptions. Just as 
Foucault did, he sees power in a fundamentally conflictual way and as a 
fundamental element of any social practice including culture. However, 
Bourdieu is particularly focused on the distributive aspects of power (Swartz, 
2013: 41). Indeed, he posits that there are instances where power becomes 
concentrated in specific kinds of resources that he calls ‘capitals’ and which 
assume four generic forms: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic. According 
to him, struggles occur both because of these capitals’ distribution within 
specific fields, but also because of the definition of the most valuable form of 
capital, which constitutes a struggle for symbolic power. In this regard, Bourdieu 
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offers an orientation for empirical research, which partially relates to Lukes’s 
concern with invisible power (Bourdieu, 1977; Swartz, 2013). 
The following section takes into consideration these power accounts and 
engages in a systematization of the existing literature on empowerment, taking 
into account its emphasis on the conflictual and consensual dimensions of 
power. 
2.3 Empowerment Theorising 
In contrast to power, empowerment has not been much theorised. As we have 
seen, whilst the use of the word is not new, efforts towards its conceptualisation 
and theorisation are much more recent, related to the events of the 1960s and 
onwards. Much of the literature available is not even academic in nature; it has 
been produced by or for development agencies and has, therefore, a specific 
policy target. Also, because of that authorship, articles and reports tend to focus 
on specific domains of action and more on conceptualisation rather than 
theorising. Moreover, the concept often remains fuzzy, implicit, and sometimes 
undefined in policy papers, although it is used as a guideline or expected 
outcome. 
In a study covering several governmental and non-governmental organizations, 
Scrutton and Luttrell (2007) noted the following kinds of variations in the 
definitions of empowerment: different emphasis on the process or outcome 
aspect of empowerment; different scopes (e.g., gender, children, poor, 
disabled); different emphases on agency and structure, in particular, in the 
analysis of institutions; different views regarding the role of outsiders in 
promoting empowerment (e.g., self-help approaches versus the need for 
external initiatives). They also noted that very often the in-depth discussion 
provided by some agencies was not reflected in their own projects and that, 
conversely, many agencies engaged with empowerment promotion even 
though they did not provide a specific policy document on the matter. 
Whereas most of these agencies’ documents do not have a theoretical concern, 
it is the case that much of the academic literature on the matter comes from 
individuals involved in policy activities often in these same development 
institutions. Other resources on empowerment come from those who are 
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engaged in strong activism and work for grassroots organizations. This means 
that even the theoretical literature on empowerment has a very practical aspect 
often targeting a specific area and thus marking a stark contrast to the literature 
on power. The following typology of empowerment takes into consideration the 
predominant literature in development (including gender studies in 
development), peace studies, and, to a lesser extent, education, social service, 
and psychology. The objective is to cover as much as possible what has been 
theorised and what influences current policy practices in development and 
peacebuilding surrounding the concept of empowerment. 
Table 2.2: Approaches to Empowerment 
Technical Approaches Emancipatory Approaches 
Agent-centred: The problem is the 
lack of capabilities of the 
marginalised 
Structure-centred: the problem is 
the structure that hinders 
individuals’ abilities to become fully 
human 
Increasing power-to is the solution. 
This is possible via capacity-
building and participatory practices 
that may foster consensus and 
create more power 
One needs to tackle power-over 
which fosters the disempowerment 
of the marginalised. Power-over is 
fostered by structural factors 
(economic, cultural, political, etc.) 
Process-oriented Outcome is as important as 
process 
Problem-solving: it is possible to 
accommodate different interests 
within the current structures 
Problem-posing: empowerment 
means immanent critique (self-
consciousness) 
 
Following the discussion on power, I identify two main strands of empowerment 
theory, as well as their limitations. On the one hand, there are approaches that 
emphasise the consensual aspects of power and thus empowerment. On the 
other hand, there are those that focus on the problem of conflict in 
empowerment promotion. For the sake of simplification, I refer to the former as 
‘technical approaches’ and the latter as ‘emancipatory approaches’ to 
empowerment. As with any simplification, these strands should be taken as 
ideal types as many times one approach may refer to and engage with the 
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other, but the difference is in the emphasis on each kind of power, as well as 
the distinct implications for policy practice. Table 2.2 summarizes the main 
features of each approach. Each one is further discussed in the sections that 
follow. 
TECHNICAL APPROACHES TO EMPOWERMENT 
The technical approaches constitute the current dominant perspective of 
empowerment, developed since the early 1990s and seen in most development 
agencies frameworks. Its main characteristics are the emphasis on agency and 
power-to and the general understanding that what causes disempowerment is 
the lack of capability of the subject to achieve what s/he needs/wants in order to 
live fully (Fielding, 1996; Moore, 2001; Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Chandler, 
2013). Agency is generally understood as “the ability of individuals (and indeed 
groups) to make decisions for themselves, to be responsible for their own 
actions” (Thompson, 2007: 24) and runs against deterministic theories. It places 
emphasis on the idea that if the individual is given the right tools and 
opportunities, s/he will be able to fulfil her/his own needs. 
The idea of capabilities relates to Amartya Sen’s (1999) mutually enhancing 
freedoms (political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, 
transparency guarantees, and protective security). In this regard, the technical 
approaches do recognise a structural dimension of empowerment, but this 
dimension is basically understood as institutional, and empowerment is thus 
linked to a specific set of generally formal institutional reforms (which often 
come under the ‘good governance’ label) that will create the right conditions for 
individuals to become agents. It presumes therefore that once individuals 
(rational beings) perceive these opportunities, they will seize agency and exert 
more power-to. 
These features are present in several definitions. Page and Czuba (1999), for 
instance, define empowerment as “a multi-dimensional social process that helps 
people gain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power (that 
is, the capacity to implement) in people, for use in their own lives, their 
communities, and in their society, by acting on issues that they define as 
important” (emphasis added). For Stern et al. (2005: 85), “Empowerment 
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requires that poor people themselves be agents, that they have choices and be 
involved in the creation of wealth” (emphasis added). In practice this means 
increasing participation in different sectors, including the economy, so 
individuals can increase their own ability to shape their own life (ibid.: 192). 
As discussed in section 2.1, the World Bank publications also relate 
empowerment with individuals and groups’ capacity to make decisions and 
implement them successfully, a process that is dependent on the interplay 
between agency and the opportunity structure (Alsop, 2004: 4). As defined in a 
2006 publication (Alsop et al. 2006), agency is understood as related to the 
assets one has; the ability to make purposeful choices, whereas the opportunity 
structure refers to “aspects of the institutional context within which actors 
operate that influence their ability to transform agency into action” (ibid.: 10) 
(emphasis added). 
Notably, in this kind of literature disempowerment is related to social exclusion 
(which clearly denotes power asymmetry), but what is striking is that the cause 
of disempowerment is attributed basically to the shape of the institutional 
arrangements of governance, whereas politically sensitive issues such as the 
nature of the state as a model for social organization, or the questioning of the 
economic model, or even more sensitive issues such as culture, are left 
unquestioned. This provides the basis for the second dominant aspect of the 
technical views of empowerment, which is the emphasis on its procedural 
dimension, in particular, participatory processes. 
Indeed, by and large most institutions that work with empowerment focus on 
participatory practices. The rationale for this is based on the principle of equity 
(Cleaver, 2001: 37) where the beneficiaries are placed at the centre of the 
process, which enables their voices to be heard and taken into account in 
policies that will affect their lives (Cooke and Kothari, 2001: 5; Scrutton and 
Luttrell, 2007). Additionally, focusing on empowerment as a process “draws 
attention to issues of reversibility” and facilitates policy-making (Eyben et al., 
2008: 6). 
While the concern with equity and reversibility has its merits, there are several 
problems with the participatory assumption when it comes to policy practice. 
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First, this understanding of effectiveness stems from a Westernised perspective 
of democracy and is based on the premise that, given the chance, people will 
express what they think and give any required input if this is something that 
may improve their lives. This view also reflects an economist’s interpretation of 
the individual as a rational utility maximizer which is something not supported 
by other theoretical and empirical accounts (Giddens, 1979: 55-59; Friedmann, 
1992: 32; Cooke, 2001). In addition, current participatory models are strongly 
based on verbal communication, which has several limitations, not least when it 
comes to external-local interactions in different cultural contexts (Cleaver, 2001: 
44; Mohan, 2001: 161; Millar, 2013). 
But perhaps the most perilous aspect of the emphasis on participation as a 
means to empowerment is that it promotes what seems to be a neutral view of 
the process (Fielding, 1996: 400). It is indeed the emphasis on the procedures 
that justifies the ‘technical’ (or a-political) aspect of empowerment. By asserting 
that everyone has the right to express their opinions and that the process allows 
that to happen, participatory approaches refrain from the responsibility of 
‘influencing’ people with alien inputs of right and wrong or biased external 
knowledge (except when the agenda is to promote participation itself). 
However, in line with what Bachrach and Baratz (1962) would say about power, 
the control of the process is already a power issue. If a local community is 
called to engage in participatory processes that are alien to their ordinary 
modus operandi, this will influence the way they respond to the process. And 
even in a context where participatory processes are not ‘alien’, it is very difficult 
to ensure that: all parties with different interests are participating; that they are 
actually expressing their views; and that, having expressed their views they will 
behave accordingly (Cooke, 2001). 
Implicit in the above assumptions is the idea that consensus will eventually take 
place in a group despite the internal differences that may exist. This reflects a 
benign view that empowering someone does not necessarily imply reducing 
someone else’s power (Thompson, 2007: 21), or that some individuals would 
be willing to accept a reduction in their power in favour of an increase for 
others. However, some situations simply do not offer a win-win solution and 
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conflict arises precisely because of the fundamental incompatibilities of interests 
(Fielding, 1996; Lopes and Theisohn, 2003). 
Furthermore, quite often the consensus reached during the participatory 
process is not genuine but reflects merely the new formal arrangement and 
responds to the expectations generated by these very arrangements. As 
pointed out by Cleaver (2001: 44), “the mere setting up of formal organizations 
and the specification of their membership does not necessarily overcome 
exclusion, subordination or vulnerability. It does not do so because the wider 
structural factors that shape such conditions and relations are often left 
untouched”. So verbal consensus does not translate into actual change and 
does not eradicate the fundamental problem that has caused exclusion in the 
first place (ibid.; Fielding, 1996). 
Finally, the over-emphasis on the process diverts attention from another 
fundamental aspect of empowerment — its outcomes. Mosse (2001), for 
instance, shows how participatory practices may be compatible with top-down 
planning systems, often even accentuating power asymmetries locally, as ‘who 
is the local’ is usually defined via a compromise with local actors and even what 
is labelled as ‘local knowledge’ entails complex micro-politics of knowledge that 
donors are not able to capture or influence. Additionally, the emphasis on the 
technique often places the concern with the results last (Pijnenburg, 2004: 9-11; 
Thompson, 2007) as participation becomes, in itself, an indicator of success. At 
worse, placing the process first at the expense of the outcomes may foster a 
relationship of dependency on external actors (the ‘providers’ of the technical 
knowledge), therefore, hindering empowerment instead of promoting it 
(Thompson, 2007: 31). 
EMANCIPATORY APPROACHES TO EMPOWERMENT 
The emancipatory approaches to empowerment are so called because of their 
radical understanding of empowerment. It is the kind of approach that prevailed 
during the 1970s and 1980s in several grassroots movements and that has 
tailored many of the feminist writings on the topic. As noted above, these 
approaches are strongly related to the concept of emancipation, as discussed in 
Critical Theory, in as much as they focus on the problem of power asymmetries 
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at the systemic level and how these cause disempowerment of specific groups 
of people. 
A Caveat on ‘Emancipation’ 
It should be noted that ‘emancipation’, as much as ‘empowerment’, does not 
have a fixed meaning, having acquired different connotations over time. In its 
origins, the concept goes back to the Enlightenment, when it was associated 
with “a view of progress as a movement towards freedom and equality” 
(Pieterse, 1992: 7). As noted by Pieterse, at the time emancipation was a 
unifying theme, which called for the liberation of the most diverse groups of 
people – the human kind – in the context of modernisation (ibid.). 
In time the concept became associated with the Frankfurt School and Critical 
Theory where, generally speaking, it is related to a deep critique of the status 
quo and the need for a transformation of the order so as to expand individual 
freedom (Horkheimer, 1937; Baumann, 2000; Wyn Jones, 2005). The details 
regarding what emancipation entails, nevertheless, vary significantly. 
Marx himself had a very broad understanding of human emancipation, stressing 
a difference between the former and political emancipation, which represented 
only partial emancipation. As he posited in On the Jewish Question (1844):  
Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract 
citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in 
his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, 
only when man has recognized and organized his “own powers” as social 
powers, and, consequently, no longer separates social power from 
himself in the shape of political power, only then will human 
emancipation have been accomplished.  
Marx’s understanding influenced scholars of the Frankfurt School. In his 
seminal 1937 essay, Horkheimer equated emancipation with the increased 
domination of nature, which was, in turn, related to the existing forces of 
production. In his view, the potential for a better life was present in the forces of 
production, however its concrete benefits were undermined because of the 
focus on capital instead of humanity as the main driver of the economy. His 
critique was, thus, directed to the status quo – namely, capitalism – as the 
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reason for the unfulfilled potential that could otherwise better serve human 
beings. Emancipation was directly related to the review of that order. 
Horkheimer’s view of emancipation was eminently material. The further 
development of Critical Theory, however, brought other dimensions into play. 
The work of Habermas, for example, redirected the focus of emancipation into 
the domain of communication and interaction. “On the Habermasian reading, 
speech is the location of emancipatory premise and capacity”, therefore “the 
developments that help realize this potential [unconstrained communication and 
unforced understanding] are considered emancipatory” (Wyn Jones, 2005: 
224).  
These definitions point to the different ways emancipation may be interpreted 
and the different analytical and practical implications arising from such 
understandings. They stress thus the flexible connotation of the term. Indeed, 
as noted by Bauman (2000), what emancipation entails needs to be 
contextualised according to its historical setting, which means that Critical 
Theory needs to be constantly revisited in order to explain the current 
expression of modernity. 
Perhaps because of the complexity underlying the debate on emancipation, the 
term is often referred to in an all-encompassing way. In Critical Security 
Studies, for instance, Booth (2005: 181) defines emancipation as: 
. . . the theory and practice of inventing humanity, with a view of freeing 
people, as individuals and collectivities, from contingent and structural 
oppressions. It is a discourse of human self-creation and the politics of 
trying to bring it about . . . The concept of emancipation shapes 
strategies and tactics of resistance, offers a theory of progress for 
society, and gives a politics of hope for common humanity. 
Discussing the concept from Marx’s perspective, Le Baron (1971: 562) notes 
that emancipation is “neither destination nor vehicle, but the journey itself, the 
continuous effort to enlarging freedom and community.” Furthermore, 
emancipation refers not only to the liberation from external chains of 
oppression, but also to the liberation of individuals from their own intellectual 
prison, or the realization of self-awareness (ibid.). 
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Whether the general and all encompassing understanding of emancipation is a 
strength or a weakness is subject to debate. According to Laclau (1996), the 
main dimensions of the concept of emancipation (which include its dichotomic 
character, its holistic dimension, transparency, the pre-existence of oppression, 
the dimensions of ground and rationality) are not a unified whole and do not 
constitute a coherent theoretical structure. In fact, he notes that “the assertion 
of the classical notion of emancipation in its many variants has evolved the 
advancement of incompatible logical claims” (Laclau, 1996: 2). Yet, this is not a 
weakness. On the contrary, “by playing within the system of logical 
incompatibilities of the latter we can open the way to new liberating discourses 
which are no longer hindered by the antinomies and blind alleys to which the 
classical notion of emancipation has led” (ibid.). 
To a certain extent, a similar argument may be raised in the case of 
empowerment. The contradictions that appear in the construction and 
operationalisation of the concept often point to incompatible logics. Yet, as this 
thesis argues, these contradictions help to shift the analysis from a pattern of 
linearity to one of dialectics and, at the same time, contribute the constant 
engagement in immanent critique as the change and movement of the concept 
needs to be constantly reassessed. 
Empowerment as Emancipation 
To a great extent, the emancipatory approaches to empowerment are based on 
the specific work of the activist and pedagogue Paulo Freire (1996) and his 
work on popular education and conscientisation, which is inspired by the 
Marxist idea of human emancipation. 
Freire’s (1996: 84) starting point is the idea of dehumanization, which is central 
to domination. According to him, the oppressed have been denied their 
humanity in as much as they have been reduced to ‘things’, transformed from 
subjects to objects. This domination, however, is only possible as long as the 
oppressed internalise their condition and accept it as natural. That is why the 
only solution for true liberation is what he calls conscientisation, “the deepening 
of the attitude of awareness characteristic of all emergence” (ibid.: 94-95). 
Conscientisation means being able to expand the boundaries of what one 
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deems possible, distinguishing between the actual consciousness (the current 
state) and the potential consciousness of the self (what could be) (ibid.). 
However, the conscientisation of some means the contestation of the power-
over of others. In sharp contrast to the technical approaches, power here is not 
only conflictual but has a dialectical character. It is conflictual because the 
awakening of the oppressed will inevitably shake the status quo that benefits 
the oppressors. It is dialectical because there are no oppressed without 
oppressors and vice-versa. Consequently, true liberation can only arise in 
communion, when both the oppressor and the oppressed perceive the problem 
of domination, and the fact that any individual will only be fully free as long as 
all humanity is free as well (Freire, 1996). 
Whereas both the technical and emancipatory approaches start with the 
acknowledgment of the existence of disempowerment, the latter goes further 
and has as its main concern why disempowerment exists and what is the force 
behind it. Therefore, while proponents want to find solutions, their approach is 
fundamentally problem-posing. This kind of frame derives precisely from the 
influence of Critical Theory and the radical concept of emancipation. 
A Critical perspective on empowerment focuses on the constant movement 
between the shaping of the structure in which individuals are embedded and its 
own transformation through agency (Giddens, 1979; Sztompka, 1993; Stirk, 
2000). It assumes that, if human beings perceive how social mechanisms work 
(conscientisation), they can actually envisage alternatives and take action to 
change things. So, whereas agency has a fundamental role, that is so because 
of its potential to change the structures that inhibit agency in the first place. 
When it comes to definitions of empowerment, the emancipatory approaches 
stress different aspects from the technical ones. According to Gita Sen (1997: 
2), a leading scholar in gender studies, “Empowerment is, first and foremost, 
about power; changing power relations in favour of those who previously 
exercised little power over their own lives” (emphasis added). Empowerment is, 
in this regard, linked to the ability of actors to gain control. 
Similarly, Batliwala (1993), also a reference in gender studies, defines 
empowerment as “a process, and the results of a process, of transforming the 
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relations of power between individuals and social groups” (quoted in Batliwala, 
2007: 560, emphasis added). She stresses the radical connotation of the 
concept, so that empowerment entails a “process that shifts social power in 
three critical ways: by challenging the ideologies that justify social inequality 
(such as gender and caste), by challenging prevailing patterns of access to and 
control over economic, natural, and intellectual resources, and by transforming 
the institutions and structures that reinforce and sustain existing power 
structures (such as the family, state, market, education, and media)” (ibid., 
emphasis added). 
The Colombo Statement of Asian NGOs and the People’s Organisations on 
People’s Empowerment in Asia20, defines empowerment as a “process by 
which people become conscious of the causes of their poverty or exploitation 
and then organise to use their collective skills, energies and resources to alter 
these conditions. It is an internal dynamic within the group, which occurs as a 
result of the group’s awareness of themselves and experiences in tackling 
problems” (quoted in Liamzon, 1997: 4, emphasis added). 
For Oakley (2001b: 13), the process of empowerment refers to the “relative 
positions of formal and informal power enjoyed by different socio-economic 
groups and the consequences of gross imbalances in the distribution of this 
power” (emphasis added). As such empowerment seeks to address this 
imbalance and “boost the power of those groups relatively ‘powerless’ in 
relation to the others” (ibid.). Alternatively, for Eyben et al. (2008; 6), 
“Empowerment happens when individuals and organised groups are able to 
imagine their world differently and to realise that vision by changing the 
relations of power that have been keeping them in poverty” (emphasis added). 
What these definitions have in common is the emphasis on (a) the power 
relations that sustain disempowerment and the need to overcome them, and (b) 
the need for the disempowered to perceive these issues and be able to see 
                                            
20 The event that led to the statement was sponsored by IRED (Innovations et Réseaux 
pour le Développement) a network of local partners from Africa, Latin America, and 
Asia-Pacific which includes peasant associations, fisherman, NGOs, etc. See official 
website: http://www.ired.org/. 
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different realities as possible options for their lives. So whether it is possible to 
change certain institutional aspects in order to foster empowerment, its 
actualisation is only possible through the self-awareness of the disempowered 
(see also Solomon, 1974; Fielding, 1996: 405); that is, the process is important, 
yet it is only effective as long as it reflects a deeper process of self-awareness 
that entails power redistribution. 
The emancipatory views of empowerment have also been subject to criticism as 
much as the technical approaches. In particular, post-modern scholars, inspired 
by Foucault’s views of power, criticise the emancipatory approaches on an 
emancipatory account. They point to the totalising tendency of the critical 
discourse, which is based on the assumption of a common truth applicable 
everywhere (Fielding, 1996: 408). The question that bothers them is who is to 
define who is oppressed, and what does it mean to be liberated (Baumann, 
2000). The post-modern critique has echoed in post-colonial studies both in 
Development as well as in Peace Studies. In the former case, the famous 
participatory rural approaches (PRA), introduced by Robert Chambers in the 
1980s (and later adopted by the World Bank) and designed precisely with the 
intent to listen to the ‘oppressed’ instead of imposing solutions, is now criticized 
because of its emphasis on a specific set of techniques (Cooke and Kothari, 
2001; Mohan, 2001).21 In Peace and Conflict Studies, critics have argued that 
the international emphasis on ownership and empowerment is nothing more 
than the exercise of power through a discourse that diverts attention away from 
the actual structural issues that cause underdevelopment in the first place (e.g., 
Duffield, 2001 and 2007; Chandler, 2006 and 2013). So the main problem 
becomes not ‘how to promote empowerment’, but who defines what 
empowerment is and who needs it. Critics also highlight how this manipulation 
is only possible because of the positive connotation of the term empowerment, 
and the pretence of a normative drive behind the initiatives that focus on it 
(Moore, 2001; Richmond, 2012). 
                                            
21 It is fair to say that Chambers did not aim to impose any set of techniques. However, 
PRA was eventually ‘captured’ by many organisations and used nearly as end in itself. 
As noted by Pijnenburg (2004: 9-16), Chambers frequently warned that the right 
attitude is more important than the mastery of the technique. 
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Post-modern critiques point to the need for constant reflexivity in the analysis 
and theorising of empowerment and to the limitations of the discourse whether 
technical or radical. However, if taken to the extreme, they may offer a strong 
epistemological critique but no practical solutions to address the issues of 
inequality and disempowerment (Friedmann, 1992: 12; Fielding, 1996; Pieterse, 
2010: 73).  
In this regard, I would like to highlight two main advantages of the emancipatory 
approaches to empowerment in relation to the technical and post-modern ones. 
First, a critical approach to empowerment is embedded in the idea of immanent 
critique. This allows for a constant questioning of the current state of affairs 
(and current policies rationale) and is more in tune with the constant movement 
of societies and their values, needs and aspirations. From this perspective, 
empowerment (as emancipation) should not be trapped into a dead end, but 
constantly reshaped, in order to fulfil its role of providing an ‘ideal’, an incentive 
for action towards change (see Booth, 2007). 
The second advantage is the breadth of the discussion on agency and structure 
underpinning it as well as its relation with power dynamics and change 
(Giddens, 1979; Sztompka, 1993; Stirk, 2000). Despite the challenges involved 
in incorporating such a level of abstract discussion into policy design (Cleaver, 
2012), this dichotomy allows for a constant reflection on the nature of agency, 
and possibilities for transformation. It also provides a space to investigate the 
complex interaction between manifestations of ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ in 
multiple levels of analysis. 
Despite the connections between the concept of emancipation and the radical 
expressions of empowerment, this thesis purposely differentiates between the 
two concepts based on two main reasons. First, it is important to flag the 
different backgrounds of each concept, in particular their (dis)connection with a 
specific set of theories. As noted, ‘emancipation’ was developed as a concept 
part of a much broader sociological discussion about modernisation. In contrast, 
‘empowerment’ has been rarely connected to social theory, being used mostly 
as an expected outcome of coordinated action or policy. 
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Second, whereas emancipation has been subject to debate, the concept itself 
has always been understood in the context of some kind of confrontation or 
power struggle. Regardless of the incompatible logics noted above (Laclau, 
1996), emancipation necessarily entails that some kind of oppression exists. As 
noted in the beginning of this chapter, that is not necessarily the case with 
‘empowerment’, at least since its co-optation into the mainstream political 
agenda. Retaining this differentiation is furthermore important in order to 
optimise the utility of empowerment as an analytical concept and enable a 
reflexive approach as the concept itself and its use are put under constant 
critique. Moreover, it also should be noted that the way ‘emancipation’ 
influences the radical strand of empowerment does not capture all the different 
understandings and interpretations that exist within the literature of 
emancipation22 therefore their direct equation would overlook the complexities 
permeating both debates. 
2.4 The Under-Discussed Features of Empowerment 
This section identifies three areas that have been given little attention in the 
literature on empowerment, both in the technical as well as in the emancipatory 
approaches. The first issue is the relevance of multiple levels of analysis for 
understanding the chain of events that lead to disempowerment and possibly to 
empowerment. Second is the role of power asymmetries and how power 
dynamics operate within and between these levels. Third is the role played by 
actors’ subjectivities and how they affect empowerment policy design and 
implementation. 
MULTIPLE LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
Most of the literature discussing empowerment and its operationalisation tends 
to focus on the micro-level or what is often termed ‘local’ or community level 
(Friedmann, 1992; Moore, 2001; Pijnenburg, 2004: 21-23; Thompson, 2007: 23; 
                                            
22 Such critique is also made in the case of Critical Security Studies (CSS). Peoples 
(2011) for instance, notes that much of the CSS literature adopts a specific 
interpretation of ‘emancipation’ that eschews the role that violence may play in 
promoting emancipation. 
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Pieterse, 2010; Cleaver, 2012). This logic is influenced by Schumacher’s idea 
that ‘small is beautiful’ and that small scale initiatives have a better chance of 
working because they allow for direct engagement with the people, avoid 
excessive bureaucratization, are less costly, and are in tune with the 
participatory strategies that are part of the empowerment discourse (Friedmann, 
1992: 139-141; Duffield, 2007: 56-59). 
However, excessive localism has been criticised on several grounds. For one, 
what/who is ‘local’ and even what constitutes a ‘community’ is not 
straightforward, especially, when it comes to participatory techniques. If 
anything, these labels tend to disguise strong heterogeneity as well as intra-
group conflict and power asymmetries (Cleaver, 2001: 44; Pijnenburg, 2004: 
22; Pieterse, 2010: 68-69). Also, the relationship between individuals and group 
empowerment, and how the empowerment of some may enhance the 
empowerment of the rest, is not clear either, and different assumptions may 
lead to very different policy strategies (Zimmerman, 1990: 169-170). Even more 
controversial is the quality of the results achieved by local vs. large-scale 
projects for ‘local’ empowerment and how sustainable they can be (Friedmann, 
1992; Duffield, 2007: 56-59; Cleaver, 2012: 6-7). 
In theory, there is no rule stating that empowerment should be circumscribed to 
one specific level of analysis, neither in terms of policy formulation, nor in terms 
of policy implementation. Indeed, some scholars have attempted to combine 
different levels of analysis in their frameworks (e.g., Solomon, 1974; Kabeer, 
2001; Alsop et al., 2006). Friedmann (1992), for instance, while placing 
emphasis on the household as the main focus of empowerment, has noted that 
the sustainability of any development policy might be severely compromised if 
there is no state support in the long run. Sen (2000), Lopes (2002), and Green 
(2008) stress that the state has a fundamental role in empowerment promotion 
to guarantee the power acquired by the excluded will be sustained in the long 
term. Moore (2001) and Eyben et al. (2008) further point out, that the state may 
facilitate empowerment through the enforcement of the rule of law and the 
promulgation of legal rights as well as by sustaining policies aiming at asset re-
distribution. 
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Often these state-related aspects are encapsulated under the label ‘structure’ or 
‘structural’. The World Bank, for instance, refers to the ‘opportunity structure’ as 
comprising “those institutions that govern people’s behaviour and that influence 
the success or failure of the choices that they make” (Alsop et al., 2006: 13). 
They define institutions as the “rules of the game” that guide/constrain human 
interaction and individual choices (ibid.). However, whilst they refer to formal 
and informal institutions, they avoid ‘global institutions’. Instead they suggest 
domains where empowerment may occur (the state, the market, and society) 
(ibid.: 19), but which are analysed mainly from a national dynamics perspective. 
In fact, when they refer to levels of analysis, they narrow them to the 
administrative boundaries of the state (macro, intermediary, and local) (ibid.: 
21). 
Moving beyond the local and state levels of analysis, authors such as Duffield 
and Chandler prefer to focus on the international system and how systemic 
dynamics influence empowerment discourse and practice. Inspired by 
Foucault’s notion of biopolitics, Duffield (2007) criticizes the emphasis on local 
and small self-reliance initiatives arguing that they are part of a set of 
mechanisms that are put in place in order to legitimate the liberal order while 
containing any possible disruption by those worse off, which is why their 
(in)efficiency should be understood contextually. Chandler (2013), instead, 
focuses on the assumptions of the liberal discourse and what he sees as an 
important change in the last few years, which is the shift from ‘freedom’ to 
‘necessity’ as a central concept within this agenda. This shift, he says, reflects a 
necessary review of the techniques of governmentality because ‘freedom’ has 
become progressively more contested and flawed. Human-centred approaches, 
which emphasise capacity-building and empowerment, are, however, 
constraining human freedom as they place the responsibility of the world’s 
problems onto the individuals and it is, therefore, the individuals who have to 
adapt to the system and not the system that needs to change (see also Pugh et 
al., 2011; Cooper et al. 2011). Ultimately, from these perspectives, the 
empowerment agenda is not really empowering but mostly a form of 
legitimating a power discourse. 
	   73	  
One of the differences between these critiques, besides their epistemological 
stand, is their general target. Focusing on the global system may be seen as a 
way to find the fundamental problem that generates all the other practical 
problems; however, it makes policy-making much more challenging. This thesis 
defends the idea that understanding empowerment requires navigating through 
multiple levels of analysis. Even if the aim is to empower a small local 
constituency, understanding the causes of disempowerment requires moving 
along the spectrum of global, national, and local power dynamics in order to 
propose effective policies. This is because the ‘power blocks’ — factors that 
obstruct the expansion of power-to of a marginalised group (Solomon, 1974: 
16-17) — are often located on a different level from the one where 
disempowerment is visible. At the same time, the framework proposed here dos 
not claim that the causality of local issues resides exclusively or principally in 
global structural aspects. Instead, it implies being open to the several chains of 
actions within and between levels. In other words, one needs to focus on power 
dynamics within and between each level of analysis to understand the chain of 
effects that lead to disempowerment instead of defining a priori which level of 
analysis is dominant in that particular situation. 
POWER DYNAMICS WITHIN AND BETWEEN LEVELS 
Taking into consideration multiple levels of analysis allows us to see power from 
a new angle and realise that empowerment promotion entails multiple chains of 
action that involve different power dynamics between various sets of actors, at 
different moments in time and at different levels. Therefore, it is not just about 
measuring if the ‘target population’ has become empowered, but how the final 
result relates to the process as a whole. 
At the most macro level of analysis, the global level, there are several domains 
where power is detectable. The emphasis on the global discourse of 
empowerment, and how it was re-defined during the 1980s and 1990s, is one 
example (Cornwall and Brock, 2005; Batliwala, 2007; Duffield, 2007; Chandler, 
2013). The definition of the discourse is important because it carries a set of 
assumptions that, once normalised in the agenda, are rarely questioned and 
become the basis for new discourses, compounding the habitus. The emphasis 
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on power-to and capacity-building as cornerstones for empowerment, for 
instance, tends to reify and legitimise the artificial dichotomy ‘capacitor/learner’ 
or its alternatives ‘donor/beneficiary’, ‘empowered/ disempowered-powerless’, 
‘developed/developing’, and transforms the ‘receiver’ into a mainly passive 
actor and the ‘helper’ into a modern version of a good Samaritan (Freire, 1996; 
Fielding, 1996; Easterly, 2006; Duffield, 2007). Another derived assumption is 
the belief in a neutral technical and transferable kind of knowledge; an 
assumption criticised at many levels in different fields of knowledge (Ibid.; Sen, 
1997; Foucault, 2004; Chang, 2006; Francis, 2010; Pugh et al., 2011). 
While these approaches point out fundamental features of power, they also 
stress the structural domain and power-over as the central explanatory dynamic 
relegating other dynamics as derivative. From this point of view, even if an 
empowerment promotion policy is successful at the local level, it does not mean 
that it is successful from a more systemic point of view (Ibid.). Instead, it may be 
the case that small changes are generated in order to prevent a bigger change 
happening, and this could be ultimately more disempowering in the long run 
(Duffield, 2007). 
I would like to posit that, whereas, this may be the case in many instances, 
such a systemic approach may also be as reductionist as focusing exclusively 
on the micro-level since attributing the ‘guilt’ of the problems to the structure 
(e.g., liberalism, capitalism) is also a way to shift responsibility away from the 
actors within it and ignore parallel power structures that often play an even 
more important role in some individual’s lives. In practice, conflict is always 
present at different levels of the social system, and even though some 
discourses are relatively homogeneous at the global level, national decisions 
differ and social consequences are different between countries and within 
countries. What generates this heterogeneity is the geometry of power that 
results from key interactions at each level. 
For instance, donors may have a strong voice in specific policy areas of a 
developing country that is aid-dependent such as Mozambique. However, 
internal political issues may sometimes prevail and affect the way decisions are 
taken in the Assembly. This, in turn, may also be influenced by the trend in local 
elections and the perception of political insecurity of the current government. At 
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the same time, for the local population in a rural village the main factor that 
influences their electoral behaviour may not be understood outside their cultural 
belief system. At each of these levels of interactions, there are power-to/power-
over dynamics at play, and the final outcome of a situation is inextricably linked 
to how these relate to each other at a specific point in time. In some instances 
donors’ influence may prevail, while at other times the government may actually 
defy donors preferences because internal power dynamics or countervailing 
global norms (such as sovereignty) take precedence. 
Integrating these levels is key to understanding empowerment and requires 
exploring arenas that have been often marginalised in the empowerment 
literature (Pieterse, 2010: 7), in particular, the domain of policy-making and the 
micro-dynamics of power which include the recognition of the role played by 
both formal and informal institutions such as ideology, culture, and tradition 
(Bourdieu, 1977; Gledhill, 2000; Mosse, 2001; Kothari, 2001; Cleaver, 2012). 
The latter are particularly important in shaping people’s understandings of the 
world and, therefore, help us comprehend their rationality and behaviour as 
much as their understanding of their own power. The next section will explore 
this further by focusing on the idea of subjectivities and its relevance for the 
empowerment debate. 
ACTOR’S SUBJECTIVITIES OF POWER 
Empowerment, regardless of how we define it, is based on the implicit 
assumption that the disempowered want to improve their lives. From the 
technical perspective, given the right opportunities, these actors will almost 
naturally take action to improve their life condition. From the point of view of the 
emancipatory approaches, the subject needs to become conscious of the 
reasons that lead to that condition of disempowerment, and once this takes 
place, their actions will also change. Either way, it is taken for granted that the 
subjects in question want to change their situation, and that change implies 
agency, which implies action. In summary, the subject is defined by her/his 
capacity to act. 
As obvious as it may seem, this assumption is very problematic. First, it is often 
the case that when circumstances change, behaviours do not change 
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accordingly (or not as policy planners expect them to). Second, and more 
fundamentally, this ontological assumption may be contested from a 
philosophical perspective. Indeed, according to Reader (2007), the emphasis 
on ‘persons as agents’ that pervades most of the social sciences is nothing less 
than a contestable philosophical bias that places those who are passive, 
dependent, and constrained as ‘counting less’ or being less of a person while 
valuing those who act (see also Scott, 1985). This is particularly so in the 
empowerment discourse, where the general aim is to foster action, seen as the 
main conduit for social change. However, patiency, which Reader presents as 
the opposite of agency (or its passive aspect) is as important as agency to the 
extent that one does not exist without the other. Therefore, in as much as 
agency is important, resistance, suffering, and non-action are important 
elements of the subject and should be given equal value in the analysis of 
social life. 
In the case of empowerment, placing attention on the agency bias may be very 
helpful as it makes us reconsider the idea that non-agency is necessarily a 
reflexion of power-over, or that non-action for change equals false 
consciousness. Instead, it reminds us to dive deep into the frames that shape 
individual’s actions in order to better understand them and, thus, understand 
why some kinds of social conditions change more easily while others seem to 
stagnate over time. 
In this thesis I use the term subjectivities to refer to the way the subjects see 
themselves and the world around them. By using the term subjectivities (plural) 
I intend to separate it from the general connotation linked to subjectivity 
(singular). The latter is more often related to Foucault’s research on the 
techniques of the self, that is, “how was the subject established, at different 
moments and in different institutional contexts, as a possible, desirable, or even 
indispensable object of knowledge” (Foucault, 2000: 87). This concept is 
certainly relevant, if we think of the weight that agency has played in this 
literature, however the Foucauldian approach also bans any possible 
conception of freedom and emancipation as it states that how the subject sees 
herself is in itself a product of power-over (Haugaard, 1997: 43-47; Holloway, 
2010: 39-40). From this perspective, the very basic notion of empowerment 
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makes no sense, as here even the idea of freedom is a result of some external 
technique of social control. 
From a Marxist-oriented perspective, subjectivity has a different connotation, 
one that stands for “the conscious projection beyond that which exists, the 
ability to negate that which exists and to create something that does not exist 
yet” and, as such, it encompasses a movement against limits (Holloway, 2010: 
25-26; see also Freire, 1996: 32-33; Booth, 2007: 112). In this case, subjectivity 
relates to liberation and a state of freedom, where the subject rescues their 
humanity and ceases to be an object (ibid.). This perspective is equally 
problematic as it implies that the subject is only a subject when she/he is 
‘conscious’ without defining how this criterion is met. 
Subjectivities (plural) is a more flexible concept. It accepts the existence of 
diverse sets of values, of “multiple interpretative horizons [that] give actors an 
ability to adapt to social context and [that] are a source of autonomy” 
(Haugaard, 1997: 187). Such values influence both the practical and discursive 
consciousness knowledge of individuals and the way they socialize, and they 
may often clash (ibid.: 179-187). Practical consciousness knowledge refers to 
the tacit knowledge that the actor is not able to formulate discursively, whereas, 
discursive consciousness knowledge implies that they have reflected on it (as 
the rational actor model assumes) (Giddens, 1979: 56-57). This dichotomy is 
important as it contests the general assumption of the rational actor that 
pervades most economics and political science models, including policy-
making. 
Bourdieu’s analysis of social representation is particularly helpful in this regard. 
According to him, “every established order tends to produce the naturalization 
of its own arbitrariness” (Bourdieu, 1977: 164). This happens through several 
mechanisms, of which, by far the most important, is the sense of limits (or 
sense of reality) that each individual has. He uses the term doxa to refer to the 
experience of taking for granted a specific reality or set of rules that govern 
social action. The doxa is fundamental to habitus. It is possible to change a 
doxa, but it is extremely difficult as general patterns of behaviour tend to 
validate the existing taxonomies that classify people and, therefore, reinforce 
the doxa (ibid.: 169). When a contestation happens, that is when it is possible to 
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see the doxa, not as an absolute reality, but as a discourse that has a 
competing alternative. 
The major difficulty in changing systems of representation is the fact that each 
individual inhabits a specific social space that tends to reinforce and validate 
the same practices that sustain that specific structure (Bourdieu, 1987: 233).  
These positions are linked to the distribution of specific resources, which 
include material but also cultural and symbolic content and that define that 
individual’s identity (ibid.). Therefore choices are not equal, and the costs 
associated with change for each individual depends on her/his position in 
society as much as from her/his feeling of identity. This is in turn what tailor 
individuals’ actions, and leads them to build strategies that take into account 
their concern with time, uncertainty, and practical consciousness (not rational 
choice) (Swartz, 1997: 101). That is why in certain cases gaining consciousness 
(e.g., a more critical view of reality) will not necessarily lead to a different form 
of action. 
It is this perspective of subjectivities, linked with a multilevel framework of 
empowerment and the idea of power dynamics, that constitutes the basis of the 
empowerment framework that I propose in this thesis. The next section 
discusses this model in more detail. 
2.5 Understanding Empowerment through a Multilevel 
Framework of Analysis 
One of the widely recognised challenges in the empowerment literature is that 
of measurement (Sen, 1997; Rowlands, 1997; Oakley 2001a; Kabeer, 2001; 
Fox, 2004; Holland and Brook, 2004; Alsop, 2006). The multitude of definitions, 
the variations in scope, and levels of analysis make it hard to determine the 
common variables that should be included in an empowerment framework. 
Similarly, the general emphasis on its procedural aspect and the 
acknowledgment that empowerment includes both tangible as well as intangible 
aspects contribute to making this task extremely challenging (ibid.). 
In the face of such complexity, many models have opted to segregate 
dimensions of empowerment according to categories such as material/non-
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material aspects, economic/political/social and other domains (e.g., Friedmann, 
1992; Oakley, 2001a; Alsop, 2006; Eyben et al., 2008), degrees of 
empowerment (Kabeer, 2001), effects according to the type of power in a 
specific dimension (personal, contextual, collective) (Rowlands, 1997; Kabeer, 
2001), different focuses of the process (contextual, structural, inner) (Rowlands, 
1997), and the list could go on (Stern et al., 2005; Luttrell and Quiroz, 2009). 
The need to fragment the concept into so many categories and variables 
partially arises from the way policies are evaluated. Indeed, many of these 
models are designed by practitioners and become references within specific 
development agencies.   
The model proposed below is less concerned with dissecting but more with 
bridging elements that are often arbitrarily separated. Instead of trying to find a 
correlation between inputs and outputs, this framework highlights the rationale 
behind the chosen inputs. Instead of finding degrees of empowerment, it 
emphasises the dialectical dimension of power. Instead of looking for a specific 
objective measurement of empowerment, it assesses how the understanding of 
it changes within and across levels of analysis, and how this influences policy 
results. 
In the context of the different approaches to empowerment, this framework aims 
to move beyond the idea of empowerment exclusively as a policy outcome or 
as the overcoming of dynamics of oppression. In this regard, the framework 
offers comprehensive space to: 
(1) Understand the different ways that empowerment may be understood 
by considering the domain of policy formulation and policy 
implementation. 
(2) Aggregate both ‘emancipatory’ aspects (i.e., the systemic level and 
the relationship between agency and structure and power dynamics) and 
the ‘technical’ aspects of empowerment (i.e., the aspect of actors’ 
capacity, or power-to). 
(3) Consider the critical inputs from post-modern critiques, by stressing 
the role of subjectivities of the various actors involved in the process. 
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Consequently, the model allows a policy to be assessed from different 
perspectives, in particular by considering the aspect of policy coherence 
(between the logics that sustain the policy and the logics that sustain action at 
the level where the policy operates) and its actual potential and effectiveness in 
promoting emancipatory effects regarding the target population. Beyond that, 
because of the emphasis on a dialectical perspective of power, the framework 
further problematizes the very emancipatory potential of the policy under 
analysis, by considering the different power dynamics at play in a specific 
setting at any given moment. 
Conceptually, empowerment is here understood as a dynamic process whereby 
actors perceive their situation as unfavourable to their interests and change 
their attitudes in order to transform their situation. It implies, therefore, the idea 
of questioning or contesting of a current reality and the expansion of the 
boundaries of what is deemed possible. It also implies the recognition of an 
individual’s personal power, which further entails a change of mental attitude 
and the reconsideration of an individual’s power-to and power-over that s/he 
exerts or is subject to. The empowerment framework proposed here (Figure 
2.2) incorporates the three elements discussed in the previous section. First, it 
incorporates multiple levels of analysis; second, it focuses on the power 
dynamics within and between these levels; third, it includes the role of 
subjectivities alongside capacity and agency. 
The recognition of different levels of analysis does not imply the recognition of a 
hierarchy among them. In practice, as the case study will show, more often than 
not the boundaries between global/national, national/local, and so forth, are not 
clear-cut. However, this stratification captures the domain of the formal and 
informal structures where empowerment policies are designed and 
implemented as well as their geographical scope. As such, the global system 
includes actors such as donors (e.g., the UNDP, the World Bank, international 
NGOs, and donors in general), institutions and discourses that somehow 
influence the behaviour of the national government (e.g., the international 
dominant development discourse), and practices that also shape expectations 
and behaviours of the national actors (e.g., aid expectations and 
conditionalities). 
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The national level includes the core state government apparatus (e.g., the 
Ministry of Development and Planning, the Ministry of Finance, and the 
president), formal regulations (such as the legislation on state administration 
and the regulation regarding the ‘7 million’), informal political practices (e.g., 
linked with the historical relationship between the main political parties and 
networks of political patronage), and the civil society in general (e.g., national 
NGOs, research institutes, the press). 
The sub-national level includes all those structures that have a narrower 
geographical scope than the national one and include, for instance, the 
provincial and district governments as well as local CSOs. I included this level 
of analysis in order to differentiate between dynamics of power that have a wide 
national component from those that take place at the more local-level and yet 
are not necessarily as local as the community. These intermediary levels are 
extremely important, as the case study reveals, because they have the potential 
to affect power, both upwards as well as downwards, connecting the macro-
level to the micro one. 
The community-level includes the target group of those to be empowered. In 
Mozambique, it includes the people living in the rural districts, peasants, local 
traders, as well as community authorities. The community-level is extremely 
hybrid and strongly influenced by informal power dynamics linked to tradition 
and which usually mix with formal domains of state power and sometimes 
overrule it. 
Finally, the individual-level is placed in this figure in order to emphasise what is 
the smallest unit of analysis when it comes to empowerment. In practice, 
however, it is impossible to separate it from the community-level, as the way 
individuals think and behave is inextricably linked to their place in the 
community. At the same time, placing the individual in focus is also a way to 
counter the usual emphasis on the group and highlight the heterogeneous 
effects that empowerment promotion may have in a community. 
The three elements in the smaller circles (subjectivities, capacity, 
agency/patiency) are not exclusive to the individual domain but permeate each 
level of analysis. Subjectivites refers to the actors’ ways of understanding the 
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world and themselves in it. Agency and patiency relates to the options of taking 
action or not (or strategy). Capacity refers to the actors’ material and non-
material potential to carry out activities that may lead to a pre-defined objective. 
It may include, for instance, knowledge, authority, assets, information and 
freedom. The arrows linking these three elements stress that they are highly 
related and a change in one of these domains may affect the others in a 
positive or negative way. 
Figure 2.2: Multilevel Framework of Empowerment 
 
 
Power dynamics pervade all the spectrum of the framework. The dotted line 
without arrows means that power is not uniform and has no pre-defined 
direction in the scheme. Instead the way it manifests may be very different at 
each level and between them, depending on the context and moment in time. 
The final outcome (expectedly empowerment) is then the result of the 
combination of these elements and may be transformative or reifying, according 
to changes in the power configuration. 
Theoretically, and taking into account the discussion carried out in the previous 
sections, this model is based on the following assumptions: 
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1–Power asymmetries permeate social relations at different levels, and 
structural aspects (the way social life is organised, including at the global level) 
are fundamental to understanding what happens at the local level. However, 
structures are not fixed and can be changed by human agency in different 
ways. 
2–The way actors understand their reality is pivotal to the comprehension of 
their behaviour, as people act according to how they think. In that sense, they 
are constantly engaged in creating reality. From this perspective, focusing on 
the rejection of truth or on ‘false consciousness’ is problematic. Instead, 
focusing on meaning and interpretation, as much as power distribution, helps us 
understand the subtler nuances that shape agency. Ultimately, measuring 
empowerment purely in objective terms runs against the central aspect of the 
concept itself. 
3–Power operates in a dialectical way, and this is reflected in the way 
empowerment operates. Understanding empowerment as exclusively the 
increase of power-to is analytically narrow. Acknowledging the relationship 
between power-over and power-to, as well as the existence of conflicts of 
interest and power asymmetries at all levels is in fact a prerequisite to 
understand disempowerment and therefore to formulate policies that are more 
realistic and in tune with the context where they operate. 
4– Empowerment is both a process and an end. It is a process as it is dynamic 
in nature, as much as power is. It is an end because it is based on the idea that 
the current circumstances may be improved, so it only makes sense as long as 
there is a potential change envisioned by the actors. 
5– Empowerment does not necessarily need ‘help’ to unfold and sometimes 
‘help’ actually curbs empowerment even if it aims to promote it. The emphasis 
on ‘help’ suits the current dominant approach to empowerment very well, but it 
runs against the radical connotation of empowerment. As will be discussed in 
the case study, ‘promoting empowerment’ only makes sense in a context where 
individuals see themselves as disempowered, and there is congruence between 
their views and those of the ‘helpers’ regarding the causes of the 
disempowerment. Unfortunately, this synergy is not the rule. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
From a radical concept that has shaped the course of several grassroots 
movements in the 1960s and 1970s, empowerment has travelled a long way 
and today rests comfortably in the agenda of mainstream development 
institutions such as the World Bank. As a feel-good concept, it has been 
extensively used alongside most development policies in both developing and 
developed countries, and it has become part of a general development ethics 
that places an emphasis on bottom-up participatory approaches. By highlighting 
two main discourses of empowerment — the technical and emancipatory 
approaches — one of my objectives was to show that competitive discourses 
do exist on the matter, and that the prevalence of one over the other has to be 
understood in light of historical circumstances. By doing so, while not refuting 
the relevance of the discursive critiques to both approaches, I also pointed out 
their limitations as explanatory accounts of social change. My second aim was, 
therefore, to identify in the former approaches areas that still need exploration 
in order to improve empowerment as a theoretical concept and also as a policy 
tool. The framework proposed at the end is the result of this effort. By mixing 
multiple levels of analysis, focusing on power dynamics within and between 
levels, and placing subjectivities at the centre of the analysis, I am suggesting 
that we need to move towards a more holistic approach to empowerment that is 
in tune with the complexities of social change and policy-making. 
The remaining chapters of this thesis largely follow the levels of analysis in the 
framework starting from the top and continuing to the bottom. The following two 
chapters discuss empowerment focusing predominantly on the national and 
international levels. Chapter 3 focuses on the historical background of 
Mozambique, taking into account general dynamics of empowerment and 
disempowerment that have shaped the constitution of the Mozambican state. 
Chapter 4 concentrates on the reconstitution of the state apparatus that 
followed the peace agreements signed in 1992 and discusses the extent to 
which peace has opened space for more empowering opportunities to those at 
the margins of the political system. Chapters 5 and 6 turn to the discussion of 
the ‘7 million’. First, Chapter 5 focuses on the ‘7 million’ policy formulation and 
the power dynamics shaping the initiative’s existence focusing, in particular, at 
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the national and provincial levels. Subsequently, Chapter 6 explores the policy 
implementation, in particular, at the community level contrasting the different 
local subjectivities regarding the ‘7 million’ as well as how the initiative has 
influenced local actor’s propensity towards agency or patiency. 
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Chapter 3 
Colonialism, Independence, and Fragmentation: 
Dynamics of Empowerment and Disempowerment from 
a Historical Perspective 
 
The struggle is part of the world’s movement for the 
emancipation of the oppressed peoples, which aims at the total 
liquidation of colonialism and imperialism, and the construction of 
a new society free from exploitation of man by man. 
(Statement of Frelimo’s Second Congress, 1968) 
 
This chapter explores the historical background of what has become a ‘peace 
success-story’ Mozambique. It focuses on the power dynamics that have 
shaped the constitution of the Mozambican state and its society and, more 
deeply, it points to the fluidity and dialectical dimension of these power 
dynamics. It argues first, that these dynamics cannot be understood linearly. All 
through this period, power assumed different forms and shifted often very 
rapidly. More fundamentally, power was always contested. Second, in spite of 
many efforts towards change, it is possible to visualise several patterns of 
continuity, even within change. The persistence of specific patterns highlights 
how difficult it is to change dynamics of empowerment and disempowerment. 
Indeed, the historical processes examined in this chapter are crucial to 
understand important contemporary aspects that characterise Mozambique’s 
state, society, and the functioning and effectiveness of the ‘7 million’ initiative. 
The chapter is divided into four sections. First, it discusses the colonial period, 
in particular, the different policies adopted by the Portuguese that contributed to 
the systematic disempowerment of the natives while also creating different 
patterns of stratification. Second, it shows how these policies were constantly 
resisted, first at the micro-level, then through the creation of the liberation 
movement, which also contained deep seeds of division. The third section of 
the chapter discusses the emancipatory call of Frelimo’s agenda after 
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independence and its theoretical and practical contradictions. The final section 
delves into the power dynamics of the post-independence war highlighting the 
different forms of power contestation as well as the effects of violence on local 
dynamics of empowerment and disempowerment. 
3.1 Portuguese Colonialism in Mozambique 
Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique can be divided into three phases. The 
first starts with the first Portuguese incursions in the late 15th century and lasted 
until the end of the 19th century, and it was marked by very limited, if any, 
control of the colonial territory. The second phase lasted from 1890 until 1930 
and was characterised by the entrenching of a colonial system based on 
concessions and labour export to foreign companies, which fundamentally 
altered the social and economic landscape of the colonial territory. The final 
phase, which lasted until independence, reflected the desperate effort of a 
fascist Portugal to alter the colonial model of exploitation and make the system 
even more exploitative and authoritarian. Despite the nuances in each phase, 
the colonial period is overall characterised by the increasing institutionalisation 
of several mechanisms of disempowerment that affected the majority of the 
native population as well as by the creation of new forms of social stratification. 
These effects would have long-term consequences in Mozambique and would 
eventually influence the political choices of the independence movement. 
EARLY COLONIALISM 
The Portuguese officially arrived in what is today Mozambique in 1498. Before 
that, Mozambique was organised into different communities with independent 
chieftaincies that were governed by land chiefs who often also had religious 
authority. The chief was the ultimate owner of the land and its spiritual guardian 
and was entitled to an annual tax either in agricultural produce or labour. This 
was the main mechanism of social differentiation. Two large state systems, the 
kingdom of Muenemutapa and the Malawi Confederation, controlled most of 
central Mozambique. Trade was important in both systems and was dominated 
by the Swahili network, which extended throughout the Indian Ocean between 
the Middle East and Asia (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 12-14). The arrival of 
the Portuguese, along with their own commercial interests, posed a direct threat 
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to this system. Years of struggle followed, but even after Mozambique was 
granted colonial status in 1752,23 Portugal was not yet able to dominate the 
trade network (ibid.). 
In spite of this, the arrival of the settlers profoundly affected the local social 
system. In 1629 the Portuguese introduced a system of land grants called 
prazos, which lasted until 1930. The prazo was a kind of feudal administrative 
scheme, which granted the settler not only the land, but also the responsibility 
to secure revenues and the local population’s submission to the Portuguese 
administration (Newitt, 1997: 203; Hanlon, 1984: 15; Cabaço, 2009: 70-71). 
That meant that the settler had practically unlimited power in his hands. 
Initially, the main revenues of the prazos came from trade.  Then, from the 18th 
century on, most of the revenues came instead from the slave trade to Brazil 
and Cuba, which had devastating consequences for Mozambique (Isaacman 
and Isaacman, 1983: 16; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 15; Newitt, 1997: 
232, 248). Overall, it is very likely that over one million Mozambicans were 
captured and sold as slaves during the nineteenth century (Isaacman and 
Isaacman, 1983: 17-18). This had a dramatic demographic effect. First, it 
destroyed the existing village structure, forcing the population to adopt new 
settling patterns, often damaging their means of livelihood, as they had to move 
away from the fertile lands where they used to live. Second, it contributed to 
increased economic disparities and social inequalities because a small class of 
merchants became increasingly rich in sharp contrast to the majority of the local 
population. Finally, it promoted cleavages within the African society, in 
particular, between clans and tribes that were the intermediaries in the slave 
business (Ibid.; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 15-16). Despite these 
circumstances, for a long time the Portuguese were not in a position to control 
the Northern part of Mozambique. On the contrary, the slave trade ultimately 
weakened the Portuguese hold over Northern and Central Mozambique 
sparking the resurgence of Muslim sultanates (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 
17-18). 
                                            
23 Before that, it was administered as part of Portuguese India (Goa). 
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Things changed after the Berlin Conference in 1884-1885. The renewal of 
international colonial competition, the 1822 loss of Brazil, and Britain’s 
economic push into Mozambique, led Portugal to employ strong military action 
in order to gain colonial control (Hall and Young, 1997: 3; MacQueen, 1997: 2), 
but, with few exceptions, they faced extreme resistance and conflict endured 
especially in the north (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 22-23; MacQueen, 
1997: 6). In 1896, the Portuguese army suffered a defeat in a major offensive 
against the Makua people who had the support of the sultanates of Angoche, 
Quitanghona, and Marave. In 1910, armed with 4600 men and heavy artillery, 
Portugal responded, and, by the end of the year, the Makua surrendered (ibid.). 
This was followed by the subsequent defeat of Quintaghona and Angoche, 
which marked the beginning of the Portuguese control in the north of what 
would become Mozambique. 
It is worth noting that, at this stage, the resistance faced by the Portuguese was 
very fragmented and based on very different agendas that varied according to 
identity and interests. Moreover, the slave trade had a major role in promoting 
social differentiation by creating a new social hierarchy which, ultimately, 
enhanced competition between these groups (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 
24). 
ENTRENCHING A DEPENDENT COLONIAL SYSTEM 
One fundamental characteristic of Portuguese late-colonialism was that, unlike 
other European colonial powers, Portugal did not use its colonies to feed its 
industrial revolution (Munslow, 1983: 5; Hanlon, 1984: 15-19). Indeed, Portugal 
was still a fundamentally agrarian economy when it consolidated its presence in 
its African colonies. In this context, the colonies became a source of raw 
materials to be sold and later invested in Portugal. In the case of Mozambique, 
after the slave trade was prohibited, the settlers looked for new streams of 
revenue, which consisted of renting out the colony. From then on, most of the 
colonial profit came from the export of labour and transit fees to the region, in 
particular to South Africa, which was then undergoing a mineral revolution (ibid.; 
Hall and Young, 1997: 4). This new phase, which was also marked by the 
entrenchment of more effective colonial administrative control, had a major 
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impact in Mozambique. Primarily, there was a change in the geographical 
pattern of the colony’s economy after moving its core from north to south. As a 
result of this new ‘integrated’ model, which Frelimo would later call ‘shopkeeper 
colonialism’ (Hanlon, 1984: 22), Mozambique became heavily dependent on 
South Africa (Munslow, 1983: 26; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1997: 17-18; 
MacQueen, 1997: 7). 
The social effects of colonialism in Mozambique were enormous. First, the 
Portuguese settlers were themselves very poorly educated and poorly trained. 
Some were actually condemned prisoners who were sent to the colony for their 
sentence (Newitt, 1995: 404). Furthermore, until 1933, those operating at the 
most basic administrative level of the colony had absolute power to accuse, 
apprehend, try, and sentence their subjects often acting with violence and 
complete impunity (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 29). Second, in order to 
govern, the Portuguese took measures that profoundly altered the existing 
social order exerting a proper balkanisation of these societies by dismantling all 
political-administrative structures that had become a symbol of resistance as 
well as all centralised societies and lineage systems (Cabaço, 2009: 76). 
In order to be able to govern effectively, the Portuguese had to rely on local 
collaborators and mercenaries. Key to this process were the régulos, members 
of local royal families, who were hired in order to administer parts of the territory 
called regedorias or regulados. The régulos were exempt from taxation and 
forced labour, and their work consisted of tax collection, local dispute resolution, 
and the maintenance of public order (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 29). They 
also counted on a series of extra-benefits such as the right to use forced labour 
to increase their own production and selling their crops at a higher price. They 
wore a uniform set by the government and were entitled to a reward according 
to the amount of taxes they collected locally (Cabaço, 2009: 78-79). In spite of 
these privileges, the régulos were constantly under assessment. They had to 
guarantee that local practices would not collide with Portuguese interests, or 
else they would be immediately punished or replaced (ibid.). In the 
administrative hierarchy, they were at the outer end of the colonial apparatus 
and the higher level in the indigenous society, having, therefore, a fundamental 
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mediation role and, at the same time, being the main expression of a dual 
society (ibid.; Mamdani, 1996). 
The second key actors in the colonial local administration were the sipais 
recruited from previous colonial soldiers and sons of loyalist chiefs. The sipais 
worked as guards, civilian soldiers, police, or tax collectors. At times they were 
even more powerful than the régulos because they could arrest African chiefs 
who failed to pay their taxes (Funada-Classen, 2012: 67). More generally, they 
were known for their brutality; for as long as they were on good terms with the 
local chiefs, they could prey upon the rural population (Isaacman and 
Isaacman, 1983: 29). As such, they were a fundamental instrument of 
repression and control. 
Besides its repressive character, the colonial system was institutionally racist 
and divisive; it maintained a separate legal system for Europeans and the local, 
whereby the former lived according to a version of the metropolitan code and 
the latter were expected to live under the rules of their traditional systems 
(Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 31). This dual system had the purpose of 
maintaining the privileged position of the Portuguese as well as to guarantee 
the provision of cheap labour. In fact, even if the local lived under the traditional 
code, they still had to abide by colonial tax law and labour codes (ibid.). This 
was necessary for the system to work and compounded what was perhaps the 
most disempowering aspect of the colonial system, the working conditions to 
which natives were submitted. 
In 1899, the colonial state introduced in the labour code a legal rationale for 
forced labour called chibalo. Accordingly, if workers were unable to comply with 
their duties, the public authorities would force them to do so. The interpretation 
of the chibalo was very subjective and in the hands of the local administrators 
(Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 34). The chibalo was either directly enforced 
(and a small wage was paid to the worker), or it came in the form of correctional 
labour which was not paid until 1917 (Newitt, 1997: 361). Chibalo workers were 
not entitled to food or lodging and suffered many physical abuses. 
Mistreatments, such as severe punishment and the use of palmatória (ferule), 
were the rule, and deaths due to these mistreatments were also numerous 
(Munslow, 1983: 30). 
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Because of these conditions, many Mozambicans preferred to circumvent the 
laws by working in South Africa, where the wages were much higher. This trend 
eventually led the Portuguese to find new ways to guarantee colonial income. In 
1901, the settlers signed an accord with the Witswaterand Native Labour 
Association, the official representative of South African mining industry, 
whereby they were paid a sum for each worker that was employed in the mines. 
Half of the worker’s salary would be paid in gold directly to the colonial 
government, which ensured a substantial profit for the colony (Isaacman and 
Isaacman, 1983: 35). Similar arrangements were made with Southern 
Rhodesia. 
By 1930, a fully dependent colonial system was thus established. Mozambique 
was rented, and the Mozambicans were institutionally subjected to a series of 
laws that systematically disempowered the majority and created local divisions 
in order to sustain colonial rule. The essence of the system would not change 
after 1930. However, changes that occurred in Portugal would lead to a 
complete bureaucratic redesign of the colonial service and an even more 
significant change in the tone of the colonial discourse. 
SALAZAR YEARS: THE HEIGHT OF DISEMPOWERMENT 
The political turmoil in Portugal, which culminated in a coup d’état in 1926, and 
the rise of the extreme right government of Salazar, brought several changes in 
the Portuguese colonial system. First, Salazar discarded decentralisation in 
favour of a strong and centrally controlled system. Second, he reorganised the 
colonial economy so that it was more beneficial to Portugal. Finally, due to his 
Catholic background, he placed the discourse of the civilising mission at the 
heart of Portuguese colonialism (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 39; Newitt, 
1997: 390-91). These three guidelines were enshrined in the Colonial Act of 
1930 and incorporated in the Portuguese constitution three years later. 
In practice, Portuguese colonies now became a unique legal entity within 
Portugal. The concession’s system was revised, and no firm would have any 
kind of sovereign rights in the colonial territories. Salazar wanted to reshape the 
colony’s economy so that it could address Portugal’s internal crisis. To that end, 
he tried to stimulate the migration of Portuguese peasants to the colonies so as 
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to increase local production. Economic growth would now be based on a series 
of export products, which in Mozambique, included rice and cotton in order to 
feed Portugal’s textile industry. Peasants would now be forced to produce such 
crops (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 43-46; Munslow, 1983: 34-39; Newitt, 
1997: 396-397). 
These new measures called for extra force to ensure local compliance. So 
whereas the chibalo was formally abolished, it was circumvented, being now 
implemented “exceptionally” in the case of “penal correction and necessary 
public work” (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 41; Newitt, 1997: 408). Indeed, a 
new law was introduced, forcing the majority of African men to work as contract 
labourers for a state or private enterprise for at least six months to pay their 
taxes. The peasants who resisted were beaten or had to work extra time much 
beyond the six months (Hanlon, 1984: 18-19). The terrible working conditions in 
the fields constituted a strong incentive for Mozambicans to keep leaving to 
South Africa. However, working conditions in the mines “were still appalling. 
Between 1936 and 1966, no fewer than 19000 miners (93 per cent of whom 
were black) died as a result of accidents in the mines, and earlier the toll was 
even heavier” (Munslow, 1983: 39). 
In 1953, the Statute of the Portuguese Indigenous of Guinea, Angola and 
Mozambique was introduced. Following the discourse of civilising mission, the 
document redefined the term ‘indigenous’, now meaning anyone “of black race” 
who was born in the colonies and did not yet possess all the “individual and 
social habits” necessary for the full application of the current public law 
(Cabaço, 2009: 112). The so-called Regime do Indigenato (Indigenous 
Regime), therefore, divided Africans and mulattos into two different groups. On 
the one hand, those who could read and write Portuguese, rejected ‘tribal’ 
customs, and were employed in the capitalist economy were granted a better 
category and were called assimilados (assimilated). On the other hand, the 
remaining majority called indígenas, were not considered citizens and remained 
subject to customary law (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 39; MacQueen, 
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1997: 12-13). In theory, anyone24 could become an assimilado, but in practice, 
the conditions available did not facilitate this transition, so only a small minority 
actually received this categorization (less than 1% of the population in 1961) 
(ibid.). Furthermore, the condition was not permanent, and it could be revoked 
at any time by the competent authority if there was any justifiable reason 
(Cabaço, 2009: 114). 
Ultimately, the mission civilizatrice was effectively a mirage. As Salazar was 
concerned with cutting expenditures, education of the indígenas was officially 
entrusted to the Catholic Church (Hall and Young, 1997: 8). In practice, there 
were not many schools, access was restricted as teaching was exclusively in 
Portuguese, and there was an age limit to get in. Failure rates were also very 
high, and many parents preferred to keep their children at home to help with 
domestic labour (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 50-51). But perhaps the worst 
part of this regime was that it played with the possibility of changing people’s 
identities.25 According to Munslow (1983: 63-63), there was indeed an intention 
to make people deny their African culture and create a class of black 
Portuguese, which would also create a barrier to possible nationalist 
movements.  
In practice, however, the mechanisms of disempowerment were so blatant that 
even the assimilados were not immune to them. In fact, they were the ones who 
were mostly exposed to the contrasts of inequality and racial prejudice. Within 
the cities, segregation was high. Most assimilados lived in two communities 
separated from the European areas and without basic services. Until the 1960s, 
Africans could not even enter ‘white restaurants’. Furthermore, the assimilados’ 
salaries were far lower than the Portuguese who also received preferential 
hiring (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 58). In the rural areas, where over 95% 
of population still lived by 1962, the situation was even worse. Besides the long-
                                            
24  Anyone who fit into the specific requirements: be over 18; speak Portuguese 
correctly; occupy a profession that pays enough for the person and his/her family’s 
livelihood; adopt ‘good behaviour’ as well as having acquired the ‘habits’ necessary for 
the full application of the current public law; and finally not having deserted or failed to 
comply with military service (Cabaço, 2009: 113). 
25 Cabaço (2009: 117) refers to an attempt of “identity genocide”. 
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term effects of the chibalo regime, and the demographic imbalance created by 
the desperate exodus of young men trying to escape forced labour, the forced 
production of cotton and rice further led to the decline of food production and 
increase of debt, famine, disease, and soil degradation (ibid.: 53-55). 
Consequently, local discontent gradually increased over time. 
In 1968, Salazar became incapacitated by a stroke and was substituted by his 
disciple Marcello Caetano who implemented a series of reforms in order to 
delink the metropolitan economy from that of the African colonies. In the 
following years, a series of investments were made that ultimately led to some 
economic growth. Caetano invested in infrastructure as well in the educational 
and health sectors (Hall and Young, 1997: 9-10). In December 1972, he 
promulgated a series of constitutional reforms that transformed Angola and 
Mozambique into ‘states’ and no longer ‘provinces’, enhancing their degree of 
autonomy (ibid.). These reforms and their results, however, came too late and 
were not enough to slow the impetus towards independence that had been 
taking place since the early 1960s. In fact, the increasing grievances provided 
the basis for what came to be the pursuit of a revolutionary alternative to the 
colonial system. 
3.2 Empowerment as Resistance and Liberation: the Anti-
Colonial Struggle 
One of the main expressions of empowerment during the colonial period can be 
found in the many forms of resistance observable all over the Mozambican 
territory. Resistance happened at different levels from more organised forms of 
open confrontation to everyday acts of sabotage to resist forced labour. At its 
height, resistance found expression in the foundation of the national liberation 
front Frelimo. What is common to these expressions of resistance is that they all 
opposed the colonial system. Nevertheless, and despite the final emergence of 
a unique liberation movement, which increased these actors’ power-to contest 
the structure, there were many different interests at play as well as different 
views of how an alternative to the colonial system should work. These unsolved 
differences would later feed the contradictions of the new-born country and 
intensify power contestation. 
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FROM MANIFOLD FORMS OF RESISTANCE TO A NATIONAL UNION 
FRONT 
All through colonialism there were several manifestations of resistance in 
Mozambique. However, many of these expressions were not a rejection of the 
system of exploitation per se but, instead, represented an effort of the traditional 
ruling class to maintain their own power (Munslow, 1983: 53). The Barué revolt 
in 1917 was one of the most important acts of resistance seen as a forerunner 
of modern nationalism. It was sparked after the Portuguese recruitment of local 
Africans to join the army and fight in the First World War and was led and 
mobilized by local spiritual mediums lasting for three years. Its main feature was 
its multi-ethnic composition which expanded its outreach in different 
communities (bid.; Newitt, 1997: 366). In spite of this, the revolt still retained a 
focus on traditionalism and looked more towards the past with the participants 
having no common long-term objectives (ibid.). Other forms of ‘pan-ethnic’ 
resistance happened over time; however, they were more the exception than 
the rule. More generally, resistance took place at the micro-level in the 
everyday spaces of the different social strata that lived under the same 
exploitative system. 
In the rural areas, for instance, tax evasion was very common and included a 
series of creative tactics such as: leaving for the interior soon after receiving a 
warning that the collector was coming, falsifying age and marital status to 
decrease the tax burden and for those living in the borders moving back and 
forth to avoid tax collection (ibid.; Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 62-63). Flight, 
as a way to permanently escape force labour, was also very common. After 
escaping, many returned to attack the symbols of their oppression such as the 
plantations’ overseers, tax collectors, the collaborating chiefs, and even the 
African police (ibid.; Munslow, 1983: 69-70). The withholding of a portion of their 
labour and mechanisms of sabotage such as the roasting of cottonseeds before 
planting were also very common (ibid.; Hedges, 1999: 210-211). At times, 
resistance came into the open such as when seven thousand women organised 
a strike to reject the cotton seeds distributed by the administrator (Isaacman 
and Isaacman, 1983: 66). Other strikes took place, but they were severely 
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repressed often resulting in years of correctional labour (sometimes abroad) as 
a form of punishment (Hedges, 1999: 214-215). 
Urban workers also engaged in several resistance activities even though their 
number was extremely small and African workers were forbidden to form 
unions. In 1911, there was an attempt to form a union for all workers in 
Lourenço Marques (today’s Maputo), but it did not succeed. Other attempts 
followed accompanied by strikes and work stoppages. In particular, the 
dockworkers engaged in seven major strikes between 1918 and 1921 appealing 
for better wages (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 69-71). These were 
immediately and violently repressed by the colonial government. With Salazar, 
repression became even worse. However, as living conditions were significantly 
deteriorating for the urban workers, new disturbances took place, in particular, 
in the case of the railway workers (in 1947) and once more with the dock 
workers (ibid.; Munslow, 1983: 73; Hedges, 1999: 215-216).  
Students also tried to mobilise. Soon after World War II, the Movement of the 
Young Democrats of Mozambique was formed. They aimed to attack Salazar’s 
state policies through pamphlets and clandestine political propaganda, but they 
were soon suppressed (Hedges, 1999: 202). Resistance manifested also within 
the migrant community. Workers in the South African mines often refused to 
work in certain mines, deserted, and formed ethnic, dance, and mutual aid 
societies (Munslow, 1983: 57). Most of these initiatives were, however, quickly 
suppressed. 
Independent churches also proliferated under colonialism representing a 
rejection of the Catholic link with the Portuguese regime (Isaacman and 
Isaacman, 1983: 72). In these separatist spaces, Mozambicans could grieve 
about their situation and criticise both the colonial government and the Catholic 
Church. The Protestant missions, in particular, came to be regarded as 
guardians of African nationalism. They educated many of those neglected by 
the colonial system, including the future leader of Frelimo, Eduardo Mondlane 
(Munslow, 1983: 67). 
Finally, intellectual and cultural resistance played an important role in spreading 
the ideals of anti-colonial struggle. Two papers, O Africano and its successor O 
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Brado Africano, gave voice to some of the abuses of the chibalo, the conditions 
of the migrants, the lack of educational opportunities for Africans, and so forth. 
While the paper was silenced under Salazar, other expressions of cultural 
resistance emerged. Poetry, music, and dance became a widespread means 
for expressing objection to colonial oppression and rejection of the ‘civilising 
mission’ (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 72-78; Hedges, 1999: 222-232). 
For a long time all these expressions of resistance were mostly localised and 
uncoordinated. While there was political and ideological discontent both among 
the peasants and among the educated stratum of Africans, there was also a 
huge gulf between these two strata. This division, along with the outflow of 
workers to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, made it difficult to coordinate a 
political agenda around a common struggle (Birmingham, 1992: 17; Munslow, 
1983: 60). The turning point of resistance came through the students living 
abroad. In 1948, a Centre for African Studies was inaugurated in Lisbon and 
attracted several assimilados intellectuals. It was these intellectuals who formed 
the Anti-Colonial Movement in Paris, in 1957, the forerunner of later 
organisations that would lead to independence (Munslow, 1983: 66; MacQueen, 
1997: 18). The link between this intellectual branch and the masses was 
fostered by the NESAM (the Nucleus of Mozambican Secondary Students) 
which embraced many of the future leaders of Mozambique’s independence 
including, Eduardo Mondlane, one of its founders (ibid.; Hedges, 1999: 203). 
Frelimo, the Revolutionary Front of Mozambique, was created in June 1962 as 
the fusion between several emerging movements including the Makonde 
National Union (MANU) from the North, the National Democratic Union of 
Mozambique (Udenamo) from the south, and the National African Union of 
Independent Mozambique (Unami), based in central Mozambique (Munslow, 
1983: 79-81; MacQueen, 1997: 21-22). Each of these groups was created by 
people in exile and was, therefore, distanced from substantial internal power 
bases. But in 1962, under the influence of Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and 
Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, they met in Dar es Salam to form a unique 
liberation movement. Eduardo Mondlane, an American-educated United 
Nations official, internally and internationally committed to the national struggle, 
was its first leader. 
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Frelimo was an alliance of different classes and strata of society including 
workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie. What bound them together were the 
common enemy, colonialism, and the will to achieve independence (Munslow, 
1983: 82; Egerö, 1992: 23-24). This strategic union, nevertheless, did not 
prevent a series of internal strains that were visible from the initial days of the 
front’s creation. Disagreements included how to pursue independence (political 
dialogue vs. armed struggle) and also what kind of country would be 
constructed afterwards (ibid.; Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 83). In summary, 
while this alliance was strong enough to start a unified anti-colonial struggle, the 
major challenge of constructing national unity would still lie ahead. 
FROM A UNIQUE FRONT TO A UNIQUE EMANCIPATORY NATIONAL 
PROJECT 
The creation of a national identity in Mozambique was not a smooth project. On 
the one hand, Frelimo competed with Portugal’s last minute efforts to ‘integrate’ 
the indigenous population in its own ‘national project’. In these last years of 
colonialism, Portugal made a series of concessions such as abolishing forced 
labour and investing in schools and health posts (Hanlon, 1984: 37-38). The 
Regime do Indigenato was abolished. As all Mozambicans were now citizens, 
there was now a universal military service requirement, which was seen as a 
professional opportunity by many. At the same time, new changes in the 
economy opened up the possibilities of social progression and stimulated 
urbanization, so the indigenous population now had more opportunities to 
improve their livelihoods and be more easily reintegrated into the urban 
economy (Cabaço, 2009: 250-257). Finally, the colonial regime instituted the 
so-called aldeamentos. Based on the US experience in Vietnam, these were 
villages where people were brought in order to stay ‘protected’ from the Frelimo 
militias and their revolutionary ideas. Originally, the aldeamentos were 
supposed to instigate new development poles (ibid.; Isaacman and Isaacman, 
1983: 100-101). However, no effort was made to explain to the people the 
benefits of this project, so most of the programme was carried out by coercion 
facing strong resistance from local actors (Munslow, 1983: 121). 
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Because these changes came too late and were not entirely successful, they 
did not constitute a real threat to Frelimo’s call for independence. Instead, the 
biggest challenge Frelimo faced was within itself as there were sharp 
differences over what a sense of nation entailed. These differences coalesced 
around who was perceived as the enemy at the time of the struggle. For many 
inside Frelimo, including the chairman, the enemy was the ‘white people’; 
therefore, the anticolonial struggle was a struggle between different races. In 
sharp contrast, the revolutionary strand inside Frelimo, which included Eduardo 
Mondlane and Samora Machel, had an emancipatory perspective of the war 
and thought that the enemy was colonialism. Furthermore, they saw the 
struggle as the possibility of Mozambique’s transition to modernity, which 
clashed with many aspects of local tradition (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 86-
88; Munslow, 1983: 102-112; Cabaço, 2009: 293). 
Another fundamental difference related to the role of the political and military 
components of Frelimo. Initially, those two areas were separated, and the 
military wing was not supposed to engage in the political agenda. Over time, 
however, the central committee started to attack this separation arguing that the 
fight was not separated and everyone should, therefore, be called to military 
duty (Egerö, 1992: 27-28). This internal conflict reached its peak in the late 
1960s. The anti-colonial war had officially started in September 1964. In the first 
years, the war was concentrated in the Northern part of the country, in the 
region of Cabo Delgado, and the Makonde people provided most of the frontline 
fighters. Lazaro Nkavandame was, then, the head of the Department of Interior 
Organisation in that Province and part of the moderate wing of the front. Using 
a tribalist discourse, he accused Frelimo of gathering most of its leaders in the 
south and, so as a way to ‘compensate’ for the ethnic balance in the 
organization, he used his position to appoint chairmen only from within his own 
ethnic group — the Makonde. By consolidating ethnic traditions, he directly 
rejected other main topics of Frelimo’s agenda such as gender equality; 
therefore, the liberated areas under his control did not abide by all of Frelimo’s 
radical ideas (Isaacman and Isaacman 1983: 97; Munslow, 1983: 105-107; 
Hanlon, 1984: 28-34; Hall and Young, 1997: 17). 
	   101	  
While having some internal support, Nkavandame’s wing was the minority 
inside Frelimo; so once the front’s radical tone was confirmed in the Second 
Party’s Congress in September 1968, he opted for what was to be a final 
schism with Frelimo. Back in Cabo Delgado, he used his control over the local 
militias to close the border. However, left unprotected, the population in the 
liberated zones in the provinces were victims of a strong colonial offense, and 
Nkavandame lost popular support. In 1969, he was expelled from Frelimo. A 
few months later, Mondlane, who had just been re-elected as Frelimo’s 
president, was killed in a parcel bomb that arrived at his office in Dar es 
Salaam. The subsequent choice of Samora Machel as new president, instead 
of moderate candidate Uria Simango, left no doubt about the revolutionary 
character of the movement (Munslow, 1983: 110-111; Egerö, 1992: 28-29; Hall 
and Young, 1997: 18-19). 
From 1968 onwards, Frelimo intensified its armed struggle extending it from the 
north to the centre of Mozambique. The strengthening of Frelimo was 
accompanied by the progressive incapacity of Portugal to finance several anti-
colonial fronts in Africa. In April 1974, a coup took place in Portugal removing 
Caetano from power (Hall and Young, 1997: 36-37). The feeling of uncertainty 
and instability that followed influenced the negotiations between Portugal and 
Frelimo, which resulted in the signing of a ceasefire on September 8, 1974. The 
ceasefire was preceded by a series of meetings. Officially, Portugal was 
unwilling to recognise Frelimo as the legitimate representative of the 
Mozambican people. But a secret meeting in July, in Dar es Salam, confirmed 
this outcome through the signing of a secret protocol. A subsequent meeting, in 
August, laid the foundations for the progressive transfer of political and military 
power to Frelimo and also provided the legal basis for the transition. Final 
negotiations were settled in Lusaka, in September, when the final accord 
between Portugal and Frelimo was signed. The official independence day was 
celebrated on June 25, 1975 (the anniversary of Frelimo’s foundation) (ibid.: 42-
43; Munslow, 1983: 127). 
It should be noted that Frelimo’s claim of being the only legitimate 
representative of Mozambique raised strong opposition not only among white 
settlers but also among many black Mozambicans and opposition groups who 
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contested the Portuguese deal with Frelimo. After the coup in Portugal, many of 
them had gathered together to form the National Coalition Party and called for 
elections to be held after gaining independence. Once this did not happen, 
clashes took place before and after the start of the transition government. 
These were, however, quickly repressed by Frelimo. The opposition leaders 
were arrested and sent to re-education camps, and Frelimo outlawed any 
opposition party (Hall and Young, 1997: 44-49; Manning, 2002: 47-48). 
EMANCIPATORY EXPERIMENTS DURING THE REVOLUTION 
Central to Frelimo’s revolutionary agenda was the concern with its cadres' 
proximity with the masses. This was fundamental in order to spread 
revolutionary consciousness and build the basis of a new society. During the 
war, this interaction took place in the ‘liberated zones’. It was there where a new 
popular consciousness would emerge and also where Frelimo would encounter 
its first big challenges to creating a new Mozambican society.  
One of Frelimo’s key policies in the liberated areas was the investment in 
education. The first ‘bush schools’ were formed in Cabo Delgado by 1965, and 
within two years, they numbered nearly 100 spread throughout the country and 
taking care of about 10000 children (Munslow, 1983: 99). By 1970, the number 
of students had tripled (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 93). In this early 
experiment, one of the most difficult issues Frelimo had to face was ethnicity 
and tradition. On the one hand, Frelimo did not want to deny people’s origins 
and their ethno-linguistic affiliation. On the other hand, it opposed tradition 
believing it could become a divisive factor threatening national unity — what it 
called tribalism (Cabaço, 2009: 299). In official speeches this aspect often 
assumed a very radical tone. In 1970, for instance, Samora Machel said: 
. . . To unite the Mozambicans, beyond our diverse languages and 
traditions, requires that in our consciousness the tribe die so the Nation 
can be born. . . We should acquire a scientific and open attitude, free 
from all the weight of superstition and dogmatic traditions (quoted in 
Cabaço, 2009: 300). 
As the radical wing of Frelimo saw it, the problem with the chieftaincies was that 
they were based on a system of entitlements of power, whereas society needed 
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to move to a system where “sovereignty belonged to the masses as opposed to 
the ancestors, or the spirits or a lineage” (Sergio Vieira, a Frelimo leader, 
quoted in Munslow, 1983: 106). This concern was linked to Frelimo’s proposal 
of creating ‘the new man’ attuned with the paradigm of modernity. In this 
society, equality was a fundamental aspect and was reflected in Frelimo’s 
praxis — in the liberated zones, every member of the front, including the 
intellectuals, had to undertake military training (Cabaço, 2009: 312). 
Another big feature of the liberated zones was the democratization of medicine. 
Frelimo invested especially in preventive medicine for all peasants. In 1966, 
more than 100,000 peasants were inoculated against smallpox. First-aid 
stations were opened, and people were instructed about personal hygiene as 
well as how to build latrines and prevent water pollution (Isaacman and 
Isaacman, 1983: 94-95). Considering the radical contrast with the colonial 
system, the expansion of the health system in these areas was proof to the 
peasants of Frelimo’s concern with their wellbeing (Munslow, 1983: 144). 
Economically, the movement invested in the collectivization of work 
restructuring the whole production system in the liberated zones. By 1966, 
Frelimo had experimented with a series of cooperative systems. This helped to 
induce a feeling of common identity and solidarity between the peasants and 
the army (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 95-96). In fact, as with military 
training, everyone without exception (including the president and the cadres) 
was requested to work in the fields (Munslow, 1983: 143). 
The economic production of the liberated areas was vital for the revolution to 
continue. As the militants needed food, centres of agricultural experimentation 
were introduced in order to avoid plant disease and other problems that could 
affect production. In time, some liberated zones were able to actually export 
surplus produce, which was used partly to support other zones and partly to pay 
for other essential goods that could not be produced internally (Munslow, 1983: 
141-142; Egerö, 1992: 33). 
The experience of the liberated areas became a major model to be used in the 
post-independence period. Most of all, it proved to be an efficient testing ground 
for Frelimo’s future national development policy. However, the reproduction of 
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this model at the national scale would constitute one of the biggest problems 
after independence. 
3.3 FRELIMO’s Emancipatory Project: Vision and Reality 
Frelimo’s agenda for the new independent country was very radical and had a 
strong emancipatory appeal. After independence, the ideals that were 
previously contested inside the movement became the starting point for the 
national development strategy. Notwithstanding the practical contradictions that 
underlined these policies, the initial popular support that Frelimo enjoyed made 
some progress possible. However, in the long run, it became clear that the 
empowering dimension of the agenda was conditional upon the popular 
acceptance of a very centralised and top-down bureaucratic system that 
ultimately was not attuned to the subjective and material needs of the 
heterogeneous Mozambican society. Within a few years, some of the 
‘empowering’ policies of Frelimo actually fostered new waves of 
disempowerment. These setbacks would further be reinforced by the 
intersection of these policies with the extremely unfavourable regional and 
international context in which Mozambique would find itself at the time. 
TRYING TO BUILD A MODERN NATION 
The radical agenda pursued by Frelimo was based on the total destruction of 
the existing system, and the construction of a new institutional basis that would 
put an end to the ‘exploitation of the masses’.  The same day Mozambique 
gained independence, Frelimo nationalised land and, one month later, the 
social sectors of law, medicine, education, and funeral services (Hall and 
Young, 1997: 49). People still retained the right to occupy land that was 
productive, and the means of production and financial services were not 
included in the nationalisation process (Hanlon, 1984: 46). However, these 
measures hit hard not only the remaining Portuguese but also many small 
entrepreneurs who were hoping to stay in Mozambique. By the end of 1976, 
90% of the whites had left Mozambique. The exodus was enhanced by the 
enactment of a law forcing individuals to choose between Mozambican 
citizenship and expulsion (Hall and Young, 1997: 50). 
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The economic effects of this exodus were devastating for the new-born country 
resulting in the abandonment of virtually all existing businesses, the 
disappearance of most skilled and semi-skilled workers, and the creation of 
massive unemployment (Hanlon, 1984: 47; Hall and Young, 1997: 50). Facing 
this pressure, Frelimo opted to seize the abandoned businesses starting a 
process of state ‘intervention’ seen as the only way to keep the economy 
running. 
Problems permeated the administrative apparatus also. At the time of 
independence, there were only about 40 Mozambicans with a degree, and most 
military cadres had no organisational experience of running a country (Hall and 
Young, 1997: 51). The administrative challenges were hardened by Frelimo’s 
decision to abolish the regedorias and strip the régulos of their functions and 
powers (Orre, 2010: 218-219). All of a sudden, the only state unit that remained 
operational was that of the village, but even this became confused as the 
country was divided into liberated and other areas. 
A way to partially compensate for the lack of administrative structure was the 
creation of the grupos dinamizadores (dynamising groups, GDs). Created in 
1974 during the transitional government, these were the improved versions of 
the people’s committees that previously existed in the liberated areas and were 
the first instantiation of the people’s power (Munslow, 1983: 151). Officially the 
GDs had the task of implementing the directives of Frelimo and the transitional 
government and “to exercise vigilance against sabotage by ‘agents of colonial 
reaction’” (Hall and Young, 1997: 51; see also Munslow, 1983: 152; Hanlon, 
1984: 49). Moreover, they were expected to mobilize the community in 
collective activities of an economic, cultural and social nature, being species of 
‘schools’ where the population would learn and practise democratic skills and 
class unity (ibid., Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 117). 
The GDs’ most empowering feature was their participatory aspect as well as 
their role in raising public awareness of the country’s on-going issues. Their 
‘dynamising’ function was related to their ability to stimulate people to take 
initiative including in the economic domain (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 
119; Hall and Young, 1997: 51). They were not meant to be permanent 
structures and, in time, their functions would be taken over by other bodies such 
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as party committees, people’s assemblies, and other organs established by 
Frelimo (Munslow, 1983: 151). In practice, the GDs had a mixed record of 
success. Taking into account how soon they were implemented, the lack of 
skills of many of its members, as well as the inability of the government to have 
a proper supervision mechanism, many GDs actually provided an opportunity 
for some members to abuse their power. Still, and in spite of this, they also 
played an important part in the promotion of national unity (Isaacman and 
Isaacman, 1983: 122). 
But the main achievements of Frelimo in the early independence years were to 
be found in the social sector. In education, all colonial curricula were replaced 
by a new nationalised one, which also included political education (Hall and 
Young, 1997: 55-56). Education was also decoupled from the Church ending 
mission control of the schools. The new educational system also rejected 
indigenous forms of educational practice, which were linked with superstition 
and the hindering of modernization (ibid.). Education became indeed the 
number one concern of Frelimo, followed by health, and it continued in this 
manner for years to come. 
In health, the emphasis was on primary health care (Hanlon, 1984: 55-62). 
Frelimo benefitted from the experiences of the liberated zones, and the nurses 
and health workers trained abroad taught basic skills in first aid and preventive 
measures to both peasants and guerrillas (ibid.; Hall and Young, 1997: 57). At 
the time of independence, there were only 30 trained doctors. Within one year, 
the government had recruited almost 500 medical workers from different 
countries to help rehabilitate the national health system, which, by then, 
received between 13% and 15% of the national budget (Hall and Young, 1997: 
58). Between 1976 and 1978, a vaccination campaign had reached 95% of the 
population, and by 1982, there were twice the number of health posts as there 
were at independence (Hanlon, 1991: 9-10). As much as in education, 
traditional indigenous practices were treated with some hostility and as non-
scientific. Traditional healers were prohibited from charging fees to work, and 
Frelimo took several measures to, as much as possible, disentangle useful 
empirical knowledge (such as use of natural remedies) from ‘superstition’ or any 
spiritual link to health (Hall and Young, 1997: 58). 
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In sharp contrast, the sector that was most problematic after independence was 
the economy, in particular, agricultural production. The sudden abandonment of 
settlers meant that there was no certainty as to whether Mozambique would be 
able to export anything or even feed its own people. Between 1974 and 1976, 
crop exports fell by more than 40%, and maize and cassava production steadily 
declined (ibid.). The situation was hardened by natural calamities including a 
draught in 1976, in the north, and flooding, in the south, the following year 
(Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 146). Things got even worse when, in 1976, 
Frelimo decided to enforce the United Nations sanctions on Rhodesia, which 
was one of its most important trading partners. The economic situation led 
Frelimo to rethink its agenda. The Party’s Third Congress in 1977 would provide 
a much more radical response to the crisis reflecting its turn towards an ‘official’ 
Marxist-Leninist agenda. 
FRELIMO THIRD CONGRESS: RADICALISING THE POLITICAL AGENDA 
Frelimo’s Third Party Congress took place in February 1977 and marked an 
important transition whereby Frelimo became officially a Marxist-Leninist party. 
Several months before the Congress, Frelimo had divulged in the media its 
‘Seven Theses’, which were to be disseminated, especially within the GDs, in 
order to make people familiar with the ideological foundations of the party 
(Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 121). The main aspect highlighted in the 
theses was that “The winning of power by the Mozambican working masses 
[had] intensified the class struggle at the national level and at the same time 
increased the aggressiveness of imperialism against our country” (Frelimo, 
1977). The masses now had “internal enemies” who tried to boycott the 
successes of Frelimo and at the same time penetrate the state apparatus. 
These were constituted by the colonial bourgeoisie, the small and middle 
internal bourgeoisie, as well as “marginal elements from the labouring classes, 
corrupted by the process and crimes of the colonial war” (ibid.). 
Because Frelimo believed these enemies constituted a real danger to the 
consolidation of a people’s democracy, it felt imperative to take a series of 
measures in order to dismantle this bourgeoisie. These measures included: the 
full destruction of the capitalist apparatus, the state taking control of the 
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country’s main financial instruments and industries, the nationalisation of land 
and rented buildings as well as of health and education (Frelimo, 1977). From 
then on, Mozambique would enter the era of People’s Democracy marking its 
official transition towards socialism. 
In an effort to reconcile the tensions between vanguardism and popularly rooted 
socialism, Frelimo invested in the creation of more cells to expand its popular 
basis. The process of recruitment was extremely rigorous. New party members 
needed to be the ‘right type’, characterized by having ‘outstanding political and 
moral qualities’, in order to carry forward the party’s agenda (Munslow, 1983: 
155). Each candidate was subjected to intense public scrutiny, and, once 
selected, their behaviour would be observed carefully by others until their 
membership was fully accepted (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 123; Egerö, 
1992: 134). 
Despite this rigorousness, Frelimo expanded its base significantly in the 
following years and the mechanisms used to that end often had an empowering 
appeal, if not empowering effects. First, the party invested in the creation of 
mass democratic organizations, including the Organization of the Mozambican 
Woman (OMM), the Mozambique Youth Movement (OJM), and the Production 
Councils. These organisations had a dual function. On the one hand, they were 
indeed mass organizations and created space for dialogue and reflection. The 
OMM was particularly important in emancipating women by combating their 
institutionalised oppression (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 126-127; Hanlon, 
1984: 142-143; Egerö, 1992: 131-132). On the other hand, they were also 
instruments to allow the progressive penetration of the party’s ideology into the 
masses. 
Frelimo encouraged accountability in the form of scrutiny of its leaders to 
ensure that the interests of workers and peasants were given due 
consideration. Any attempts to abuse power were punished leading even long-
term party members to be removed from their positions and publicly exposed 
for improper conduct (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 125). As a way to 
promote greater popular participation, Frelimo also created the local and 
municipal people’s assemblies where, at the end of 1977, all adult 
Mozambicans voted for representatives (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 128; 
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Egerö, 1992: 130-150; Monteiro, 2000: 18-19). By the time the elections were 
completed, over 2,200 candidates had been rejected including 700 ‘chiefs’ or 
traditional authorities that had not inspired confidence in the communities or 
were seen as holding on to power (ibid.).  
While this may represent an empowering aspect of society because people 
gained the confidence to contest what was not beneficial for them and many of 
the elected were ordinary peasants and workers who were previously voiceless 
(Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 128; Monteiro, 2000:23-24), there were also a 
series of problems that hindered the efficiency of the assemblies. First, there 
were not enough resources to guarantee their sustainability (Egerö, 1992: 147; 
Cahen, 1987: 144). Second, the function of the assemblies and the role of 
individuals within this format were widely misunderstood (ibid.). Third, as they 
were strongly linked to the party, representing a fusion of the party and the state 
at its most basic level (Cahen, 1987: 141), they did not have de facto political 
autonomy or even clear legislative functions (ibid.; Hanlon, 1984: 144). Finally, 
notwithstanding their supposedly representative character, in some instances, 
there were tensions in the election process between local interests and the 
party’s prescribed ‘local interests’ (especially in the case where people wanted 
traditional authorities to be part of the assemblies) (Geffray, 1991: 18). 
Unfortunately, as Hanlon (1991: 14) admits, “Frelimo adopted a government 
structure little different from that of the Portuguese”. Territorially, the country 
was separated into ten provinces, 128 districts, and localities that largely 
corresponded to the territorial lines inherited from the colonial period (Hall and 
Young, 1997: 72). The system was also highly centralised with the president 
appointing governors and ministers. Below that, there were also appointed 
national and provincial directors and district administrators. The same structure 
was replicated at the provincial and district level, although those in charge at 
these levels had very little if any administrative experience and received no 
special training. In addition, Frelimo never defined the role of the provincial and 
local governments or of the elected provincial and local assemblies. This, 
together with the centralised budget and planning system, ultimately destroyed 
local initiative “and replaced it with a hierarchical and differential structure which 
was totally incapable of carrying out the grand plans” (ibid.). It further enhanced 
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the top-down system, in spite of the rhetoric of popular representation (Cahen, 
1987: 145). 
‘Democratic centralism’, the label used by Frelimo to describe its system, was 
thus the result of the merging of party and state, but which included, in theory, a 
constant contact with the base so that popular demands could be attended 
(Hanlon, 1991: 14). In practice, however, the bodies which were supposed to be 
the closest to the masses, the assemblies, had, in fact, no autonomy and never 
met without the presence of some leadership from the party (Hall and Young, 
1997: 77). This distance from the masses was further intensified by the 
increasing bureaucratization of the state/party, which was also linked to the 
emergence of a new elite that isolated itself from the masses (Egerö, 1992: 
134).  
On the economic side, the Third Congress focused on the countryside. Frelimo 
planned to industrialise the country based on an agriculture surplus 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 29). The first pillar of this policy involved 
investing heavily in state farms – the abandoned land that the state took over 
after the flight of the Portuguese settlers. This proved extremely problematic. 
First, whereas the government perceived state farms as symbols of 
modernization and large-scale production, these were incompatible with the 
reality of existing rural workers. Indeed, these farms needed skilled and 
educated workers found among the assimilados and more educated urban 
strata of the population (ibid.: 80). While the state presumed that these lands 
had been ‘abandoned’, in fact, in the eyes of many peasants they had been 
taken by the Portuguese, who had deprived families of an ancestral claim 
several generations ago (ibid.). Furthermore, the discrepancy between the 
available resources (financial, technological, and human) to run the state farms 
and the required resources resulted in very low productivity (Finnegan, 1992: 
114).  
The second pillar of the economic policy was the investment in cooperative 
schemes along with the project of ‘villagisation’ — the building of the communal 
villages. This was also very problematic. Overall, much of what was 
implemented was very detached from local reality (Cahen, 1987: 150; 
Finnegan, 1992: 115-116). For one, the very elite of Frelimo had little 
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awareness of the local tradition of economic planning which was based on the 
logic of family production (Hanlon, 1984: 95-109; Hall and Young, 1997: 101). 
Therefore, and even though Frelimo launched a big educational campaign to 
demonstrate the advantages of the communal villages, many peasants received 
the news with suspicion and specific groups (e.g., privileged rural peasants) 
resisted this process (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 154). 
This disconnect with the local setting was reinforced by the presence of Soviet 
and East European state officials and planners (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 
1995: 29). Practical problems included: undertrained and overworked officials; 
lack of incentives for the peasants to work collectively; illiteracy; the 
inappropriateness of the sites for the collective fields often with unfertile land, 
lack of water, and far from the peasants own houses; and also a very rigid 
planning system that was based on top directives not adaptable to practical 
issues on the ground (Isaacman and Isaacman, 1983: 156; Hall and Young, 
1997: 101). Furthermore, Frelimo also faced the difficult decision of where to 
allocate its scarce resources, and political issues often outweighed the needs of 
the cooperatives. 
It is worth noting that the communal villages not only had an economic function 
but also constituted a means of control over the population (Hall and Young, 
1997: 102) replacing the initial lack of state administrative apparatus in the 
countryside (Geffray, 1991: 21; Nilsson and Abrahamsson, 1995: 80). This was 
linked to a fear of class differentiation that could take place if villagisation was 
not fully implemented (ibid.). In fact, while there were some villages that were 
created through the voluntary movement of the peasants to new areas, most 
were created with a high degree of compulsion under the pressure of the war 
and natural disasters (Hanlon, 1984: 128). From 1978, there were actual cases 
of forced villagisation. The justification for these operations, which were usually 
carried out by the military, was the war and the chance of Renamo attacks. 
However, the mechanisms used were extremely violent including individuals 
being relocated at gunpoint and having their houses burned (ibid.). In the long 
run, this compounded the crisis of legitimacy that the state would face in the 
eyes of the peasantry (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 79-82). 
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In hindsight, and regardless of the efforts to adapt Marxism-Leninism and 
ground it in local experience, many of the policies carried out by Frelimo were 
based on an ideology not readily adaptable to the local reality of Mozambique 
(Cabaço, 1995: 86-87; Hall and Young, 1997: 68). However, the ideological 
drive caused the party to become more and more coercive in an effort to 
contain any attempts of contestation of the system. Bureaucratic solutions 
assumed a life of their own often disrespecting basic freedoms of the 
population. 
One of the most blatant examples of an authoritative bureaucratic exercise was 
the so-called Operation Production, which was led by (current President) 
Armando Guebuza. At the time, numerous ‘marginal’ individuals from urban 
areas were forced by security forces to move to the countryside to engage in 
productive labour with the major objective of eliminating underdevelopment. 
That meant, on the one hand, enhancing production in the countryside, and, on 
the other hand, eliminating social pressure in the urban zones where 
unemployment was rising (Egerö, 1992: 221; Hall and Young, 1997: 104). This 
exercise was carried out in such a way that those who did not have a work 
identity card — and therefore did not have the right to reside in the city — were 
forcefully removed from their houses and sent to isolated areas to work on the 
state farms. 
In summary, as Frelimo’s discourse became more radical, the emancipatory 
appeal that was at the base of its legitimacy became more and more an 
abstraction detached from reality. While the ambitious project of social 
engineering was fading, the party engaged in more coercive means to force the 
ideal to become reality. Arguing the need to develop class-consciousness, 
Frelimo made enemies not only with the forces of colonialism but also with the 
people it was supposed to liberate by neglecting their own subjectivities. 
As noted by Hall and Young (1997: 74): 
The Frelimo revolution was about freedom in the obvious anti-colonial 
sense but (like all revolutions) also made claims to provide 
‘emancipation’ in a broader human sense. Yet this process of 
transformation (like all revolutions?) was to be guided by an elite of 
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revolutionaries with very clear ideas about the content and direction of 
this emancipation – ideas that were not to be subject to popular veto, 
questioning or indeed debate. But precisely because modern revolutions 
are about ‘emancipation’, the masses must be mobilised around and in 
support of their ‘universal’ truths – mere compliance is not enough. 
The contradictions of the emancipatory discourse could not be wider. As the 
war approached, people’s hopes of actual empowerment began to fade. 
3.4 From Unity to Fragmentation: Power Dynamics during War 
Times 
Mozambique had been independent for just over a year when it suffered the 
first raids coming from Rhodesia. At the time, these attacks were a response to 
Mozambique’s decision to apply UN sanctions to that country as well as its 
support for ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union) guerrillas. As it turned 
out, this was just the start of what would be a brutal and violent protracted 
conflict that would last until 1992. 
One of the main points of disagreement in the analysis of the Mozambican war 
surrounds the extent to which external and internal factors played a role in both 
triggering as well as making the war last (e.g., Minter, 1989a; Roesch, 
1989/1990; Cahen, 1989/1990; Geffray, 1991; Hanlon, 1991; Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson, 1995; Saul, 1999; Funada-Classen, 2012). This is a delicate discussion 
as it is mostly based on the counterfactual ‘what if Rhodesia/South Africa had 
not created/supported Renamo?’ It is furthermore complicated by the fact that, 
in a context where internal and external factors are very porous, it seems 
extremely difficult to clearly weigh or separate each dimension (Chingono, 
1996; Nordstrom, 1997). Finally, thinking about the ‘origins’ or ‘roots’ of the war 
may actually lead us not to the first attacks from Rhodesia, but back to colonial 
times or the liberation struggle where many of the problems related to 
Mozambican state formation, and its relationship with South Africa, are to be 
found (Saul, 1999: 126-132; Funada-Classen, 2012). 
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In this regard, this thesis is less concerned with the determinant factors that led 
to the war but more with how these dimensions influenced and interacted with 
each other and how they affected local dynamics of power. 
THE EXTERNAL CONTOURS OF THE WAR  
Several aspects of external origins contributed to the inception and 
maintenance of the war in Mozambique. First, Renamo was born abroad. The 
origins of the movement go back just before the 1974 coup in Portugal when an 
agreement was made between the Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation 
and the Portuguese. Renamo was meant to be a fifth column to spy on the 
ZANU guerrillas based in Mozambique (Finnegan, 1992: 31). Later, its tasks 
were broadened to include the destruction of infrastructure as a way to 
discourage Frelimo from providing support to the guerrillas.26 
Much of the initial Renamo contingents were “personnel of the elite black units 
of the Portuguese colonial forces, who fled Mozambique before or immediately 
after independence” (Hall and Young, 1997: 117; see also Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson, 1995: 59-60). The other parts of the contingent were members of the 
Flechas unit; a counter-insurgency unit created by Portugal to fight Frelimo and 
controlled by the Rhodesian Intelligence (ibid.; Venâncio and Chan, 1998: 3). 
These were later joined by inmates freed from Mozambican re-education 
camps, former Frelimo soldiers imprisoned for corruption who had guerrilla and 
military skills, as well as some régulos (ibid.). 
Training and small operations in the region of Gorongosa started in 1977, 
initially from within Rhodesia, and, from 1979, led to joint operations inside 
Mozambique (Hall and Young, 1997: 119). In 1980, as the Rhodesian war 
ended and black-ruled Zimbabwe emerged, Frelimo hoped that no further harm 
                                            
26 It should be noted that, similar to Renamo, the origins of Frelimo were related to the 
role of external actors such as J. Nyerere and K.  Nkruma. Moreover, the military 
training of the militias was only possible due to their harbour in Algeria and the military 
cooperation from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Furthermore, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, and 
Malawi all sent troops to help Frelimo during the war. In summary, external/regional 
factors have always played an important role in Mozambique’s history (see Hume, 
1994: 20; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995; Nordstrom, 1997: 49). 
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would come from this front. Nevertheless, internal dynamics in South Africa 
played a major role in the turn of events. With the rise of the government of 
Prime Minister P. W. Botha, South Africa entered the phase of the doctrine of 
Total Strategy. In an effort to pursue an increasingly more aggressive war 
against the enemies of apartheid — which included Mozambique — an 
agreement between a South African military commander and his Rhodesian 
counterpart resulted in the transfer of Renamo to South Africa (Hanlon, 1991: 
20-21; Finnegan, 1992: 194; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 42; Hall and 
Young, 1997: 124).  
With South Africa’s massive investment, Renamo became a real machine of 
destabilisation. By 1982 it had destroyed 840 schools, 12 health clinics, 24 
maternity clinics, 174 health posts, two centres for the handicapped, and 900 
shops as well as kidnapping 52 foreign technicians and killing 12 (Hall and 
Young, 1997: 129). Renamo also had the support of different groups of 
Portuguese including those who fled Mozambique at the time of independence, 
ex-military personnel and many right-wing groups from Europe, the United 
States, and countries such as Saudi Arabia and Oman (Finnegan, 1992: 33-34; 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 60-61). 
The intensification of the Cold War with Reagan’s election in the United States 
in 1980 also influenced the war. With the policy of ‘constructive engagement’ 
towards South Africa, the United States (US) government initially turned a blind 
eye to Botha’s destabilisation strategy (Hanlon, 1991: 18; Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson, 1995: 44). Inside the American Congress, there were supporters of 
Renamo who saw it as the liberal counterpart to Frelimo (Cohen, 2000: 182). 
While the US Congress never approved proposals to officially give support to 
Renamo, ultimately, there was a compromise and, for several years to come, 
the US would cancel any aid to Mozambique (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 
44-45). 
Donors’ behaviour towards Mozambique during the 1980s constituted one of 
the main setbacks for the Frelimo regime and actively contributed to the 
worsening of Mozambique’s humanitarian situation. Between 1981 and 1983 a 
major drought occurred in Southern Africa and Mozambique was highly 
affected. As the war intensified people got trapped in the flooded region, as 
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Renamo would kill anyone leaving Frelimo controlled areas. Renamo moreover 
burned the crops in the fields and destroyed the grain stores (Hanlon, 1991: 20-
21). As South Africa kept sending supplies to Renamo’ bases, there was limited 
action that Frelimo could take. 
In January 1983, the Mozambican government made its first appeal for food aid 
in the affected area. Six months later, aid to Mozambique had actually 
decreased (Hanlon, 1991: 21) because the US position of denying aid to 
Mozambique influenced several other donors, including UN agencies, to do the 
same (Hanlon, 1991: 43-53; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 100). Aid 
eventually arrived nearly a year after the requests, but by then, at least 100,00 
people had starved to death (Hanlon, 1991: 29). 
Trapped between the war, natural disasters and lack of aid, Frelimo was forced 
to review its relations with the West. In 1984, Frelimo asked for the rescheduling 
of its debts but was denied any negotiation unless it joined the World Bank and 
the IMF. Donors’ demands also included the start of peace negotiations with 
South Africa and the government’s guarantee that relief aid could reach the 
parties in need — which was moreover linked to the creation of a parallel 
structure of aid controlled by international NGOs (Hanlon, 1991: 29; 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 100). 
In March 1984, Mozambique and South Africa signed the Nkomati Accord 
whereby Mozambique committed to stop supporting the anti-apartheid 
movement African National Congress, and South Africa committed to stop 
supporting Renamo. South Africa, however, never complied with the accord. 
Instead, just a few months later, its aid to Renamo had escalated (Hanlon, 
1991: 31; Finnegan, 1992: 34). Furthermore, the resumption of aid did not 
compensate for the major loss in agricultural production (Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson, 1995: 103). In urgent need for credit, especially to import food, 
Mozambique entered the era of stabilization agreeing to its first structural 
adjustment in 1986 and shifting away from the socialist experiment. 
The side effects of aid and adjustment in Mozambique were multiple and 
included aid dependency, the undermining of the state’s legitimacy, and market 
distortions (Hanlon, 1991 and 1997; Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1996). The 
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long-term effects of these policies will be discussed in the next chapter as they 
directly affected the country’s post-war reconstruction. Suffice to say, here, that 
the immediate effects of these interferences influenced the war dynamics 
contributing to the economic hardship faced by the majority of Mozambicans as 
well as to the spread of violence through the direct support of Renamo. 
However, the extent of these effects over time was increasingly influenced by 
the internal dynamics that were also shaped by the nature and implementation 
of Frelimo’s policies. 
FEEDING THE WAR: THE INTERNAL FACTORS 
One of the central issues that compounded the war from the internal point of 
view was the complicated and contradictory relationship between the 
modernizing ideals of Frelimo and the values held by the peasantry. Frelimo’s 
policies were based on Marxist ideologies, but in practice, peasants and 
revolutionaries had different objectives; the former just wanted their land back, 
while the latter wanted a new society (Cahen, 1987: 150; Chingono, 1996: 36-
39). Furthermore, notwitstanding the policies dedicated to rural areas, Frelimo’s 
main concern and investment went to the urban zones where the actual 
‘proletariat’ (the main potential for industrial transformation) resided (Egerö, 
1992: 135). 
It should be noted that the rural population was extremely supportive of Frelimo 
in the initial years of independence. Indeed, the growth in exports from 1977 to 
1981 was due in large part to the population’s euphoria at independence and its 
willingness to translate the government’s political mobilisation for campaigns 
and voluntary work into economic momentum (Roesch, 1992: 466; 
Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 48). This strategy, however, was based on 
people’s self-reliance and became unsustainable in the long run (ibid.; Egerö, 
1992: 367). 
The way the communal villages were implemented further fuelled the 
contradiction between ideology and reality. As noted by Geffray (1991) in his 
study of the district of Eráti in Nampula province, while initially, there was rural 
support for the implementation of the communal villages (in particular, because 
of the opportunities provided by the trade cooperatives) as people’s 
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displacement became more coercive this also enhanced local conflict 
dynamics. This tension was compounded by the fact that land governance was 
de facto linked with the local authorities — the régulos – who, in turn, were 
stripped of their powers by Frelimo. This created resentment and, in the worst 
case, led some old régulos to support Renamo (Geffray, 1991: 31-36; see also 
Cahen, 1987: 150). 
According to Geffray (1991: 16), one of the fundamental problems of Frelimo 
was precisely the party’s denial of local identities. He blamed Frelimo for 
“paradoxical blindness” and for treating people as if they were a ‘blank page’. 
Indeed, it was precisely by ignoring the social and historic existence of the rural 
populations that Frelimo could legitimise its discourse on the basis of reason 
(communal villages as development poles) and politics (the communal village 
as an emancipatory project) (ibid.: 53). This attitude ultimately contributed to the 
increase of local support to Renamo. 
Other studies disputed the extent to which Geffray’s analysis of Eráti was 
generalizable to Mozambique as a whole. Roesch (1992: 465), for instance, 
noted that, differently from Nampula, very few communal villages in Gaza were 
the result of coercive government actions. Even though he acknowledged the 
contradictions inherent in Frelimo’s policies, he also observed that in many 
instances there was essentially a compromise between Frelimo and the local 
leaders so their spiritual beliefs and mysticism was accepted and also used in 
the war against Renamo (ibid.: 474; see also Orre, 2010: 220). Manning (2002: 
64) furthermore showed that not everyone rejected how Frelimo stripped 
traditional authorities of their power. In many cases, the régulos were linked to 
the colonial abuses and, therefore, in some cases, the population welcomed 
these changes. O’ Laughlin (1992: 32) also noted that locals did not feel 
intimidated about demonstrating their religious affiliation in the communal 
villages. Instead, much more than the negation of identity, what fed the war in 
the rural areas was Frelimo’s strategy of accumulation based on wage-sectors. 
Similarly, according to Chingono (1996: 36), the main problem with Frelimo’s 
policies was that they “undermined the peasants’ security by pursuing agrarian 
policies that reduced the peasantry to poverty and marginalisation”, and that 
was because their policies were based on a Marxist, anti-peasant ideology. 
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Ultimately, according to him, this is what led to the crisis of legitimacy of the 
state. 
In practice, it seems very difficult to weight dimensions that most probably were 
interlinked (e.g., socio-economic and identity/cultural aspects). Indeed, 
Frelimo’s economic project was based on a real social and cultural 
transformation of the Mozambican society, which included, therefore, issues of 
identity. And it was precisely the contradictions embedded in this big plan that 
were exploited by Renamo, a movement that for a long time, had no clear 
ideological agenda of its own besides opposition to Frelimo. But even this 
identity built on contrast was sufficient for some individuals to change their 
position and give their support to the rebel movement (Geffray, 1991: 23-24). 
And indeed, one of the contrasting characteristics that Renamo liked to 
publicise was precisely its acceptance of the Mozambicans’ traditions and 
beliefs. In fact, Renamo was known for its collaboration with régulos, majubas, 
as well as feiticeiros and curandeiros (traditional healers and witches) 
(Finnegan, 1992: 15); they were some of the first ones to join the movement 
(Chingono, 1996: 44). 
The role of identity should not be minimised. It was indeed the case that some 
people interpreted the war as a response to the repression of traditional cults 
(Geffray, 1991: 27-28). Besides being an issue in the context of the 
traditional/modern debate, the Mozambican identity also presented an ethnic 
dimension. While the war in Mozambique was never characterised as ethnic, 
there was a general complaint that Frelimo’s leadership was constituted 
exclusively of Southerners, mestiços (mixed people), and white intellectuals 
(Hall and Young, 1997: 83; Venâncio and Chan, 1998: 7; Manning, 2002: 44-
47). This created an impossible situation for adequately discussing issues 
related to ethnicity and identity which were, however, very important for part of 
the population. At the same time, ethnicity was a key issue within Renamo, 
which accused Frelimo of an ethnic bias even though Renamo itself was 
predominantly Ndau (Roesch, 1992). 
In summary, although Mozambique’s conflict was never characterised as ethnic, 
identity and culture were important factors that often mingled with the economic 
setbacks that accompanied the first years of independence. Ultimately, the war 
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had many complicated facets and issues such as ethnicity and identity often 
played an important role in the everyday dynamics on the ground — sometimes 
saving people, sometimes killing them.  
THE EVERYDAY AND THE DIALECTICAL DYNAMICS OF THE WAR 
Thinking about the war in Mozambique from the external/internal frame 
overshadows many of its complexities. First, internal and external aspects 
always intermingle during war and peace times and not least, during 
revolutionary periods. Second, this dichotomization is biased towards the 
search for responsibility for the war and misses other aspects of power 
dynamics such as the social transformation feature of the war, which may also 
include empowering aspects. 
The complexities of the war may be easier to capture if we look at the micro-
dimension. In this regard, the first thing that becomes questionable is ‘who is 
Frelimo?’ and ‘who is Renamo?’ Not only is it the case that these parties were 
very heterogeneous, but besides them, there was a myriad of different actors 
that, while clearly influenced by the war between Renamo and Frelimo, 
behaved according to their own agenda often completely unaligned with the 
agendas of the main-stage parties. As pointed out by Nordstrom (1997: 46-47), 
blackmarketeers, predatory bands, ex-militia, mercenaries, not to mention 
foreigners who were also involved one way or another in the conflict constantly 
defined the way the war evolved. 
When it comes to the everyday and the breakdown of the war, defining parties 
and interests is far more complicated than when one looks at the main-stage 
parties. The same applies to the understanding of the empowering and 
disempowering effects of the war on individuals’ daily lives. On the one hand, 
the very thought of war brings with it countless images of disempowerment. In 
Mozambique, the terrorist tactics used by Renamo became infamous for their 
brutality (Gersony, 1988; Finnegan, 1992; Wilson, 1992; Nordstrom, 1997: 156-
173). Besides the immediate physical disempowering effects of violence 
(destruction of livelihood, homes, and bodies), terror had as a major objective 
the undermining of social order by destituting individuals of agency (Wilson, 
1992). In the words of Nordstrom (1997: 163): 
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The grotesque calls to the fore the fact that undermining the determinacy 
of existence is a lethal play of power and politics aimed at alienating the 
individual from society at large, and thus from a basis for political 
resistance and change. 
Violence was also part of Renamo’s recruitment method. Most of Renamo’s 
recruits were abducted and stayed in their camps under threats and extreme 
psychological pressure (Gersony, 1988; Minter, 1989b; Roesch, 1992: 470-
471).27 The punishment for escaping was usually death (ibid.; Geffray, 1991: 
73). Also, all those who were captured had to spend several days as captives 
and testified to terrible acts of violence. The purpose was to make them forget 
where they came from and adapt to their new reality, which included the 
psychological certainty that they would never be able to get back to where they 
came from (ibid.). In summary, violence was mostly used as a means to exert 
power-over the people and as a way to contest Frelimo’s power.28 
At the same time, for those who exerted violence, the feeling was often 
empowering. Many young men were particularly impacted by Frelimo’s policy of 
the communal villages and later by the effects of stabilization. Besides being 
compelled to brutality, they also faced a serious lack of opportunities to improve 
their lives socially and economically. Many also faced an identity crisis caught 
between their traditional lineage and their relative exposure to modernity. For 
them, joining a militia provided the power and the excitement they would not 
have had otherwise. Belonging to Renamo, they were not forced to work in the 
fields; they were also allowed polygamy and carrying a gun suddenly provided 
them with respect and others’ obedience (Geffray, 1991: 74-76; Roesch, 1992: 
477-478). This empowering feeling, however, was the result of the exercise of 
power-over others. 
                                            
27 But there were also cases of voluntary recruitment or ‘arranged kidnapping’ and, 
later on, promises of scholarships abroad for those who joined the movement (see 
Manning, 2002: 80-89). 
28 Extreme violence was also used by Frelimo against civilians in different occasions, 
although proportionally much less than Renamo (Finnegan, 1992: 224; Venâncio and 
Chan, 1998; 12). 
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Perhaps even more remarkable than the use of violence was people’s 
resilience and their ability to move on during the war (Finnegan, 1992: 13). 
Resilience was often based on the creation of new mechanisms of survival. 
Chingono (1996: 72), for instance, argues that the war created new 
empowering opportunities, the main one derived from the emergence of a new 
“grassroots economy” which transformed pre-capitalist relations of production of 
kin, clientele, and lineage ties into capitalist relations. This, in turn, had some 
positive results in the liberation of specific subordinated groups such as the 
youth from elders and women from man. 
This example points to the dialectical aspect of power dynamics developed 
during the war. As noted by a “barefoot entrepreneur” interviewed by Chingono 
(1996: 93), “it’s suffering that gives us the courage to take risks”. Similarly, it 
was the need to survive the war that made people cross traditional barriers and 
put women in the markets. And it was also the war that made people “graduate 
from peasants to capitalists” (ibid.). From this perspective, war should be seen 
as a context of deep transformation with the potential to disempower but also 
provide opportunities for empowerment. 
Nordstrom (1997: 142-152), from another perspective, shows how 
Mozambicans “reconfigured violence as an act of resistance against violence by 
developing a series of endogenous mechanisms of conflict resolution, and 
means of unmaking violence”. These included a series of rituals and 
ceremonies aimed at re-socialising those who had been exposed to violence, 
including those who had been perpetrators. The empowering aspect of these 
mechanisms relied on their ability to assert “personal agency and political will in 
the face of intolerable repression” (ibid.: 13-15). More importantly, these 
mechanisms became a fundamental instrument of peace. In fact, they helped 
build peace during the war (ibid.: 218). 
On the other side of the spectrum, some expressions of empowerment during 
the war pointed to the rescue of tradition and its use to fight violence. That was 
the case for several resistance movements that took place in the rural areas 
many of which represented the regaining of agency via spirituality (Wilson, 
1992). One such case was the story of Manuel Antonio and his Parama army 
that became popular in the late 1980s (ibid.; Nordstrom, 1997: 57-62). As the 
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story goes, Antonio had died at age fourteen of measles but revived, returned 
from his grave after six days, and decided to free his people from the ravages of 
the war. His main concern was Renamo. Using his healing powers as 
curandeiro (healer), he used a special vaccine that made his followers 
invulnerable to bullets and the cuts of machetes. None of Antonio’s followers 
had any military training, and yet by 1990, the Parama had liberated about 
150,000 people from Renamo’s occupation in the Zambezia region (Nordstrom, 
1997: 58). 
The symbolism of the Parama army is profound. Even though their focus was 
the fight against Renamo, they were an independent army. They represented 
the peasantry taking their problems into their own hands empowering 
themselves. In fact, in the eyes of the population in Zambezia, those 
responsible for their own safety were the Parama, not the armed forces. Yet 
even the Parama army was not immune to change. Over time, even their 
soldiers engaged in the perpetration of violence against civilians. In 1991, they 
were defeated in a major battle against Renamo. A few months later, Manuel 
Antonio was killed (Nordstrom, 1997: 62). 
Other actions took place that reflected the use of violence to counter violence. 
In a locality in Gaza province, for instance, some individuals armed themselves 
to defend their villages from both Renamo and Frelimo forces (Chingono, 1996: 
54). Passive ideological resistance also played a role. Chingono (1996: 54) 
observed that in some areas in Manica province, peasants explained natural 
disasters as an “expression of anger at Renamo’s abuse of young girls and 
married women and its prohibition of the living to bury their dead”. After that, 
negotiations and a ceremony followed with Renamo’s soldiers in attendance 
resulting in the cessation of Renamo’s more grotesque actions of brutality. 
It was also the case that many grassroots activities during the war went beyond 
the mere struggle for survival or the resistance to violence. As noted by 
Chingono (1996: 101), “The collapse of state power and corresponding rise in 
anarchy offered the bureaucratic and commercial elite unprecedented 
opportunities of accumulating wealth via the grass-roots war-economy”. As the 
state had no capacity to enforce labour laws, many used this chaos to exploit 
labour, divert public resources, engage in smuggling, and even the abduction of 
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children to sell them in Zimbabwe for labour (ibid.: 102-108). Of course, such 
activities were based on the pre-existence of extensive forms of 
disempowerment not least of which was the lack of social protection as well as 
the limited freedom to choose how to earn a living. But as the examples above 
demonstrate, the dialectical aspects of the war had a profound effect in the 
everyday. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the main power dynamics that have shaped 
the formation of the Mozambican state and society. First, it highlighted the role 
of the colonial period in altering the social and economic forces that existed 
before the arrival of the Portuguese. Whereas social differentiation existed 
before colonialism, colonial exploitation significantly contributed to the 
enhancement of social stratification and, in particular, the consolidation of 
mechanisms of cumulative and progressive disempowerment of the local 
constituencies. Second, the chapter explored the different mechanisms of 
power contestation during colonialism and how they developed into a 
significantly unified agenda that shaped the independence struggle. As shown, 
in spite of the apparent cohesiveness of the independence movement, there 
were significant internal differences regarding how the new country should be 
run. Partially, these cleavages would later feed the war as future Renamo 
militants would also include ex-Frelimo members. Third, the chapter described 
the crisis that followed independence, ignited by the contradictions embedded 
in the emancipatory discourse of Frelimo and its persistence in applying a 
foreign theory, developed for industrial Western countries, in a country where 
over 90% of the population was rural. The effects of these policies, combined 
with an extremely unfavourable regional and international environment, 
ultimately led to a protracted violent conflict that lasted nearly two decades. The 
last part of the chapter explored the war in detail breaking down its different 
dynamics and effects in terms of empowerment and disempowerment. 
Looking backwards, one major aspect that arises in all these phases of 
Mozambique’s history is that power was always contested. Whether during the 
colonial or Frelimo era, all those individuals who felt disempowered by state 
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policies found ways to contest and sometimes regain power even if in a 
different arena. The various forms of resistance were fundamentally attempts of 
empowerment against a context of imposed disempowerment. The other 
important observation is that some spontaneous forms of empowerment were 
more successful than several policies aimed at promoting empowerment. In this 
regard, the contradiction concerning the emancipatory call of Frelimo is not 
unique. Looking at many development agencies today as well as many current 
Frelimo policies, it is possible to observe the same belief in social engineering 
as the primary mechanism of social change. Ironically, despite the radical 
emancipatory discourse, which targeted the radical change of the system, 
Frelimo relied on a very technical promotion of empowerment completely 
neglecting the newly liberated and ignoring local subjectivities. 
Finally, despite so much change, several aspects of continuity and reproduction 
are visible in Mozambique’s history. The tendency towards centralisation, first 
with the Portuguese and later with Frelimo, is one example. The tendency 
towards elite creation, first because of deliberate unequal laws during the 
Portuguese era and later due to the bureaucratic imperatives created by 
Frelimo, is another. Overall, these observations reinforce the dialectical 
perspective of power and how it manifests in society, in particular, the constant 
movement and fragile balance between expressions of power-to and power-
over. The next chapter will bring this discussion forward to the period that 
followed the war stressing, in particular, how peace itself was contested. 
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Chapter 4 
Post-war Mozambique: Designing Peace, 
(Re)Distributing Power(?) 
 
. . . Our peace is itself a ‘paradox of success’. . . The paradox 
lies precisely in the fact that this peace results from the welding 
together of the good will of the various social segments and 
strata and their commitment to the country’s development 
projects, while, on the other hand, in the struggle against 
absolute poverty, the gulf is growing between a minority which 




Mozambique has often been portrayed in the policy and academic literature as 
a peacebuilding success story (Alden, 2001; Van Den Bergh, 2009; Manning 
and Malbrough, 2009; Astill-Brown and Weimer, 2010). Its ‘success’ label has 
been justified on three main grounds: first, because unlike other African 
countries, after the peace agreements war never resumed; second, because 
the previous rebel movement, Renamo, successfully transformed itself into a 
political party taking part in government; finally, because over the years the 
country has shown a remarkable level of economic recovery following the 
recommendations of the international financial institutions (IFIs). 
This chapter contests this success story by challenging these assumptions and 
focusing on what has changed in terms of power redistribution after peace. 
Indeed, whereas Mozambique never went back to a full-scale war, the quality of 
the peace achieved has been increasingly put to test culminating most recently 
(2013-2014) in a series of violent clashes between Renamo and the 
government with the resumption of a discussion about the peace agreement. 
These recent events, along with the trends in human development and the 
political environment in the last twenty years, raise serious questions about 
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whether some of the most fundamental problems that fed the war have been 
solved with peace. 
This chapter addresses the question ‘What has changed for the ordinary 
Mozambican after the end of the war?’ In this regard, it addresses 
empowerment from a macro perspective taking into account the political and 
economic institutional changes introduced with peacebuilding, and the extent to 
which they have affected power distribution in Mozambique. This chapter 
provides, therefore, the broader context that influenced the creation and 
implementation of the ‘7 million’. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. First, it discusses the peace process 
making a distinction between the peace negotiations led by the elite, on the one 
hand, and the grassroots mechanisms of peace on the other hand. While both 
domains were equally important for peace to take place, the fact that the formal 
process was not popularly rooted contributed to the redesigning of a state that 
became largely distant from the masses. The two sections that follow discuss 
precisely this aspect, focusing first on the country’s development policies and 
second on the implementation of multiparty democracy. The general argument 
is that there is a huge gap between what has been promised by institutional 
reforms and what has been achieved. More specifically, the process of social 
engineering has been reduced to merely restructuring state institutions with the 
general expectation that these changes would eventually lead to changes in 
power dynamics. However, despite these efforts, power dynamics have 
remained mostly unchanged, instead, reinforcing the dominance of a specific 
political elite. When it comes to people’s empowerment, the persistence of 
strong structural constraints ultimately reduces any potential space for 
contestation and systemic change.  
4.1 Top-Down and Bottom-Up Peaces 
As war represents the violent contestation of power distribution, in theory peace 
negotiations should provide precisely the locus where a new distribution of 
power would be discussed and agreed (Addison and Murshed, 2006). In the 
case of Mozambique, it is often said that peace between Frelimo and Renamo 
mostly represented the change of location for where to fight their battle; with 
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peace, politics replaced arms, but the parties were still hoping to win over each 
other, instead of sharing or renegotiating power (Weimer, 2002; Alden, 2006). 
Therefore, whereas the end of organised violence was, without a doubt, an 
important gain for Mozambicans in general, it was not accompanied by a more 
substantial change in the political setting which remained profoundly elite-
centred. Indeed, the design of the new post-war state institutions, and the 
peace negotiations more generally, were characterised by a considerable 
popular deficit. So whereas Mozambicans contributed to peace de facto at the 
everyday level, by engaging into several grassroots peace mechanisms, the 
popular deficit in the formal domain of peace prevented the creation of more 
substantial spaces that could promote the empowerment of the ordinary people. 
THE ELITE’S PEACE 
The peace process in Mozambique was influenced by several factors. At the 
international level, with the demise of the Cold War, the United States increased 
its interest in fostering peace in Mozambique, whereas the Soviet Union 
drastically cut its military support to Frelimo (Hume, 1994: 22; Alden, 2001: 22). 
Regionally, the progressive end of apartheid paved the way for the end of South 
Africa’s support to Renamo (ibid.; Cohen, 2000: 193). Zimbabwe, on the other 
hand, the main regional supporter of Frelimo, faced increasing internal 
contestation of its involvement in its neighbour’s war (Alden, 2001: 22). These 
factors, along with the constant droughts and the social economic effects of 
structural adjustment, had a major impact on the parties’ capacity to pursue war 
eventually leading to a stalemate (Hume, 1994: 21; Rupiya, 1998: 14). 
Internally, in 1989, Renamo held its first party congress kick-starting its 
progressive transformation from an armed faction into a political organization 
(Venâncio and Chan, 1998: 24; Manning, 2002: 92-93). The same year, Frelimo 
held its Fifth Party Congress officially calling off the socialist experiment and 
committing to promulgate a new constitution (Hume, 1994: 22; Synge, 1997: 
15-18; Alden, 2001: 24). 
Notwithstanding these circumstances, the parties were unwilling to negotiate. It 
fell to a few members of the Protestant and Catholic churches and several 
neighbours (Kenya, Zimbabwe, later Botswana and Malawi) to push for an 
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encounter between them to take place. In June 1989, the first meeting between 
Renamo and Frelimo representatives took place in Kenya paving the way for 
peace negotiations (Hume, 1994: 17-18; Venâncio and Chan, 1998: 21; Lundin, 
2004: 8). Formal peace talks started in July 1989; they were later mediated by a 
collective body comprised of four observers from the Church and hosted by the 
Italian government culminating in a peace agreement in 1992. Donors had a 
major influence on the process contributing financially as well as with advice to 
each of the parties (Hume, 1994; Synge, 1997; Cohen, 2000; Manning and 
Malbrough, 2009; Van den Bergh, 2009).  
All through the negotiations, the level of mistrust between Frelimo and Renamo 
was extremely high as Frelimo was unwilling to recognise Renamo as an equal 
party, and Renamo contested the Frelimo government’s legitimacy and 
representativeness (Hume, 1994: 25-47; Cohen, 2000: 189; Lundin, 2004: 9; 
Van den Bergh, 2009: 33-34). By 1992, however, the burden of continuing the 
war became unbearable for both parties. On the government’s side, the effects 
of structural adjustment contributed to popular discontent (Alden, 2001: 29). 
The failed coup attempt in June 1991, led by Frelimo hardliners, further 
suggested the need for a final settlement of the conflict (ibid.). On Renamo’s 
side, the effects of the drought and the fact that it did not have access to 
humanitarian aid, served as major incentives to speed up the conclusion of the 
agreement. In August 1992, president Chissano and Renamo’s leader 
Dhlakama finally met face to face in Rome and signed a declaration agreeing 
on a date for completing the negotiations and implementing a cease-fire. The 
final general peace agreement (GPA) was signed on 4 October 1992 and 
declared that the UN would be tasked with ensuring its implementation. 
The GPA (Rep. Moz., 1992) consisted of seven protocols focused on military, 
political, and humanitarian issues and included a timetable for the elections and 
its monitoring mechanisms. Yet, as noted by Rupiya (1998: 15), “not only had 
many practical elements been insufficiently discussed [in the GPA], but both 
sides lacked the capacity to set up and operate the complex structures required 
for implementation”. In particular, there had been no serious discussion on 
practical elements related to military questions, guarantees, and the ceasefire 
itself (Hume, 1994: 141-148; Synge, 1997: 22). This was not only due to the 
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sheer level of disagreement between the parties, but also to the inadequate 
information they had about the deployment of their own forces (ibid.). These 
issues affected the implementation of the GPA and the effectiveness of the UN 
mission, UNOMOZ, set up to monitor its implementation. 
Critiques of UNOMOZ abound,29 particularly, regarding issues of disarmament, 
general bureaucratic delays, costs of the mission, and the problematic 
coordination of the different agencies involved (Synge, 1997; Venâncio, 1998; 
Manning and Malbrough, 2009; Van Den Bergh, 2009). Despite such criticism, 
there is also a general consensus that the mission was successful in ensuring 
the non-resumption of the armed conflict and in establishing a minimum level of 
trust between the parties in order for elections to take place in a stable 
environment (ibid.; Cabaço, 1995: 96; Ajello, 2002). What UNOMOZ did not 
accomplish, however, and most probably could not, was to actually level the 
playing field between the parties ensuring a redistribution of power after the 
war. 
Indeed, donors did try to equalize the balance between the two parties, in 
particular, by financing Renamo’s transformation into a political party (Cabaço, 
1995: 99; Synge, 1997: 45; Venâncio, 1998: 100-101; Ajello, 2002: 323; 
Manning and Malbrough, 2009: 89-90). However, this support was not sufficient 
to guarantee a transition of the guerrilla group into a successful political party. 
In fact, whereas Frelimo’s power foundation was extremely strong and 
consolidated, Renamo was unable to transition itself into a consolidated party in 
such a short-term period of time. According to Cabaço (1995: 96), these 
financial incentives actually blinded Renamo from perceiving its own 
institutional limitations in the subsequent elections, a situation of which Frelimo 
took advantage. 
The monitoring of the first general elections was placed under the responsibility 
of UNOMOZ. Besides Renamo and Frelimo, another 14 smaller parties 
competed in the elections (Synge, 1997: 118-119). In spite of what had been 
                                            
29 The UN operation was large and complex and will not be discussed in detail in this 
thesis. Further information may be found in Alden (2001) and Synge (1997). For the 
discussion on the security aspects related to UNOMOZ, see Lalá (2005).  
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agreed in the Peace Accords, during the period leading to the elections, donors 
started to put pressure on Frelimo insisting that it consider a government of 
national union (GNU). This pressure influenced Dhlakama to also call for 
change and created tension between Frelimo and donors; however, it did not 
lead to a change in the agreement (Synge, 1997: 123-125). 
The final phase before the election was marked by tensions and several 
incidents, including threats and allegations of intimidation. One day before the 
election (set for 27-28 October, 1994), Dhlakama announced a boycott (joined 
by three small parties) stating that there were several irregularities in the 
process. However, the National Elections Commission (CNE) decided that the 
election should go ahead and, at the last minute, extended the process for a 
third day (Synge, 1997: 127-128; Van Den Bergh, 2009: 82-83). Regardless of 
the boycott, Mozambicans went to the poles in large numbers. At the end of the 
second day, Dhlakama lifted the boycott. On 19 November, the official results 
were released showing Chissano’s victory with 53% of the presidential votes 
against 35% to Dhlakama. In the National Assembly, Frelimo won 129 seats 
against 12 for Renamo. The elections were considered fair overall by 
international observers (UNSC, 1994). On 9 December, Chissano was sworn in 
as president marking the end of the UNOMOZ mandate and the start of its 
withdrawal (Synge, 1997: 140-141). 
In hindsight, it is undeniable that external actors played a fundamental role in 
the promotion of peace in Mozambique (Cohen, 2000; Manning and Malbrough, 
2009). At the same time, UNOMOZ was criticised for its invasive character and 
lack of flexibility and coordination with the local structures. Synge (1997: 45) 
referred to its activities as being “invasive and destabilizing to, rather than 
creative and supportive of, the shaky structures of the Mozambican state and 
society” (see also Venâncio, 1998: 110; Alden, 2001: 90-91). According to 
Synge (1997: 149), by installing a parallel administration during the transition 
phase, the UN undermined state authority that was already weak, spurred 
corruption, and weakened the capacity of state agencies in the long run. 
Despite these different instances of external engagement, it should be noted 
that both Frelimo and Renamo played a strong role in the negotiation process 
making explicit their own demands and positions towards the mediators and, 
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therefore, claiming ownership of the peace process (Van Den Bergh, 2009: 36). 
Furthermore, Frelimo’s ability to retain power was also the result of a set of 
calculated actions. Indeed, even when under pressure, Frelimo did not make 
concessions that could undermine its political power. Therefore, the view that 
peacebuilding was somehow imposed in Mozambique should be viewed 
cautiously, for interfering in a part of the organisational apparatus of the state is 
very different from affecting real power redistribution, in particular, between 
elites. Finally, and even though the peace process relied heavily on the 
bureaucratic imperatives of the agencies involved in its implementation which 
largely silenced the voices of ordinary Mozambicans (Synge, 1997: 152, 165), 
the very success of peace in Mozambique was deeply related to the way that 
ordinary people dealt with this transition as discussed below. 
THE GRASSROOTS’ PEACE 
Whilst the peace negotiations were discussed mainly at the elite level, peace, 
de facto, in Mozambique was also the result of a series of initiatives that took 
place in the daily lives of the thousands of victims and perpetrators of violence 
who made a concrete effort to make peace a reality (Honwana, 1996; 
Nordstrom, 1997; Lundin, 2004; Van Den Bergh, 2009). These spaces for 
peace were not only inspired by the negotiations, in fact, quite often they 
worked in spite of the negotiations and even in the midst of violence. As formal 
peace approached, the vacuum created by the ‘uncommitted leadership’, the 
‘weak international mechanisms’, and the ‘undisciplined armies’ created, in turn, 
more space for ‘people’s peace’ to flourish as no one wanted to risk the 
resumption of the war (Wilson, 1994; Cabaço, 1995: 97). 
People’s peace assumed several shapes, but it had one common aspect, which 
was the recognised need for reconciliation. Different from South Africans, 
Mozambicans ruled out the option of a truth commission and preferred, instead, 
to focus on forgiveness and social reintegration (Lundin, 2004: 16-17; Van Den 
Bergh, 2009: 39-42). The reasoning for this was the general understanding that 
punishment would only delay peace and probably contribute to a never-ending 
process as it was very difficult at that stage to clearly separate victims and 
perpetrators of violence (which also included the state). As such, the law on 
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amnesty received no objection during the negotiations neither from the 
Mozambican population nor from the international community (ibid.). 
At the national level, the mass organizations played an important role in 
preparing people for peace. In November 1992, the OMM organized a 
conference and invited their Angolan counterparts to discuss possible initiatives 
to involve women in the new democratic space (Van Den Bergh, 2009: 66-70). 
The OJM organized a national seminar with Norwegian support, and the 
Mozambican Workers’ Organisation (OTM) held a series of events throughout 
the country in order to prepare the population for the forthcoming elections. 
Mass organisations also joined the seminars promoted by AWEPA (Association 
of European Parliamentarians in Africa) and the CCM (Christian Council of 
Mozambique), which aimed to explain the peace agreement and its implications 
for the daily lives of citizens (ibid.). 
The churches engaged in several activities at the grassroots level before and 
after the peace agreement. The CCM created a Commission for Justice, Peace, 
and Reconciliation in 1984. Besides their engagement in humanitarian activities, 
the churches wanted to contribute to the spread of democratic values and 
peace (Van Den Bergh, 2009: 27-27). In cooperation with AWEPA, between 
1991 and 1993, the CCM developed a nation-wide programme that “created 
possibilities for people to speak out and to discuss the new situation, but also to 
be informed about the new political situation, the multi-party democracy and the 
elections” (ibid.: 29). They also launched a national  ‘swords for ploughshares’ 
campaign creating opportunities for voluntary disarmament. Similar activities 
were conducted by the Catholic Church (ibid.: 65). 
At the local level, there were reports of ‘local peace agreements’ even before 
the GPA was signed. Citing the case of Morrumbala in Northern Zambezia, 
Wilson (1994) reported that over one month before the signing of the peace 
agreement, local Renamo units were informing the people/local population 
about the peace to come. When peace came, the local chiefs informed their 
constituents about their freedom of movement and ensured that taxation on 
food was ended. In a parallel effort, the Morrumbala local government made a 
post-war plan for the district, which envisaged partnerships with NGOs to 
ensure adequate resources to accommodate the influx of returning refugees 
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from Malawi. When the peace agreement was signed, Renamo gathered with 
the local government to discuss peace. By late January 1993, there was a 
Renamo official residing in Morrumbala and overseeing issues with the 
administrator. When tensions arose because of the late distribution of 
humanitarian aid, both the Frelimo district army commander and the Renamo 
commander undertook a joint operation in order to avoid the escalation of 
violence and its possible undermining of local peace. All sides further engaged 
in demining the roads as the UN efforts on this issue were delayed (ibid.). 
More generally, at the local level, a series of endogenous initiatives for social 
reconciliation took place based on spiritual rituals for social reintegration. As the 
vast majority of the Mozambican population was (and still is) rural, local rituals 
played a fundamental role in consolidating peace and promoting reconciliation 
as well as restoring communities and restabilising social order (Honwana, 1996: 
345). At this level, one of the major concerns of Mozambicans was the fear of 
the Mpfhukwa, “the spirits of the dead who did not have a proper burial with all 
the rituals aimed at placing them in their proper positions in the world of the 
spirits” (ibid.: 351). As unsettled souls, the Mpfhukwa were believed to have the 
capacity to “afflict, provoke maladies and even kill the families of those who 
killed or mistreated them in life” (ibid.). The way to deal with this was by 
performing specific rituals in order to exorcise or appease these spirits. 
The war further created a major concern locally with the effects of ‘social 
pollution’ – the contamination that some people get by being exposed to 
strange environments or being victims of witchcraft and sorcery. In particular, 
social pollution may arise from one being in contact with blood and death, which 
was, of course, aggravated during the war. As such, in order for people to be 
fully reintegrated and be able to resettle in their homelands, they all needed to 
undergo a cleansing ritual that usually involved the burning of the clothes 
previously used, as well as vaccinations (incision in the body later filled with 
medicinal herbs) (Honwana, 1996: 354-355). 
Honwana (1996: 357) noted that these rituals were widespread after the war 
and often a precondition for social reintegration, e.g., for families to accept ex-
child-soldiers back home. They were specifically important because they spoke 
the language of these communities being in line with their social cosmology and 
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defining their identity and sense of belonging. They also allowed for 
reconciliation to take place without people having to talk about it as would be 
the case with a truth commission. In fact, it was believed that speaking of 
violence would bring the spirit of violence back (Van Den Bergh, 2009: 42). 
The fact that the people and several grassroots organizations took the initiative 
to engage in peace makes the Mozambican case an example of integrative 
peace where people actually owned and designed this process to a large extent. 
Indeed, these peace actions reflect forms of empowerment, especially in 
subjective terms, by consolidating an ideal of peace integration. At the same 
time, when it comes to the formal aspect that shaped the reconstitution of the 
state, there was a huge disconnect between everyday people’s priorities and 
what the front stage actors focused on. Issues of development, for example, 
were silenced as a result of the primary concern with politics and security, even 
though the war was, to a significant extent, fed by the problematic development 
policies of Frelimo, as well as by the humanitarian issues that stalled economic 
development. This general disconnection is at the heart of some of the 
problems faced today in Mozambique, where the polarization of political dissent 
is accompanied by deep-rooted problems of wealth distribution. This in turn 
reflects the asymmetrical distribution of the peace dividend and stands at the 
heart of the problems related to empowerment promotion. The next two 
sections discuss this issue further by focusing on Mozambique’s development 
and political landscape. 
4.2 Post-War Development Landscape: the Mozambican 
Paradox 
One of the main problems of the post-war Mozambican development agenda is 
the lack of an internal redistribution of the peace dividend. Indeed, whereas the 
country’s development model has been praised for its macro-economic 
achievements — in particular its annual average growth of 7% and low 
inflation30 — it has also been criticised for its shortcomings in terms of long-term 
                                            
30  See indicators at the World Bank Online Database. Available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ (Accessed: 23 March 2014). 
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sustainability as well as for its limitations in curbing poverty (de Renzio and 
Hanlon, 2007; Hanlon and Smart, 2008; Hanlon, 2010b; Cunguara, 2012; AEO, 
2013; BTI, 2014). As argued in this thesis, initiatives such as the ‘7 million’ are 
severely affected by the context in which they are implemented. Therefore, 
understanding the general economic development landscape of Mozambique 
helps us to identify some of the main structural constraints to this and other 
policies aimed at empowerment promotion. 
MOZAMBIQUE’S MACRO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE SUCCESS 
STORY? 
Mozambique entered the reform period in the late 1980s. Since then, the IFIs 
and Western donors have significantly influenced the country’s economic 
policies. The period between 1985 and 1995 was particularly severe, as the 
IMF pushed for structural reforms based on cuts in public expenditure and 
economic liberalisation which had several negative effects on the Mozambican 
economy (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 111-130; Hanlon, 1996; de Renzio 
and Hanlon, 2007). 
First, the restrictive economic measures hit the social sector and the state 
administrative apparatus. As wages were cut, nurses and teachers were 
pushed below the poverty line, and many skilled people left the public sector in 
search of better wages in international NGOs and development agencies 
(Hanlon, 2004; Hanlon and Smart, 2008: 13). Over time, this also fostered petty 
corruption, since those affected looked for new avenues of income to be able to 
pay for their daily needs (ibid.). 
Second, by imposing severe credit restrictions, the reforms hit the agricultural 
sector and domestic production in general. In some cases the effects were 
disastrous, creating massive unemployment and the closure of several factories 
(Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 1995: 149; Hanlon, 1996: 44-45; Cramer, 2001; 
Hanlon and Smart, 2008: 13; de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007: 9). 
Third, the privatization process was extremely fast paced and did not take into 
account the social and political aspects that characterised the Mozambican 
transition (Cramer, 2001 and 2006: 266-269; Pitcher, 2002; de Renzio and 
Hanlon, 2007). As a state coming out of a socialist experiment, Mozambique did 
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not have a middle class at the time of transition, so the process offered the 
opportunity for a small bureaucratic elite to suddenly become the new 
entrepreneurial class. Therefore, privatization in Mozambique, instead of 
reducing the state, was marked by a process of “transformation through 
preservation”, in the sense that these “economic and political reforms have 
redirected the role of the state in the economy, but they have not led to its 
withdrawal” (Pitcher, 2002: 6). As the state bureaucracy was fundamentally 
dominated by Frelimo, the privatization process ultimately contributed to 
strengthening the party’s power. 
In terms of its economic effects, because of the way it was handled, the 
privatization process gave rise to several inefficient and non-competitive 
enterprises (Cramer, 2001), many of which soon found themselves on the verge 
of bankruptcy (de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007: 8). Besides, it also provided the 
space for growing corruption and rent-seeking in the state machinery and in the 
private sector (ibid.; Hanlon, 2004). Finally, the transition period, while opening 
the way for an influx of foreign aid, also made Mozambique one of the most aid-
dependent countries in the world bringing along serious problems of 
accountability, sovereignty, and sustainability (de Renzio and Hanlon, 2007; 
Hanlon and Smart, 2008). 
In the second half of the 1990s, while the IFIs’ pressure eased, the number of 
foreign investors in Mozambique increased. Progressively, the country’s 
economy moved towards the phase of the so-called ‘megaprojects’ 
concentrated mostly in the mineral sector. The megaprojects have been 
criticised on several grounds, in particular, because the contracted firms have 
major tax and fiscal exemptions leading to the loss of great potential state 
revenue. Furthermore, the projects create few jobs, do not contribute to the 
diversification of the economy, and increase the country’s economic 
vulnerability (Hanlon and Smart, 2008: 14; AEO, 2010 and 2013; Cunguara, 
2012: 161).  
So, whereas Mozambique has been recently celebrating the decrease of its aid-
dependency, the country is, in fact, far from self-sufficient. First, the reliance on 
donors’ budget support is still high (33.5% as forecasted in the 2014 national 
budget) (AIM, 11 Dec. 2013). The country, furthermore, depends on imports for 
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most of its consumer goods including food, in particular, from South Africa 
(Weimer et al., 2012: 50-54; AEO, 2013). Moreover, whereas most of the 
country’s workforce is located in the agricultural sector, this sector’s weight in 
the economy has significantly shrunk in the last thirty years consolidating 
Mozambique as an economy of consumption instead of production (Weimer et 
al., 2012: 51). Finally, the Mozambican economy has suffered from extremely 
low international competitiveness, a situation magnified by the lack of adequate 
infrastructure, the inefficient government bureaucracy, and the poorly educated 
workforce all of which are worsened by the high levels of corruption (AEO, 
2013). 
Corruption has indeed become a chronic problem in Mozambique. It manifests 
in different forms from state capture 31  to administrative corruption 32  and 
patronage, which affect everyone from the foreign business community to the 
ordinary rural Mozambican (Hanlon, 2004; Martini, 2012; BTI, 2014: 34). 
According to Hanlon (2004), donors have actively contributed to the 
intensification of corruption, both by exerting pressure to speed-up privatization 
processes in the 1990s and by turning a blind eye to major corruption scandals 
(see also Cramer, 2001: 270-271). The extent of corruption is a matter of 
concern as it affects the effectiveness of several sectors of the government, and 
it is perceived as an obstacle for the business community, in particular, small 
and medium enterprises (Martini, 2012). 
Despite several measures to tackle corruption, there has been no significant 
improvement especially during the two mandates of president Guebuza (Fael 
and Cortez, 2013; BTI, 2014: 11-12, 34). The anti-corruption instruments 
created have been mostly inefficient not least because of the severe weakness 
of the judiciary (ibid.; Martini, 2012). The Mozambican watchdog Centre of 
Public Integrity (CIP) noted that the deviation of funds from the state has 
actually been on the rise since 2005, and the major cases of corruption (linked 
                                            
31 This involves “taking control of the state apparatus in order to extract rents from the 
state transactions” (Hanlon, 2004: 754). 
32 Linked to the implementation of existing laws, usually involves paying of bribes for 
the accomplishment of services (Hanlon, 2004: 754). 
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with major political figures) are usually omitted from public reports which favour 
instead cases of petty corruption usually involving low ranking state employees 
(Fael and Cortez, 2013). 
One of the biggest challenges for fighting corruption in Mozambique is linked to 
the strong relationship between Frelimo and the overall functioning of the state 
apparatus, which has become even stronger under President Guebuza. As 
noted by CIP, in the last ten years, the distinction between the private and the 
public state sphere has been increasingly blurred as the discovery of mineral 
resources in the country has created a major rush from several members of the 
government to create enterprises in order to control part of the extractive sector 
(Fael and Cortez, 2013; see also Hanlon, 2004 and 2009b; Cunguara, 2012; 
Weimer et al., 2012: 55-58). 
At this point, it could be argued that corruption is an intrinsic phenomena to 
economic development and not necessarily ‘bad’ (Abrahamsson and Nilsson, 
1995: 157). Hanlon, for instance, argued in 2009 that President Guebuza could 
be pursuing “a new form of elite development capitalism” (Hanlon, 2009b). 
According to him, Guebuza is part of a Frelimo faction that is not purely 
predatory, but it is also concerned with the country’s development. So, whereas 
the President’s family holds a significant share of the Mozambican private 
sector, and Guebuza does promote the expansion of businesses in which he 
has direct interests, “he is also attracting the brightest of the foreign trained 
younger generation who work hard and want to move quickly, while 
marginalising the old comrades who are only trying to get rich through ‘goatism’ 
and influence, using their family and party links” (ibid.: 6). That would be, 
somehow, a gain in comparison to the previous administration which belonged 
to the exclusively predatory elite. 
Hanlon himself acknowledged that this alone did not extinguish the traditional 
predatory elite.33 However, what seems more problematic in this state of events 
is that the current development model does not fundamentally change the 
peace dividend problem. So, whereas the country’s economy is indeed running, 
the agricultural sector remains weak, Mozambique still depends on imported 
                                            
33 For a critique of Hanlon’s argument, see Lalá (2014) and Saul (2011). 
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food, and over 70% of the population still relies on subsistence agriculture and 
will not necessarily benefit from the extractive sector. In summary, while it may 
be the case that some of the people have been ‘empowered’, most experience 
disempowerment in many dimensions of their lives. 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT AND THE FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY 
According to the 2013 Human Development Report (UNDP, 2013), 
Mozambique scored 0.327 in the Human Development Index (HDI) ranking 
number 185 above only the Democratic Republic of Congo and Niger. When 
the Inequality-Adjusted HDI34 was considered, the score fell to 0.22. The report 
also noted that, according to the Multidimensional Poverty Index,35 79.3% of the 
population lived in multidimensional poverty and an additional 9.5% were 
vulnerable to multiple deprivations. 
Whilst the new methodology used for the HDI has been criticised (AIM, 19 Mar. 
2013), these different indexes constitute an example of how complicated it is to 
measure poverty. Indeed, disagreements on statistics about poverty in 
Mozambique are fairly common and influence the government position about its 
own progress on development (Cunguara and Hanlon, 2010; de Brito, 2012). 
The poverty line used by the government, for instance, is MZN 18 per day, 
which is the equivalent to USD 0.6. If this poverty line is used, then the poverty 
rate in Mozambique currently stands at 54.7%. However, if the international 
standard of USD 1 per day is used, then this percentage increases to 60% 
(AEO, 2013). 
Other variations depend on the proxies used to measure poverty. A report 
published by the National Direction of Studies and Analysis of Policies in 
                                            
34 According to the report, “The 2010 HDR introduced the Inequality-Adjusted HDI 
(IHDI), which takes into account inequality in all three dimensions of the HDI by 
‘discounting’ each dimension’s average value according to its level of inequality. The 
HDI can be viewed as an index of 'potential' human development and the IHDI as an 
index of actual human development.” 
35 The MPI identifies “multiple deprivations in the same households in education, health 
and standard of living” (HDR, 2013). 
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Mozambique36 (DNEAP) (Rep. of Moz., 2010a), for instance, noted that the 
2008/09 poverty indicators showed a significant improvement of the non-
monetary indicators of poverty, compared to the years 2002/03. These include 
better access to education and health and were the result of a series of 
government efforts in providing basic services. At the same time, the report also 
acknowledged that the rates for consumption poverty have barely changed 
during the same period at below 55%.37 These findings were also presented in 
the national 2010 MDG Report (Rep. of Moz., 2010b: 2), which highlighted the 
“strong supportive environment” existing in Mozambique, which would lead to 
the achievement of the 2015 poverty reduction target. 
In a critical assessment of the DNEAP report, de Brito (2012) noted that, while it 
could be the case that there had been a relative stabilization of poverty, the 
actual number of poor had actually increased in absolute terms. Furthermore, 
seven out of the ten provinces had, in fact, become poorer, whereas the others 
had a significant decrease in the number of poor. More generally, looking over 
the last 20 years, some authors note that poverty in Mozambique has, in fact, 
become more complex (Hanlon and Smart, 2008; Fox, 2008). On the one hand, 
there are several aspects of continuity such as the urban/rural difference (the 
latter being usually poorer) as well as variation along the north/south axis of 
Mozambique (the North being the poorest section of the country) (Fox, 2008: 
42). On the other hand, several changes have occurred. Firstly, the intensity of 
poverty has varied, increasing particularly in the urban areas (Fox, 2008: 43-44; 
Hanlon and Smart, 2008). Secondly, there has been an increase in the levels of 
vulnerability in the rural areas, due partly to climatic shocks and seasonal 
income shortfalls (ibid.; AEO, 2013). Additionally, there has been an increasing 
level of inequality and differentiation, mainly in the rural areas, reducing the 
possibility of social mobility and creating a category of extremely vulnerable 
                                            
36 The DNEAP is part of the Ministry of Development and Planning of Mozambique. 
37 In 2012, the World Bank published a Policy Research Working Paper criticising the 
methodology used in the DNEAP report showing its inconsistency with a series of other 
indicators and discussing some errors that may have produced the non-robust results 
(Alfani et al., 2012). 
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people who struggle to be “above the poverty line” but eventually fall “back into 
poverty” (Hanlon and Smart, 2008: 65).  
More generally, and regardless of some improvements, most Mozambicans still 
lack basic services. The last census, released in November 2009, for instance 
(referent year 2007), revealed that only 10% of all houses visited had electricity 
(double the figure of 1997); only 10.1% of the population had piped water (the 
figure in 1997 was 8.5%) while most of the population still obtained water from 
unprotected sources. Also, 54.3% of the homes had no sanitation at all not 
even a simple pit latrine (a figure that was 66% in 1997) (AIM, 18 Nov. 2009). 
Considering the intensity of the problem of poverty, it is no surprise that 
president Guebuza made the issue the cornerstone of his political agenda 
(Guebuza, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009a). This discourse is marked by a general 
call for action on the part of Mozambicans, so they become the agents of the 
‘fight against poverty’ (luta contra a pobreza). The fight against poverty has also 
been at the heart of the government’s relationship with donors which is officially 
centred on the Action Plans for the Reduction of (Absolute) Poverty, known as 
PARPAs (Plano de Ação para a Redução da Pobreza Absoluta), the 
Mozambican versions of the World Bank/IMF Poverty Strategy Reduction 
Papers. There have been four versions of this policy since 1999. The last one, 
covering the period 2011-2014, was renamed PARP (without the last ‘A’ for 
‘Absolute’ poverty). The main objective of the PARPAs/PARP is poverty 
reduction. PARPA I defined a target of reducing absolute poverty from 70% in 
1997 to less than 60% by 2005 and less than 50% by the end of the decade. 
PARPA II redefined the aim as reducing it from 54% in 2003 to 45% by 2009. 
PARP set the reduction goal from 54.7% (as of 2011) to 42% by 2014 (Rep. of 
Moz., 2006 and 2011). 
The PARPAs/PARP have been criticised on several grounds. First, there has 
been criticism regarding the lack of clear sequencing and articulation between 
them as well as incoherencies within each document (de Brito, 2012: 30; 
Francisco, 2012). Second, the policy actions defined were considered vague, 
resembling more declarations of intent than concrete policy measures (de Brito, 
2012: 31; Castel-Branco, 2012). Third, there is a problem of coordination 
between important national policy mechanisms in Mozambique. Whereas the 
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PARP is the most important strategy document for donors, there are two key 
documents guiding Mozambican national policies, namely the Five Year Plan, 
which is a general outline of policy intervention for the government, and the 
Economic and Social Plan (PES), which is more specific in terms of policy 
measures. The Five Year Plan originates from Frelimo and is a document of the 
executive; whereas the PES is placed under the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance and the Ministry of Development and Planning. In theory, the Five Year 
Plan should inform the PARP, but critics highlight precisely their lack of 
connection (BTI, 2012: 26). Besides, the distribution of tasks between 
governmental institutions and how these are intended to interact in the 
implementation of the policies is unclear, a factor that also has consequences in 
the evaluation process of the PARPAs/PARP (ibid.; Francisco, 2012: 3-4). 
Moreover, following donors’ priorities, the PARPAs have generally focused on 
the achievement of the MDGs leaving aside aspects such as how productivity 
(especially agriculture) may affect the former (Cunguara, 2012: 165). The 
several critiques of this disconnect and the 2008 and 2010 riots in Maputo 
eventually influenced the last negotiations, and the PARP (2011-2014) finally 
included both concerns with agricultural production as well as employment 
promotion in its agenda (Rep. of Moz., 2011; BTI, 2014: 31). Still, according to 
critics, the topics are mostly disconnected from the concrete discussion of 
fundamental elements that may affect their development, in particular, the 
economic chain that links agricultural production and the market (Castel-
Branco, 2012: 109; Cunguara, 2012: 167).  
These problems have led some authors to ask what the real objectives of the 
PARPAs/PARP are, and one of the answers is that they exist to mobilize 
external resources and thus guarantee the political and macroeconomic stability 
of Mozambique (Francisco, 2012: 5; Castel-Branco, 2012: 112). A second 
answer is that they work as a legitimiser of foreign aid as they are designed in 
close consultation with local stakeholders reinforcing participatory mechanisms 
and, therefore, supposedly promoting local ownership (Francisco, 2012: 5-7). If 
that is so, perhaps the PARPA/PARPs have been more successful in the first 
case because foreign aid, although in decline, keeps pouring into the country. 
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On the other hand, the matter of ownership, and especially empowerment, is far 
less a success as discussed below. 
THE CASE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OBSERVATORIES 
The Development Observatories (DOs), originally called Poverty Observatories 
(POs), were created in order to help evaluate and monitor the implementation of 
the PARPAs/PARP. On the one hand, the DOs constitute a consultative body 
expected to support the government in gathering reliable data on policy 
implementation as well as make suggestions for policy improvement. On the 
other hand, they also constitute a vehicle to foster accountability between the 
government and civil society (Francisco and Matter, 2007: 26). DOs are 
comprised of members of the government apparatus, civil society, and 
international development partners, and a permanent governmental body is in 
charge of their organisation (ibid.). The first national PO was launched in April 
2003. Since then, national PO/DO meetings were held on an annual basis, and 
since 2005, they have also taken place at the provincial level. 
In 2004, in order to enhance their participation in the POs, CSOs created a 
platform called G20, which became the official CSO representative at the 
national level. The G20 started to publish an annual report on poverty that was 
praised for its good standards and was used as material for discussion in the 
PO influencing the elaboration of the subsequent PARPAs. In spite of this 
positive outcome, reports about the efficiency of the POs/DOs and their 
influence on policy making have been critical overall. A 2007 report by 
Francisco and Matter concluded that, notwithstanding the DOs potential to 
instigate citizens’ participation, they had been restricted to mere consultative 
bodies “with no channels for feedback, social accountability, checks and 
balances and other forms of citizens’ empowerment and participation” 
(Francisco and Matter, 2007: 6). One of the problems in this regard was the lack 
of interaction between CSOs and the government between each annual 
meeting. In 2011, another report echoed these findings, adding that, as a 
consequence of its poor results, “an increasing number of CSO activists are 
disenchanted with the DOs” (Pereira, 2011: 4-5). 
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The process leading to the PARP was especially criticized. In a 2012 civil 
society report, Adalima and Nuvunga (2012) noted that civil society participation 
in that process had been weak and mostly reactive to the government 
proposals. One of the obstacles for CSOs’ participation had been the internal 
crisis faced by the G20 which was eventually terminated in 2010. Without a 
cohesive leadership, many CSOs worked on an individualized basis having, 
therefore, less leverage for action than the government. Another obstacle, 
however, was the way the process of consultation was structured and 
organized by the government, in particular, the definition of the timetable. 
Indeed, the government started to work on PARP before officially calling/inviting 
members of civil society. Therefore, in practice, civil society was involved in the 
process only at the final stage when the most important issues (including the 
removal of ‘A’ for Absolute poverty and the change in the format of the 
document structure) had already been defined. Regardless of these problems, 
the report recognised that there had been improvements in the DOs, especially 
in the capacity of CSOs to discuss specific topics. 
In May 2012, I had the chance to take part in the X Session of the Nampula 
Provincial DO and observe how some of the above issues manifested during 
the event. The meeting consisted of representatives of all sectors of the 
provincial government, as well as all the district administrators, several 
members of the local councils of the districts, many members of local CSOs and 
some donors. The discussion was divided in four thematic clusters following the 
ten-year Province Strategic Plan: (1) economic growth, (2) participative 
governance, (3) infra-structure and environmental issues, and (4) human 
capital. In each cluster, first, the government representative presented 
institutional achievements, and then the debate followed. Lastly, a case study 
(previously chosen by CSOs) was presented by one of the members of the civil 
society. 
On the positive side, participants seemed generally free to talk. In particular, 
members of the local councils and local leaders raised their voices to point to 
practical problems affecting their communities such as the lack of water, the 
very poor quality of the schools, and the problems related to the construction of 
roads in their district. However, it was clear that they also lacked a common and 
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organised voice. Because topics were presented individually and were very 
specific to their communities, they did not seem to contribute to the concrete 
proposal of policy measures. As for the CSOs, many expressed very critical 
comments, but often the voices heard were from the same CSOs while others 
remained mostly silent (Obs. 51). 
On the negative side, it became clear that not all criticism of the government 
was welcome. While many of the results presented by the government pointed 
to an evident underachievement compared to the expected outcome the 
reasons for the underachievement were not made clear. When questions were 
raised, more often than not, general excuses were given which avoided 
accountability. For example, there were several complaints about the work on 
infrastructure and its overall poor quality. The audience complained repeatedly 
that the constructor was never held responsible for the bad work and some 
referred to a case in one of the districts as “a real shame”. Facing the criticism, 
the presenter (from the provincial government) simply replied that they 
recognised the problem, but ”at least the work shows that we are committed 
with the improvement of the issue” as if this was a satisfactory response from 
the government regarding public expenditure (Obs. 51). 
As some budget values were not addressed clearly in the official presentations, 
voices in the audience wondered out loud if there may have been cases of fund 
deviation, and some participants also offered a reminder about the previous 
session’s recommendation to improve accountability in the use of public 
spending. To this, the presenter vaguely replied that the power point 
presentation only had the “highlights”, and later the governor, who was 
presiding over the session, noted that “audit sessions were being held 
regularly”. But no further details were given. 
But more striking was the government reaction to a case study presented by the 
CSOs with regards to the 15% taxation for deforestation in the case of 
exploitation of natural resources. The presenter discussed the case pointing 
towards the problem of accountability and the fact that the 15% tax should be 
reverted locally, but the evidence showed that this was not happening; there 
was no explanation regarding where the money was going. In his response, the 
government representative harshly criticised the presentation for its “lack of 
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methodological accuracy and no references” (although the original report had 
been sent to the government with the full data). After several minutes of 
critique, he then vaguely mentioned that the money did not necessarily have to 
go back to the same place where the tax was charged (Obs. 51). The episode 
was later widely commented on informally by some participants. Some of them 
used the example to highlight some of the limitations faced by CSOs in terms of 
influencing policy in Mozambique, and how this kind of exercise could, 
therefore, be frustrating. 
Considering the problems discussed in the Nampula DO, it was surprising that 
the issue of corruption never came to the discussion. Indeed, the problems 
described above, both in the macroeconomic domain of the economy, as well 
as from the perspective of human development, suggested that lack of 
accountability and transparency was strongly present and felt by the people as 
an element that influences their lives on a daily basis. At the same time, this 
very element seemed to reflect the central issue of power disparities between a 
nascent civil society and a strong and extremely politicised government. 
DEVELOPMENT AND EMPOWERMENT? 
The considerations above reveal a series of important aspects that affect 
empowerment promotion policies. First, they show the relevance of the national 
structural context in which policies are designed and how they may become a 
form of structural constraint to empowerment promotion. Second, the analysis 
indicates that poverty, which in itself is an indicator of disempowerment, has 
several non-economic features that may reinforce its economic domain. As 
noted by Duncan Green (2008: 7), “Poverty is about much more than a low 
income . . . It is a sense of powerlessness, frustration, exhaustion, and 
exclusion from decision-making, not to mention the relative lack of access to 
public services, the financial system, and just about any other source of official 
support” (emphasis added). The example of the DOs illustrates how difficult it 
may be to change other power dynamics that may have a direct effect on 
poverty reduction. Thus, it is important to pay attention to the political domain of 
poverty and, in the Mozambican case in particular, examine how party politics 
affect the country’s political economy and, therefore, anti-poverty strategies. 
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The analysis also points towards the problem of corruption and lack of 
accountability. Although this is a complex relation, and one that varies 
according to how one defines corruption and poverty, there is evidence 
suggesting that even if corruption by itself does not cause poverty, it has, 
nevertheless, “direct consequences on economic and governance factors, 
intermediaries that in turn produce poverty” (Chetwynd et al., 2003: 6). From the 
economic perspective, corruption reduces economic investment, distorts 
markets, and increases inequality; whereas from the governance perspective, it 
erodes the government’s institutional capacity to deliver public services and 
increases budgetary pressures on the government (ibid.). In both cases, these 
derivative effects may contribute to an increase in poverty and inequality, which, 
in turn, affects the distribution of the peace dividend (see also Negin et al., 
2010). 
Finally, taking into account the long-term effects of these development policies, 
whereas their empowering effects have been limited, they have indirectly 
contributed to spontaneous attempts of empowerment. The Maputo riots, for 
instance, in 2008 and 2010,38 were a response to the rise in the prices of both 
food and fuel. Whilst they were initially resisted by the government, who stated 
that the price changes were irreversible, as the riots went on accompanied by 
episodes of violence, the government then opted to subsidise both food and 
fuel in an effort to calm the protests (Cunguara, 2012: 167-168). More 
generally, the riots called attention to the problems of instability that may have 
been generated by the perceived unsatisfactory levels of socio-economic 
improvements — that is the problem of perceived disempowerment (see also 
Astill-Brown and Weimer, 2010). 
Manifestations of apparently ad hoc violence in the rural areas also raise 
questions about the extent to which social stability may be guaranteed as long 
as life conditions do not improve and individuals are denied their most basic 
                                            
38 The two and half days of riots resulted in 13 deaths, nearly 300 hundreds injured, 
and the destruction of public and private good and were organised through mobile 
phones SMS messages (Hanlon, 2010c). 
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needs. A regular phenomenon has been the violence related to cholera.39 The 
violence is usually associated with misinformation regarding the use of chlorine 
pills to clean the water and has been going on at least since 2001 leading to the 
deaths of Red Cross workers as well as of community leaders accused of 
spreading cholera in the water (Hanlon, 2009a; AIM, 07 Jan. 2011). Other 
episodes of violence are related to beliefs in witchcraft and the role played by 
community authorities. In 2011, for instance, a community leader had his house 
burnt to the ground; he was accused of controlling a crocodile that had been 
killing people in the Limpopo river (AIM, 04 Jan, 2011).  
What episodes like these suggest is that communities, facing different kinds of 
social constraints, transfer the responsibility for these problems to specific 
actors and, facing the latter’s inability to deal with the situation, take their own 
actions in order to ‘solve the problem’ or ‘make justice’. Recalling some of these 
sporadic episodes of communal violence, Hanlon (2009a: 129) noted: 
In a time of hunger when people see no hope of improvement in their 
lives, perhaps the passive and violent resistance to putting chlorine in 
local water supplies should be seen as local people making a desperate 
attempt to regain some power – as a disempowered group finally taking 
a stand to defend its very survival. 
Unfortunately, because they are sporadic and do not target the structural 
factors that cause disempowerment, these actions do not seem to change 
power at a scale big enough to trigger a major change process. 
4.3 Democracy, Power (Re)Distribution, and People’s 
Empowerment 
Democratization is one of the pillars of current peacebuilding practice especially 
in the shape of multiparty elections (Manning, 2003; Paris, 2004; Richmond, 
                                            
39 According to Carlos Serra who made a study of the cholera cases, the protests were 
led by unemployed youths who saw no future for themselves (quoted in Hanlon, 2009a: 
128). Furthermore, most of the local population really believed that the rich and 
powerful wanted to kill them, and that it would be done by putting chlorine in the water 
(ibid.). 
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2011). Arguably, democracy is seen as a vehicle to distribute power as it 
provides the opportunity for different parties to rule. More generally, democracy 
is deemed empowering as it gives institutional means to express people’s 
power through participation, in particular, through the possibility of voting, 
instances of debate, and opportunities for political expression (Sørensen, 1993; 
Sen, 1999: 55; Welzel and Inglehart, 2008). 
It should be noted that democratization in peacebuilding scenarios is made 
difficult by a set of unfavourable social, economic, and political conditions that 
affect post-war contexts (Manning, 2002: 4). At the same time, as a tool of 
conflict resolution, democracy is problematic as it is based on the idea of 
institutionalised competition between political forces who were previously at war 
which means that there still is the recognition of often deep divisions between 
them (ibid.: 16; Weimer, 2002: 64-66). 
In Mozambique, the democratization process seems to have become stuck in 
the still on-going power dispute between Frelimo and Renamo, whereas the 
more popular dimensions of democracy have been relegated to a subordinate 
place. In this section, I first look at democracy from the ‘top’ view, highlighting 
how Frelimo has managed to maintain power in spite of all the institutional 
changes since the Peace Accords. Second, I discuss democracy from the 
‘bottom’ view taking into account how ordinary Mozambicans, including 
organised civil society, have perceived these democratic changes, and the 
extent to which these have provided spaces for empowerment to occur. I argue 
that, whilst democratization has changed the institutional design of Mozambican 
politics, this was not enough to promote a significant change in power 
distribution especially in such a way as to empower Mozambicans in general. 
Instead, the structural constraints generated by Frelimo’s dominance and the 
lack of strong political opposition reverberate at the bottom limiting the efficacy 
of a nascent organised civil society. 
POWER AT THE TOP: THE MORE IT CHANGES THE MORE IT STAYS THE 
SAME 
The democratic model agreed on in the peace negotiations presented a series 
of limitations to the consolidation of democracy in Mozambique. The adopted 
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model favoured a ‘winner-take-all’ system with a very strong executive and a 
weak legislative branch. Here, the president is directly elected by the people in 
a simple majority vote system, whereas the deputies of the national legislature 
are elected via a system of proportional representation which includes closed 
party lists in each of the 11 electoral districts (ten provinces and the capital). 
The number of seats is proportional to the registered number of voters in each 
electoral district, and until 2006, there was a clause in the legislation that 
forbade parties that obtained less than of 5% of the national votes from taking 
any seat thereby reducing any possibility of small parties being represented in 
the legislature. The president is head of state and chief executive and appoints 
the prime minister who is the chief of the cabinet as well as all the governors of 
the provinces and of Maputo. The President also appoints the cabinet without 
external consultation with other parties. In summary, the executive has 
dominant power in the main national decision-making process. 
Taking into account the political history of Frelimo and Renamo, it is no wonder 
that the former was highly privileged by this model. Indeed, some analysts 
would argue that the peace deal was only possible precisely because Frelimo 
knew that with such a system, it would be able to retain control of the country’s 
political scene (Carbone, 2005; Morier-Genoud, 2009). As of April 2014, Frelimo 
has won all presidential elections (1994, 1999, 2004, and 2009) as well as the 
majority of seats in Parliament and most municipal elections (1998, 2003, 2008, 
and 2013). 
It should be noted that Frelimo’s dominance, per se, would not be anti-
democratic, assuming its power represented the actual will of the Mozambican 
people. Nevertheless, the case is far more complex. First, whereas the 
presidential and parliamentary elections have been considered free and fair 
overall, they have, nonetheless, been characterised by various irregularities. 
The 1999 elections were particularly tense as the results were very narrowly in 
favour of Frelimo’s candidate, then president Joaquim Chissano, with a margin 
of just over 200 thousand votes, a number by far inferior to the total of invalid 
votes (500 thousand) (Hanlon, 2000). This prompted Renamo to contest the 
results and led to a series of protests that ended in clashes with the police. A 
dramatic episode took place in Montepuez where protestors were violently 
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suppressed by the police leading to the killing of 40 people and the further 
death of over 80 people who suffocated in an overcrowded prison (AIM, 5 Dec. 
2000; Morier-Genoud, 2009: 159). The 2009 elections were also condemned by 
national and international observers (Hanlon, 2010a; Freedom House, 2014); 
however, as Frelimo won by a landslide, it was agreed that the irregularities did 
not fundamentally affect the results. 
Second, Frelimo’s position of dominance is enhanced by a series of 
mechanisms intended to consolidate the party’s power in the state machinery. 
In this regard, the primacy of the party instead of the personal leadership is a 
key feature that makes Frelimo stronger than Renamo (Carbone, 2005; Hanlon 
and Smart, 2008: 96-97). By reinforcing a centralised decision-making process, 
the primacy of the party is also what keeps Frelimo united despite increasing 
internal fragmentation (ibid.; Weimer et al., 2012: 38-44). Finally, Frelimo’s 
dominance is compounded by the party’s control of the economy (see above) 
and the weak rule of law. In particular, the judiciary lacks independence, which 
is reinforced by the fact that judges and state attorneys are appointed by the 
head of state and depend financially on the executive (UNGA, 2001; BTI, 2014: 
11; Fael and Cortez, 2013). 
Third, there is a problem related to the weakness of the opposition parties and 
the fragmentation of Renamo. Whereas Renamo has invested in its political 
wing since the mid-1980s, and more effectively since the peace negotiations 
(Manning, 2002: 84), in time, it has lost cohesion. This was partly due to 
Dhlakama’s individualistic and authoritarian way of ruling Renamo which has 
led to the expulsion of important cadres of the party who, in turn, have created 
or joined new parties or even been co-opted by Frelimo (Carbone, 2005; 
Hanlon and Smart, 2008: 94-95; Vines, 2013; BTI, 2014: 4, 14). Unfortunately, 
the new parties are too small to compete with Frelimo (ibid.; Van Den Bergh, 
2009: 78, 113), so ultimately, Renamo gets weaker, and Frelimo gets stronger 
in the political setting. 
The current political scenario has led observers to label Mozambique a de facto 
but not de jure one party state (Weimer et al., 2012: 39) as the aspects 
highlighted above are perpetuated notwithstanding the formal institutional 
reconfiguration of the state. Therefore, not only has democratization (elections) 
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not changed Frelimo’s dominance, but also, it may have further legitimated it via 
the façade of elections. Additionally, the more this becomes consolidated, the 
more the opposition reacts, and the less attention is given to the grassroots and 
what changes democracy has brought locally. 
More recently, the asymmetrical distribution of the peace dividend between the 
political elite has led to a new surge of instability that started in 2012 and 
persists at the time of writing (15 April 2014). Facing the emergence of new and 
more organised opposition parties, Renamo’s leader has resumed violence as 
the main bargaining mechanism to pursue political negotiations. In April 2012, 
clashes between Renamo ex-combatants, Dhlakama’s ‘Presidential Guard’ 
(about 300 men responsible for his security), and the government riot police 
took place in Nampula, then the residence of Renamo’s leader. In October 2012, 
Dhlakama moved to Gorongosa, where Renamo held its base during the war, 
making threats of resuming the war and dividing the country in two as well as 
urging a revision of the Peace Accords (@ Verdade, 18 Oct. 2012). 
In 2013, reacting to the electoral law approved in December 2012, Renamo 
started to engage in a series of activities which included ambushes on cars, 
lorries, and buses as well as military convoys (AIM, 26 Feb. 2014b); the 
blocking of one of the main transport arteries of the country; and the boycott of 
the 2013 municipal elections. Frelimo responded by resorting to military power 
in order to contain these actions (Canalmoz, 11 Feb. 2014). Yet, and despite 
this, after months of clashes, Renamo succeeded in changing the electoral law 
making a much criticised deal with Frelimo that was later endorsed in 
Parliament and marking a significant setback in the democratic procedures that 
regulated the National Elections Commission and its executive secretariat 
(Fauvet, 20 Feb. 2014; AIM, 26 Feb. 2014a; AIM; 06 Mar. 2014). 
It is unlikely that these clashes will lead to a resumption of the war as the 
context that in the past allowed the war to flourish has fundamentally changed. 
Still, as shown, Renamo can cause substantial disruption to the country’s 
economy and general stability. Whereas many of Renamo’s weaknesses are a 
function of its origins and leadership, the way democracy has developed has 
much to do with the recent events. Renamo’s behaviour is a clear call for a 
different distribution of the peace dividend. At the same time, it is a protest that 
	   154	  
is little concerned with democracy from the perspective of what most 
Mozambicans want. 
DEMOCRACY AND PEOPLE’S POWER 
The dynamics highlighted above directly influence Mozambicans’ perception 
about democracy and their country’s political system as well as affect their 
behaviour. This shapes their willingness and ability to act in order to improve or 
sustain the current system, which, in turn, affects the chances of people’s 
empowerment. 
Since 2002, the independent research project Afrobarometer (2009 and 2012; 
Pereira et al., 2003) has been carrying out surveys across all 10 provinces in 
Mozambique interviewing samples of respectively 1400 (2002), 1198 (2005), 
1200 (2008), and 2400 (2012) individuals/participants to enquire about their 
views on democracy. In 2005, they asked an open question about what 
democracy meant, and 33% of the respondents associated it with civil liberties 
and personal freedoms followed by 15% who associated it with peace. 
Curiously, only 8% made the link with elections and multiparty democracy, 
nearly the same percentage as those who related democracy with social and 
economic development (7%) and equality and justice (6%) (Afrobarometer, 
2009: 2). In 2012, however, when asked about the relevance of having a 
multiparty system, 60% of the respondents ‘agreed’ or ‘agreed very strongly’ 
that “many political parties are needed to make sure that Mozambicans have 
real choices in who governs them” (ibid.: 19). Furthermore, when asked to 
choose just one thing as an ‘essential’ characteristic of democracy, the most 
frequent responses were: “people choose government leaders in free and fair 
elections”; “people are free to express their political views openly”; and 
“government ensures job opportunities for all” (emphasis added) (ibid.: 22). 
It is interesting to note the striking change in the emphasis of some issues over 
others. The current concern with multiparty elections seems to reflect the 
constant repetition of a process that was non-existent before 1994 and a 
‘learning process’ regarding what democracy is/should be. At the same time, 
the emphasis on ‘freedom’ and ‘job opportunities’ also shows that elections are 
	   155	  
not sufficient and the responses reflect the dissatisfaction with post-war 
progress.  
These opinions need to be contextualised. On the one hand, they represent the 
progressive internalisation of liberal values in a post-colonial society. On the 
other hand, they connect with views that stand in sharp contrast with the same 
liberal values. For instance, while acknowledging the value of the multiparty 
system, the general view of the state and its functions is still very paternalistic. 
As pointed out in the last Afrobarometer (2012: 13), when asked to choose 
between the two following statements: (1) “The government is like a parent. It 
should decide which is good for us”, or (2) “The government is like our 
employee. We are the bosses and should tell government what to do”, 39% of 
the respondents ‘strongly agreed’ and 20% ‘agreed’ with the first statement. So, 
on the one hand, there is a will for democracy (as represented by multiparty 
elections, freedom, and socio-economic improvements). On the other hand, the 
culture of participation as a means of ‘balancing the state’ or ‘making demands’ 
and ‘ensuring one’s own rights’ is still very weak, which is reflected in (and a 
reflection of) the development of civil society. 
Since the introduction of the multiparty system, the number of CSOs has grown 
significantly in Mozambique totalling a registered number of 4457 in 2005 
(Francisco, 2009: 62-63).40 About one fourth of these organizations operate in 
the field of law, advocacy, and policies, and, in theory, they benefit from a legal 
environment that favours their potential lobbying activity (Francisco et al., 2007: 
57). Nevertheless, there are many factors constraining their effectiveness. 
The first factor is the institutional context where CSOs operate. Whereas there 
are opportunities for participation, such as the DOs, the actual capacity people 
have to exert power and influence politics is extremely limited as the informal 
domain of social relations, more often than not, overrides the formality of law. 
As noted by Francisco et al. (2007: 57), “It is not a formal or legal limitation, but 
rather constraints and forms of social and psychological intimidation that 
produce feelings of inhibition, fear of reprisals and emotional unease”. This fear 
is linked to the strong political competition between Frelimo and Renamo, which 
                                            
40 The article uses the term Non-Profit Institutions (NPI). 
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translates into different forms of ideological and political intolerance (ibid.). 
Moreover, there is a strong permeability between politics, the public sphere, 
and associations in general as many of the CSOs members previously worked 
for the government or have strong links with Frelimo (AfriMap, 2009: 76). 
Consequently, there is little pressure from CSOs to try and change the 
relationship between civil society and the government. Instead, they tend to 
adapt to the preferences of the latter (ibid.). 
My experience in Nampula province corroborates some of these findings. 
Nampula is one of the provinces where about one fifth of CSOs are 
concentrated (AfriMap, 2009: 75) and has the reputation of having a strong and 
active civil society that is, moreover, very coordinated not only among 
themselves, but also with the provincial government through the Development 
Coordination Unit of Nampula province (UCODIN). In spite of this, many 
participants in this research admitted feeling that they are not free to speak their 
minds. 
One interviewee, for instance, while speaking about local CSO employees, 
expressed the following concern: 
. . . Depending on the situation and its convenience, people do or do not 
‘wear the shirt’ of civil society.41 Because there are people that, in some 
instances we would expect them to present themselves and speak ‘as 
civil society’, but they don’t. Even here it happens. Many people don’t 
question things because they don’t want to be seen ‘badly’ (mal vistas) . . 
. You have the privilege of being able to say what’s on your mind, but I 
don’t, because I cannot go against my employer (Int. 70). 
That is particularly the case when the CSO organization does not have financial 
autonomy or when their work depends on the good will of the government 
bureaucracy. 
Other interviewees reported examples of governmental pressure to retain 
control of certain processes such as trying to influence the allocation of 
                                            
41 The expression in Portuguese is ‘veste a camisola da sociedade civil’ and means 
‘assume openly the position of civil society’. 
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resources or exerting pressure in order to avoid public exposure of policy 
irregularities. A worker at a local CSO that offers funding for small projects, for 
instance, reported that before the ‘7 million’, administrators tried to prevent 
them financing projects in regions where the opposition party was more popular 
and even tried to obtain the funding for their own governmental projects (Int. 
48). As this particular CSO did not depend on government funding, they never 
had to compromise. Nevertheless, that is not the position of many CSOs in 
Mozambique. 
In another case, just before my arrival in Nampula in May 2012, a meeting took 
place between several CSOs and members of the provincial government to 
assess the recent process of re-election of members of the local councils (see 
chapter 6). On this occasion, some CSOs who had followed the process 
decided to invite local individuals who were victims of improper procedures, 
e.g., were expelled from the councils without any due justification. Once these 
individuals started to tell their stories, some of the government participants tried 
to silence them and accused the CSOs of having invited ‘external people’ to the 
event without previous consultation. Suddenly, an issue of citizenship became 
an issue of authority and power relations. The fact was furthermore disturbing 
for the government as the people they had invited had a mostly positive 
assessment of the same process. 
In some cases, the political aspect of the interference is clearly mixed with the 
personal interests of the individuals. An interviewee, for instance, recalled an 
episode in 1994, when, while working for an international NGO, he fired a local 
employee who was caught stealing (Int. 11). He did so by launching a 
disciplinary process and suing the employee. The latter tried to appeal in court 
but lost the case. However, during this period, the NGO received state 
inspections from several departments on a weekly/15 day basis as an indirect 
mechanism of pressure because the ex-employee had very strong political 
connections. According to him, cases such as this still happen, although with 
less frequency than in the past, and constitute a clear example of how 
bureaucracy becomes an instrument of political power. 
A second aspect that has a negative effect on CSO’s capacity in Mozambique 
is the matter of resources (Francisco et al., 2007; AfriMap, 2009). According to 
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INE, the Mozambican National Institute of Statistics, 70% of CSO funding in 
2005 was coming from abroad compared to 25% from private companies and 
families and 3% from the government (Francisco et al., 2007: 38). As the CSOs 
are dependent on external funding, that means that, while they are free from 
internal political pressure, their agendas are often (if not always) influenced by 
donors’ priorities (see Hanlon, 1991). Besides, this dependency also points to 
the high risk of discontinuity of projects (Hanlon and Smart, 2008: 22-23). 
In Nampula I interviewed and had several informal conversations with different 
individuals from six CSOs including local and international NGOs. At least three 
local CSOs had a general policy of not receiving government funding as a 
means of ensuring their autonomy and neutrality. However, their reliance on 
donors often had direct effects on their work even if in varying degrees. In some 
cases, for instance, they had to slightly ‘rephrase’ their plans of actions or make 
small changes in order to satisfy the donor but in ways that still allowed them to 
pursue their own agenda. In other cases, they had to delay on-going projects as 
they waited for donors’ approval of new budgets. In extreme cases, there were 
also incidents of discontinuity or radical change of projects especially in the 
case of international NGOs (Int. 11, 49, 50, 57). In Nampula, a response to 
these shortcomings was found in the strong cooperation institutionalised in the 
Provincial Civil Society Platform, which gathers all provincial CSOs together, in 
an effort to coordinate their work, avoid duplication of activities, and save costs 
in the case of projects that have common or related targets.  
A third kind of problem faced by CSOs in Mozambique is the general political, 
social, and economic environment in which they operate. The political aspect is 
very connected to the institutional domain highlighted above and centred on the 
polarised competition between Frelimo and Renamo. However, it is also 
worsened by the high levels of corruption present at different levels of social 
strata, as well as by the high levels of poverty and illiteracy, which results in the 
absence of a broad popular critical mass (Francisco et al., 2007: 64). This last 
aspect is particularly important because it is not simply a result of ‘bad policies’, 
but a mix of historical factors combined with deep-rooted cultural aspects that 
are very difficult to change. 
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My experience in Nampula also supported this explanation. According to a CSO 
worker in Nampula, for instance, one of the main problems he found in his work 
was the general lack of knowledge that individuals have about their rights (Int. 
48). This is, indeed, a problem generally recognised in the province (and which 
is by no means exclusive to Mozambique). Not only are the people not aware of 
their rights, but even when they perceive there is something ‘wrong’ happening, 
they frequently do not know where to go in order to complain. Indeed, the same 
interviewee added, “I am not sure whether it is really lack of consciousness 
about their rights or whether it is a profound mistrust of the judiciary system. It is 
something in between”. As several examples of the case study will show, this 
seems to be the case. When justice is hampered through a series of informal 
networks of power, those who have no resources to push for justice see 
themselves with no option but to give up or wait for someone to help them. 
More generally, this situation seems to reflect a vicious circle where a history of 
democratic deficit is amplified by the socio-economic situation and vice-versa. 
As Cabaço (1995: 102) observed, whilst the Rome Accords put an end to the 
wave of destruction that consumed Mozambique for so many years, they did 
not bring any proposal for the recomposition of Mozambican society. Therefore, 
the new concepts introduced after peace such as democracy, multiparty 
elections, and separation of powers were as abstract and distant from the 
ordinary Mozambican as was the previous concept of democratic centralism 
and, therefore, did not have a catalysing effect in order to actually change social 
relations at the local level. 
Twenty years later, Cabaço’s reflections are still pertinent and lead us to 
enquire why these concepts seem so distant from the everyday lives of the 
majority of the population. In this regard, one aspect that is at the heart of this 
(lack of) change is the clear imbalance between the (formal) gains of civil 
liberties in contrast to the material benefits of democracy. Ultimately, especially 
in the rural areas, daily needs (food, water, hospitals) are the order of the day 
and often take precedence over other concerns. In fact, often people’s 
engagement with party politics seems to be driven by these very needs. 
An informal comment from a local citizen in Angoche was illustrative in this 
regard. While he was talking about the general problems of his locality such as 
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lack of water and hospitals, he mentioned with an exclamatory tone “And we 
are all Frelimo here!” as if the political affiliation was the factor entitling them to 
receive these which in reality should be their basic rights. That was not an 
isolated experience. In many instances, the feeling of citizenship manifested by 
some individuals was mingled with a sense of ‘belonging to the party’ as if they 
were two sides of the same coin. 
According to an interviewee (Int. 70), this problem is very much enhanced by 
the current levels of poverty and lack of opportunities. As people do not have 
many options, they feel the need to get attached to politics or silence criticism 
for fear of losing what is, in fact, their citizens’ rights. In her view, as the working 
environment becomes disconnected from the public sector, this fear may 
diminish and people may feel more entitled to think critically and express their 
criticism. From this perspective, we may understand that disempowerment, in 
this case, has a huge structural component that will only be overcome when 
people decide to take risks and challenge the current power structure. In this 
context, perhaps the major problem faced by CSOs is precisely changing 
mentalities (or breaking the habitus). 
THE DIALECTICS OF EMPOWERMENT THROUGH SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
An employee of a local NGO in Nampula spoke to me about the problem of 
‘mental poverty’ (Int. 57) saying, “Until people are able to get out of this situation 
of mental poverty they will lose and become increasingly poorer. We won’t be 
able to get over the material poverty . . . As you may imagine, changing the 
mentality of an adult person is not easy. It takes time, a lot of time…” And this is 
something that a three-year project, or any single project, would not be able to 
do. 
A worker at another local NGO, which works exclusively with capacity building, 
reported, “I feel that . . . people . . . are more worried about obtaining subsidies 
and gifts than with obtaining knowledge and as a result many people do not get 
an adequate capacity-building” (Int. 56). In her view, many people attended the 
NGO meetings for capacity building precisely because of the food or because 
they received notebooks and pens, and she thought that if those were not 
provided probably the attendance would decline sharply. “This is a poverty 
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situation. There are people who are interested in learning, but others only go to 
get something [material] and I feel this is a setback, because if people were 
eager to learn . . . they could slowly develop”. 
Similarly, a worker at yet another local NGO noticed that in the districts people 
have a weak vision of their own development. In his words, they have “a 
general perception that we are ‘poor ones’ (uns pobres coitados) that need help 
and that what people give is ‘help’, ‘charity’’’. According to him there is no 
agency, initiative to change, but instead a mentality of “waiting for help” (Int. 
68). 
If the aim is changing mentalities — so that empowerment may take place — 
then the paradox underneath this aim becomes evident and the question arises, 
‘How can empowerment be achieved through a process of social engineering?’ 
The comments above point to a major problem in the general assessment of 
CSO’s effectiveness in Mozambique, which is the fact that many still work from 
the ‘top-down’ instead of from the ‘bottom-up’. First, most development workers 
I met come from a very Western perspective of development. Many have 
studied abroad or have been trained by international development agencies 
both governmental as well as non-governmental. As such, there is a general 
desire to transform the local society, so they may develop according to what 
would be the desirable model from a Western development perspective. This 
presents a natural contradiction where, even though we have local people 
working locally, the agenda is overall guided by the perceived need for social 
engineering and the need for transformation and changing mentalities instead 
of being demand-driven. 
This problem is recognised by some CSO employees who presented a very 
reflective position about their own work. According to one of them, ”We don’t 
have an approach to empowerment that begins from the bottom-up . . . It is 
always ‘look, governance is this… nutrition is that’ . . . I think that by bringing 
this knowledge to the community you even create conflict . . . of identity, 
conflicts of ways of being (formas de estar)’”. He gave the example of gender 
equality, and added, “Ultimately the question remains whether we are 
empowering or bringing more confusion” (Int. 49). 
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Another interviewee further noted the discrepancy between what people preach 
and what they do outside their jobs. “Your job tells you that you ‘have to 
promote participation’. So I go there preaching this as a way to guarantee my 
own job, not because I think I have to change something in my country” (Int. 
70). The different behaviour that individuals have once they get home from their 
jobs represents a blatant example of how some values are not truly embedded 
in the agents that are supposed to promote change. In her view, this is a major 
problem when it comes to the sustainability of these projects. Once the 
agencies and the funding are gone, the situation reverts. 
The question to be asked is whether, in spite of all these problems, these efforts 
are still worthy and if they bring enough benefits to promote long-term change, 
or, instead, whether they further enhance the spirit of dependency and reinforce 
the very mentality they aim to change. An anecdote from a local employee of an 
international NGO summarises this dilemma. While visiting a village, he asked 
to speak to the chief of the local committee the organization was working with. 
While waiting, he overheard the chief saying in Macua, “Let him wait. I am the 
chief. If it wasn’t for us he wouldn’t have a job” (Int. 68). The story suggests that, 
perhaps, the mentality has changed but not in the way expected. As CSOs 
jump to cover areas that the state is not ‘able’ to, they seem to reverse the 
chain of responsibility. So instead of complaining to the government about the 
need for schools, water, etc., communities often turn to NGOs or self-
mobilization while reinforcing the legitimacy of the government (which may then 
claim that things have changed for the better) even if the latter is not providing 
for their needs. 
This problem is reflected in the complicated assessment of CSOs’ impact in 
promoting empowerment and is at the heart of the technical/emancipatory 
approaches debate. The central issue is how to measure the effects of these 
interventions in the long term and, especially, to what extent they contribute to 
the creation of critical consciousness perhaps having an effect beyond the local 
level. According to some practitioners, there has been an increasing awareness 
of the people’s rights in the fields they work with, e.g., land rights and human 
rights (Int. 37, 57). The extent to which this consciousness translates into 
action, however, is not straightforward, and sometimes, it is not necessarily 
	   163	  
captured within the scope of action of the CSO as there are significant 
variations according to each area and each CSO’s experience. As noted by one 
interviewee, there are changes, but they come very slowly (Int. 70). 
In summary, much has changed with the introduction of democracy especially 
in the formal domain of the Mozambican state. Despite this, substantial 
changes, especially in terms of power redistribution, have been less visible. The 
potential of democracy for people’s empowerment has been strongly hindered; 
first, by the problems linked to the strong role of party politics in the country’s 
life and second, by the socio-economic problems inherited since colonial times 
and compounded by the war. As politics and the economy are inextricably 
linked, ultimately, it seems very difficult to break what has become a vicious 
circle of politicization and power reiteration. Nevertheless, there are signs of 
change, and, as many Mozambicans reminded me, big changes take time. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Many things have changed, many things… For instance, here we 
did not have a mill, now we do. There is a school in the other 
village. In some places there is electricity… (FG 26). 
Nothing has changed. It got worse! . . . It was worth during war 
time. . . . We know that war destroys, kills, but we are all able to 
find a way. Now you have a part of those who own the world, 
while you stay there humiliated (Int. 36). 
The country is developing, but in the cities . . . Here? We are 
producing, we are not told what to do (FG 17). 
 
What has changed for the ordinary Mozambican after the end of the war? I 
asked this question repeatedly in Angoche and was often surprised by the 
different answers. Many participants highlighted the changes in security — the 
‘no need to run anymore’ (FG 64) — as well as the improved access to basic 
services that did not exist previously. But some also manifested disillusionment 
and recognised the inequality of these improvements. A régulo even recalled 
with some nostalgia the colonial times when roads were better and the 
economy was thriving in the district (FG 66). Responses reflected some of the 
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issues discussed above, in particular, how the peace dividend has been 
distributed and the nature of the changes that have occurred with peace. 
In this chapter, I have focused on the general institutional changes linked to the 
peace/statebuilding process. In this regard, first, the chapter highlighted the 
general disconnect between the ‘top’ and the ‘bottom’ levels in the design of 
peace including the country’s policies for development and democracy. The 
‘top’ in this case was represented by the political elite that constituted the state 
administrative apparatus and, also with varying degrees, the international actors 
that were also involved in these processes. I would like to reinforce this aspect 
of variety in the degree of influence when it comes to external actors. Indeed, 
whether or not donors may have influenced several aspects of the 
peacebuilding process in Mozambique, internal power dynamics played a 
fundamental role in shaping the final outcome of peace and directly affected the 
warring factions willingness to accept or reject external recommendations. More 
generally, even though donors have strong bargaining power due to the 
country’s aid dependency, this does not translate directly into a form of top-
down power over. As much as Mozambique needs aid, donors also need the 
success-case story to sustain similar policies in other places, so they also often 
compromise. 
Instead, a higher degree of power asymmetry seems to exist between the ‘top’ 
(the political elite) and the ‘bottom’ (the ordinary Mozambicans) because of the 
dire socio-economic conditions that prevail in the country. So, whereas in 
theory, people have the power to react, protest, try to change things, in practice, 
personal risks may be too high endangering their very survival. It is here that we 
may observe the strong structural constraint that exists on people’s 
empowerment. On this, two aspects further consolidate this situation. First, 
there is a strong link between the socio-economic and the political constraints 
faced by Mozambicans. In particular, the country’s economy has become 
increasingly linked with the consolidation of the dominant party, so the spaces 
for change and contestation are reduced. Second, the government has 
implemented a series of cosmetic measures that are theoretically pro-
empowerment but which, instead, reinforce the current state of affairs. 
Therefore, as people are given spaces to participate, they are led to believe that 
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things are improving. Nevertheless, the fact that these spaces do not lead to 
structural changes begs the question of whether the government is not simply 
postponing de facto empowerment by containing stronger claims and demands 
for change. 
More generally, peacebuilding in Mozambique demonstrates the limitations of 
social engineering processes in promoting empowerment. Social engineering is 
based on a linear understanding of progress, while empowerment, as discussed 
in this thesis, has a dialectical aspect more often than not accompanied by 
conflicts of interest. The current processes of social engineering in 
peacebuilding have incorporated the premise that changing processes leads to 
a change in results. What the Mozambican case illustrates is that processes 
may be changed but in such a way as to leave specific power dynamics largely 
unaltered and thus limit the scope for power change. More generally, changes 
at the ‘top’ do not necessarily lead to changes at the ‘bottom’ level. On the 
contrary, by adapting change mechanisms, it is possible for elites to manipulate 
the spaces for change at the local level, especially, when the processes are 
based on fundamental social assumptions that differ from the local context. This 
particular aspect will be discussed in detail in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 5 
The ‘7 million’ Viewed from the Top 
 
Roberta, decentralisation is becoming re-centralisation! . . . I 
usually say that our rulers don’t feel as if they were 




This chapter discusses the origins, the design, and the empowerment rationale 
of the ‘7 million’, this thesis’ case study. The ‘7 million’ has become, in recent 
years, one of the main political flags of President Guebuza, and it is presented 
as a fundamental tool of the ‘fight against poverty’ as well as an instrument that 
fosters decentralisation and local empowerment. It represents, in this regard, a 
synthesis of the post-war changes discussed in the previous chapter. This 
chapter focuses specifically on how this initiative came into existence, what its 
purpose is in the Mozambican political agenda, and its empowerment rationale. 
Central to this discussion is the clash of opinions regarding what the ‘7 million’ 
should be, how it should operate, and how this is reflected in its transformation, 
refinement, and operationalization in time.  
The chapter concentrates on the upper levels of analysis of the empowerment 
framework proposed in Chapter 2, in particular the national level, but also taking 
into account the role of donors and the sub-national provincial level. First, I 
discuss the general features of decentralisation in Mozambique. Second, I 
review the origins of the ‘7 million’ by considering both the background 
experiences that preceded it as well as the political drivers behind it. Third, I 
examine the regulatory instruments of the initiative detailing its empowering 
mechanisms and its expected outcomes. Fourth, I consider the views of the 
central government and provincial actors regarding the achievements of the ‘7 
million’. Finally, I discuss the institutional and methodological limitations related 
to the initiative and its assessment. 
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I argue that, whereas the ‘7 million’ was originally inspired by previous 
successful experiments of decentralised planning, in time, it became a political 
tool attached to President Guebuza’s political agenda. This had the negative 
effect of narrowing the initiative’s empowering potential as (1) political decisions 
took precedence over technical and practical concerns and (2) the series of 
problems behind the initiative and its assessment have been silenced in favour 
of a discourse that highlights its success outcomes. 
5.1 Decentralisation in Mozambique 
Decentralisation has been at the centre of the institutional reforms pursued by 
several post-war countries, being perceived as an important mechanism to 
enhance democracy and development (Baker, 2006: 32; Jackson and Scott, 
2007). The argument pro-decentralisation is largely informed by its empowering 
aspects. First, it is argued that by bringing the government closer to the people, 
the former will be held more accountable for its performance (UNDP/ECA, 
2002: 10; Crook, 2003: 77; Massuanganhe, 2006; Heijke and van den Berg, 
2011: 3). Second, decentralisation is perceived as contributing to poverty 
reduction precisely because resources are allocated at the local level 
(UNDP/ECA, 2002: 13). Consequently, in theory, decentralisation should 
redistribute power resources (political and economic) across different layers of 
society. 
In Africa, in particular since the early 1990s, there has been a strong push 
towards decentralisation. Nevertheless, it is the case that in several instances 
decentralisation has not redistributed power; instead, it has “reinforced the 
power of local elites and has worsened spatial inequalities” (Olowu and Wunsh, 
2004; see also UNDP/ECA, 2002: 13; Boone, 2003; Crook, 2003). Reasons for 
this include the current conditions that prevail in African states, which cover 
both practical aspects (e.g., scarce human resources and harsh political and 
institutional environments) (UNDP/ECA, 2002: 18-19; Olowu and Wunsh, 2004: 
13-14), as well as institutional aspects often reflected in the mechanisms of 
clientelism (ibid.; Zack-Williams and Mohan, 2004: 9). Moreover, the dual nature 
of the African state points towards a de facto disjuncture between formal rules 
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and local practices which also contributes to these poor results (Boone, 2003: 
4).  
Taking this into account, the choice of which kind of decentralisation and how it 
will be implemented is a key question to be posed. Broadly speaking, 
decentralisation may be understood as “those legal acts and administrative 
measures that initiate a transfer of responsibility (authority), resources (human 
and financial), accountability, and rules (institutions) from central government to 
local entities” (Olowu and Wunsh, 2004: 4-5). It is an institutional process that 
aims to redistribute power within the national context, reinforcing mechanisms 
of local governance. Due to its complexity, decentralisation is often fragmented 
or put in place gradually, redistributing only one or few of these aspects. 
In Mozambique, decentralisation was introduced in the context of the 
institutional reforms that followed the Peace Accords of 1992, and it was driven 
by the need for stabilisation and economic recovery (Reaud and Weimer, 
2010). From the perspective of peace, decentralisation was also based on the 
need to understand more deeply the local aspects that had contributed to the 
war and, thus, constituted an effort from the government to get closer to the 
population (Lundin, 2002: 107). 
The first law on devolution (3/94), known as the law on municipalities, was 
passed just before the first multiparty elections in 1994 and called for elections 
of all the presidents of the municipal councils, the district administrators, and 
district and municipal assemblies in the country. Elections were scheduled for 
1996, but when it came to its implementation Renamo questioned the 
legislation, and Frelimo found itself torn between pro-reformists and 
conservatives (Braathen and Jørgensen, 1998; Bornstein, 2008; Weimer, 2012: 
86-87) stalling the process. Notwithstanding the internal division, Frelimo was 
also under the influence of donors who were already supporting several 
projects of decentralised budgeting in selected provinces (Barnes, 2005; 
Bornstein, 2008; Reaud and Weimer, 2010: 18). The government furthermore 
faced practical problems linked to the access to service provision in the districts. 
As a consequence, a compromise emerged. First in November 1995, the 
assembly declared the devolution law unconstitutional. Then in 1996, a 
constitutional amendment was passed (Law 9/1996) which created a parallel 
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system of local governance, which included the urban autarquias (the 
municipalities) and the deconcentrated local state organs (known as OLEs). A 
further law (10/97), officially designated 33 municipalities.42 The OLEs were 
regulated by Law 8/2003 five years later. 
In practice, this parallel structure refers to the different dimensions of power and 
autonomy in the case of each administrative entity; the actual process of 
decentralisation is concentrated at the level of the municipalities while the OLEs 
represent the process of deconcentration (Rep. of Moz., 2005, Art. 3, Par. 1). 
Therefore, the municipalities have mayors and Municipal Assemblies elected 
every five years as well as their own revenue system (Reaud and Weimer, 
2010), while the OLEs have their main political representatives indicated by a 
superior administrative echelon, which ultimately reinforces a system where 
accountability is upwards — to the authorities, not to the citizens (Jackson, 
2002: 9). 
This system reflects the gradual approach to decentralisation, which entails the 
progressive transformation of the OLEs into municipalities (Weimer, 2012: 77). 
Gradualism takes into account the ‘lessons learned’ from the process as it is 
implemented in stages avoiding a ‘shock therapy’ that could have negative 
effects, especially in the fiscal domain. It also takes into account the local need 
for capacity building and the actual resources needed to make this process 
effective (Int. 73). Nevertheless, some analysts interpret this option as the only 
available compromise inside Frelimo (Soiri, 1996; Weimer, 2012: 78), which 
seems to explain the process’ pace, in particular, the sudden amendment of the 
law on devolution. Indeed, the 1994 parliamentary elections showed that 
Renamo had much more support in the rural areas than Frelimo had expected, 
therefore many analysts agree that this move was intended to maintain the 
current power distribution in favour of Frelimo (Meneses and Santos, 2009; 
Reaud and Weimer, 2010; Weimer, 2012: 87).  
In practice, this dual governance system has turned out to be quite complex 
and contradictory in its operation. For one, the parallel system of sub-national 
decentralised units leads to constant conflicts of authority between the 
                                            
42 In 2008, another 10 municipalities were created and a further 10 in 2013.  
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representatives appointed by the government (at the provincial and district 
level) and the elected mayors in the municipalities that often share the same 
territory (Soiri, 1999: 24-25; Meneses and Santos, 2009). This level of conflict is 
further exacerbated by the role played by traditional authorities, and it is 
intensified where the opposition comes to power through municipal elections 
and its policies collide with the Frelimo government’s agenda (ibid.). 
The role of the traditional authorities is, indeed, an important crosscutting issue 
in Mozambique and that affects the process of decentralisation. As noted in 
Chapter 3, after independence, Frelimo took a harsh stance on traditional 
actors. In 2000, recognising the need to review the relationship between these 
authorities and the state, the Council of Ministers approved a decree (15/2000) 
introducing the term community authorities as a replacement for traditional 
authorities. The idea was to make the latter more inclusive emphasising the 
legitimacy aspect of the community in recognising the leaders.  Also, 
community authorities would not only include traditional lineage chiefs but also 
neighbourhood and village secretaries as well as other local leaders recognised 
by the community (Weimer, 2002: 77). 
Whilst this process has been presented as a form of recognition of the local, in 
practice, several critiques have been raised both regarding the process that led 
to the recognition of these authorities as well as to the actual function of the 
decree. In the first case, the question of who was a legitimate traditional 
authority was far from clear, and the process was highly contested at the local 
level (Buur and Kyed, 2006). In the second case, and to a great extent because 
of the former, the process was perceived as a way to further centralise political 
control. Buur et al. (2007: 13), for instance, noted that “initial drafts of the LOLE 
[Law of the Local State Organs] law provided for consultative forums comprising 
appointed and locally ‘elected’ people’s representatives, but these provisions 
were later removed” on the basis of Decree 15/2000. The decree was further 
used to justify the non-expansion of local elections to the rural areas (ibid.). The 
political drive of the initiative was also visible in the fact that the recognised 
leaders (over four thousand) were overwhelmingly Frelimo members (Buur and 
Kyed, 2006: 852). 
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This very complex context of decentralisation sets the scenario for the launch 
and implementation of the ‘7 million’ and, unsurprisingly, will be reflected in 
many of the contradictions and limitations of the initiative. The next section 
discusses the specific background of the ‘7 million’, highlighting its link with the 
overall process of decentralisation. 
5.2 The Origins of The ‘7 Million’ 
One of the findings of this research lies in the identification of two different 
narratives regarding the origins and purposes of the ‘7 million’. On the one 
hand, there were actors who understood the origins of the initiative as going far 
back to the immediate post-war era, if not before, and saw it as the culmination 
of a series of previous experiments with decentralised budgeting that were 
taking place in the country in coordination with donors (Int. 1, 2, 71). On the 
other hand, there were those — especially in the high echelons of the state — 
who focused on the open presidencies43 of Guebuza as the main driver of the 
initiative. According to this narrative, it was during the President’s visits to the 
countryside that the issue of lack of credit as a major hindrance to development 
in agriculture became visible (Int. 3, 4, 74). 
These two views are not mutually exclusive, nevertheless, they place a different 
emphasis on what is or should be the most fundamental purpose of the ‘7 
million’. In the first case, the purpose should be to contribute to the on-going 
process of decentralisation; whereas in the second case, the driver is 
specifically centred on the provision of credit concessions to the poor strata of 
rural society. The second view ultimately informed the progressive regulation of 
what started as a budget and was later transformed into a fund. At the same 
time, because of these different views, the process that led to the regulation of 
the ‘7 million’ was also accompanied by a series of tensions inside the 
government especially between the technocrats on the one hand and the 
political strata on the other hand. 
                                            
43 These are annual visits that the President makes in the rural areas, in order to 
interact directly with the population. During the visits, local people have the chance to 
publicly speak to the president and raise questions or complains about local issues. 
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PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES WITH DISTRICT PLANNING 
From the long-term perspective, the origin of the ‘7 million’ is deeply embedded 
in the immediate post-war context and the recognised need to place the district 
at the centre of the political agenda (Int. 2, 71). To that end, in 1994, a small 
budget was allocated to the provinces in order to be distributed to various 
agencies and district administration departments (Int. 71; ECIAfrica, 2004: 14; 
Barnes, 2005). At the same time, several donor agencies working with rural 
development in the provinces introduced a series of participative methodologies 
as components of their projects that, at the time, focused mostly on 
infrastructure (Barnes, 2005). By 1997, district planning initiatives were taking 
place in at least five of the ten provinces in Mozambique supported by 
international aid agencies. It was then that the government ordered an 
evaluation of these experiments and, based on the results, decided to 
implement a pilot programme on decentralised planning and finance in 
Nampula province in 1998 (ibid.; ECIAfrica, 2004: 14). 
What became known as the ‘Nampula pilot’ (officially, the Local Development 
Fund Programme in Nampula Province) was built upon a pre-existing United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) project in that province in 
partnership with the National Direction of Budget and Planning (DNPO, then 
part of Ministry of Planning and Finance, MPF) and with support from the 
government of the Netherlands and the UNDP (ibid.; Borowczak and Weimer, 
2012: 112). In 2002, the project was expanded to the province of Cabo Delgado 
and, in 2003, the World Bank decided to replicate the experience in four other 
provinces. 
In its origins, the Nampula project was broadly focused on participative 
planning, community, and capacity development (Int. 6). The idea was to train 
local citizens so they could progressively become engaged in participatory 
planning and enhance local accountability. This was a ‘soft’ approach, in the 
sense that they were basically experimenting with new participative 
methodologies and adapting them according to the context (Int. 11; Pijnenburg, 
2004: 105-117). At the time, the fund entered the existing budget mechanism 
(through the provinces), and there were priority areas, in particular, basic 
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services. The district in consultation with the population decided the specific 
priorities (Int. 6). 
The ‘Nampula pilot’ is considered by many as a watershed in the Mozambican 
experience of decentralised planning, in particular, because it was backed by 
significant resources both in planning and implementation and because it had 
important upstream effects, including the Program of Decentralised Planning 
and Financing (PPFD) (ECIAfrica, 2004; Barnes, 2005; Borowczak and Weimer, 
2012: 109-114). Other important legacies were the introduction of the District 
Development Plans (PDD)44 and the District Social and Economic Budget Plan 
(PESOD) (ibid.; Macuane et al., 2012: 244). Furthermore, it was in Nampula 
where the first versions of the local councils were created (ibid.). 
Many elements contributed to the success of the Nampula experience, in 
particular, the impressive coordination between donors, the provincial 
government, and the central government (Borowczak and Weimer, 2012: 115-
116) as well as the strong coordination with CSOs, which were particularly 
involved in the constitution of the councils and the implementation of 
participatory district planning activities (ibid.; Macuane et al., 2012: 246). There 
were, however, limitations as well. In terms of development outcomes, the 
Nampula experience did not take into account the development of the local 
market and private sector even though there were local demands for this (Int. 
82). In addition, the participatory mechanisms focused on promoting 
participation in the planning stage, but not in the implementation stage (e.g., by 
hiring local workers to build the new infra-structure), which partially reduced the 
feeling of ownership in the community (Int. 10). Several of these limitations were 
later reflected in the implementation of the ‘7 million’. A central question, 
however, is ‘to what extent did the above experiences influence the design and 
rationale of the initiative?’ 
THE BIRTH AND TRANSFORMATION OF THE ‘7 MILLION’ 
According to an interviewee who closely followed the birth of the ‘7 million’, the 
above experiments were indeed a source of inspiration for the creation of the 
                                            
44 These are called Strategic District Development Plans (PEDD) from 2004. 
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initiative as there was a general perception that they had effectively promoted 
local empowerment by encouraging participatory planning (Int. 2). At the same 
time, there was also recognition that these different resources, coordinated by 
donors and the provincial governments, could be managed more efficiently 
when directly flowing to the districts. It was in this context that there was a 
suggestion in the DNPO that all the funds reaching the districts via the 
provinces should be merged, and the total value split among the number of 
districts and be sent directly to each one of them. The monetary value at the 
time (2005) was around USD 300,000 per district or seven billion meticais45 (Int. 
2). The suggestion was incorporated in the national budget approved for 2006 
(Rep. of Moz., Law 12/2005) which included, for the first time, a direct allocation 
of seven billion meticais to each of the 128 districts in the country46 and was 
formally called the Local Initiative Investment Budget (Orçamento de 
Investimento de Iniciativa Local, OIIL) later popularised as the ‘7 million’. Thus, 
in 2006, the previous projects led by donors and the provinces were substituted 
by a unique national project, and for the first time, all districts became de facto 
(as since 2003 they were already were de jure) state budgetary units (Int. 2; 
Valá, 2010: 37). 
At first, the law did not set out specific rules for the use of the budget, but initial 
instructions coming from Maputo stated it should be channelled to the 
infrastructure sector (Int. 2; Valá, 2010: 27). Indeed, in many cases the budget 
was used in infrastructure and other local development activities (ibid.; Int. 74). 
However, there were also several cases where it was used ‘discretionarily’ by 
district administrators who spent it buying luxuries such as cars, new expensive 
furniture, improving their own houses, the administration building, and even 
purchasing jacuzzis (Int. 2, 4). Since there were no clear rules attached to 
budget use, it was even problematic to classify these actions as ‘irregular’. In 
fact, it is often simply acknowledged that 2006 should not be taken into account 
in the assessment of the ‘7 million’. 
                                            
45  It later became seven million because in January 2006, the new metical was 
introduced worth 1000 of the old metical. 
46 Besides the 128 rural districts, two urban districts were included and in 2008 a 
further two (Rep. of Moz., MPD, 2009a: 2). 
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Besides, when the ‘7 million’ was introduced, there were no clear mechanisms 
of monitoring and accountability. Indeed, it was only during the open 
presidencies, which started to take place nationally from 2005, that President 
Guebuza had the chance to see the often problematic use of the ‘7 million’ in 
the districts. That was also the moment when the initiative moved from a more 
technical experiment linked with decentralisation to becoming a political flag of 
his government. 
The first attempts to regulate the ‘7 million’ came in April 2006 when a circular 
from the Ministry of Finance (Rep. of Moz., MF, 37/GM/MF/06) was sent out to 
all provinces indicating that the budget should be used in local investment 
initiatives without giving further details on what kinds of activities this included. 
In May, another circular (Rep. of Moz., MF, 101/GM/MF/2006) was 
disseminated specifying the ‘Methodological Orientations for the Execution of 
Funds for Local Investment Initiative Expenses’, including the ‘7 million’.47 The 
document included a section on the use of funds for the development of socio-
economic infrastructure as well as a section focusing on the promotion of local 
economic development activities, which included the selection of projects 
discussed with the local councils. At the time, there were no legal mechanisms 
to allow the district government to deliver money directly to the beneficiaries; 
therefore, the orientations also established that the district administration was 
the intermediary that purchased any material requested. 
In August 2006, an expanded meeting with ministers and all district 
administrators was held, and there were clear instructions that the budget would 
now have to be used to fund exclusively economic activities aimed at food 
production, income generation, and job creation (Int. 2, 3; Valá, 2010: 27). This 
meeting was a crucial landmark in the definition of the ‘7 million’ and was 
followed by a long and difficult process aimed at regulating and fitting the new 
instrument into national legislation. The first problem was that, due to the 
                                            
47 I would like to highlight the use of the terms as only in 2009 the ‘7 million’ became a 
fund. The change of terminology often gives rise to confusion as there were already 
district funds in the past, and today there are other funds in the district besides the ‘7 
million’. I interpret this as one of the signs of the lack of clarity of such instruments 
since its inception. 
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different initial instructions, there were already several projects going on that 
suddenly had to be interrupted (Int. 2). Not finding other means to finish what 
they had started, many administrators began to pressure the government and 
contest the decision. In response, the government clarified that the provinces 
should not stop supporting the districts. Additionally, in 2008, it decided that a 
small part of the district budget (2.3 million meticais) would be allocated to 
administrative activities at the local level (Rep. of Moz., MPD, 2009a: 16). 
Moreover, a differentiation criterion was created constituted by a formula that 
took into account for each district: (1) the population number (35%), (2) the local 
poverty index (30%), (3) the district territorial extension (20%), and (4) their 
capacity to collect public revenue (15%) (Rep. of Moz., MPD, 2009a: 8). At the 
time these criteria were discussed, there was a suggestion that district 
performance should also be taken into account in order to stimulate competition 
and effective use of the resources (Int. 4). This criterion, however, never 
entered the equation. 
In the meantime, all through 2007, the government pushed for a series of 
training events in order to capacitate the local councils about the use of the ‘7 
million’ (Int. 3). Yet in 2008, several problems still persisted, in particular, in the 
process of budget allocation. One of the problems was the lack of control and 
transparency in the use of the ‘7 million’.48 A common practice, for instance, 
was for members of the local administration to offer a certain amount of money 
or products to the small farmer and ask him to sign the documents as if he was 
taking double that amount. There were also several problems with district 
administrators. One, for instance, was caught with USD 80,000 in his personal 
                                            
48 The ‘7 million’ has been a hot topic in the press portrayed as both a miracle and as 
an initiative with several ‘cardinal sins’. The amount and extent of the critique of the 
initiative depends on the source. AIM and Journal Notícias, for instance, while 
acknowledging some problems also note the government’s efforts to tackle the issues, 
which are depicted mostly as problems of implementation at the local level. Other 
sources, such as O País, Canalmoz, Savana, and blogs such as macua.blog offer 
more in-depth critiques of the initiative often relating what happens locally with 
structural aspects of the initiative. But they also report stories about people who obtain 
the fund and run away or stories of politicisation (party bias) in the fund allocation. 
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account. Others were discovered and face disciplinary processes. But many 
were never held accountable (Int. 2). 
At the heart of the issue was the legal means available to implement what was 
ultimately a political decision. With the new directives regarding the ‘7 million’, 
there was a call for the government to enter what was traditionally the private 
sphere, something it did not have legal competency for. It was here where the 
tensions became stronger between the government’s political wing, on the one 
hand, and the technocrats on the other hand. However, an order ‘came from 
above’,49 and it stated that the money should be distributed directly to the 
people, so, the working group in charge of regulating the OIIL needed to “figure 
out” a legal basis to make it happen (Int. 2, 83). It was at this juncture that the 
idea of transforming the OIIL into a fund started to take root. As a budget, the ‘7 
million’ needed to be used within each fiscal year, and all the repayments would 
go back to the state coffers which partially stimulated the mentality of immediate 
gain. As a fund, the money would remain in the district in the long run and the 
state could progressively withdraw, as the fund would slowly feed itself through 
the repayment of the loans (Int. 2, 3). 
One crucial matter to define was the fund’s administration. The technocrats 
advocated that the fund needed to be managed autonomously from the district 
administration by a non-governmental body also responsible for its monitoring 
(Int. 83). Whilst this was complicated, due to the costs of building such an 
autonomous structure in the 128 districts (Int. 82), the working group tried to 
advance such a proposal at the Council of Ministers, but they faced fierce 
opposition from several lobbies inside the government (Int. 2). 
The decree approving the District Development Fund (FDD) — the updated 
version of the ‘7 million’ — was ultimately passed in December 2009. The 
‘solution’ found by the working group was to make an exception to the role of 
the councils as stated in the LOLE. In that document, the local councils are 
merely consultative, whereas the administrator is the one to make decisions 
                                            
49 This expression was used constantly in the interviews with participants in the central 
government, and stressed the top-down character of several decisions related to the ‘7 
million’. The last section of this chapter discusses this in more detail. 
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while taking into account the opinions of the councils. Nevertheless, when it 
comes to the ‘7 million’, the councils assume the position of decision-makers in 
the choice of the projects to be funded. That was the way to ”play with the law” 
(Int. 2).  
As this process was taking place, donors and IFIs started to put pressure on the 
government by expressing their disagreement with the idea of the state giving 
credit to people (Int. 2), although this criticism was never made public (Int. 1). 
There were informal comments that the scheme was a waste of money and it 
was a political instrument to gain votes during the elections (Int. 4, 73). In spite 
of this, the government did not reconsider. As noted by the Minister of Finance, 
“We consider this a Mozambican model . . . Don’t other countries subsidise 
agriculture? We want to do this but differently” (Int. 73). Eventually, this 
resistance and criticism faded. 
It should be noted that, even though the ‘7 million’ was a national initiative, it 
was only possible because of the huge amount of donors’ budget support 
directed to Mozambique over the years and continuing even today. Therefore, it 
is plausible to assume that donors could have put enough pressure on the 
government to make it reconsider the allocation of the ‘7 million’ or push further 
for the money to be distributed to micro-credit institutions, so these could 
manage the loans to local entrepreneurs. Yet, donors’ option, ultimately, was to 
stay quiet (Int. 1). There was no clear answer as to why this was so, but a 
possible interpretation is that there was a strong political pressure for the ‘7 
million’ to be implemented and, as its total cost was proportionally low, donors 
may have simply preferred to keep silent (ibid.). At the same time, and even 
though the credit was to be financed by the state, it still aimed at the 
development of the private sector, which contributed to the enhancement of the 
market economy, a goal more in line with donors’ preferences. 
TRIAL AND ERROR, AND THE POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE ‘7 MILLION’ 
The ‘7 million’ is generally portrayed as a trial and error initiative (aprender 
fazendo) (Int. 2, 4, 6, 73, 74). As explained by several interviewees, the ‘7 
million’, when first implemented was experimental, so the ‘lack of rules’ was not 
a ‘slip’, but an intentional aspect (Int. 6, 73, 74). More generally, the instructions 
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received initially were aimed at minimising any central and provincial 
government intervention and allowed the districts their own process of 
procurement (Int. 2). In time, as lessons were learnt, rules were formulated in 
order to make the instrument clearer. 
At the same time, the non-rule rule was also the only solution found in a context 
where a lot of disagreement existed regarding the details of the initiative (int. 6). 
At the technical level, there were factions pushing for the broader process of 
decentralisation since the late 1990s. In 1999, they tried to ensure that the 
districts would get more autonomy in local planning; however, they faced fierce 
opposition from other technocrats with close links to the political faction in the 
Chissano government (Int. 71). And without previous political consensus, it was 
impossible to advance any proposal, so they had to come up with a less 
ambitious plan, one that detailed the levels of representation of the district and 
the local councils. 
When the ‘7 million’ became linked with the principle of credit concession, many 
felt disappointed because they viewed it as a setback to the progressive work of 
district planning that had taken place. Accordingly, the credit idea clashed with 
the country’s financial law and led to a “shameless process of successive 
corrections”, which further distorted the original intention of the ‘7 million’, which 
had a series of multiplying effects that were more empowering in the long run 
(Int. 71). The government’s political wing acknowledged this clash of opinions in 
the interviews. They saw it as a resistance from technocrats to accept the 
possibility of the state giving money to support local development, as this was 
not the “usual activity of the state” (Int. 74). Nevertheless, their reasoning was 
that a change was necessary as the existing mechanisms providing funding for 
local development (banks and microfinance institutions) were not reaching 
those most in need, so they needed to find mechanisms to overcome these 
limitations (Ibid.). 
It is precisely in this schism that the political dimension of the decision becomes 
clear. As shown above, the ‘7 million’ as an idea preceded the ‘7 million as 
credit’ idea, but a fundamental change in this process was the ownership of the 
discourse now linked to the President. In the words of one interviewee, “Who 
took the decision was the government at its highest level” (Int. 74). Yet, as 
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noted by one of his colleagues, “Today, if you mention the ‘7 million’, most 
people will link it with the President of the republic as if it was his program. But 
in reality it is not his. It is part of a historical process” (Int. 2). Still, according to 
this respondent, President Guebuza legitimately made the initiative his own by 
linking the ‘7 million’ with key political topics such as ‘the fight against poverty’ 
and unemployment. That is, however, a benevolent view of the politicisation of 
the ‘7 million’. Another way to evaluate it is by assessing the initiative’s political 
utility and how it thrives regardless of its many problems. In fact, not all 
interviewees agreed with the argument that the ‘7 million’ was needed. 
One UNDP advisor, for instance, noted that in the 2006 meeting (see above), 
he openly contested the need to create the ‘7million’ as a credit instrument as 
there was already a previous regulation that specified the creation of a 
community development fund which rendered the ‘7 million’ as a credit tool 
unnecessary (Int. 82). Instead, he suggested that this money should be used in 
the promotion of local economic development and that 10% of its total should 
be used in capacity building such as business planning. All district 
administrators were present at the time, and, according to him, agreed with the 
proposal. During the break, however, he was informed that the Minister of 
Planning and Development, who was present, was very unhappy with these 
comments and that the decision had already been made, and it was political. In 
the same meeting, as noted by another interviewee (Int. 1), “there was a 
representative of a micro-credit agency who stood up and almost pleaded with 
the Minister to hand over the administration of the ‘7 million’ to micro credit 
agencies as they had the experience to do it. He made a very good case… but 
ultimately was ignored”. 
In practice, the ‘7 million’ has become one of the main political banners of 
President Guebuza. Despite all its problems — discussed below and in the next 
chapter — the program is presented as a major success, and it has hugely 
increased the President’s popularity, not only internally but also internationally. 
For example, the initiative has been recently praised by the African Peer 
Review Mechanism and portrayed as an example to be followed by other 
African countries (AIM, 30 Jan. 2014). In September 2013, Guebuza took part 
in the Columbia University World Leaders Forum and gave a lecture entitled 
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Poverty and Inclusive Development: The 7 Million as a New Paradigm for 
Socio-Economic Development. On this occasion, he referred to the initiative as 
the “Mozambican economic paradigm” and mentioned its numerous positive 
results in reducing poverty as well as in promoting the people’s self-esteem 
(AIM, 26 Sep. 2013). 
More generally, the emphasis in the official discourse is on Mozambican 
ownership of the ‘7 million’ and the fact that it was a national solution for a 
problem that had not been addressed by donors including a response to the 
weaknesses of the financial system and its limitations for reaching the poor (Int. 
4, 73, 74). The extent to which the ‘7 million’ complies with these objectives or 
whether it is a political instrument is clarified by the analysis of its own 
regulation to which we now turn. 
5.3 The ‘7 Million’ Regulation and its Empowerment Rationale 
This section discusses the regulatory framework of the ‘7 million’ taking into 
account the existing documents as well as the views of some of the actors 
directly engaged in the initiative’s creation. The aim is to understand the ‘7 
million’ empowerment rationale based on its declared objectives and legal 
instruments. This task needs to be put into context. The ‘7 million’ was originally 
created as a temporary governmental intervention. Indeed, the very idea of 
transforming the OIIL into a fund, the FDD, stemmed from this envisaged 
temporary character; by injecting money into the districts for credit concession, 
the repayments would later stay within the district and be used again for new 
projects making it a self-funded activity and allowing for the progressive 
withdrawal of the central government’s contribution (Int. 2). After eight years, 
however, the state investment curve has not gone down, and in March 2012, 
both the Minister of Planning and Development and the Minister of Finance 
admitted that there was no timeframe for the end of the national disbursement 
for the ‘7 million’ as the funding was still needed for the completion of its 
objectives (Int. 3, 73). 
This fluid character of the ‘7 million’ is reflected in the series of documents that 
have been used as the legal basis for its implementation. Many were released 
ad hoc as mere clarifications and not proper procedure manuals. An actual 
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manual was compiled in 2011 (Rep. of Moz., MAE/MF/MPD, 2011) and, 
according to an interviewee, was going to be made public in 2013 after the 
completion of my fieldwork (Int. 83) which means that the manual was not used 
as a basis for the implementation of the projects up to that year. 
Table 5.1: Regulatory Instruments (‘7 Million’ and Local Councils) 
YEAR DOCUMENT  CONTENT 
2000 Ministerial Diploma 107-A/2000 First defines what LCs are 
Mar. 
2003 
Law 8/2003, LOLE Law of the Local State Organs, 
establishing the district as a state unit 
June 
2003 
Community Participation and 
Consultancy in District Planning. Guide 
to its Organisation and Functioning. 
First guidelines specifying the work of the 
LCs and other local community institutions 
June 
2005 
Decree 11/2005, RELOLE Regulation of the 2003 LOLE, it clarifies 
the functions of the LCs 
23 Dec. 
2005 
Law 12/2005 (state budget for 2006) Introduces the ‘7 million’ for each district 
Apr. 
2006 
Office 37/GM/MF/06, 11 Apr. 2006 (sent 
out to the provinces) 




Office 101/GM/MF/2006, 12 May 2006 Gives methodological orientation for the 
implementation of the ‘7 million’ 
Nov. 
2007 
Circular 002/MPD/GM/2007, 20 Nov. 
2007 
Provides a form to be filled and sent to the 
province every 3 months, ref. the 
implementation of the projects 
2009 Ministerial Diploma 67/2009, MAE e 
MPD 
It approves the guide that regulates the 
LCs, signed in 2008 
Apr. 
2009 
Circular 002/MPD/GM/2009, 16 Abr. 
2009 
Presents the templates to be used in the 




A book-collection of the above 





Decree 90/2009 Transforms the OIIL into FDD and specify 
its rules  
Sep. 
2011 
Fundo Distrital de Desenvolvimento. 
Manual de Procedimentos 
(MAE/MF/MPD) 
Most recent regulation of the ‘7 million’, 
concluded in 2011 but only authorised for 
distribution in 2013 
 
Source: author’s compilation. 
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EMPOWERMENT AS AN OUTCOME: THE ‘7 MILLION’ OBJECTIVES AND 
EXPECTED RESULTS 
The most appealing aspects of the ‘7 million’ as depicted in the political 
discourse are its manifold empowering aspects which comprise material and 
non-material dimensions. More generally, the ‘7 million’ is presented under the 
umbrella of the ‘fight against poverty’ and is related to the stimulation of 
agriculture and food production in the districts (Int. 3). The basic idea is that “the 
first kind of poverty we need to fight is hunger”, and for this to happen, 
Mozambicans need resources to increase production, which is why credit is so 
important (ibid.). The focus on food production is also linked to a second 
concern, which is job creation. In this regard, the fund is perceived as a 
mechanism that will increase household income and, therefore, allow for the 
expansion of services and hiring, stimulating the local economy (Int. 74).  
These expected results are summarised in the Decree 90/2009, Art. 2 of its 
introduction which states that “The District Development Fund aims at attaining 
and managing financial resources in order to instigate development and 
entrepreneurship as a means to satisfy the basic needs of local communities, 
by granting reimbursable loans”. Article 4 of the regulation contained in the 
decree states that the fund should finance: (a) actions that aim to stimulate 
entrepreneurship, at the local level, of poor but economically active people that 
do not have access to bank credit; (b) food production, trade, and job creation 
(permanent or seasonal) ensuring income generation; (c) other activities that 
aim to improve life conditions related to community economic and productive 
activities (Rep. of Moz., 90/2009). 
One of the fundamental aspects of the ‘7 million’ is that it targets the poorest 
strata of the economically active population. As noted by one interviewee, “. . . 
this initiative is not for medium entrepreneurs . . . it is for small entrepreneurs 
those who do not have access to funding from banks” (Int. 74; also Int. 4). This 
is not unproblematic, and it was not an easy discussion in the design of the 
instrument, since the choice of the target group has different implications in 
terms of the type of local development as well as the extent of the collective 
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benefit. However ‘the orientation’50 was to adhere to the premise that those 
most in need (and economically active) should be the targets of the initiative. 
This reflects the inclusive aspect of the fund. 
Several other objectives are also pointed out in the discourse. The 2009 MPD 
report, for instance, highlights the initiative’s role in injecting resources in the 
rural areas, thus, contributing to the expansion of financial services and, in the 
long-term, the attraction of foreign investors to the districts (Rep. of Moz., MPD, 
2009a: 5, 14). In the long term, the ‘7 million’ is also seen as a means to make 
the Mozambican economy more inclusive (Guebuza, 2009b) by facilitating the 
poorer strata of Mozambican society access to financial resources. In this 
regard, the benefits of the ‘7 million’ are not restricted to those who get the 
credit but are seen as benefitting the whole community, increasing household 
consumption, improving the peoples’ habitat, even allowing leisure, and 
creating, therefore, a chain effect (ibid.). 
In addition, the ‘7 million’ is also linked to non-material empowering features 
such as the “production of capabilities” (Int. 73). As noted by the Minister of 
Finance, “one of the innovations of this program is to give back responsibility to 
the local power”, which explains why the ‘7 million’ is not a subsidy but a 
stimulus for innovation and creative ways of increasing production. More 
generally, the official discourse also states that the ‘7 million’ represents a 
contribution to the agenda of decentralisation. According to the 2009 MPD 
report, for example, the initiative is “the result of the deepening and 
improvement of the movement towards decentralisation and deconcentration of 
planning and budget activities, which aims at empowering the levels of 
governance that are closer to the population instigating, therefore, the country’s 
local development with the participation of the communities” (Rep. of Moz., 
MPD, 2009a: 5-6). 
                                            
50 All through the interviews, the use of ‘the decision’, ‘the orientation’, ‘the order’, and 
similar terms that indicate a top-down connotation of the decision-making process 
without a clear subject, was very common (e.g., Int. 2, 10, 72, 74, 83). After inquiring 
about this with some interviewees, it became clear that these refer to the President’s 
own decision in these matters which are ultimately not contestable. 
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The local is, indeed, central to the empowering aspect of the initiative. In the 
words of Guebuza (2009a), “With the ‘7 million’ we started a change in the 
development paradigm, where the beneficiary is now protagonistic in this 
process”. Doing so, furthermore, is deemed to represent the rescue and 
consolidation of local self-esteem (ibid.) that  is fundamental in the promotion of 
good governance (Guebuza, 2009b). In summary, the ‘7 million’ is expected to 
have a series of indirect effects that will eventually change local subjectivities by 
making local communities more engaged in local governance, more actively 
involved in the decisions that will affect their lives, and encouraged to start their 
own business. 
EMPOWERMENT AS A PROCESS: THE FUNDAMENTAL ROLE OF THE 
LOCAL COUNCILS 
One of the crucial legitimising aspects of the ‘7 million’ and its empowering 
potential is the inclusion of the local councils (LCs)51 in the decision-making 
process. As noted by the Minister of Planning and Development, “It is a 
participatory process; it is an endogenous process where people perceive the 
problems that their community have. Problems are discussed locally so they 
may be later solved by the ‘7 million’” (Int. 3). In this regard, the legitimacy of the 
LCs is linked to the assumption that they represent the local interest. In the 
words of Guebuza (2006), “the district LCs and local fora, which aggregate 
personalities that have integrity confirmed by their popular indication to 
represent the communities’ interests, contribute so that development is more 
reflective, endogenous, sustainable and led by its first and last beneficiaries”. 
General Aspects of the Local Councils 
The local council is defined as “an organ of consultancy of the local 
administration authorities, in search of solutions for fundamental matters that 
                                            
51 I will use the terms ‘local council’ and ‘consultative councils’ interchangeably in this 
thesis. The 2009 regulation on these bodies uses ‘local council’ in its main title. 
However, in Art. 21 it specifies, “the local councils in the district different echelons are 
designated ‘consultative councils’ of the district, administrative post, locality, and 
village”. 
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affect the lives of the population, their well-being and sustainable development” 
(Rep. of Moz., 11/2005, Art. 111). They should be comprised of prominent 
people in the communities, such as “community authorities, representatives of 
interests groups of an economic, social, and cultural nature chosen by the LCs 
or forum of a lower echelon in proportion to the population of each territorial 
rank” (ibid., Art. 118). 
The councils have the function of “guaranteeing the communities’ participation 
in the conception and implementation of the economic, social, and cultural 
programs that contribute to local development” (Rep. of Moz., MAE/MPD, 2009, 
Art. 6) and are established at the different levels of the district subunits (ibid., 
Art. 7). In order to ensure their bottom-up character, LCs are initially constituted 
at the lower level of the villages. Once selected, there is a further selection 
process internal to the village LCs in order to choose those who will belong to 
the immediate upper level (the localities’ LCs). The process is repeated from the 
locality to the administrative posts (APs) LCs and finally from the APs to the 
district LC which is the pinnacle of the local representation hierarchy. The idea 
is to create a chain of communication so that the voices of each and every 
community may reach the administration. 
Table 5.2: Local Councils according to District Levels 
DISTRICT SUB-LEVEL NUMBER OF 
PARTICIPANTS 
PRESIDENT 
District 30-50 District Administrator 
Administrative posts 
(AP) 
20-40 Chief of the AP 
Localities 10-20 Chief of the locality 
Villages 5-10 Chief of the village 
Source: Rep. of Moz., MAE/MPD, 2009.  
 
The LCs represent the procedural aspect of empowerment when it comes to the 
‘7 million’ precisely because of how they are designed and the way they are 
supposed to function. As noted in Article 11 of the councils’ guide, the LC 
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“should be an institution based on a process through which citizens may 
participate and influence the decision-making process on development”. In this 
regard, they can make recommendations to the different structures of the local 
government regarding community issues, and these should be taken into 
account by the local authorities (ibid., Art. 12). 
Several principles reinforce the LCs’ empowering potential including the 
requirement for diversity (of gender, culture, occupation, age and class), 
equality (no discrimination of any kind, including political and ideological), 
dialogue, transparency, justice (impartiality in treatment), and 
representativeness. Article 33 further stresses the role of accountability, stating 
that the councils should have regular meetings with the community in order to 
update them of on-going plans and discuss any proposal for future plans for 
that particular territorial echelon. 
LCs should have at least two ordinary meetings per year at each territorial 
echelon, in order to discuss the previous’ year district plans, work on proposals 
for the coming year, and do any updates of the on-going district plan (Art. 28). 
Extraordinary meetings may take place at the request of the district 
administrator or when a third of the members request it (Art. 27). Sessions 
should be public (Art. 29), conducted in the local language with an interpreter if 
needed (Art. 30), and their summaries should be publicised locally and sent 
back to the administration. 
Whereas the LCs are referred to as the ‘civil society’ in the districts, in fact, they 
are a hybrid institution which counts on the presence of a local government 
representative as their president. This presence is justified by the president’s 
role as instrument of ‘articulation’ between the community and the local 
government. S/he is the one who organises the meeting and has the function to 
hear what the community has to say (Art. 20, Art. 35.2.o). S/he may suggest 
that influential people in the community should participate in the councils’ 
meetings but has no right to vote (Art. 36.20). 
In practice, how ‘articulation’ operates and how the idea of ‘suggestion’ is 
perceived locally are far from black and white issues. But this is not the only 
ambiguous aspect of the guidelines. An important issue that is not even detailed 
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and that affects the empowering dimension of the LCs is the process that leads 
to their constitution. Article 36 states that the members of the LCs “are chosen 
by the local community for a period of four years, after which, a reconfirmation 
of their legitimacy should be necessarily done by the respective community or 
social group.” Some rules of representation are specified such as at least 30% 
of the members should be women, at least 20% should represent the youth, 
and “as much as possible” at least 40% of the members should be community 
leaders (ibid.). Yet the details of the how are not included. What is clear is that 
the councils at the higher echelons should be chosen among the members of 
the echelon immediately below and that at each echelon, there should be a 
public meeting led by the local government authority to introduce the council 
members to the community so the latter may evaluate and legitimise the 
members (Art. 37). Nevertheless, at the lower echelon, the villages, which are 
the ones closest to the community, there are no specific indications of how the 
members are chosen. Instead, the article simply points out that the members of 
the village LCs should be chosen among the local forums, community 
committees, community authorities, and other interest groups. It does not state 
who should choose them and how. As will be discussed later, this is a 
problematic aspect that, in practice, may jeopardise all the other aspects that 
contribute to the councils’ legitimacy and local empowering potential. 
The Local Councils and the ‘7 Million’ 
Looking at the LCs’ regulation, it becomes clear that their functions are much 
wider and independent of the ‘7 million’. Article 35 of the guide outlines 17 very 
general tasks of the LCs, one of which is to “approve proposals of finance 
concession requests to local initiative projects”. This task should, therefore, be 
seen in light of the others which include taking into account the district’s 
economic potential in order to reduce poverty. A clearer link between the district 
LCs and the ‘7 million’ was established in the decree that created the FDD 
(90/2009) where Article 7 states that the Council of the Fund is the District 
Consultative Council (DCC) and Article 8 clarifies that the latter is the fund’s 
deliberative organ. Article 9 additionally lists all the specific functions of the 
DCC regarding the FDD, including approving the annual activities plan and 
respective budget, following and monitoring the financed projects, approving the 
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schemes for reimbursement of the loans, and guaranteeing that the loans will 
be reimbursed (Rep. of Moz., 90/2009). 
In this competency, the council should be assisted by a technical commission 
(TC) whose chief is designated by the administrator. This is a crucial point. The 
council makes ‘the decision’ as it is this body that knows the local needs; 
nevertheless, it needs technical advice as many of its members do not have 
formal education and/or specific knowledge related to management and 
business planning (Int. 73, 83). The TC fulfils this role by assessing the projects 
submitted and advising the DCC about their viability (Int. 83). The commissions 
also have additional tasks such as giving advice in order to improve the projects 
viability and organising the managerial aspects of the fund’s disbursement 
(Rep. of Moz., 90/2009, Art. 12).  
These procedures have been clarified even further in the FDD 2011 Manual 
(Rep. of Moz., MAE/MF/MPD, 2011) where the sequential steps highlight that 
the TCs should give a clear opinion about each project (including document 
analysis, project viability, community impact analysis, and risk analysis) to the 
DCCs so they may take such issues into account during the decision process. 
Aside from this, the DCC is also requested to take into account the congruence 
of the projects with the District Strategic Development Plan. 
The FDD implementation is furthermore assisted by the local District Services 
for Economic Activities (SDAEs) and other specialised institutions including 
non-governmental actors that may work in partnership with the government 
(Rep. of Moz., 90/2009, Art. 12). This technical assistance should ensure the 
technical improvement of the approved projects and their viability and 
sustainability. Point 6 of the Article further states that the technical assistance 
should not add any costs to the fund, which became very problematic in 
practice. 
So we see that, overall, there is a major concern in the regulation to sustain the 
principle that, even though the LCs are consultative when it comes to the ‘7 
million’, they are the ones who decide. Yet, assuming the limitations of their 
technical capacity, the regulatory instruments also provide institutional support 
in order to guarantee a minimum quality assurance as well as follow-up 
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mechanisms in order to increase the projects’ chances of success. So, local 
empowerment assumes multiple forms in its procedural aspect, notably, by 
reinforcing the direct interaction between the councils and the communities, the 
expression of the local interest to the authorities, but also as the opportunities 
for capacity development of the members themselves regarding governance 
issues and local development. 
Despite this, the regulation has important shortcomings that have the potential 
to hinder the empowering effects of these initiatives at the community level. 
One is the fact that there is no restriction on members of the councils submitting 
their own proposals and, therefore, obtaining disbursement from the fund. In 
theory, this conflict of interest should be monitored by the technical 
commissions and the SDAEs and should be minimised as long as capacity 
building takes place (Int. 74). Nevertheless, in practice, there is no clear 
procedure on the matter, and many LC members have, indeed, become 
beneficiaries of the fund. 
A more general critique is based on the fundamental question of whether the 
LCs should be the ones to approve these projects. According to one 
interviewee (Int. 82), his interpretation of the Decree 90/2009 is not that the 
councils approve the projects, the most fundamental criterion is (should be) the 
projects viability which is assessed by the TC. Looking closely at Article 9(b), 
the matter is indeed ambiguous as it states that it is up to the LCs to “evaluate 
and approve the projects submitted by the Projects Evaluation and 
Management Commission”. This could mean that, as the interviewee sees it, 
the Commission should first do a screening of the projects that are technically 
viable and submit only these ones. However, the 2011 guidelines leave less 
room for doubt by specifying the sequencing of the process as well as the 
advisory character of the commission in this regard. 
In summary, whereas the ‘7 million’ regulation presents an extensive 
opportunity for local empowerment promotion, it also leaves important issues 
unaddressed potentially jeopardizing the initiative’s official intent. Much of its 
declared empowering potential is furthermore linked to the LCs, portrayed as 
bodies linked to the initiative, even though their existence officially preceded the 
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‘7 million’ and even though they have a much broader work agenda largely 
detached from the ‘7 million’. 
Regarding its contribution to decentralisation, a thorough reading of the 
regulation calls into question the discursive optimism regarding the potential of 
the ‘7 million’ for this process. The very use of ‘consultative’ attached to the 
councils leaves no doubt about the limited aspect of this participatory space. In 
addition, the role of local government figures in this process may be interpreted 
as an attempt to retain power instead of delegating it to the communities, and 
perhaps, this is the reason why in the official discourse the effects of the ‘7 
million’ are mostly portrayed as extremely positive, despite the many problems 
that exist in its implementation. 
5.4 How the ‘Top’ Perceives the Results 
The ‘7 million’ has been widely publicised in the government’s official discourse. 
In his 2009 state of the nation address, President Guebuza (2009a) affirmed: 
The ‘7 million’ has brought visible changes in the districts. In some areas 
where there was hunger, now our hard working people ask for 
marketplaces so they can exchange their surpluses. They ask for 
financial institutions [banks] where they may deposit their savings or look 
for financial resources to expand their business. In certain areas, 
bicycles and motor-bicycles are not a novelty anymore. Not even the 
shops where these vehicles are repaired. What is new is the shop where 
they sell accessories. Mozambique has marched at a fast pace. Poverty 
has withdrawn considerably. 
In the presidential discourse, the ‘7 million’ is often portrayed as a panacea 
thanks to which local development has taken place, food production has 
increased, local communities have been integrated with the national market, 
jobs have been created, and poverty has been reduced (ibid.; Guebuza, 
2009b). It is indeed impressive how such a relatively small budget seems to 
have had miraculous effects. In fact, besides these material effects, the 
empowering results of the ‘7 million’ are extended also to the domain of local 
governance. First, the initiative is directly linked with the role of the LCs, which 
are represented as the manifestation of local civil society (Guebuza, 2006; 
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2009b). In the President’s words, these organs constitute “schools of 
consensus building” and have a main role in fostering accountability which 
makes the ‘7 million’ a “school of good governance” (Guebuza, 2009b) that also 
tackles corruption (Guebuza, 2011). Besides, as the LCs contribute to enhance 
the people’s freedom and self-expression, the ‘7 million’ also contributes to 
improve their self-esteem (ibid.). 
Whilst the government recognises some challenges regarding the ‘7 million’, the 
official view is that its benefits by far exceed its problems. The next subsections 
critically discuss this general success story by taking into account the views of 
the central government as well as the government and civil society of Nampula 
province. 
THE VIEWS OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
Since its inception, the ‘7 million’ has been poorly assessed in terms of its 
effects and, in particular, its empowering outcome. 52  Official national 
assessments, in particular, have been scanty. The first national report from the 
government was released in February 2009 and discussed the initiative’s 
results from 2006 to 2009. In August 2009, a consultancy firm delivered an 
evaluation report commended by the MPD (Métier, 2009) on the latter.53 By 
May 2013, there were trimestral reports presented regularly in the Council of 
Ministers54 and, according to an interviewee, a national assessment was to be 
                                            
52 The main exceptions are specific academic articles (Forquilha, 2010; Sande, 2010; 
Forquilha and Orre, 2012). 
53 This section focuses on the official discourse, so I will not discuss the report in 
question. It is worth mentioning though that, while recognising positive aspects such as 
the progressive improvement of the instrument and its effect in sparking democratic 
participation, the report also stressed several weaknesses of the OIIL, in particular, in 
the field of its institutional capacity which paved the way for several other 
implementation problems (Métier, 2009). 
54 These reports were/are not available online. Thanks to one of the interviewees I had 
access to one of them referring to two trimesters of 2011. These are descriptive 
briefings reporting numbers related to the fund’s disbursement per province and giving 
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concluded in 2013 that should be the basis of a new national report (Int. 83). 
However, at the time of writing, such a report, if completed, has not been 
available in the respective Ministries’ websites. 
The MPD 2009 report was particularly benevolent regarding the effects of the ‘7 
million’. It presented it as an advance on the previous experiments in district 
planning due to its focus on private economic activities (Rep. of Moz., MPD, 
2009a: 4). According to the report, “the OIIL is, without a doubt, a preponderant 
factor of mitigation [of the world food prices crisis’ effects in Mozambique] and 
of development with emphasis on the rural area” (ibid.: 5). The report further 
stated that the role of the LCs had been “positively surprising” as they 
constituted a central vehicle for the interaction between government and the 
communities (ibid.: 11). In this regard, the ‘7 million’ had instigated “dynamics 
without precedence” in these interactions promoting “profound debates” 
regarding the objectives and mechanisms of the fund (ibid.).  
The report also acknowledged some “constraints and challenges” including the 
non-integral fulfilment of the government’s recommendations on the use the 
budget, the lack of proper monitoring of the implemented projects, the limited 
capacity of the bodies involved in the selection of the projects, the need to 
adjust the interest rates charged, the reduced capacity of recipients to pay back 
loans, the lack of involvement from the councils in the monitoring of the 
projects, and the lack of attention to the synergy between the projects approved 
and the local production chain (ibid.: 15-16). 
Notwithstanding these problems, the report agreed that “the positive results [of 
the ‘7 million’] are by far superior to its negative aspects” (ibid.: 19) This 
statement was followed by seven pages with impressive numbers of projects 
and job posts created in each province. Accordingly, between 2006 and 2009, 
25,943 projects were created all across the country generating 107,950 new 
jobs (both temporary and fixed-term) (ibid.: 24). The report concluded by 
noticing that “not all the reports sent by the provinces answered what was 
asked” by the central government (ibid.: 26). Nevertheless, although it 
                                                                                                                                
some examples of projects financed with a brief assessment of the results and pictures 
of the selected businesses.  
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recognises the need to address these issues, it did not raise the matter of how 
problematic the methodology was for the very assessment presented in the 
previous pages. 
The tone of the 2009 report expresses the official view of the ‘7 million’. Indeed, 
the majority of interviewees in the central government recognised the 
challenges regarding the initiative, but they also expressed that its benefits 
clearly outweighed its limitations. Different from the report, however, they often 
ignored or minimised the methodological aspects of the data collection and, 
instead, cited the data as if it was reliable adding reference to their personal 
experiences visiting projects in order to corroborate the assertion of success. In 
addition, many respondents also emphasised that the benefits of the ‘7 million’ 
should be measured beyond the financial aspect as it has helped to strengthen 
the private sector, in particular, in those areas where other agents (e.g., banks, 
micro-credit institutions) would not go (Int. 2, 4, 73). 
Participants also highlighted a series of non-material benefits of the ‘7 million’. 
The promotion of entrepreneurship, for instance, was perceived as not only 
producing economic benefits but as part of a deeper social process of ‘shaking 
up’ the Mozambican social fabric, taking a step away from the state of lethargy 
that had prevailed since colonial times (Int. 4). Moreover, the ‘7 million’ was 
perceived as having put in motion a new space for citizenship as most people 
now discussed the topic (Int. 74, 2). 
These aspects were all understood as linked to the empowering potential of the 
fund. According to the Minister of Finance, for instance, one way the initiative 
produced empowerment was through the provision of local capacity for the 
district to run its own economy without relying on external actors (Int. 73). 
Enabling local people to realise their potential was, in this regard, the crucial 
point and was linked with the goal of bringing back the people’s self-esteem and 
belief in themselves and their capacity. It was about providing opportunities that 
did not exist previously and moving beyond subsistence (ibid.). From this 
perspective, the ‘7 million’ acted as a driver to expand the people’s possibilities 
(see also Guebuza, 2009b). 
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Regarding the initiative’s limitations, most interviewees stressed the very 
reduced repayment rate as a central challenge to be addressed. Yet, 
respondents also noted that many projects have a different timeframe (e.g., 
raising cattle takes up to three years to give a proper return) and, therefore, 
noted that the emphasis on the return rate could be misleading when assessing 
the success of the fund (Int. 3, 72, 73; see also Guebuza, 2009b). Whether or 
not this may be the case, it is also true that the low rates of repayment affect 
the fund’s sustainability and may further foster a culture of non-compliance.55 A 
second challenge reported was the lack of local capacity (both from the LCs to 
approve viable projects as well as from local beneficiaries and even the TCs) 
perceived as also hindering the success rate of the projects (Int. 74).  
In spite of these acknowledged limitations, some participants in Maputo also 
stressed the pedagogic aspect of the ‘7 million’ which reinforced the ‘doing and 
learning’ discourse. From this perspective, whatever the challenges 
encountered, they did not remove the merit of the initiative, which is to invest in 
a local model instead of only abiding to donor-driven programs (Int. 82). 
Moreover, even the ‘new problems’ generated by the ‘7 million’ were described 
as proof of its effectiveness in changing things as well as being a catalyst that 
made important problems come to the surface (Int. 4, 74). 
Harsher critiques of the ‘7 million’ were extremely rare in the central 
government. Critical views focused mostly on the implementation process 
arguing that, if properly implemented, the initiative could have produced much 
better results (Int. 74, 83). This reasoning turned out to be the best way to put 
the responsibilities for any failures on the lower echelons while emphasising the 
merit and the broader principles of the initiative. 
                                            
55 Technically, there are sanctions foreseen in the FDD regulation. According to the 
contract that should be used (according to the Circular 002/MPD/GM/2009), in case the 
beneficiary does not abide to its duties (e.g., implement the project according to what 
was presented and approved and does not return repay accordingly), two sanctions 
should be applied: 1) the immediate suspension of the remaining parcels of the loan, 
and 2) the seizure of the assets obtained (Rep. of Moz., 2009b). Yet in practice, this 
seems to be rarely, if ever, applied (see next chapter). 
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NAMPULA VIEWS 
As much as in Maputo, the general perspective within the Nampula provincial 
government was that the results of the ‘7 million’ were “notable” and its “impact 
was evident” (Int. 5, 7, 9, 47). The increased number of jobs, the increase in the 
amount of bicycles circulating in the districts, the reduction of the rural exodus, 
more food in the districts, more trade, the building of improved houses, and 
even access to electricity were some of the issues linked with the empowering 
effects of the initiative. Additionally, it was often observed that the most 
important effects of the ‘7 million’ were qualitative rather than quantitative. In 
fact, according to some interviewees, now people felt that they had an active 
voice, that they could negotiate their own priorities with the government, and 
even women had more space to express their priorities and the chance to start 
their own business (Int. 5). Thus, the ‘7 million’ had a psychological and moral 
empowering effect which was not only extended to these participatory spaces 
but also to an acknowledgment that having a business is not a simple task (Int. 
6). Echoing President Guebuza, the ‘7 million’ was portrayed as a school of 
governance because the very problems generated by the ‘7 million’ in the first 
year also stimulated local discussion, led to the removal of some administrators, 
and showed, therefore, the need to place more emphasis on mechanisms of 
social control (ibid.). 
Regardless of this optimism, the link between the ‘7 million’ and these results 
were often unsubstantiated. Indeed, many of these improvements could be 
related to other processes such as the expansion of infrastructure in the 
previous years, the stability of the economy, as well as the parallel work of 
several NGOs and donors in the province. However, many interviewees placed 
the merit of these improvements fundamentally on the ‘7 million’ (Int. 5, 7, 9), as 
this initiative was perceived as the main driver of other changes. 
As for the challenges, one central issue recognised in the provincial 
government was the existing limitations in terms of monitoring activities and 
capacity building, in particular, in the case of the beneficiaries and their ability to 
present a repayment plan as well as thinking long-term in their projects (Int. 7, 
9, 47). One of the explanations for this limitation was the over-reliance on 
donors for the continuity of these activities. At the time of the interviews, for 
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instance, one participant reported that the recent crisis in Spain had led to a 
reduction in that country’s aid which, in turn, meant fewer technocrats, 
meetings, and visits to the districts causing a delay in the provincial evaluation 
of the districts (Int. 7).  
Overall, most statements highlighted the technical view of the challenges faced 
by the ‘7 million’, technical assistance being perceived as key to its success. 
This view was presented along with the ‘trial and error’ discourse. Interestingly, 
here, some interviewees expressed that the ‘7 million’ should be understood as 
a kind of a subsidy precisely to finance these “marketization experiments”; 
therefore, a direct financial return of these experiments should not be expected 
as this was not the point (Int. 5, 6). 
Another mark in the provincial perspective was the reference to challenges 
related to local culture and history. Some respondents referred, for example, to 
the local tendency towards short-term thinking as a heritage from the war and 
its ‘emergency-mode’, a major challenge to the promotion of an ‘entrepreneurial 
mentality’ (Int. 5, 6). More generally, the historical legacy also explained the 
difficulty of changing a mentality of centralism in favour of decentralisation. As 
noted, until recently “the local levels were mail boxes that collected raw data 
and never analysing it” (Int. 6). 
Regarding the cultural aspects, participants stressed specific features linked 
with tradition and the belief in witchcraft (Int. 6, 10). They mentioned, for 
instance, that when someone gets more prosperous than others in a 
community, this often causes envy and may lead to the use of witchcraft against 
the person. This possibility instils fear in many people who prefer to stick to their 
status, even if it is less prosperous. This, in turn, makes development a much 
slower process. Another problem highlighted was the perpetuation of traditional 
hierarchies, in particular, the exclusion of women and the youth from important 
decisions in the community, which, in turn, limited the implementation of new 
development models (ibid.). 
Members of CSOs in Nampula made similar remarks (Int. 8, 11), yet they also 
expressed harsher critiques of the ‘7 million’. A common criticism was related to 
the effects of the ‘7 million’ on the LCs (ibid.; Int. 48). Accordingly, the problem 
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was that the councils should be discussing development in the broad sense, in 
particular, the strategic dimension of local development policies. Whereas this 
work had been gradually conducted in Nampula province in the past, when the 
‘7 million’ came in, the agenda suddenly changed and became again focused 
on immediate gains to the detriment of long-term strategic planning (ibid.). In 
the words of a participant, “What was really important in the process — the de 
facto empowerment of the communities, the prioritization, implementation, and 
monitoring of the district planning — all that the pioneering experiments in 
Nampula had privileged became second place” (Int. 11). Instead, the 
technocratic dimension of the process has prevailed over the participatory 
concern that guided the previous experiences. As for the councils, they were 
now all focusing on the ‘easy money’ available. 
Another interviewee noted that the introduction of the ‘7 million’ also harmed the 
work of the CSO where he works which focuses on the concession of small 
grants for local development projects. In his words, “the corruption practices 
that accompany the ‘7 million’ has created a general perception that aid money 
is just to spend, indiscriminately, and not to produce . . . All you need is a 
godfather, then you will get this money and don’t have to worry about the work 
you should do” (Int. 48). This trend shifted individuals’ behaviour, so all of a 
sudden, those requesting this CSO’s help started to invent unrealistic and 
overpriced project budgets, often tripling the costs in order to get more money. 
Eventually, the CSO was forced to take a stronger role in the process in order to 
retain transparency as well as introduce the rule of co-financing so that those 
wanting help now needed to provide for part of the costs themselves. 
This type of harsh criticism was often accompanied by a major critique 
regarding the political aspect behind the initiative (see also Forquilha, 2010 and 
Forquilha and Orre, 2012). Some interviewees among CSOs noted, in 
particular, that since Guebuza came to power in 2005, there had been a 
retrocession in the country’s political flexibility (Int. 11). Ultimately, and in spite 
of the good will of many technocrats in the government, it is the political 
linkages that determine policy outcomes in general including the good will of 
local administrators (Int. 48). And this is not just a local phenomenon, in fact at 
the province level major decisions need the consensus of the Frelimo Provincial 
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Committee (which is the organ that indicates names of administrators and key 
political figures in the province) (ibid.). 
If we look at the ‘7 million’ this way, then, in effect, the problem is not the ‘7 
million’ per se, but its political instrumentalisation (Int. 8, 10, 50). If that is the 
case, two questions should be posed. First, what is the balance between the 
pros and cons of the ‘7 million’? As seen above, some participants within CSOs 
had very negative views about the initiative in Nampula. Besides the 
consequences in the local mentality, they did not see economic results that 
justified the intervention and gave several examples of non-functioning projects 
around the province (Int. 11, 14, 48). Others offered a more nuanced view. 
Looking backwards, and whilst acknowledging the limitations of the LCs (e.g., 
the quality of participation), they recognise that what happened marked a 
significant step towards the expansion of participation nation-wide (Int. 8, 50). 
CSO’s interviewees also recognised some technical problems and the need for 
more capacity building in the implementation of the ‘7 million’ (Int. 8, 50). But 
the extent to which this was a politically neutral issue remained an open 
question. As noted by one participant, “It is interesting, in the context of a 
market economy in Mozambique, to say that a government team may train 
entrepreneurs. I have doubts about that!” (Int. 8). So why does it happen this 
way? This leads us to the second question: should not a good policy instrument 
take into account the extent to which it could be manipulated and distorted? 
And if this question was posed, was not the actual purpose of the ‘7 million’ to 
be used as a political tool more than a development tool (the argument of Orre 
and Forquilha, 2012)? 
The decision-making process discussed above, and the way the ‘7 million’ has 
been used in the political discourse point towards this direction. However, 
before resuming this question, I would like to highlight other elements that may 
clarify the current state of the ‘7 million’. Some of these issues were not directly 
pointed to as ‘problems’ in the interviews, but the analysis suggests that they 
have strongly contributed to the limitations of the initiative in promoting local 
empowerment. 
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5.5 Institutional and Methodological Constraints on the ‘7 
Million’ 
In this section, I discuss two major problems detected in the interviews’ 
analyses and that, I argue, significantly affected both the effectiveness of the ‘7 
million’ and existing opinions on the matter. The first problem relates to the 
institutional changes that took place in the central government since the start of 
the ‘7 million’. When the ‘7 million’ was introduced in 2006, it was placed under 
the responsibility of the MPD under the National Directorate for the Promotion of 
Rural Development (DNPDR). In 2010, however, the DNPDR was transferred to 
MAE, which is responsible for the agenda of decentralisation. As noted by an 
interviewee in that Ministry, “the truth is that we as an institution were caught by 
surprise by the presidential decree” (Int. 72). The explanation they were given 
was that, as President Guebuza had placed poverty at the centre of the political 
agenda, poverty was now not only a ‘development’ issue, but a ‘state’ issue. 
Since the MAE is responsible for the government institutions at the local state 
levels, then, it should be up to MAE to handle the rural development agenda 
(ibid.). Employees of the DNPDR were also caught by surprise by these 
changes and were given no information regarding the reasons for it, with one 
interviewee saying, “We just got the information that on a certain date we would 
be relocated, but why? . . . I personally think we were better placed in the MPD” 
(Int. 83). 
This change had several implications for the program. First, the split, and the 
fact that some people remained in the MPD, instead of moving to MAE, meant 
that some of those who had been engaged with the whole process since its 
inception would no longer deal with it. Second, this move contributed to the 
politicisation of the ‘7 million’. Indeed, according to an interviewee at MAE, part 
of the argument that justified this change was that, as the district administrator 
is directly accountable to that Ministry, this facilitates a ‘direct command’ which, 
in turn, would avoid a lack of local commitment to important national priorities 
(Int. 72). In this interviewee’s opinion, this was positive because it compensated 
for the lack of preparation and capacity of some of the locally appointed leaders 
(ibid.). This, however, could also be interpreted as an institutional means to 
centralise governance while retaining the discourse on decentralisation. Indeed, 
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the way the decision to relocate the DNPDR was taken points to an evident top-
down politically driven action. As noted by the same interviewee, “These kinds 
of things are not discussed here. . . The government macro structure is not 
even discussed in the Assembly. It is decided. It is a topic exclusive to the 
President and his cohort”, so the function of the MAE is simply to understand 
the decision and implement it (Int. 72).  
The extent to which these changes affected the ‘7 million’ was also 
compounded by the already complicated institutional coordination between 
national institutions. So, for instance, whereas the ‘7 million’ may be seen 
(arguably) as an initiative related to state administration, its efficacy in the long 
term is also dependent on coordination with the Ministry of Agriculture and its 
ability to deliver the necessary services so that local rural entrepreneurs may 
fully implement their projects. This integration, however, is not there (Int. 4, 72). 
A third implication of this change for the ‘7 million’ was the reduction of funds for 
the monitoring of the initiative. Indeed, the MPD had more funds that could be 
(and were) utilised in the monitoring of the ‘7 million’, which is not the case in 
the MAE, and which explains why regular monitoring from the central 
government has been drastically reduced since 2009 (Int. 82, 83). In fact, as of 
April 2013, there had been no national monitoring visits for two years (Int. 83). 
Compounding this problem is the quality of the data presented by the districts 
and provinces to the DNPDR concerning the ‘7 million’.  This leads us to the 
second problem considered in this section that is the methodological 
weaknesses of this process. 
The key aspect to highlight here is the inconsistency that, even though there is 
a recognition of some methodological problems with the data gathering in the 
case of the ‘7 million’, there is no fundamental questioning in the government 
regarding the validity of the data. This aspect raises, once more, the question of 
political intent regarding the initiative; as long as the data remains favourable to 
the government, it serves the political purpose of legitimising the program. 
The data that reaches Maputo is provided by the provincial governments, 
which, in turn, get the information from the districts. The provinces have the 
double function of organising the data and also regularly conducting monitoring 
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visits to the districts. The basic matrix used to monitor the projects includes a 
series of indicators (e.g., the amount of money disbursed for each project, the 
repayment plan, the interest rate). The problem is that not all provinces are able 
to send to Maputo the complete matrix. As noted in the DNPDR, a lot of data is 
lacking, so, there is no way to make a proper assessment of the ‘7 million’ (Int. 
83). In particular, a lot of data related to the first years is unavailable, and 
several projects do not even exist on paper which raises the question of how 
these reports were compiled in the first place if there is no proper way to follow 
the projects (ibid.). 
Another problem noted was the discrepancy between numbers that do not 
match. For example, at times there is a mismatch between the numbers 
provided by the provinces and those for the sectoral reports from the 
government. At other times, mismatches are found in monitoring visits. In a 
central monitoring visit to a district, for instance, it was found that up to 90% of 
the ‘existing’ projects actually did not exist anymore (Int. 83). This means that 
many reports, including the 2009 report, could be questioned on the basis of 
methodology (e.g., ‘Do those jobs created still exist?’). 
The extent of the methodological problems in the assessment of the ‘7 million’ 
becomes even clearer when we reach the provincial level. First, there are 
problems of resources that limit the provincial capacity to make regular visits 
and collect data. As visits become less frequent, much of the evaluation is 
made by phone calls to the district staff (Int. 7), which naturally compromises 
the quality of the monitoring. Second, the way the monitoring visits are 
conducted is very politically sensitive and resembles more a ‘visit’ than a 
‘monitoring’ process. As explained in the provincial government: 
We first send a document saying that we are about to come. When we 
arrive, we automatically present ourselves to the district government . . 
. Then they tell us [the number of projects, and general data] because 
they know, we don’t. They indicate to us a few technicians from the local 
administration to work with us. They tell us, ‘go to the locality ‘x’, see 
beneficiaries ‘a’, ‘b’, ‘c’’, then we go to the localities. Once we get to the 
locality, we also present ourselves to the local authorities of the locality, 
of the administrative posts and, if it is the case, of the village, if we get 
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there. It is a matter of ethic, of protocol. I cannot get to your house, start 
messing with your stuff before interacting with you first, it’s not like that . . 
.Then we present ourselves to the beneficiary or the association. We 
speak to them, we listen, take notes, then we also give our point of view. 
We never just say ‘this is bad’. We give our opinion, but in a way . . . we 
want to show that they can do better if they try other ways (Int. 9). 
What this report suggests is that the respect for local power hierarchies is 
primordial and comes first. The fact that the village is compared to someone’s 
house, indicates how the definition of public and private spaces is unclear. The 
concern with the way the ‘critiques’ are going to be expressed does not seem to 
follow the logic of a ‘monitoring’, and even less of an organised capacity 
building mechanism. The idea that all they give is ‘advice’ – as any decision is 
and shall remain exclusively local — is problematic. On the one hand, it is 
based on the idea that local ownership is key to this process which is in tune 
with the empowering appeal of the ‘7 million’. Nevertheless, on the other hand, 
it would be expected that a monitoring visit would be a tool to ensure that 
whatever practices take place in a specific matter do so according to the law 
and its respective regulation and not following political or personal priorities. It 
would also entail the assurance that those to be empowered are those with less 
power rather than those who already have more power at the local level. 
Leaving the choice of places and projects to visit to the district administration is 
a way to bias the process as there is no way to control that the projects selected 
for visits are not chosen solely because of their high degree of success. 
Additionally, the fact that many of the problems encountered locally (see next 
chapter) did not resonate in the interviews in the province could plausibly be a 
reflection of the lack of public denunciation of these cases which, in turn, affect 
their consideration as ‘irregular’ from a statistical point of view. As people refrain 
from making accusations, even a monitoring process is limited in its ability to 
capture some irregularities. 
These methodological problems are further compounded by the indicators used 
to assess the ‘7 million’. An interviewee in Maputo, for instance, noted that there 
needs to be a general change regarding what a ‘job’ is, so that ‘self-
employment’ is included in the label ‘jobs created’ (Int. 74). Accordingly, self-
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employment has been highly promoted by the ‘7 million’ and makes a concrete 
difference in peoples’ lives. However, when asked if they have a job, many of 
these self-employed individuals do not recognise it as such (ibid.). A more 
critical view regarding the measurement was found in Nampula. One 
interviewee, for example, posed a fundamental question, “What are we 
measuring?” (Int. 6). In his view, what should be measured was the 
‘sustainability’ of the projects financed by the ‘7 million and how many jobs 
created were sustainable in the long run. However, as noted by one of his 
colleagues, what they have so far is nominal data that does not capture the idea 
of ‘impact’ (Int. 7). So ‘numbers’ are there, but what they mean is at best fuzzy. 
The above considerations suggest that the success story of the ‘7 million’ 
highlighted in the discourse is not based on solid analysis. At the same time, 
the fact that the methodological problems have been pointed out inside the 
government raises questions regarding the intentions behind what seems a 
deliberate disregard for these problems. How this affects the empowering 
potential of the ‘7 million’, however, needs further analysis at the level of the 
district which is the topic of the next chapter. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed both the origins and the transformations of the ‘7 
million’ emphasising its empowering potential. Key questions raised were why 
the ‘7 million’ was created and how it was designed and operationalised from 
the point of view of the upper levels of analysis (in particular, the national and 
provincial levels). In this regard, the analysis pointed to several initial 
conclusions. First, there is a remarkable difference in the way the ‘7 million’ is 
depicted both in terms of its origins and in terms of its main objectives. From the 
point of view of those involved in previous experiments of decentralised 
planning, the ‘7 million’ is the continuation of a long-term and gradual process of 
decentralisation — sometimes perceived as a setback to previous experiments. 
From the political perspective, it is a presidential initiative that indeed 
contributes to the process of decentralisation but that was conceptualised 
through the specific lens of the expansion of credit in the rural areas in order to 
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stimulate economic activities — it is to a certain extent an evolution of existing 
processes. 
A detailed analysis of the initiative’s birth and its transformation shows that the 
second discourse reflects, in fact, a gradual process of politicisation of the ‘7 
million’ leading to a change of ownership of the idea in order to directly link it 
with President Guebuza. This politicisation was further evident in the processes 
leading to the instrument’s regulation and the disregard at the central level of 
serious problems related to the policy’s implementation and monitoring reflected 
in the lack of resources for the latter. The political use of the ‘7 million’ as a 
‘success story’ also reinforces the observed tendency to minimise some of its 
major problems. In fact, as shown, there is no denial that problems exist, but the 
emphasis is instead on the technical features of these problems and on the far 
more important successes of the ‘7 million’. In this regard, one of the 
fundamental aspects that legitimises the ‘7 million’ is its empowering appeal 
related to its procedural aspect linked to LCs. This empowering rationale, 
nevertheless, is based on a technical perspective of empowerment as 
discussed in the second chapter. It is process-driven; it is apolitical and takes 
for granted individual agency. The next chapter will explore in detail the 
problems of these assumptions when it comes to the initiative’s implementation 
at the local level. 
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Chapter 6 
The ‘7 million’ Viewed from the Bottom 
 




. . . People don’t react because of the bread. They can’t 
complain because of the bread. So one day they’ll know that this 




One of the challenges of empowerment promotion resides in the translation of 
the policies’ rationale into practical actions that are in tune with local contexts. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the empowerment logic of the ‘7 million’ is 
fundamentally linked to the LCs and based on technical premises that privilege 
participation as the means to increase the people’s power-to 
speak/discuss/jointly decide what is the best for their own communities. This 
chapter explores the bottom level of analysis of the empowerment framework 
presented in Chapter 2, including the triad (i) subjectivities, (ii) capacity, and (iii) 
agency/patiency, in an effort to understand how the ‘7 million’ has been 
implemented and interpreted in the district of Angoche, and to what extent it has 
generated local empowerment.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first two discuss the procedural 
aspect of empowerment in the implementation of the ‘7 million’. In the first 
section, I critically assess the representativeness of the LCs vis-à-vis the rural 
communities taking into account these bodies’ constitution and the way they 
function in Angoche. The second section analyses specifically the process that 
leads to the selection of the ‘7 million’ projects and the power dynamics 
underneath it. The third section examines the empowering outcomes of the 
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fund, considering its material and non-material domains, as well as the specific 
contextual aspects that influence these outcomes. 
I argue that the empowering logic that sustains the ‘7 million’ is overridden by 
pre-existing power dynamics that shape local behaviours and which are aligned 
with a series of formal and informal relations of authority that fundamentally 
clash with the idea of horizontality that justifies the constitution of the local 
councils. These procedural limitations affect the empowering effects of the ‘7 
million’ as they shape which projects will be selected, the values distributed, as 
well as local actors’ subjectivities regarding the initiative and their own power in 
the local context. 
6.1 Empowerment as a Process I: the LCs vis-à-vis the Local 
Communities 
Before getting into the analysis of the process that leads to the allocation of the 
‘7 million’, it is important to assess what is portrayed as its main legitimising 
feature — the LCs and their representativeness. This section discusses this 
aspect taking into account, first, the process that led to the constitution of these 
bodies, and, second, the way they relate to the communities they are supposed 
to represent. 
THE LOCAL COUNCILS’ CONSTITUTION 
As noted in the previous chapter, it was in Nampula province where the first 
versions of the LCs were implemented back in 1998/1999. These early 
experiments covered selected districts, including Angoche, and were fairly top-
down as, before approaching the communities, the teams in charge of creating 
the LCs needed to turn to the local authorities who would, in turn, call and 
conduct the meetings in which the LC members would be selected (Int. 5, 10). 
With the introduction of the national legislation for the OLEs, the existing LCs in 
Nampula had to be reconstituted, a process that took place between 2006 and 
2007, carried out by several teams in all the APs of all the Nampula districts 
(Int. 5, 50). Despite this, these new councils did not necessarily represent the 
full expression of a bottom-up process. Indeed, some early LC members 
admitted that, at that stage, they were not voted on by the community, instead, 
	   208	  
they were chosen (FG 34), indicated by community authorities such as religious 
leaders (Int. 38). 
In 2011, a major process of reconstitution of the LCs took place nationally 
largely driven by the recognised need to improve these bodies’ 
representativeness and inclusiveness. In Angoche, this ‘revitalisation’ was 
organised and monitored by the district’s technical commission (TC). As a rule, 
the TC sent a warning about a week before the event to the chiefs of the APs 
so these could inform the localities, the régulos, and the village chiefs about the 
process. When the TC arrived in the communities, people were gathered 
waiting, then, first, the communities would choose the LC members at the 
village level, and then, these would proceed to the locality level where some of 
them would be selected to the LCs at the upper levels (Int. 55). Despite the 
concern to make this process as transparent and inclusive as possible, the 
evidence from the fieldwork showed that the revitalisation process had several 
problems that affected the LCs’ legitimacy, inclusiveness and 
representativeness vis-à-vis the local communities. 
As a general rule, while describing the process, the new LC members frequently 
used the words ‘elected’, ‘voted’, and ‘chosen’, often interchangeably, to 
describe how they had been selected. Usually they stated that they “were 
chosen” by the community (Int. 21, 43, 75; FG 24), then — normally after more 
questions — they would explain how the process actually took place. As it 
turned out this ‘choosing process’ had different meanings including aspects of 
voting, invitation/indication, and volunteering sometimes mixed in different 
orders. 
Ms Alzira, for instance, explained that she ‘was chosen’ by the community when 
the TC visited her village (Int. 43). Mr José also said he ‘was chosen’ by the 
people, but after more questions, he explained that first he was called by the 
secretário do bairro who asked him if he wanted to be part of the LC, and only 
after that, he followed the procedures of ‘elections’ competing with other people 
for the LCs at the upper levels (Int. 21). Mr Domingos reported a similar 
situation (FG 66). Ms Luiza, on the contrary, stated having volunteered for the 
job after a general call from the secretário do bairro in her village for members 
of the LC (Int. 81). In the AP of Angoche Sede, the process was led by the 
	   209	  
district administrator in a public meeting. Members of the LC selected in that 
occasion reported that the voting process was open, and they had their names 
called by the people at that time (FG 34).  
A term widely used in the interviews , ‘the community’,  needs clarification. Most 
members were unanimous in stressing that they were chosen by ‘the 
community’ and that ‘the community’ was fully aware that the selection process 
was taking place. If by ‘the community’, we understand the everyday people 
living in the villages, it was never clear what proportion of villagers were present 
during these processes. Reports from the TC refer to participation numbers 
ranging from 17 to 239 at each locality, which are very reduced numbers if we 
take into account the district population of 276,471 people (INE, 10 Aug. 2012) 
and its 14 localities. Moreover, these nominal values say little about the quality 
of participation and the general dynamics that preceded the presence of the TC. 
Indeed, several accounts revealed that key to the selection of the LC members 
was the role played by the régulos and the secretários de bairro who first 
received the information from the administration regarding the reconstitution 
and then pre-selected specific members of the community so these could be 
‘voted’ later among the population when the TC came to the villages (Int. 21; 
FG 65, 66, 19). 
A central issue here is, therefore, how the communities perceived this process 
and the extent to which they took part of it. In one focus group, for instance, 
participants stated that “the leaders know better who are the people in the 
community that may participate better” (FG 65). Yet, in several focus groups, 
many individuals were simply not aware of the reconstitution of the LCs, most 
answers ranging from a very vague “I’ve heard about it” (FG 29, 27, 69; Int. 76, 
77, 78), generally followed by “but I did not vote” (FG, 26, 27) or “I was not 
invited/not informed” (FG 69; Int. 36, 76), to a simple “I don’t know” (FG 23, 64; 
Int. 80). Also, in many cases, those who were aware of the process had very 
critical views about it. Participants in one focus group, for instance, expressed 
that in the LCs “they are only chosen within the structure” and only later they 
are presented to the population, so they did not see it as a real choosing 
process (FG 22). Others stated, “they don’t want us to participate because they 
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know we are going to complain” (FG 26). Another group further mentioned that 
the LC members “elected themselves” to the AP (they referred to the continuity 
of old members) (FG 64); therefore, in their view it was not a participatory 
process. 
This last observation points to an ambiguous aspect of the revitalisation that is 
the continuity of old members in the renewed bodies. According to some of the 
members who had their mandate renewed, before the start of the process, 
there was an internal discussion where it was decided that some old members 
needed to stay in the councils because they had experience and previous 
training. Yet, while all of them emphasised they had been “re-elected” (FG 34, 
46; Int. 38, 39), how this procedure took place was less clear. Mr Hassan, for 
instance, recalled that old members were assessed by their performance and 
the people in the community were given the choice to keep them in the LCs (Int. 
39). In a more detailed account, however, Ms Joana admitted that those who 
remained were not re-elected in the community, but internally, inside the council 
(Int. 38), and only the new members were selected in the communities. 
Accounts like these reinforce the questionable participatory aspect of the 
reconstitution, in particular, its inclusiveness. Indeed, besides the problem of 
selectivity, the fieldwork revealed that the process also had a strong gender 
bias, as there was a huge gap between the levels of participation of women and 
men (FG 23, 27, 29). 
TC members had mixed views about the reconstitution process. On the one 
hand, some members highlighted the positive aspects of this process, in 
particular, its transparency and the fact that the new bodies were mostly literate, 
differently from the former ones (Int. 25, 53, 54, 55). On the other hand, there 
were harsh critiques regarding certain aspects of the process. First, and 
confirming the findings from the focus groups, some members recognised the 
lack of control of the processes that preceded the arrival of the TC in the 
villages and localities. As the visits were pre-scheduled, when the team arrived, 
everything was set up and some had the feeling that people had been pre-
selected, even though that was not the original agenda (Int. 40, 53). Also, when 
the time came for the voting of the positions of secretaries and assistants within 
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the LCs, there were indications that these also had already been pre-
determined. One interviewee admitted feeling that they went there basically to 
legitimate the process and not to make it happen (Int. 40). 
A second observation was related to the political aspect of the process. One TC 
member noticed that, when they arrived in the villages, they called for everyone 
to participate including members of other political parties (non-Frelimo). 
However, they were told by the local leaders on several occasions that 
members of the opposition did not want to participate. He sensed that the 
régulos had become linked to the party, in the view of the population, curbing 
the willingness of other parties to take part of the process (Int. 63). 56 
Unfortunately, most of the time, the TC did not verify this further. Only in one 
village did they actually schedule a new voting process so opposition parties 
could participate. Why this verification was not made comprehensively is a 
crucial question. One could hypothesize that the process was, indeed, a mere 
legitimization of local power politics in favour of Frelimo as some authors have 
argued in other case studies (Forquilha, 2010; Forquilha and Orre, 2012). 
Indeed, one of the TC members noticed that most of the people chosen for the 
LC were trusted members of the party (Int. 40). A proper assessment of this 
hypothesis, however, would have required more time and means to investigate. 
Nevertheless, the data gathered from the fieldwork showed that selectivity was 
indeed an issue, and, taking into account the national context discussed in 
previous chapters, it is plausible to consider this a valid hypothesis. 
                                            
56 As noted by Nuvunga (2013: 43-45), even though the LOLE (2003) and its regulation 
(2005) defined the village as the lowest level of the district unit, they did not define its 
formal authority representative, so the villages were ruled by the different traditional 
leaders later designated as community authorities. In 2012, however, a decree was 
approved which centralised the designation of the chiefs of the village, so they were to 
be indicated by the provincial government (just as the chiefs of the localities and AP). 
According to Nuvunga, this was a political strategy as in several villages — namely in 
Angoche — there were many sympathisers of Renamo. The government, therefore, 
wanted to have time to co-opt those leaders (which it did through the legal institution of 
the communities authorities) and, therefore, be able to further centralise the party at 
the local level. 
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LOCAL COUNCILS’ INTERNAL DYNAMICS AND RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
COMMUNITIES 
According to the LC members, LC meetings had been very frequent, particularly 
at the AP and district levels, most members having attended far more than two 
meetings in the previous six months before the interview (FG 30, 34, 46; Int., 
20, 38, 39, 41, 43, 81). As a general rule, it was the president of the LC who 
called the meetings and organised the agenda (Int. 38). Even though members 
are technically allowed to propose a meeting to the president, in practice, this 
kind of initiative was only reported in one case (FG 19) while the usual was for 
members to wait for the ‘convocation note’ sent by the president a few days 
before the meeting (Int. 20). 
This posture of waiting for instructions coming from the top was reinforced by 
some members’ lack of knowledge of their potential for proposing and 
mobilising meetings. Also, it was rare to find reports of members referring to 
meetings with the community in general. Mr José (Int. 21), for instance, a new 
LC member, seemed quite puzzled when I asked him if he had any meetings 
with the community. His response was, “No, because we were never authorised 
to do that”. He added that if they did so, and “got caught” it would look bad. If he 
was told so, he thought it would be a good thing to do. He also noticed that, up 
to that moment, a village LC meeting had never taken place. In contrast, Mr 
José had been to a total of ten meetings in the LC upper levels. Mr José’s 
report reinforces another observation, which was the fact that some village LCs 
did not seem to properly operate or even exist anymore even if they had been 
created in 2011 (FG 15, 17). As the village is the level closest to the majority of 
the population in the district, and the localities are often very distant from most 
villages, this constitutes a serious setback to what should be the deepening of 
the ‘bottom-up’ aspect of the LCs. 
Regarding the meetings, overall, the LC members interviewed agreed that 
participants talk a lot and that they feel really free to express their opinions (Int. 
21, 43; FG 44, 46). Members’ views were, in general, very positive regarding 
their own participation in the meetings, but their statements also revealed that 
often this ‘participation’ was not proactive and critical, instead, more an 
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expression of ‘pleas’ and/or ‘approval’ of propositions. Besides, some 
participants also noted that speaking was of no practical use, for example, 
stating, “We are really authorised to speak freely. Only, sometimes we speak in 
vain, it is worth nothing. We only give our opinion . . . But it doesn’t work. We 
only live to talk…” (FG 44).  
An aspect that seemed to significantly influence the internal dynamics of the 
LCs was the presence of ‘guests of honour’ invited by the presidents of the LCs. 
These could include, among others, the chiefs of the locality, traditional leaders, 
school directors, and the chief of the police (FG 19, 46; Int. 28). Mr José and Mr 
Amade explained that these guests were invited so they could share their 
knowledge about specific topics discussed in the meetings (FG 19). When I 
asked how they felt about having external guests, first, they said that this was a 
“decision taken” that they were not consulted about it. They admitted feeling a 
bit constrained by their presence at times, but they also expressed feeling 
comfortable not to agree with everything they suggested. As they saw it, these 
people were there to make suggestions because they knew better about some 
issues. 
What seems problematic, here, is not that there are guests, but who the guests 
are and how things are portrayed. Indeed, the reason why the LCs came into 
existence, officially, was because they were seen as representing the local 
interests, therefore, they knew better what they needed. Yet, there are guests 
who seem to ‘know better’ about some issues, so they have an important 
influence. LC members in a focus group (FG 46), for instance, commented that 
the presence of these special guests made a difference to the outcome of 
meetings in the sense of promoting action. As an example, they spoke about 
the mobilization regarding the ‘7 million’ repayment. The fact that the leaders 
were there to explain the details of how to make the repayment somehow gave 
the instructions a different weight which would, in turn, promote more action by 
the LC members than if they had not been there. 
Regarding the relationship between the LC and the communities, one of the 
main findings of this fieldwork was precisely the very weak interaction between 
the communities and the LCs, which contrasts to the LC members’ positive 
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assessment of their representative role. In this regard, it should be stressed 
that, while providing several details regarding the LC meetings at the different 
levels, the existing regulation misses the opportunity to provide detailed 
mechanisms of communication between the LC members and the communities. 
While members are aware that LC meetings should take place periodically, their 
most important duty — the community interaction front — becomes a less rigid 
commitment more often than not based on irregular and informal means of 
interaction (Int. 38; FG 34; FG 44). There is, in fact, a predominant idea 
between LC members that “people know who the LC members are”, therefore, 
they understand that, when needed, people reach the members of the LCs in 
order to present their issues (FG 30, 34). 
Remarkably, none of the LC members questioned their ability to represent the 
community. Yet, the information gathered in the communities showed a much 
more problematic picture. First, most of the participants interviewed had a very 
mixed understanding of what the LCs were and their general functions. Most of 
them would say that they “heard about” the LCs, but when they were asked 
about details about their functions, answers varied sharply. Some respondents 
linked them exclusively with the ‘7 million’ (FG 27), others, especially women, 
were unsure about how they worked (FG 19, 23). Some mentioned not knowing 
anyone in the community who was part of an LC (FG 29). Interestingly, of the 
four focus groups where people expressed clear knowledge about these 
bodies, three of them had members of Local Development Commissions 
(LDCs) that had regular capacity building sessions with NGOs that included 
information about the LCs  (FG 64, 65, 66). 
Second, the general view of the LCs and their work was often critical. In one 
focus group, for instance, someone referred to the councils as a “montagem” 
(mise-en-scène) (FG 15). They explained that, even though there existed 
councils in the villages and localities, ultimately, what counted was what took 
place in the AP and district administration because it is not “just anyone” who 
reaches the LC at district level but only “the most influential people of the 
chiefs” (ibid.). This view of separation also came up in other groups. On one 
occasion, the participants explained that they simply did not speak to the LC 
because the LC members think of them (the community) as “people from a 
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lower level” (FG 22), so they felt they were not heard. Some communities 
reported interacting with the councils, but, even in these cases, they pointed to 
the lack of initiative of the LCs to promote interaction with the community (FG 
64) and the lack of any action/feedback regarding the concerns brought to them 
(ibid.; FG 66).  
Curiously, the views of the beneficiaries of the ‘7 million’ regarding the LCs were 
not necessarily more positive. While some reported attending some LC 
meetings, especially after obtaining the loan (Int. 42, 77, 78; FG 46), many 
admitted not having any regular interaction with them (FG 26, 31, 69; Int. 35), 
and some actually expressed a very critical view of these bodies and their 
effectiveness. First, there were beneficiaries who had been victims of 
irregularities where LC members played an active role (Int. 35, 78; FG 16). 
Second, some believed that the LC actually had no power to do much for the 
community or for local development (FG 67, 69; Int. 80). Mr Pedro, for instance, 
while expressing appreciation for the work of the LCs, also admitted that when 
the community brings some of the local problems and requests to them, the 
members themselves say that the solutions belong to the “maximum ones” — 
people who have real decision power (Int. 42). Similarly, Mr Armando noted that 
there is, indeed, a lot of discussion in the LCs, but no concrete results (Int. 77). 
According to Mr Luis, one of the problems is precisely the kind of people that 
belong to the LCs as well as the general environment that hinders critical 
discussion. He remarked, “They put there [in the LC] people who don’t know 
what development is. Yes, they put an old man there, who lives far away. . . 
What is he going to discuss? Even the chief of the AP will not discuss anything. 
Even though he sees things here are not well, he won’t be able to speak, he is 
afraid” (FG 69). 
Yet, there is one thing that the LCs have been doing fairly effectively, that is 
mobilising beneficiaries to repay their loans. That was in fact the main, 
sometimes only, interaction that most beneficiaries interviewed had with the 
LCs (FG 26; Int. 36, 76, 77, 78, 79), which shows that, different from the past, 
the repayment of the ‘7 million’ has become a number one topic in the local 
government agenda. At the same time, because of the LCs increasing 
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engagement in the reclaiming of the loans, in the eyes of the beneficiaries, 
these bodies are becoming predominantly associated with the government, and 
not with the community. Indeed, many beneficiaries interviewed admitted to 
never having been asked by the LC members about their difficulties or 
problems in project implementation (FG 31, Int. 35, 36). So, we see here the 
‘top-down’ dimension prevailing on the ‘bottom-up’ aspect of the LCs, and the 
latter being perceived mostly as a ‘debt collector’. 
A final important observation refers to the aspect of gender. The fieldwork 
revealed that the link between the LCs and the women in the communities was 
particularly weak. More generally, there was a huge asymmetry between men 
and women regarding their knowledge of the LCs as well as their interaction 
with LC members. Additionally, the focus groups showed a strong disconnect 
between the female members of the LCs and the women in the communities. 
Indeed, even when the women interviewed knew that there should be women in 
the LCs, many could not identify any women they knew that belonged there (FG 
18, 65, 66). In some cases, they knew a female member but this was not 
accompanied by any kind of interaction that could foster women’s interests in 
the district (FG 23, 27, 29, 64). 
More generally, as this fieldwork took place only about six months after the 
reconstitution of the LCs, it was too soon to analyse the changes that may have 
arisen from this process. At that time, there were different opinions about the 
effects and potential effects of the recent changes, but it was difficult to find 
evidence to support any of them. Regarding the communities, many participants 
expressed a sensation of ‘sameness’ (FG 15, 24, 65). Another aspect that was 
difficult to assess was the difference in terms of training and knowledge that the 
LC members had regarding their own functions. At the time of the fieldwork, 
many of the new members of the LCs had not received any formal training. Yet, 
as noted, they already had several meetings and had also selected the ‘7 
million’ project proposals (FG 19, 30; Int. 21, 43). One participant noted that he 
was expecting training to be given, but interestingly, he was not waiting for the 
government to do that, but for Akilizetho (see also FG 44). 
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To a large extent, all these aspects influence the implementation and 
effectiveness of the ‘7 million’, in particular, its local empowerment potential. In 
practical terms, the (lack of) communication between the LCs and the 
communities will furthermore influence the selection of for the ‘7 million’, which, 
in turn, will affect this initiative contribution for local development. The next 
section explains this procedural aspect in more detail. 
6.2 Empowerment as a Process II: Applying to and Obtaining 
the ‘7 million’ 
Before detailing the procedural aspects of the ‘7 million’ at the local level, it 
should be noted that even though the ‘7 million’ is one of the most popular 
national policies in Mozambique, the degree of information that people had 
about it in Angoche as well as their understanding of its mechanism varied 
sharply. One of the most common answers in the communities regarding their 
knowledge of the ‘7 million’ was that they had “heard about it” (FG 17, 23, 29, 
62, 64, 65), but whatever came after this quote was very heterogeneous. Some 
individuals, for instance, knew that it was a credit obtained from the government 
(FG 27, 62, 64, 65). Others, especially the women, did not know exactly what it 
was (FG 23, 29), and some simply knew nothing about it (FG 18).  
Among those who were familiar with the initiative, a common observation was 
that there was a mystery regarding the procedures in order to obtain the fund 
(FG 64, 65, 66). One participant explained, “It’s like going hunting. Each one 
goes, one gets a gazelle, another one a rabbit, but it’s difficult to get the secret . 
. . to get the gazelle”. It was also remarkable that, most of the time, people had 
heard of the ‘7 million’ not through the LCs, but by other means such as 
informal talks in the community (Int. 36, 42, 75, 79), local government channels 
(FG 17, 69; Int. 77), the radio, and even provincial visits (FG 23). 
This brief context shows that, even though the LC is central to the process that 
leads to the allocation of the ‘7 million’, there had been no coordinated efforts 
from these bodies to spread the information about the fund, at least according 
to the communities. This may explain some of the misconceptions about the 
process as well as the ambiguous way some individuals view ‘7 million’. 
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OVERVIEW OF THE SUBMISSION/APPROVAL PROCESS 
According to the ‘7 million’ regulation, the projects submitted should be 
approved at the level of the district consultative council (DCC). It is at this level 
that the TC has a central role in advising the LC members of the viability of the 
proposed projects before the final decision. This means that, in theory, any 
project could be rejected at the district level taking into account the basic 
evaluation criteria (viability, community impact, and risk). In practice, the 
interviews revealed that the main level where projects are selected is at the 
localities. According to the district administrator, the projects are collected in the 
villages, approved at the locality, confirmed in the AP and homologated/ratified 
in the district (Int. 54). He explained that these steps are based on the 
understanding that “local people know better what they need”, so it should not 
be up to the DCC to reject any proposal. The chiefs of the AP also repeated this 
discourse which fundamentally highlighted the bottom-up aspect of the ‘7 
million’ and the minimum interference of the upper levels in the decision-making 
process (Int. 13, 41). 
In practice, what takes place is less linear than the picture described. First, most 
of the beneficiaries interviewed did not deliver the proposals to the LCs but 
directly to the local government (locality, AP, or administration). This means 
that, in theory, several of these projects should go down to the locality level in 
order to be approved before going up again. According to one AP chief, the 
projects, in fact, go back to the village level, so they may be verified before the 
approval (Int. 13). In practice, it is extremely difficult to verify the dynamics 
between these levels not least of all because the documents’ transition from 
one place to the other is not clearly documented. As reported by the 
beneficiaries, once they delivered their project proposals, they were not given 
any receipt or even a copy of the project. This also makes it difficult to calculate 
the actual amount of projects submitted per village and compare them to the 
final numbers of approved projects. The data obtained in the district 
administration only shows the number of approved projects. Some interviewees 
gave a general idea of the number of projects submitted in 2011.  
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Table 6.1: Examples of Projects Submitted and Approved 
LC LEVEL SUBMITTED APPROVED 
Locality (FG 19) 25 8 
Locality (FG 46) 78 12 
Locality (Int. 28) 38 8 
Locality (FG 30) 20 8 
Village (FG 24) 4 1 
 
What follows the delivery of the proposals is also not a homogeneous process. 
In theory, inspection visits should take place before the approval of the 
proposals, so the LC members can verify the feasibility of the projects 
submitted. In practice, there seems to be confusion between the idea of 
confirming the aptitude of the applicant and the idea of inspection to assess the 
project’s potential. Indeed, only on two occasions did members of the LC 
describe having made an inspection visit before the project’s approval (FG 19, 
30). One of the reasons for this seems to be the understanding that, as long as 
the LC members know the applicants and their background, this somehow 
represents a certain assurance regarding the project’s viability (Int. 21, 38). 
Reports from the beneficiaries confirm that, as a general rule, visits only take 
place after approval when the implementation has already started (Int. 76, 77, 
78); the contrary is the exception (FG 16).  
Internally, as described by LC members, the selection process starts with all 
members reading the proposals after which they take into account the types of 
projects (e.g., trade, food production), the applicant’s capacity to implement the 
project (e.g., if s/he already has the business in question, and the 
resources/capacity to make the business viable), the expected impact, and the 
geographical distribution of the projects (e.g., which villages do not have 
projects yet) (FG 30, 34, 46; Int. 21, 28). The general concern with “growth”, 
“jobs creation”, and “eradicating absolute poverty” was also mentioned (Int. 21, 
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FG 34). Notwithstanding these objective criteria, LC members admitted facing a 
major dilemma. On the one hand, they expressed the need to make the money 
available to as many people as possible; on the other hand, they were 
concerned about the sustainability of projects, which required more money to 
be allocated to each project.  
Each year, as soon as the district administration knows how much money they 
will have available for the ‘7 million’, they make a division per AP and per 
locality based on the population number in each subdivision (Int. 54). 
Consequently, before the LCs discuss the projects, they already know the total 
they have to take into account for the fund’s distribution. In 2012, the average 
budget available for each locality was MTZ600,000 with the exceptions of the 
most densely populated areas of Angoche Sede and Nametoria Sede which got 
more than double this amount (Int. 39). If we consider this amount 
(approximately £11,300), and further consider that this money will be split 
among an average of six to eight projects, it becomes clear that it is not much, 
especially if the purpose is to create jobs. 
Speaking about the selection of projects for 2012, Ms Ana explained: 
We discussed this. Each person that asks the money, they know that if 
they ask this specific amount they will be able to do one thing. But we 
agreed that the fund is too small and the projects too many, that’s why 
we discussed and reduced. If the person asked 300,000 we gave them 
150,000. It is not convenient to give 600,000 to one person only . . . We 
need to be inclusive (FG 34). 
As shown in graph 6.1, there has been indeed a tendency to approve many 
projects of very small value across the years. And even though the total amount 
available for the fund in the district has increased since 2007, there has been a 
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Graph 6.1: Number of Projects per Value Disbursed  
(Thousands of Meticais) 
 
Source: Excel sheets obtained in the Division of Local Development and Planning, 
Angoche District Government. 
 
In this regard, the fieldwork revealed a contradiction between the data obtained 
and the general ‘orientation’ identified in the discourse. According to several 
interviewees, in 2012, there had been an instruction in the administration to 
finance projects with a minimum of MTZ100,000. This instruction, however, 
came half way through the process and as many projects worth less than that 
had already been approved they had to move back to the AP and locality levels 
in order to be re-approved with a higher value. As these adjustments clashed 
with the total budget available per locality, several projects had to be postponed 
until the following year (Int. 21, 41, 43; FG 19, 46). In spite of this, according to 
a list obtained in the district administration, there were still 49 projects worth 
less than MTZ100,000 (approximately £1,880) approved in 2012, and of those, 
29 were worth MTZ50,000 (approximately £940) or less. Moreover, the 
following year, the number of small projects increased significantly, 60 of them 
(over 40% of the total) worth MTZ50,000. As shown in the graph, most projects 
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stand within the threshold between MTZ50,000 and MTZ100,000. The only 
occasions where projects were paid over a million meticais was in the case of 
the three tractors acquired in each AP and in the case of a project of 
mechanization in 2009 and 2011.  
 
Table 6.2: ‘7 Million’ Total Disbursement and Number of Projects per Year, 
Angoche District 
(Thousands of Meticais) 
 
























* Value approved by the LC, of which MTZ11,879,000 were formally sent to the district, 
and MTZ388,900 were going to be taken from the repayment account. 
Source: Excel sheets obtained in the Division of Local Development and Planning, 
Angoche District Government. 
 
According to one member of one LC, the tendency to avoid financing proposals 
with high values is partly related to the risk factor and the fear of disbursing a 
high amount of money for a project that may not work (Int. 75). The problem, 
nevertheless, seems to be precisely the contrary, that is, the lower the value 
disbursed, the higher the chances of no completion of the project. In fact, 
another central issue in the selection process was precisely the gap between 
the values requested in the proposals and the values obtained for the projects’ 
completion. As noted in graph 6.2, many of the beneficiaries interviewed 
received substantially less than what they had asked for.57 
 
                                            
57 Reports from CEDE regarding their monitoring of the ‘7 million’ Angoche confirm 
similar findings, that is, a huge gap between values requested and disbursed in several 
projects (CEDE, 2010c and 2011a). 
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Graph 6.2: Values Requested and Obtained 
Examples from 2010-2011 
 
The decision regarding the values approved poses a central problem that 
touches the bottom-up/top-down dynamics of the scheme. On the one hand, 
there is a deliberate policy of the local authorities not to interfere in the 
decisions taken by the LC members. Similarly, the members of the TC do not 
interfere in the LC’s decisions. As explained by one of the TC members, their 
main task in the project’s approval process comes in the final stage before the 
final decision of the DCC. At this stage, very often they detect limitations in the 
projects and suggest corrections most of which point towards the need to 
increase the project’s costs. When this happens, the project goes back to the 
lower levels in order to be approved again, now with a different value. As this 
process ultimately affects the total budget available, often these corrected 
projects are postponed until the following year (Int. 53). On the other hand, and 
in spite of this advice and the internal discussions, the LCs tend to prioritise 
aspects of distribution instead of sustainability of the projects. Part of the reason 
for this seems to be the social pressure derived from the many people who 
send projects. Besides this, however, the power dynamics during this process 
suggests that there are other issues at stake that ultimately influence the final 
outcome. 
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POWER DYNAMICS DURING THE PROCESS 
The first observation when it comes to power in the allocation of the ‘7 million’ is 
about the control of the process. In theory, it is the collective body of the LC that 
decides which projects will be approved, each member having an equal say. In 
practice, however, there are many subtle aspects that influence the final 
outcome and that are transversal to the LC discussions. One main aspect is the 
relationship between applicants and members of the LCs and/or local 
authorities, which include bribes, gifts, and promises of a certain percentage of 
the value to be obtained. The interviews revealed that these practices were 
extremely common, regardless of time and space, 14 of the 23 beneficiaries 
interviewed reporting such problems. More generally, the format of the 
irregularity changed after 2009 with the removal of then administrator José 
Carlos Amade from office as well as the transformation of the OIIL into the FDD. 
In fact, during the first years of the ‘7 million’, most irregularities were directly 
linked with the figure of the administrator — first, Arthur Barraca, then, Carlos 
Amade.  
Mr Barraca’s name was one of the most quoted in the interviews, linked with 
several irregularities. Under his administration, as the ‘7 million’ was still 
disbursed in goods and not money, the predominant scheme was to force 
beneficiaries to buy overpriced products in a specific store that had a previous 
agreement with Mr Barraca. As the beneficiaries were not given any receipt, 
they could not even verify the products’ value. This happened, for instance, with 
Mr Asim, a tradesman who was forced to buy overpriced products that were not 
even requested in his business plan at a local Indian store (Int. 36).  
Other beneficiaries shared similar stories. In 2006, for instance, members of a 
fishing association made a request of MTZ300,000 in order to buy fishing 
material and conservation equipment. Instead, they received only nets and 
other incomplete fishing material, valued at MTZ160,000 but without any receipt 
(FG 31). In 2008, a farmers’ association applied for a loan of MTZ215,000 in 
order to buy a mill and construction material. They were surprised when the mill 
was delivered (without receipt) as they never had the chance to present an 
invoice for the products required. They were also given only part of the material 
requested and were asked to go to the same Indian store (Int. 79). 
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In an extreme case, a farmers’ association became indebted even though it had 
never requested a loan (FG 29). They explained that, in 2007, their village 
received a visit from the First Lady. Impressed by their association and the 
community’s organisation, she decided to make a series of donations, 
specifically a mill to the association, and a school and a health centre to their 
village. The school and the health centre were never built, but the mill arrived a 
few months later. A few months after that, the farmers received a visit from Mr 
Barraca who ‘explained’ to them that the mill was not a donation but part of the 
‘7 million’. He brought the documents for them to sign and they felt unable to 
contest the situation assuming, therefore, a debt of MTZ205,000. 
Mr Barraca left office in 2008, but his replacement, José Carlos Amade, 
continued his legacy. In fact, Mr Amade became famous in the press because 
within a year of his mandate, during the open presidency in Angoche, several 
people openly complained about his abuses and the disrespect of the law 
including the undue charge of fines and commissions regarding the ‘7 million’ 
(O País, 05 May 2009). In May 2009, he was dismissed from his post, and in 
2012, after an investigation, he was finally jailed in Nampula (AIM, 27 May 
2009). 
Since his removal from office, there have been fewer complaints regarding the 
role of the district administration in the case of the ‘7 million’. Nevertheless, this 
has not diminished the occurrence of irregularities. Instead, the interviews 
suggest that this has simply led to the concentration of irregularities at the lower 
echelons of the local government as well as in the LCs. Indeed, several 
beneficiaries admitted having disbursed different amounts of money in advance 
both to LC members as well as to “people in the AP” or chiefs of the localities in 
order to have their proposals approved for the loan (FG 16, 69; Int. 78). The 
amounts mentioned ranged from MTZ600 (approximately £11) to larger sums 
such as MTZ6,000 (approximately £113) but some preferred not mentioning 
values. At times the ‘gift’ was not money but goats or chickens or a mix of both. 
In other cases, there were requests for a “promise”, so the beneficiary did not 
pay in advance but was requested to pay later a percentage of the amount 
requested once s/he obtained it (Int. 81). 
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As explained in a focus group with beneficiaries, there are different stages 
when one needs to negotiate the loan. First, there is the incentive given when 
the documents are being prepared. At this stage, the request is not openly 
declared. Instead, local authorities would insist that the documents presented 
are “not correct” until the applicant offers them something. After that stage, 
however, “you have to confirm”, that is the applicant has to promise to give 
something back when s/he finally obtains the fund. According to them, this 
usually happens in the AP and locality levels but never in the district 
administration (FG 69). Other participants confirmed similar procedures (FG 16, 
Int. 78, 81). 
Another common story was the exchange of names and projects in order to 
change the values allocated to specific beneficiaries. Ms Sofia (Int. 35), for 
instance, applied to the ‘7 million’ just before administrator Barraca left office. 
She submitted a proposal asking for MTZ300,000, and the project was 
approved for MTZ140,000. After a few months, seeing no signs of the money, 
she discovered that her project had been exchanged with another individual’s 
who had originally asked for MTZ55,000 but who promised to pay to the LC 
MTZ20,000 so the projects could be exchanged. How she came to know about 
these details reveals an interesting aspect of the internal dynamics of the LC. In 
fact, the MTZ20,000 paid to the LC was supposed to be split between the 
members. As one of them was left out, he decided to tell Ms Sofia what had 
happened. 
A similar story happened to Mr Latifo (Int. 32), who applied for the ‘7 million’ in 
2007. Unlike Ms Sofia, his project was not approved. Yet, in 2010, he came to 
know that his name was in the list of the AP along many beneficiaries who had 
not repaid their loans. Puzzled, Mr Latifo started to investigate the story and 
discovered that his name and project had been used back then to give money 
to another person who died one year later. 
An important aspect to highlight in the accounts of Ms Sofia and Mr Latifo is the 
political dimension that shaped their stories. Mr Latifo had his project rejected in 
2007 because he “was accused” by the chief of the AP of “being Renamo”, 
which he denied. Ms Sofia, despite being a member of Frelimo, was 
reprehended by LC members for not going to the party meetings as frequently 
	   227	  
as she should. The political (party) dimension of the LCs and the ‘7 million’ is a 
very delicate topic, and yet, very difficult to assess. Evidence about this link was 
presented in a study by Forquilha (2010). His evidence was based on an in-
depth qualitative study in the district of Gorongosa where he used local 
informants in order to identify the parties of the LC members and of the 
beneficiaries. Due to the different circumstances of my fieldwork, I was not able 
to trace the party of each LC member. In fact, the party issue did not come 
naturally as a topic in the interviews with the exception of those cases where 
the projects had been refused and interviewees justified the matter by focusing 
on party discrimination. But in these cases, it was difficult to get concrete 
evidence to support the claim of political bias. 
Two examples were illustrative in this regard. Mr Ricardo, a member of 
Renamo, told me that he submitted a project in 2011 but that he was not 
allowed to receive the money because he was a “non-moderate Renamist” (Int. 
37). He came to know through some members of the LC that one of the 
secretaries had opposed his project on a party basis. However, after further 
questioning, it became clear that other factors had influenced his case. Indeed, 
aware of the political sensitivities in Angoche, Mr Ricardo decided to propose a 
project together with a colleague who is a Frelimo member. They asked for 
MTZ600,000 but got a response that they could only receive MTZ250,000. He 
replied that this amount was far below what he needed to implement the 
project, so he refused it. His colleague then decided to try alone and was later 
granted MTZ100,000. Mr Ricardo stressed the political dimension of the 
episode, nevertheless, from his own report it becomes evident that other 
factors, in particular the large amount of money requested, also influenced the 
outcome. 
Mr Osias, a well-educated member of Renamo with a graduate certificate and a 
successful businessman, told me that in 2011 the administrator invited him to 
submit a project proposal aiming at job creation. He did so and initially made a 
proposal asking for MTZ600,000 which was later amended to MTZ300,000. He 
explained that he followed all the stages of the process and that the project had 
been approved at all levels of the LCs. Nevertheless, when the time came to 
receive the money, he was informed that, “unfortunately, at the last minute, it 
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wasn’t possible anymore” (Int. 33). He was not given any explanation even 
though, until that time, he was in constant contact with the chief of the locality 
who had ensured him that his project had been approved. Mr Osias explained 
that the project had been approved regarding its viability. He was there when 
the document was signed in the economic sector before going back to the DCC 
for final approval. In his view, the reason for the last minute change was some 
opposition possibly from some ‘guest of honour’ usually invited to the LC 
meetings. He explained it as a ‘party’ issue. 
A few days after this interview, I had the chance to hear from some LC 
members about Mr Osias’ case. They explained that in their meeting, the 
project was actually rejected based on the fact that Mr Osias was already a 
successful businessman, so they agreed that the money should go to “those 
who do not have it” (FG 34). But they also mentioned that he “had been 
promised” because there was a lady in the LC that was pressing for his project 
to be approved. This comment was followed by several complaints by the 
participants regarding the dynamics of the LC meetings and the projects’ 
approval. Mr Victor, for instance, said that ultimately, they (the members of the 
LC) do not have much power to decide anything, “it’s them who decide” (Ibid.). 
He and his colleagues noticed that there are many important people who want 
to have their friends’ projects approved, and this puts the members in a difficult 
position. Besides, they also feel pressure outside the LC as people who do not 
have their projects approved often find someone to blame (ibid.). 
So, whereas the party issue may be an element at stake in these dynamics, it 
seems difficult to capture the extent to which it is so as it is methodologically 
difficult to isolate the ‘party’ variable. In fact, several of the problematic/irregular 
cases observed involved beneficiaries who were members of Frelimo. 
Therefore, what seems to matter is not only the party element, but also the 
personal networks of relationships that each one has and how this can be used 
to maximise benefit at the individual level as well as each actor’s position in the 
field at stake. 
In this regard, one important observation made by some members of the DCC 
was precisely their lack of control over whatever follows the discussion of the 
projects, including the elaboration of the final list of projects approved, which 
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stays in the hands of the TC. As noted, the DCC members make a list of the 
projects approved in the meeting but that is not the one that is later attached to 
the public administration wall. Some DCC members recalled having asked the 
TC to make a copy of the list they compile in the meeting, “but they don’t do it”, 
and the LC has no means to enforce anything because “the technical team has 
more power than us” (FG 34). And part of this power is exercised through the 
writing up of the final list before making it public (Ibid.; Int. 38).58 
The stories told by some LC members show that power often manifests 
precisely in these spaces between the different stages of the process of the ‘7 
million’ projects’ approval. Indeed, in the final stage before the list becomes 
public, many things happen that escape their control and knowledge. Ms Joana, 
for instance, a member of the DCC since its first constitution, admits that many 
times, new names appeared on the final list that were not previously there, and 
vice-versa, in many cases, names that were approved in the meeting 
disappeared (Int. 38). Mr Victor, a new member, gave the example of a 
beneficiary in the village that had just received the money from the fund, but his 
name was not on the original list approved by the DCC (FG 34). After double-
checking the list, Mr Victor asked the beneficiary about it, but the latter replied 
with a threatening “Eh pah, you don’t try to find it out!” Another example of 
irregularities highlighted by DCC members was the use of fake names by 
people in the local government in order to obtain the fund. They said they 
eventually know about this because sometimes the person whose name was 
used does not get anything in return, and then, they tell the truth to the LC 
members (FG 34). 
As the LC members see these problems taking place, some of them feel that 
they should do something, yet taking action is not an easy option. On the one 
hand, LC members reported looking bad in the eyes of the community — e.g., 
when they say a project was approved and the name disappears from the list 
they look like liars — so this creates an incentive to take action. On the other 
                                            
58 The view that the TC has more power than the LC also came up in a focus group 
(FG 67). In fact, some in the group could not make a clear distinction between the LC 
and the TC as they saw both as practically mingled. 
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hand, many feel that there is no space where they can take concrete action 
precisely because they have no control over the process (FG 34; Int. 38). Some 
pointed out, for instance, that at that stage (May 2012), many people had not 
received the money yet, even though their projects had been approved a long 
time before. However, they, as members of the LC, had no way to verify what 
was going on. They were concerned as only 15 people had received the 
money, and this delay could seriously damage the projects especially those 
focused on agriculture because of the seasons. They further showed suspicion, 
as these 15 were “people from the chiefs”, so they felt that their only option was 
to speak to the higher authorities, e.g., people from the provincial government 
or during the open presidencies. But then, as they also admitted, it is very late 
to make any difference to those affected by these problems (FG. 34). 
Angoche’s history, nevertheless, shows that speaking out may make a 
difference as the removal of administrator Amade illustrates. Mr Hassan was 
one of those who had the privilege to speak in one of the open presidencies. He 
reported different problems at the time, such as the generalised non-repayment 
of the loans, the problem of overpriced material, or of the mills with missing 
pieces that were bought directly by the director of economic activities (Int. 39). 
According to him, problems still happen, and he gave a recent example of a 
situation where he directly interfered, which involved the use of the name of an 
applicant by a local employee in the district accounting department (ibid.). The 
applicant submitted a project for the ‘7 million’ but never got a reply regarding 
its approval. Yet, one day he received a call from the chief of accounting in the 
district administration who asked for his bank account number. He though it was 
because he got the credit. Instead, the chief later asked him to transfer the 
money to his own account and did this repeatedly. The applicant then consulted 
the LC members and realised his projects had not been approved which meant 
the chief was using his account to receive money for his own personal 
business. More money entered the account, but then, Mr Hassan advised him 
to hold the money and go to the police, which he did. The case was still being 
resolved at the time of the interview. 
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WHOSE RESPONSIBILITY? 
One of the reasons why it is difficult to clearly assess the power dynamics 
behind the allocation process of the ‘7 million’ is the unclear chain of 
responsibility that exists behind it. As noted above, several LC members 
recognised the existence of irregular activities in the process, yet, they often felt 
unable to take action in order to change things because they did not know 
where to go if not to the higher scale of government authorities. At the same 
time, many beneficiaries or individuals who have attempted to obtain the fund 
and had to deal with LC members’ requests also did not know where to 
complain or feared to do so because of the possibility of retaliation in the future. 
Their reports, therefore, point towards the lack of a mechanism for complaint, 
redress, and accountability. 
The interviews with the members of the TC and the administrator were 
enlightening in this regard. First, when asked about eventual irregularities in the 
case of the ‘7 million’, there was a tendency to deny such cases existed (Int. 12, 
53). As one TC member explained, this may be because people complain 
directly in the administration as the TC has no formal capacity to do anything 
about it (Int. 53). According to the administrator, nevertheless, while complaints 
were common, that was not the case for irregularities. But then he added, 
“There may be irregularities in the base. Here we only homologate the projects, 
they are approved in the base” (Int. 54). 
The chief of the TC noted that they had received complaints about illicit charges 
for the projects or political favouritism in the past, but stressed that situations 
like these had become less common in recent years (Int. 25). Other members 
noted that the problems were usually linked with the associations and the 
misuse of the money received (Int. 12). The administrator further denied any 
existence of political favouritism, highlighting that they had three projects 
approved recently from members of the opposition and adding that there was a 
misperception among member of the opposition regarding the ‘7 million’ which 
led many of them to refrain from submitting proposals (Int. 54). 
A central problem in these accounts is that there seems to be no space where 
people can actually go and safely denounce illicit actions regarding the ‘7 
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million’. First, even though the TC is the body responsible for monitoring and 
evaluation, it is not in charge of imposing corrective or punitive measures. One 
member, for instance, recalled two episodes where he was approached for 
advice regarding irregular actions (Int. 63). One case referred to a mismatch 
between the value obtained by an association and the value that appeared in 
the invoice it received. The other was a complaint about a régulo who denied a 
project to someone because the person did not agree to pay him part of any 
fund awarded. In both cases, the TC member gave general advice.  
Respectively, for the association to pay only what they actually received and 
find out who received the rest of the money; for the second person, he was 
advised to go and speak to the régulo (the same one who asked for the 
payment) and try again the following year. The problem, according to the 
interviewee, is that the TC is not there to solve problems. Their competency is 
limited to an advisory role to the LCs, so in cases like these, only the ‘big chiefs’ 
(i.e., the administrator) can do something about it. 
In practice, as discussed in the next section, this type of procedure limits the 
access that people have to justice and allows irregularities to continue reducing 
the potential positive effects of the ‘7 million’. Furthermore, it reinforces the 
primacy of authority at the expense of accountability as a principle of 
governance at the local level. On example was the story of Mr Paulino, an 
elderly farmer who applied for the fund in 2010 (Int. 80). After requesting 
MTZ500,000 for an agriculture project, he got his project approved for 
MTZ150,000, just enough for him to buy a mill. Aware of his plans, the 
administrator told him he had a friend in Nampula who was selling a mill for 
MTZ140,000. Finding himself in a delicate position, Mr Paulino accepted the 
deal. A few days later, he received the mill, which, nevertheless, came with 
several pieces missing including the engine. In order to make the mill operate, 
Mr Paulino had to sell four head of cattle and borrow additional money spending 
an extra MTZ40,000 not covered by the fund. Meanwhile, Mr Paulino went to 
the administration to explain the situation. He spoke to the chief of the TC and 
the administrator himself who told him to go to Nampula and complain to the 
person who sold him the mill. After a while, Mr Paulino gave up trying to fix the 
situation. As his case involved a friend of the administrator, no one would do 
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anything that might somehow implicate his involvement in the projects’ 
outcome. “Here is different from there, in your land. Here you are threatened, 
that’s it, there’s no way. A ruler (dirigente) is a ruler. No one can be above him”, 
Mr Paulino said, laughing. 
At the lower echelons, participants reported similar episodes. One of the few 
projects worth over a million meticais was the case of a tractor bought in one of 
the APs. Mr Ronaldo, one of the members of a farmers’ association, explained 
that they had submitted a project proposal asking for MTZ280,000 in order to 
buy animals and other farming material. Instead, they “were given” a tractor 
worth over one million (FG 46). According to the LC members who ‘approved 
the project’, this happened because the AP needed a tractor, so they thought 
that Mr Ronaldo’s association was the more trustful and efficient recipient. The 
problem was that Mr Ronaldo himself did not want the tractor, nevertheless, he 
felt obliged to accept the deal and a much bigger debt. 
These two cases point towards the grey zone into which many ‘7 million’ 
projects fall. In both cases the beneficiary accepted a proposal because it was 
posed by people who were in a different position of authority, and they felt they 
had to say yes. In itself, this does not constitute an irregularity, but it does 
reflect a perverse expression of power over that is extremely difficult to resist or 
contest. Also, because of that, it is a situation that will not be questioned once it 
is done. 
In summary, by looking at these procedural aspects, we may start to 
understand some of the issues that directly affect the empowering results of the 
‘7 million’. Indeed, if we think in terms of empowerment as a process, we find 
that the linear idea that promoting participation will result in the participant’s 
empowerment (or the empowerment of those who they represent) does not 
necessarily apply here. On the contrary, there are several formal and informal 
networks of power that fundamentally affect the functioning of the local councils 
and how members relate to each other as well as how they relate to external 
actors. This, in turn, directly affects the project’s approval. The spaces between 
each phase of the process and the lack of a clear chain of accountability, 
furthermore, provide opportunities for these informal expressions of power to 
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operate, sometimes enhancing power asymmetries instead of contributing to 
local empowerment. 
6.3 Empowerment as an Outcome 
This section discusses the empowering effects of the ‘7 million’ taking into 
account both its material and non-material dimensions. The section also 
addresses some of the contextual issues that have influenced these results and 
the problems related to the monitoring and evaluation of the initiative. 
INCREASE OF SOCIAL WELFARE? 
According to the Angoche district’s administrator, the ‘7 million’ had several 
positive and empowering results related, in particular, to its effects in promoting 
economic growth and an increased circulation of currency at the local level (Int. 
54). Within the administration, the ‘7 million’ was even referred to as a “part of 
the peace that people now have” (Int. 25), an instrument that allows them to 
change their own situation as they feel supported by the government. The initial 
data obtained in the district government’s administration was particularly 
positive regarding the results in terms of job creation as shown in graph 6.3. 
The numbers also referred to a significant amount of food production between 
2006 and 2012 including 450.2 tons of “different products”, 56 heads of cows, 
and 436 heads of goats (District Gov. of Angoche, Excel sheets). 
Notwithstanding this initial positive assessment of the initiative, further data 
gathered in the administration revealed a much more critical scenario regarding 
the effects of the ‘7 million’. First, some members of the TC believed that the ‘7 
million’ had contributed to “something” but mostly small changes (e.g., the 
shortening of the distances to buy basic products, an increase in trade 
especially informal trade) that did not fundamentally have any impact on the 
district’s development, not even on the number of jobs (Int. 12, 53, 63). Second, 
a monitoring report obtained a while later, dated from March 2010 and covering 
visits to 17 projects financed by the ‘7 million’ (approved between 2007 and 
2009), showed that 11 of the projects had not produced anything sustainable 
(District Gov. of Angoche, 2010b). In fact, many projects did not exist anymore, 
and some beneficiaries had moved to other districts not leaving any information 
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about their whereabouts. In many cases of associations, members had simply 
split the money obtained and nothing had been built. Ironically, two of the five 
cases where some success was reported referred to beneficiaries who I 
interviewed in 2012 and that painted a very different picture from the notes in 
the report. In another short report (District Gov. of Angoche, 2012), written a few 
days before my arrival in the district in 2012, it was noted that the tractor of the 
AP of Namaponda, worth two million meticais as approved in 2011, was never 
used and was, therefore, not providing any benefit to the community not even to 
the association that obtained it. 
 
Graph 6.3: '7 Million': Jobs Created per Year, Angoche District 
 
Source: Excel sheets obtained in the Division of Local Development and Planning, 
Angoche District Government. 
 
There are many reasons that explain such outcomes, and the main ones will be 
discussed below. Yet, it is worth noting that in the view of the TC members and 
most local authorities, the key problem of the initiative was related to the 
“behaviour of the beneficiaries”, and to the low rate of repayment (Int. 12, 13, 
25, 41, 54). Indeed, sometimes the beneficiaries were portrayed as 
misinterpreting the ‘7 million’ and taking it as a grant that did not need to be 
repaid (Int. 25, 55). Other times, they were accused of acting in “bad faith” (Int. 
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12). At times, other factors were pointed out such as the gap between the value 
requested and the value disbursed per project (Int. 12, 63) and changes of the 
original projects without asking for advice (Int. 55). Contextual factors, such as 
the weather in the case of agriculture and the lack of preparation to run a 
business were also mentioned (Int. 28, 54), but these factors were, however, 
given less significance than the idea of the ‘spirit of non-repayment’, which 
seemed to be the predominant explanatory framework. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the low repayment rate is, indeed, a big 
issue that affects the sustainability of the ‘7 million’. In Angoche, if we take into 
account the period 2006-2011, only 3.85% of the total amount invested was 
repaid. If we ignore 2006 (as the government does), even so, there is only a 
return rate of 4.5% in five years. Even if we consider that some projects, such 
as cattle raising, take a long time to generate profit, the percentage is still 
extremely low. 
Graph 6.4: '7 million' in Angoche: Total Disbursed and Repayment per Year* 
 
* Note that the value for 2012 only refers to the first trimester. I did not have access to 
the full amount for 2012 and 2013. 
Source: Excel sheets obtained in the Division of Local Development and Planning, 
Angoche District Government. 
 
The interviews revealed that a fundamental problem regarding the ‘7 million’ is 
actually the low success rate of the projects which may be explained by several 
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factors. First, the vast majority of applicants develop the projects by themselves 
with no help and with no previous experience of how to make a business plan. 
Of those interviewed, only two reported having had previous training and/or 
help from one or more NGOs (FG 16; Int. 75). Notably, they were also the ones 
who reported the highest level of satisfaction with their projects noting 
improvements in the level of production, optimization of the soil, and describing 
plans for future investment. They also had solid associations, which kept the 
same membership over time. 
The general rule, however, was very different. For one, most of the applicants 
were not used to long-term planning and many never had much money in their 
hands at once. Despite this, the only ‘help’ many of them got was the 
suggestions of corrections from the TC during the approval process. But then, 
the other problem was that often the corrections pointed towards the need to 
increase the project value, which, in turn, clashed with the LCs tendency to 
approve projects with a far lower budget than originally requested. And here lies 
the second reason for the lack of success of many projects. 
Because the values obtained were reduced, it was very common to find 
beneficiaries that had slightly, or fundamentally, changed their initial plan. 
Some, for instance, were able to follow only part of the plan, e.g. only buying 
seeds and giving up buying animals (FG 16), investing in retail instead of 
wholesale (Int. 76), or buying four head of cattle instead of 10-15 (Int. 77). 
Others completely changed plan (Int. 81). Mr Salimo, a tradesman who 
received a third of what he asked for in his plan (Int. 78), noted that the problem 
was that when they reduced the budget requested they cut the window that 
allows recipients to make a profit, “But since it is something ‘given’, it is not an 
obligation, I thanked those [MTZ]100,000, but that was not my will”. Ms Ana 
made a similar point (Int. 81). Having changed her plan due to the reduced 
value obtained, she, nevertheless, was able to produce 35 sacks of rice as well 
as peanuts, which she sold in order to be able to start the repayment. The 
problem was that she did not make enough profit to reinvest, so all she got went 
back to the fund, as repayment. 
Besides the reduced values obtained, some beneficiaries also reported 
contextual problems that negatively affected their business. Mr Adelino was one 
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of the few beneficiaries interviewed who obtained the full amount requested 
(MTZ400,000), which he used to buy fifty 250L containers in order to transport 
fuel and become a fuel supplier (FG 69). Unfortunately, he was able to do this 
only twice, as just a few months after he obtained the loan, Petromoc (the 
Mozambican petroleum agency) changed the rule regarding the transport of 
fuel, and he could no longer use those containers. In the case of agriculture, 
there were reports of how the bad weather and/or plagues had affected 
production seriously damaging the beneficiaries’ prospects of profit (FG 46). 
Unsurprisingly, the most problematic cases were those from the first years 
where the beneficiaries received the overpriced or unsolicited material. Many 
reported being worse off and wished they had not received the ‘7 million’ 
because they got stuck with a debt without having any benefit (FG 26, 31; Int. 
35). The mill ‘donated by the First Lady’, for instance, was broken at the time of 
the interview, and it was not the first time (FG 26). They explained that they did 
not have any money to pay for its fixing and that, even when it worked, the mill 
did not pay enough in order for them to make a profit. Furthermore, whatever 
they obtained was being used for repayment of the loan. Ms Sofia, a 
tradeswoman, and the members of a fishing association, victims of similar 
problems, shared the same feeling of being stuck/paralysed (Int. 35; FG 31). 
As for the tractor allocated to Mr Ronaldo’s association (FG 46), it also became 
a source of dissatisfaction. The tractor was of bad quality and needed new (and 
expensive) pieces in order to function properly. The association could not afford 
to buy these pieces, and besides, as they had to repay the loan, they barely 
used the tractor for themselves. Instead, they rented it out to the community. 
Considering the stories above and going back to the estimates of jobs created, 
there seems to be a contradiction between the numbers and the accounts given 
in interviews. In fact, of the beneficiaries interviewed, only a minority reported 
having created new jobs with their projects (Int. 75, 77). The vast majority tried 
to maximize the use the resources by working on their own. One member of the 
TC later clarified this contradiction, ”We are being a little optimistic. If the project 
says it will employ ‘x’ number of people, then when we go into the field and see 
that the project is taking place; it is presumed that it works”, and so they take 
into account the number of jobs stated in the original project (Int. 53). More 
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critically, another member expressed the disagreements inside the team 
regarding ‘what is a job’ and a ‘job created’. In his view, there was a difference 
between ‘being a beneficiary’ — which presumes that the job already exists and 
the loan will be an investment in this job — and ‘creating a new job’. However, 
some of his colleagues considered the beneficiaries as ‘new jobs’, that is, if an 
association of ten people obtained the loan, they would be counted as ten new 
jobs. In spite of the internal discussion, he admitted, “the last word is from the 
chief”. 
The accounts above suggest that the materially empowering results of the ‘7 
million’ are therefore very limited. First, not all the beneficiaries have improved 
their financial situation or the sustainability of their business — many feeling 
worse off because of the debt. Second, the community dimension of its 
empowering potential is reduced when it comes to the projects’ capacity to 
generate jobs. 
From the communities’ standpoint, the benefits of the ‘7 million’ had been 
mixed. Some communities highlighted the increase in trade and the reduction of 
the distance to buy basic products (FG 65). Some people also referred to mills 
and tractors (FG 15, 24), but the actual benefit from these projects depended 
on the quality of the equipment and, as noted, there were cases where these 
were broken with no prospect of them being fixed. Other participants expressed 
critical views of the projects and the beneficiaries stating that many just made 
the money disappear and increased their number of wives not employing 
anyone in the community or even that the money had been split among the LC 
members (FG 15, 17, 22). More generally, there was a widespread complaint 
that there were few projects approved in each village, so the benefits were 
naturally asymmetrical (FG 24, 65). In fact, I also visited communities that did 
not feel any effect of the ‘7 million’ as there were no projects near their villages 
(FG 64). 
CHANGING LOCAL SUBJECTIVITIES AND PROMOTING AGENCY? 
Crucial to the subjective dimension of empowerment is the actors’ increased 
feeling of power-to. In the analysis of the ‘7 million’ we may look at this taking 
into account the different groups of actors involved in the initiative. The LC 
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members, for example, by being directly engaged in the projects’ approval 
might be expected to feel more empowered. Their views regarding their own 
power, however, varied significantly not least because of their own 
understanding of what ‘power’ entails. Mr José, for example, noted that, as 
members of the LC do not have any wage, there is no difference in power 
between them and any member of the community in this regard (Int. 21). 
Despite this, he acknowledged that as an LC member, he had more space to 
influence certain topics that affected the community. 
Other members also felt that they could somehow “help the community” by 
being in the LC and “make a difference” (Int. 43, 75, FG 44). There were 
different opinions, however, regarding what kind of difference. Mr Artur, for 
example, felt that the LCs had very limited capacity to bring about significant 
changes in the communities, especially, in terms of development and local 
welfare. He attested, “We need enterprises here, in order for things to change, 
investment, to make a difference!” (FG 30). As a member of the LC, he thought 
there was very little he could do on that front. As for community work, he 
explained that these are tiny things that do not bring actual change, the change 
they need. “We don’t have here an enterprise employing 500, 1000 people. 
Without this, poverty will not diminish. We need things from outside, the 
enterprises!” 
In another village Ms Alice and Mr Ali expressed a similar view. They felt that 
they made a difference by taking the lead on mobilisation tasks, such as 
cleaning the main roads or promoting hygiene in the village. But besides this, 
they felt it was difficult to contest and change things that are more political in 
nature (FG 44). For instance, I asked them if they would feel comfortable to 
complain if a local government official was not performing his job well, so he 
could, perhaps, be removed; they said that was impossible as “they are really 
authorities”. Ms Alice, in particular, felt disheartened as her village never 
obtained a project from the ‘7 million’ no matter how much she pleaded for it in 
the LC meetings. She expressed feeling “condemned” by her community 
because of that and that her village felt discriminated by the AP. As a member, 
she felt there was nothing she could do, perhaps because she was a woman, 
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she reasoned. But even Mr Ali, a man, agreed. When I asked whether there 
was anything they felt they could do in order to change the situation he replied: 
Mamá, impossible, ‘cause things get stuck in the authorities, and even 
though we’re members, epah…, no, we don’t have [the power]. Maybe 
by lying they can say that these people have power, but at the end of the 
day we, as members of the LC we don’t have power in its totality. 
Sometimes when we speak, the chiefs, yeah, they may agree, but when 
they get out of there, they invalidate that (FG 44). 
Regarding the beneficiaries, an initial expectation of this research was to find a 
correlation between the level of success of the projects and their feelings of 
empowerment. As noted above, the rate of success of the projects was low and 
even those beneficiaries who reported a certain level of satisfaction with the ‘7 
million’ still had several complaints regarding the way forward pointing towards 
structural problems such as the lack of infra-structure and market issues as 
obstacles to the sustainability of their businesses in the long run. 
Mr Pedro (Int. 42) and his two associates, for instance, obtained a loan to build 
a guesthouse in one of the district’s APs. Whereas he was thankful to the ‘7 
million’, he also admitted that movement in the region was extremely slow, as 
the road to reach the AP was in terrible conditions, and there was no electricity 
there which limited any other services he could provide in order to attract 
guests. He noticed that these and other complaints were constantly presented 
in the LC meetings, but there was nothing that they (LC or members of the 
community) could do about it, except wait. Therefore, aside from the question of 
whether the project had been adequately assessed before its approval 
regarding its economic viability, Mr Pedro’s interview showed the contradiction 
between the feeling of empowerment initially arising from the ‘7 million’ and the 
project’s sustainability, which depended on factors he could not influence. 
Like him, the successful farmers’ association mentioned above (Int. 75) also 
faced limitations on their business related to structural aspects that they felt 
they could not influence. In their specific case, however, what made the 
difference was their connection with several CSOs, which gave them access to 
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different kinds of knowledge and opportunities, including extra funding for their 
activities. 
Sadly, the vast majority of the cases analysed showed a very different picture. 
In particular, several of the cases featuring irregularities unleashed a chain of 
disempowering effects where the beneficiary felt trapped with an unfulfilled 
project, a huge debt, and the fear and pressure linked to the repayment 
obligation. First, particularly in the early years, many beneficiaries accepted the 
credit in material aware that it was not going to benefit them but feeling 
constrained to accept the products (FG 31, 46). In the words of Mr Asim (Int. 
36), “How can a person, when she asked… she cannot deny what she is given, 
right? . . . But when I received all those things not related to my plan, what 
could I do? I needed to sell that anyway”. Secondly, when what is at stake is 
cash and not goods, even though the beneficiary is aware that the amount is 
insufficient, in a context of (often extreme) poverty, the tendency is to thank the 
government and not complain (Int. 75, 78, 79).  
The idea of accepting whatever comes is tricky to comprehend in the context of 
empowerment. On the one hand, it may be seen as a ‘better than nothing 
position’, and this was indeed the case in many of these situations. On the other 
hand, it shows a tendency towards acceptance that mixes general respect for 
the authorities with the fear of possible reactions to any complaint. Depending 
on which aspect prevails, the feeling of empowerment may be the opposite. 
In this regard, the issue of fear was a recurrent theme in the interviews. Mr 
Asim, for instance, tried to complain about the requirement of buying the 
products in the Indian store, but once he realised there was no negotiation on 
that matter, he gave up. He told me, “In your land people complain because 
they have information. But here, people have guns, and if there is a revolt, 
people will shoot”. The farmers’ association that got the mill from the First Lady, 
on the other hand, did not even dare to question their situation. They signed the 
loan form and started to make a monthly deposit. Later, they went to the district 
administration to explain their case, but it was useless. They were told by CSOs 
not to pay back the debt, but they admitted, “We are afraid of going to jail” (FG 
26). They also felt pressured by the LC members who had threatened to take 
away the mill if they did not pay the ‘loan’. Fear also prevented many 
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beneficiaries from denouncing the bribe culture of which they were victims. “The 
problem when you do this is that you will never get anything else”, explained Mr 
Salimo (Int. 78). And as everything needs to be approved at the local level 
(village, locality) before reaching the district, potential beneficiaries need to 
abide by the local authorities’ requests. 
It is worth noting that the fear beneficiaries have is not only of local authorities, 
but it applies to social relations in the community in general. Indeed, I heard 
many stories within associations where one or more members ran away with 
part of the money leaving the project unaccomplished, but in all cases, no one 
took action to report the problem. Part of the reason was because they believed 
that reporting would not solve the problem. More generally, however, they 
understood that such actions could somehow be ‘revenged’ later on. For 
instance, if they complained during an official visit from Nampula or Maputo, 
later on, if they went to the hospital, they would not be treated. Or, once the 
government authorities left they could go to jail but not because they spoke but 
because there would be another situation that would be used as an excuse (FG 
69). 
Fear is of course not a result of the ‘7 million’, but a factor that precedes it and 
that may be enhanced with it as the initiative brings in new elements that may 
be used as tools of power. At the same time, depending on the attitude of each 
individual, fear and injustice may also provide the window of opportunity for 
empowerment reinforcing its dialectical aspect. Ms Ana, for example, sent her 
project to the same locality as Mr Salimo, and, like him, she was charged an 
amount by the chief of the locality in order to have her project approved. 
Whereas Mr Salimo paid and stayed quiet in fear of future retaliation, Ms Ana 
(Int. 81) — feeling more fearful of the debt and her ability to pay back — 
expressed her agency by rejecting the loan and later denouncing the chief. Her 
action ultimately led to the removal of the latter from his post. In this case, 
agency proved key to change power; once the power-over exercised by the 
chief was contested Ms Ana not only obtained the loan, but later became a 
member of the LC enhancing her own feeling of power-to and belief in her 
ability to change things. 
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Ms Ana’s case exemplifies a successful case of agency. However, other 
examples point towards different outcomes. Ms Sofia, for instance, remembered 
several occasions when she tried to solve her case (the exchange of 
values/projects inside the LC) and how useless each of these attempts turned 
out to be (Int. 35). One of her attempts included a letter written to the district 
administration explaining the case. The problem, in her view, is that there are 
people “in the structure” that do not pass the information on. Instead, they 
withhold these problems from the district administrator. Therefore, as she and 
other interviewees recalled, while trying to follow the hierarchal procedures 
(e.g., first speaking to the people in the administration’s subdivisions and only 
speaking to the administrator as a last resort), they were always told that the 
problem would be solved, but it never was. Besides, every time they tried to 
reach the administrator, they were bureaucratically prevented from doing so as 
even to reach the room where his secretary stays and to be able to make an 
appointment one needs to have previous authorization from one of the 
administrative subdivisions. This means that if anyone in these divisions has 
any reason for not wanting someone to have access to the administrator, this 
access most probably will never take place.  
Eventually, Ms Sofia came to speak to the administrator during one of his visits 
to the villages. She explained her case, he told her he had never received her 
letter and then invited her to go speak to him in his office. However, when the 
day came, she went there and he was not in. She went several other times but 
was repeatedly told that he was busy. Other participants shared similar stories 
(Int. 35, 80). Taking these events into account, it is not surprising to hear 
participants saying that they got tired of trying to fix their problems. What they 
expressed could be pictured as a case of frustrated agency that, instead of 
empowering actually reinforces a situation of disempowerment; instead of 
expanding the boundaries of possibilities, it reinforces the feeling of incapacity 
to change things and, therefore, acceptance of what is. It makes people 
express more patiency than agency in the long term. 
It is important to highlight here the different waves of empowerment/ 
disempowerment taking place at the same time and how these waves operate 
in different dimensions of empowerment. For instance, in some cases where 
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irregularities took place, and even though the beneficiaries knew that the 
situation did not favour them, they did not initially have the awareness that what 
was taking place was against the law. In some cases, they only became aware 
of it thanks to the interference of CSOs (FG 26, 31, Int. 32). It is also important 
to note that being aware has not necessarily changed their behaviour. In fact, 
above all, these participants were also aware of the difference between what 
the law dictates and the practices that take place in their country/district, that is, 
they were aware of the existent local power asymmetries. This indicates how 
complex the link between subjectivities, capacity, and agency/patiency is. 
Related to this, another important element that emerged in the interviews was 
the strong over-reliance of some respondents on external actors (mainly 
donors, but also individuals like myself) in order to help them change things. As 
participants in a focus group mentioned, “We don’t have any way [to change 
things]. We only want this situation to change” (FG 26). When asked if there 
was anything they could do for change, they replied, “Only if helped” (see also, 
FG 30, 69). What these statements point to is the understanding that 
meaningful change will only be possible if some external actor (or internal, e.g., 
an authority from the province or the President) comes to their rescue as their 
position is mostly constrained by structural aspects that they feel incapable of 
changing even if they try. That is, there is a general idea that the expansion of 
the boundaries of possibilities may only come from outside, not from within. 
The communities’ statements echoed the beneficiaries’. The fear of complaining 
about perceived injustices was a factor in several focus groups (FG 15, 22, 23, 
65). “If you complain, then when you need a document they won’t give it to 
you!” one group member said (FG 15). Others also referred to possible 
retaliations within the community if someone was blamed for something (FG 
65). One participant explained, “In order to complain, you need to make contact 
with the structure, be together”, because as a simple member of the community 
“you’re watched” and risk being accused of belonging to the opposition and 
then jailed (FG 22). 
The constant reference to ‘the structure’ was indeed a key element that pointed 
to a clear understanding of separation and hierarchy that defined those who 
have power and those who do not. Not belonging to the structure constituted, in 
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itself, a limitation in terms of actions and possibilities. Furthermore, opposing 
the structure was perceived as an insurmountable task that they had no 
capacity to achieve as the costs were simply too high. As noted by one 
participant speaking about corruption, when someone comes from Maputo to 
monitor, they have the power from the higher level of the structure. However, 
when the issue is circumscribed to the district level, there is no way to change 
because “there is a network already settled” (FG 15). ‘Complaining’ means 
‘contesting’; those who complain are considered ‘rebels’, and this has local 
consequences. That is why any action for change needs to come from outside. 
The idea of lack of capacity to change was repeated over and over with 
expression such as, “We don’t have the possibilities” (FG 17), or “We feel 
impossibilitated” (FG 22), or “There is nothing we can do” (FG 29), “We have no 
means” (FG 64), often followed by the expressed need for an outside form of 
action such as  “you donors need to bring things directly to us” (FG 23), or 
suggesting that people like myself could maybe advise the government to 
change its attitude (FG 15). If anything, these statements reinforce an idea not 
of empowerment, but of dependency, not of emancipation, but of acceptance of 
one’s own limitations. And here is where the aspect of the multidimensionality of 
empowerment comes into play; these subjectivities are not restricted to the ‘7 
million’, instead, they reflect deep structural aspects that pervade the general 
functioning of the Mozambican state including the state reforms that followed 
the Peace Accords, the direct and indirect influences of external actors in 
national, and local dynamics as well as the micro dynamics that also depend on 
cultural traces of the societies in question. Some of these issues have been 
discussed in previous chapters from the macro-perspective. The next section 
focuses on some institutional aspects from the perspective of the district as well 
as some community dynamics that also impact on the policy results. 
CONTEXTUAL LIMITATIONS OF THE ‘7 MILLION’ 
To a great extent, the poor empowering effects of the ‘7 million’ in Angoche are 
a reflection of the way decentralisation has been taking place in Mozambique 
and the way it keeps the districts entrenched in a hierarchical top-down 
governance mentality. Despite the rhetoric that stresses participation, and the 
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institutionalisation of the LCs, the local tendency is to abide by the rules that 
have been in place for decades and that privilege ‘accountability in the reverse’, 
that is, from the bottom to the top. In this regard, the participatory and 
empowering appeal of the ‘7 million’s clashes with the current environment that 
exists locally. 
At the same time, the initiative’s ambitious character is not in tandem with the 
institutional capacity that the districts have to implement it. First, in Angoche, 
resources for training and capacity building have been insufficient to guarantee 
the adequate coverage of all the existing councils. Ideally, the TC should meet 
the LCs at all levels on a regular basis. Yet, as of May 2012, the new members 
of the LCs had not had the adequate training they needed to carry out their 
expected functions. According to the district administration, this was due to a 
delay in the funds available to pay for transport of the TC to the villages (Int. 
25). 
The district government’s lack of funding for such activities is often 
compensated by the support and direct work of NGOs portrayed as “partners” 
and “support instruments” (Int. 25, 54). This reliance on NGOs to accomplish 
what should be a local government duty has pros and cons. On the one hand, it 
seems positive to have a civil society body training what should be another civil 
society body (the LCs). Because of their nature and commitment to the 
principles of good governance, gender equality, and participation — and taking 
into account the high quality of many NGOs in Nampula province — their 
engagement in these processes contributes to the depoliticization of these 
activities which, in the Mozambican context, is a very important aspect to be 
nurtured. On the other hand, this over-reliance presents a series of problems. 
First, as NGOs have a fluctuating budget and rely on donors, they cannot 
guarantee the provision of these services in the long term or even the full 
coverage of the districts. Second, this reliance also creates a dependency in 
terms of the format of the training, so where the NGOs are not present, the 
district government faces difficulty in reproducing the same kind (and quality) of 
capacity building (Int. 25).  
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Lack of resources also affects the monitoring and evaluation of the ‘7 million’. In 
Angoche, monitoring visits only started in 2010. Until then, there was no 
information available regarding the status of implementation and effectiveness 
of the projects (Int. 63). As of 2012, field visits did take place, but the interviews 
revealed that their frequency was irregular. According to the TC chief, there 
were three basic visits every year centred on the discussion of the district plan 
with the councils and the discussion of the ‘7 million’ project proposals (Int. 25). 
Monitoring visits, on the other hand, were fairly irregular. One TC member 
reported that the team would make about five to six field visits per year, which 
were far from sufficient to cover the over 400 on-going projects (Int. 55). 
Apart from time constraints (as most members of the TC are employees in other 
sectors of the local government), material means — especially transport for all 
members of the team — also constituted a limitation (Int. 52, 53, 55). 
Consequently, in order to save time and cover as many projects as possible — 
and taking into account the distances between the villages — visits tended to 
be short and focused on the verification of the project’s existence, 
implementation, and repayment (Int. 53). I could not verify the totality of reports 
available of these visits. When I asked for reports in the administration, I was 
given only two, referred to above, as well as reports related to the LC 
reconstitution process. It should be noted that the term ‘report’ does not 
characterise adequately these documents. One was a large table with brief 
notes on each project visited in 2010. The other one was a document of four 
pages where three did not add any new information regarding the fund’s 
implementation, and only one project was covered with very little information.  
Besides the difficulty in keeping up with the monitoring, several pre-2009 issues 
remained pending. According to one TC member, they still had to make several 
updates and calculations regarding the projects that involved the delivery of 
goods instead of money (Int. 55). These efforts, however, were limited by 
several practicalities such as the lack of invoices and the change of interest 
rates (that initially did not exist). Accordingly, all these cases needed to be 
reassessed; however, there was no specific policy for that at the time. 
Another issue, partly related to the problem of institutional capacity, and also a 
major constraint to the effectiveness of the ‘7 million’, was the lack of 
	   249	  
mechanisms of accountability. In a nutshell, if anything goes wrong, it is never 
clear who is responsible and this, in turn, makes it difficult to enforce the search 
for solutions and corrections in order to improve policy implementation. This 
applies to several types of actors. The TC, as noted, is a counselling body and 
cannot enforce decisions or even penalties in cases where there has been 
misuse of the fund or misbehaviour by LC members. The administrator and 
other executive actors could do this, but there is a tendency to not interfere, 
“Unfortunately many people don’t understand that the solution is not with the 
administrator, but there [at the base]” (Int. 54). Conversely, as noted in previous 
sections, the local view is that the only people who can change things are the 
highest authorities; thus, if the administrator has the posture of delegating 
responsibility to the lower echelons, there is a limbo where no one is, in fact, in 
charge of anything. Instead, this reinforces a tendency of delegating power but 
not responsibility. 
The responses to the few irregular cases acknowledged by the TC reinforce this 
observation. Accordingly, if they noticed anything irregular in the monitoring 
visits, e.g., if they were told that an LC member requested a bribe in order to 
approve a project, their general response would be to talk to the LC and 
advise/request they not do so and invite them to reflect on it giving “constructive 
criticism” (Int. 25, 55). The language used had a strong pedagogic character 
and at no point was there reference to the possibility of reprisals. 
Whereas some respondents were optimistic about this posture as a mechanism 
of behavioural change (Int. 63), the matter would require further research. More 
generally, however, this ‘soft’ approach seemed to reinforce the problem of 
accountability and directly influence the general views that, if something needs 
to change, it has to be brought about either by external pressure or by top-down 
reform. In fact, even members of the TC admitted that the only way to improve 
things is by having more frequent and serious monitoring preferably with 
individuals from the province (Int. 12). 
Besides these institutional aspects, my fieldwork has also revealed a series of 
community issues that also affected the empowering results of the ‘7 million’. 
First, participants revealed several problems with the dynamics within 
associations that obtained the loan. In some cases, some members took the 
	   250	  
money and ran away (FG 69); in other cases, members shared the value 
instead of making a collective investment (ibid.); in others, the president of the 
associations took advantage of their position and deceived the other members 
(FG 31, 64). As observed by a TC member, in the beginning of the ‘7 million’, it 
was very common for ad hoc associations to be created just to obtain the loan 
(Int. 63). Since 2011, any association applying for the fund needs to be first 
recognised by law, so it is more difficult for this to take place. Yet, the effects of 
these situations are long lasting as those who remained responsible for the 
loans feel the burden of the non-completion of the project and the pressure to 
repay. Also, as much as in the case of the irregularities, there was a tendency 
for those harmed to not complain or denounce those who deceived the other 
members. In one of the cases, the ones who remained in business were still 
bothered by the ex-member who sometimes went to his market stand to steal 
fish (FG 69). Even though they could report the case, they tried to speak to the 
family of the person instead and said that things “have improved” although it still 
happened. In other cases, the members did not take any confrontational action 
in an effort to avoid conflict (FG 31, 64). Only in one case did a big fight take 
place along with a death threat that ended up involving the police. But at the 
end, the members decided to invest in the common business (opening a 
butchery) but working separately inside the store (FG 69). 
A second community dynamic related to the aspect of inclusiveness of the ’7 
million’ refers to gender. Women are disadvantaged from the start when it 
comes to the ‘7 million’ simply because of their position in the family and 
community structure. Even though they are the ones who work the most in the 
fields, they are not the ones who own (by tradition, not by law) the right to take 
care of the household income. In fact, they depend economically on men, which 
is one major reason why they need to get married (FG 27, 29, 64, 65). Several 
women complained about the distribution of money within the household 
acknowledging that they worked as much as their husbands but did not have 
the autonomy to spend their share of the income according to their own 
priorities (FG 27, 29). Some also accused men of spending money with other 
women and on alcohol and often also spending money that was meant for the 
household’s needs (FG 64). Furthermore, they shared the view that many men 
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when they receive more money or feel unhappy simply left and then failed to 
take any responsibility for their children (FG 29, 65). 
These household dynamics reflect the general position of women in this 
context. Many participants expressed the view that they did not have a voice in 
their communities. “A woman is just to obey”, one said (FG 18). Some 
complained about not having any help, not even from their husbands, but they 
also explained that this was not because their husbands did not want to help 
them; it happened because they were poor (FG 23). Yet others highlighted that 
ultimately, the man is ‘the chief’ and that they did not have the means to contest 
this even though they often complained about their unhappiness to their 
husbands (FG 29). The only way they felt they had some power was as a 
community of women through mutual solidarity (FG 27).  
Given the cultural context, and the power asymmetries defined by gender, it is 
not surprising that most beneficiaries of the ‘7 million’ are male. As discussed in 
the previous section, this reflects a different kind of knowledge and access to 
information that is entrenched in the way the community system works and that 
places women in a less privileged position from the start. That does not mean 
that there are no women beneficiaries, but the proportion is much lower 
reflecting, therefore, an asymmetry between the power-to that these women 
have and the power-over to which they are submitted. 
6.4 Assessing the ‘7 Million’ Beyond Angoche 
If we compare the implementation of the ‘7 million’ in Angoche with other 
districts, we find that several of the problems discussed above also took place 
elsewhere, albeit to a different extent. During my fieldwork, for instance, while 
following the work of Akilizetho, I had the chance to conduct two focus groups 
(one with 11 men, the other with 12 women) with several members of LDCs 
from the districts of Moma and Mogovolas, also in Nampula province, as well as 
interviewing the administrator of Moma and a member of the TC of Mogovolas. I 
also had access to a very informative district report from Mogovolas assessing 
the implementation of the ‘7 million’ in that district between 2006 and 2010.  
Regarding the focus groups, participants reported several stories that reflect a 
series of limitations of both the ‘7 million’ and the LCs as tools of empowerment 
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promotion. Concerning the LCs revitalisation process in their district, for 
instance, some noted several problems that, similar to Angoche, call into 
question the representativeness of these bodies. According to one participant, 
in his village, the announcement about the meeting with the TC came very late, 
just one day before the event; therefore, at the time of the selection of the new 
members of LCs, there were very few people in the community (FG 58). Other 
participants from this same village also noted that the TC members had to work 
with the local authorities and, therefore, instead of ensuring that the event was 
inclusive, they trusted the words of the leaders who told them that the local 
voting had already occurred. Although the TC members suggested that a new 
voting process should be scheduled so more people could be present, the local 
chiefs told them that was not needed, so they never came back. As a result, 
many of the new LC members selected were relatives of the chiefs, not people 
chosen by the community. Although the participants did not see this process as 
correct, they did not speak out at the time because “one person alone is worth 
nothing” (FG 58). Also, when I asked if they considered speaking to the higher 
authorities in the districts, they noted that it is simply useless because the “LCs 
are linked to the government, and so we cannot complain to the government” 
(ibid.). “If we speak, they think we are trying to steal their power”, one 
participant further explained. 
The member of the TC of Mogovolas also referred to the problem of the low rate 
of community participation during the reconstitution process. According to him 
(Int. 61), the percentage of the community present in most locations was below 
the minimum of 5% required, with the exception of one AP. He also confirmed 
that they should have re-scheduled the process in several instances, but they 
were only able to do so in a few cases. It should be noted that the TC in 
Mogovolas has only two people, compared to eight in Angoche, which clearly 
affects their capacity to cover the district and also monitor the projects’ 
implementation (ibid.; Mogovolas Dist. Gov., 2010). Additionally, according to 
the TC member, to do their job, they need to “borrow motorbikes” and “repay” 
their owners by leaving two litres of fuel when the job is done which reflects the 
scarce resources available for their work. In fact, in 2011, the district of 
Mogovolas had no resources to do any evaluation regarding the ‘7 million’. As 
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for the training of the members, as in Angoche, Mogovolas relied on the help of 
Akilizetho and other CSOs. 
As in Angoche, several participants in the focus group also had critical views 
about the LCs and their work. Many of them referred to the fact that the LC only 
discusses the ‘7 million’ but none of the other community issues (FG 58). As 
they saw it, the members say they will do things but never put it into action. 
Some also noticed that most people in their villages were not aware of the work 
of the LCs; the participants were aware because they were also members of the 
LDCs, but, in general, there was no interaction between the LCs and the 
communities. One of the women in the focus group also reported an episode 
that reflected the complicated power dynamics within the LC. As reported, she 
was already a member of the LC, but also later became a member of a LDC, 
where she had a series of capacity building workshops from Akilizetho. As she 
recalled, once the other members noted she had become “smarter”, she was 
arbitrarily removed from the LC even before finishing her mandate. She was 
told by one of the LC members, who was a member up at the district level, that 
she was not a member anymore. She never took action to complain or question 
the decision, one of the reasons being the fact that the member who expelled 
her was also member on a higher echelon of the LC. 
Also, as in Angoche, the issue of ‘the party’ did not directly arise in the 
discussion. As noted, there were clear indications of separateness (us vs. them) 
in the reference to the LCs. Additionally, several examples were given of how 
difficult, if not impossible, it was to contest “the authorities” as well as how the 
LC was linked to the government. Despite the lack of direct connection between 
Frelimo and the LCs, it is the case that the ‘authorities’, in particular, the 
presidents of the LCs are Frelimo by default. 
As discussed in Chapter 6, it is very difficult to capture empirically the extent to 
which party politics influence the functioning of the LCs and the ‘7 million’. The 
fact that party issues are almost naturalised in the everyday seems to be one of 
the factors that makes this issue nearly invisible at first sight. Approaching it 
with direct questions is furthermore problematic as it may raise both suspicion 
as well as sympathy, either way reinforcing biases in the research. Precisely 
because of these complexities, more studies on this connection are required in 
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order to deepen understanding of the way ‘party-power’ operate at the local 
level in Mozambique. 
Regarding the ‘7 million’ and its effects, several of the problems encountered in 
Angoche were also reported in the case of Moma and Mogovolas. As in 
Angoche, there was a gap between the official data and the views of the 
communities and non-official reports. The administrator of Moma, for instance, 
expressed a similar view to his counterpart in Angoche regarding the ‘7 million’ 
and the LCs. In particular, he emphasised the bottom-up aspect of the initiative 
highlighting that the selection of the projects occurs at the lower echelons, 
whilst the district LC only “confirms and homologates” the results (Int. 60). 
Following the general national discourse, he agreed that ‘the ‘7 million’ is 
“revolutionising the concept of development making it operational” (ibid.). He 
also referred to the increase of production and formal trade as well as the 
reduction of Moma’s dependency on Nampula city in order to have access to 
several basic products. Finally, regarding any irregularities, his emphasis was 
on the “misperceived information” at the beginning of the ‘7 million’ when 
individuals thought they did not have to pay funds back as well as problems 
with associations and the lack of the beneficiaries’ capacity to manage a 
business plan. He also added that transparency was key, and “it should start at 
the base”, that is, localities and APs; a point also made by his Angochean 
counterpart. 
Remarkably, the district report from Mogovolas reported several problems 
surrounding the initiative, in particular, from 2006 and 2009. During this period, 
as noted, the projects directed to the ‘7 million’ were not sufficiently discussed 
within the realm of the LCs. In fact, the members’ knowledge of the rules 
regarding the approval of these projects was insufficient. Accordingly, several of 
the projects approved during this period did not reflect the knowledge and 
involvement of the communities (Mogovolas Dist. Gov., 2010: 4). Thus, several 
measures were taken from 2009 onwards in order to reorganise the councils 
and improve the implementation of the ‘7 million’. Also, a process of monitoring 
took place, thanks to which, the district government identified a series of 
problems (e.g., misuse of the fund by some beneficiaries) but also good 
practices that were later shared among associations and even among different 
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locations of the district in order to improve the results of the initiative (ibid.). 
Different from Angoche, the report also stated that in some cases, the LCs also 
took “corrective measures”, specifically, they took back from certain 
associations the financed tractors and gave them back to the fund due to the 
“associations’ mismanagement”. As for the return rate, according to the report, 
Mogovolas presented better results than Angoche having in 2010, a return rate 
of 7.41%, which reflected an improvement of 5.8% between 2006 and 2009. 
In spite of this, non-official sources revealed a more critical view of the results of 
the initiative. One of the problems reported in the focus groups of men, for 
instance, was the delay in the delivery of money once a loan was approved 
which is particularly damaging in the case of agriculture (FG 58) (also reported 
in Angoche). Another problem highlighted was the very reduced value 
disbursed to the projects approved (ibid.). As in Angoche, this seems to be a 
key issue in several other districts. Reports from the CSO CEDE on the districts 
of Maganja da Costa (Zambezia province) and Marromeu (Sofala province) 
confirm that the asymmetry between the values requested and the values 
obtained are often gigantic, seriously compromising the beneficiaries’ ability to 
implement the original project proposals (CEDE, 2010a, 2010b and 2011b). 
This is indeed one of the reasons why beneficiaries often change their plans 
(and not necessarily report the change back to the district) (ibid.; FG 59). It also 
contributes to the situation where everything the beneficiary earns goes back to 
the repayment, and he/she returns to the starting point without having any profit 
to reinvest in the business (ibid.). 
A final important point of similarity between Angoche and other districts relates 
to the issue of gender. The women from Moma and Mogovolas reported feeling 
discriminated against in the attribution of the ‘7 million’ (FG 59; see also reports 
from CEDE). They said they are depicted as “not knowing how to manage 
money” (FG 59) and, therefore, rarely get access to the fund. Also, in cases 
where some women obtained the fund by being part of mixed associations, they 
were discriminated against internally within these associations. One of them, for 
instance, who was also a member of the LC, recalled having created an 
association with other colleagues in 2007 in order to apply for the fund. When 
they obtained the loan, all the money was designated to only one person who 
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was a man. Besides the issue that the association was created within the LC of 
the AP, reflecting the conflict of interests not addressed in the regulation of the 
FDD, being a woman put her in a subordinate position and she had nowhere to 
complain and never benefitted from the loan. Another participant reported a 
similar case from 2010. One of the reports from CEDE (2010a) also showed a 
major discrepancy between the number of projects approved for male and 
female beneficiaries in the district of Mangaja da Costa. 
This brief look at other districts shows that the findings of this research 
significantly relate to what takes place elsewhere in Mozambique. That was also 
the view of a program officer at CEDE who has been leading this CSO 
monitoring of the ‘7 million’. According to him, there are “some good cases”, 
particularly in other provinces, but problems abound (Int. 14). In particular, even 
if the project works, there are still problems related to the market and the 
difficulty of selling what is produced. In his opinion, one of the factors that make 
a positive difference is political pressure. He gave an example of a district in 
Inhambane where the administrator faced threats of losing support inside the 
party and, therefore, had a more committed attitude towards the ‘7 million’ 
implementation. The problem is that such a posture reinforces what is, in fact, 
one of the main problems underlying the ‘7 million’— the upward chain of 
accountability, despite the propaganda to the contrary. 
Indeed, looking back, the LCs may be partly compared to the people’s 
assemblies and committees that proliferated during the first years of 
independence (see Chapter 3); while they contain certain aspects that enhance 
participation and may foster empowerment, they are also intimately linked with 
the country’s political structure. And that is why they also have the potential to 
become nothing more than just a formal expression of bottom-up participatory 
processes while, in fact, they are contributing to the lack of questioning of 
deeper power asymmetries that contribute to poverty in the first place. In 
summary, the ‘7 million’ and the LCs are like a double-edged sword that may be 
used for empowering purposes but also as a tool to consolidate power 
asymmetries at the local level. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the bottom-up view of the ‘7 million’ implementation 
taking into account both the procedural aspects of the policy’s empowering 
potential as well as its results in the district of Angoche. In this regard, one of 
the general issues that the findings revealed was that the empowering logic 
prescribed in the official discourse and the fund’s regulation is fundamentally 
affected by local dynamics that often clash with the former. Consequently, and 
first of all, whereas the LCs are officially represented as the legitimising pillar of 
the ‘7 million’, the constitution of these bodies and the way they function 
showed that their representativeness is directly influenced by local power 
dynamics that involve pre-existing relations of authority and that are at odds 
with the idea of horizontality that justifies these participatory practices in the first 
place. Moreover, even though the LCs should be an organ of articulation and 
representation of the communities’ interests, in practice, they have become 
more accountable to the government than to the communities and interact more 
with the former than with the latter. Hence, the councils’ top-down dynamics 
tend to prevail over its bottom-up potential. 
These dynamics, in turn, affect the way the ‘7 million’ is distributed and its 
effectiveness. One crucial aspect, in this regard, is the control of the process 
that leads to the projects’ allocation. As shown, regardless of the discourse that 
emphasises an option of ‘non-interference’ in the councils’ decisions, there are 
several manifestations of direct and indirect interferences that affect which 
projects will be approved as well as the values distributed. In practice, the ‘7 
million’ creates a new space where pre-existing power relations may be 
consolidated or new ones created depending on the different positions that 
actors find themselves in. The lack of mechanisms of accountability and the 
informality that prevails in the different stages of this process further reinforces 
the initiative’s potential to be used as a mechanism to increase the power-over 
of selected individuals over others instead of the community’s power-to vis-à-vis 
the local government. Although this may foster the empowerment of some 
people, it is clearly not consistent with an emancipatory perspective of 
empowerment. 
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The empowering effects of the initiative ultimately reflect these issues. From the 
material perspective, the low rate of success of the projects affects the 
sustainability of the financed activities as well as of the fund itself. From the 
subjective perspective of empowerment, the interviews revealed that the ‘7 
million’ and the LCs alone do not override more fundamental traces of local 
behaviour and structural constraints that come from history and culture, 
including the role played by fear of contestation and confrontation with ‘the 
structure’. This, in turn, reinforces the understanding that change and 
empowerment are somehow linked with the intervention of outside forces — 
whether in the shape of higher authorities or NGOs/donors. 
In summary, even though the ‘7 million’ has been presented as a mechanism to 
strengthen local empowerment by promoting a bottom-up process, it has been 
caught up in a top-down rationale that is related, on the one hand, to the more 
general aspects of post-war state reform that has limited de facto power 
distribution — including by keeping the districts as deconcentrated (not 
decentralised) units and, on the other hand, the structural constraints that exist 
at the local level and that include both traces of culture as well as informal 
networks of authority that mingle with the hierarchical trace of the state. This 
general trend did not exclude some cases of success, or even expressions of 
agency, in order to contest power. Nevertheless, the balance is still more 
towards the entrenchment of the structure instead of its contestation.	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Chapter 7 
The Contradictions of Empowerment Promotion 
through Social Engineering 
 
My summary of the ‘7 million’ in a nutshell is that technically it’s 
been a complete disaster but politically it’s been a huge success. 
(UNDP advisor, Maputo) 
 
This chapter brings us back to the objectives and questions at the heart of this 
research. As noted in the introduction, this thesis had three main objectives. 
First, it intended to explore the concept of empowerment in the academic and 
policy domains. Second, it aimed to discuss the utility of empowerment as an 
analytical tool that helps understand how power operates in a given social 
context. For this specific purpose, I proposed an analytical framework that 
included multiple levels of analysis and a triad encompassing subjectivities, 
capacity, and agency/patiency as sub-components of empowerment. Third, the 
thesis aimed to explore empowerment in its operationalization taking into 
account two lenses of analysis; on the one hand, understanding empowerment 
as a policy goal, and on the other hand, using it as an analytical concept in 
order to understand change. Whereas Chapter 2 covered the first two 
objectives, Chapters 3 to 6 focused extensively on the third aim by exploring the 
case of Mozambique’s peace and the ‘7 million’. 
This concluding chapter brings these elements together and goes back to the 
research questions, specifically: 
1. Considering its empowering ambition and the current Mozambican 
political and economic context, how aligned with local reality is the ‘7 
million’ initiative? 
2. What are the effects of the ‘7 million’ on rural people’s 
empowerment? 
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3. What lessons can be drawn from the case study that could contribute 
to the theoretical literature on empowerment and better policy 
planning for empowerment promotion? 
The first two questions, which are closely related, are discussed in the first 
section of this chapter, while the remaining sections explore in depth the third 
question. The second section discusses the limitations of the policy in delivering 
better results by contrasting technical and political explanations for such 
outcomes, as well as by discussing the contradictions embedded in the idea of 
promoting bottom-up empowerment from the top-down. The third section 
addresses the lessons learned from the case study in terms of policy planning 
and implementation. The fourth section goes back to empowerment theorising, 
and discusses the contribution of the multilevel framework of analysis and the 
case study to the theoretical literature on empowerment. The conclusion 
resumes a discussion of the research hypothesis presented in the introduction, 
acknowledging the limitations of this research as well as pointing to new 
research directions arising from it.  
7.1 The Empowering Effects of the ‘7 Million’ 
The extent to which the ‘7 million’ had empowering results, and the extent to 
which the initiative is aligned with local reality may be easier to understand if we 
think in dialectical terms, exploring the dichotomic and opposing aspects 
underneath it. In this regard, by looking at the ‘7 million’ and the case of 
Angoche, the first dichotomy we find is the complex liberal/non-liberal character 
of the ‘7 million’ making it a hybrid initiative. On the one hand, the ‘7 million’ 
takes into account a series of liberal assumptions such as the promotion of 
entrepreneurship (thus the private sector) through credit concession, the 
relevance of civil society engagement in local governance (through the LCs), 
and decentralisation (see Chapter 5). On the other hand, different from most 
micro-credit initiatives, the ‘7 million’ is provided by the state resembling, in this 
regard, a state development bank with a different outfit (see Hanlon and Smart, 
2008: 183). And yet, different from other state-bank initiatives, the state is not 
only the provider of the fund, but it is present in the process that leads to the 
fund allocation in the person of the respective presidents of the LCs — the local 
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government officials in each district territorial echelon. The presence of such 
authorities, even if they are not formally authorised to make decisions regarding 
the fund, mingles with several other dichotomies that are also at the heart of the 
‘7 million’ and that ultimately affect its empowering potential. 
One such dichotomy is tradition/modernity, which has been at the centre of 
Frelimo’s political agenda since soon after independence (see Chapter 3) and 
still is an important issue in contemporary Mozambique. Some of the 
fundamental assumptions regarding the ‘7 million’ and the LCs are based on 
the existence of a modern state with functional institutions. At the same time, as 
noted in Chapter 6, several of the factors that influence the people’s behaviour 
regarding the LCs and the ‘7 million’ are only understandable within the context 
of local culture, history, and tradition — that is, through the customary and 
informal practices that regulate social relations at the very local level. The 
respect for local traditional hierarchies, the different roles attributed to gender, 
the fear of witchcraft, all this conforms to pre-established values that, so far, 
have remained vastly unchanged regardless of the introduction of formal rules 
that emphasise different, sometimes opposite values, such as gender equality. 
This dichotomy is, furthermore, linked to two others, respectively, 
formality/informality and verticality/horizontality. Tradition is based on 
informality, whereas the modern state is based on a series of formal contracts 
that include its constitution and national legislation. In current democratic states 
— the staple of the ‘modern state’ — these legal bases also favour a high 
degree of formal horizontality based on the principle of equality. This, in turn, 
clashes with the traditional principles that sustain an important hierarchical 
chain of authorities that are key to regulating local social spaces in these 
societies. This leads us to another dichotomy, discussed further below, which is 
the top-down/bottom-up dynamics of social processes. Ideally, liberal 
democracies should privilege bottom-up processes, as they should reflect what 
the masses want. In the case of Mozambique, not only tradition but also history 
(see Chapter 3) has consolidated a system where top-down dynamics override 
bottom-up ones. 
The dichotomies above explain to a large extent the limitations of the ‘7 million’ 
in promoting local empowerment, pointing to the lack of alignment between the 
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logics that sustain the policy and the dynamics that sustain social organization 
at the local level. Ultimately, the rationale of the policy is based on a technical 
perspective of empowerment: it is presumed that by emphasising capacity 
building and by providing participatory spaces for debate and decision-making 
local people will be able to increase their ability to empower themselves both 
materially (thanks to the projects and their expected outcome) as well as non-
materially (by creating a space where people can raise their voices and by 
slowly expanding the boundaries of what they deem possible). 
In practice, however, the in-depth analysis of the initiative’s operationalisation 
shows that local behaviour may be better understood from a dialectical 
perspective, where aspects of opposition exist concomitantly, affecting people’s 
ability and willingness to behave in certain ways, often in opposition to what 
would be expected from the policy’s perspective. The results of the ‘7 million’ in 
terms of empowerment are therefore a reflection of such contradictions. 
THE ‘7 MILLION’ EFFECTS IN ENHANCING POWER-TO 
If we assess the ‘7 million’ from the perspective of the technical approaches to 
empowerment, one of the expected outcomes would be the increase of local 
actors’ power-to. As discussed in Chapter 5, key to the initiative is the increase 
of material well-being, through the creation of jobs and increase in food 
production. At the same time, the policy also foresees non-material empowering 
features, related to the spaces of representation created at the level of the local 
councils. Moreover, as declared in several instances by President Guebuza, the 
‘7 Million’ also targets a change of mentality, not least of all by consolidating 
people’s self-esteem, another way to enhance power-to. 
All these objectives may be analysed looking at the triad that is at the centre of 
the proposed framework of analysis in Chapter 2 – capacity, agency/patiency 
and subjectivities – all of which reflect important aspects of power-to. Taking 
into account the variable capacity, we have seen that the material benefits of 
the fund have been poor overall from the perspective of its direct and indirect 
beneficiaries. The problem of the low values disbursed linked with the poor 
capacity to design and implement a business plan have largely contributed to 
these poor results. Yet, in some cases, the ‘7 million’ also increased the 
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capacity of some individuals of surviving in the short term or, in the most 
successful cases, also providing the beneficiaries the opportunities to expand 
their businesses. Additionally, if we consider the high rates of bribes being 
reported, it is also the case that some actors (not necessarily the expected 
beneficiaries) have gained something out of this process. In this regard, the 
case study showed a significance degree of variance in relation to the effects of 
the ‘7 million’ in increasing actors’ power-to through an expansion of material 
assets. 
From the non-material perspective of capacity, the effects have also been 
mixed. Being a member of the LCs, for instance, has not necessarily converted 
into more power-to as control, yet it has provided some power-to decide which 
proposals will be selected in the district to receive the loan, at least to a 
selected group of people. Additionally, as noticed by some beneficiaries, some 
LC members actually have benefitted financially by demanding bribes during 
the process, in this case, exercising power-over the applicants by using their 
position as members of the LC – that is, their power-to came as a result of their 
power-over others. 
The collective empowering potential of both the LCs and the ‘7 million’, on the 
other hand, have been much smaller. As discussed, the LCs have not 
significantly influenced the community’s involvement in access to local 
governance or even enhanced a local feeling of citizenship. Instead, in many 
cases, it has reinforced a sense of separateness between the ‘ordinary 
Mozambican’ and those who are closer to power (in this case, the LCs 
perceived as closer to the local government authorities). 
From the technical perspective, agency is key to empowerment, as it is through 
agency that power-to is expressed. One of the indicators of the success of the 
‘7 million’ would be, in this regard, the extent to which it has fostered agency – 
whether by leading to an increase in requests for the loan or through the 
participation of local actors in the local councils. 
Regarding the local councils, the first thing to note here is the limited scope of 
their member’s agency: as discussed in Chapter 5, even though the LCs may 
determine which project proposals will be approved, their role in other regards is 
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exclusively consultative, which limits their ability to act and make things happen 
in other domains beyond the selection of proposals. As observed in the 
interviews, members are very aware of their role, and this in turn affects the way 
they perceive their own capacity, that is, it affects their own subjectivities of 
power. 
If agency is interpreted here as ‘participating’ in the meetings, it is indeed the 
case that the creation of local councils has helped increase local agency – and 
perhaps even more so the introduction of the ‘7 million’, since it creates a major 
stimulus for actors to go to the meetings. At the same time, the interviews also 
showed that it is quite rare for LC members to spontaneously take the initiative 
to propose meetings and reach the community, usually waiting for the 
‘convocation note’. 
If we expand the idea of agency to include the willingness to speak one’s voice, 
the assessment becomes more complex. As discussed in Chapter 6, most 
members expressed feeling comfortable to speak their minds, but that does not 
mean that their voices will be heard. This means that the effects of speaking out 
and generating further action and change will not necessarily correspond to the 
desires of the speaker. The fact that many members noticed this gap between 
speaking out and influencing decisions shows the limitations of the empowering 
potential of being a member of the LCs, as well as of the ‘7 million’ in attending 
to local needs. 
Regarding the local community and the beneficiaries, the ‘7 million’ undoubtedly 
had an effect in terms of encouraging people to apply for the fund and start a 
new business or invest in an on-going one. Yet, agency has also varied 
according to groups of actors and over time. First, and even though there are 
women beneficiaries of the fund, the research found that many of them have 
little knowledge of the ‘7 million’ and thus are less prone to ask for a loan. 
Second, in some cases where there have been irregularities, the ‘7 million’ has 
actually reduced people’s capacity for action, by fostering instead a posture of 
patiency instead of agency. 
The ‘7 million’ effects on local agency are directly linked with its influence (or 
lack of) in shaping local subjectivities, in particular people’s perceptions about 
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their own power. This particular aspect will be discussed in more detail in the 
following section, from an emancipatory perspective, but I would like to refer 
here to a basic tenet of the presidential discourse, which is the ‘7 million’ as a 
vehicle to consolidate people’s self-esteem, which, in turn, would foster good 
governance (see Chapter 5). The fieldwork showed no substantial evidence that 
the ‘7 million’ has improved people’s self-esteem. Perhaps the closest to such 
an effect was the acknowledgement of some members of the LCs that they felt 
honoured to be members of these bodies and that they were in a position where 
they could make some difference. However, this declaration was rarely followed 
by a recollection of examples where ‘making a difference’ actually happened. 
On the contrary, in many instances LC members stressed the limitations they 
faced in terms of pursuing change or simply following more closely the different 
stages of the ‘7 million’ procedures. Similarly, the testimonies from the 
communities and beneficiaries did not indicate any significant perception of 
improved self-esteem arising from the ‘7 million’. On the contrary, where 
irregularities took place they contributed to the reverse. 
In summary, if we assess the empowering effects of the ‘7 million’ from the 
technical perspectives that informed its rationale, and focus on the policy effects 
in terms of increasing local actors’ power-to, we note that, despite a significant 
degree of variance across actors, the overall results are very much below the 
intended outcome. Whether some actors did observe an increase in their 
power-to, especially by obtaining the loan, these positive effects were offset by 
the many limitations discussed in detail in Chapter 6. We may summarise these 
effects as: (1) little change in terms of promoting capacity (material and non-
material), (2) limited scope for change regarding agency and (3) meagre effects 
in the domain of changing subjectivities of power (as of perceived increase of 
power-to). 
THE EMANCIPATORY EFFECTS OF THE ‘7 MILLION’  
Looking at the empowering effects of the ‘7 million’ from an emancipatory 
perspective requires two fundamental questions to be addressed: first, ‘To what 
extent has this policy changed power relations?’ and, second, ‘To what extent 
has it contributed to the creation of local critical awareness and the expansion 
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of the boundaries of what is deemed possible?’ These questions are intimately 
related and they also relate to the three variables at the heart of the framework 
(capacity, agency/patiency, subjectivities). Besides, they also require the 
parallel consideration of the different levels of analysis indicated in the 
framework. 
Regarding the first question, the potential of the ‘7 million’ to contribute to a 
change in power relations may be assessed from two different perspectives. 
First, if people’s capacity increases thanks to the effectiveness of the policy, 
then there exists a potential for reduction of social power asymmetries and 
increased social welfare. Second, assuming the material benefits of the ‘7 
million’ were not positive, it could still be the case that, thanks to the 
participatory procedures embedded in the policy and the promotion of agency, 
people could feel more confident to express criticism, contest perceived 
injustices, and, thus, push for change. 
Considering the first perspective, as noted above, the material benefits of the ‘7 
million’ were not significant enough to promote change in the societal 
distribution of material power. That is, its ability to reduce poverty and tackle 
inequality has been limited by the way the process of allocation of resources 
has been carried out. The lack of sustainability of the projects, the problems 
related to repayment and debt are examples of such limitations. Also, in many 
cases, the ‘7 million’ has (through irregularities) benefitted intermediary actors 
and not necessarily those envisaged in the policy; as such, in these cases, it 
has increased the power of those already in a privileged position instead of 
redistributing resources to those most in need. 
As for the second perspective, which implies that the policy had strong effects 
in terms of promoting agency and people’s ability to push for changes and claim 
for what they believe is their rights, the case study showed that such effects 
were also very limited. As discussed, in some cases, agency proved able to 
alter power to a certain extent when exercised as a contestation of some 
perceived injustice. Yet, other times, in similar situations, agency became 
counter-productive, or ‘frustrated’, reinforcing the view that any effort to change 
things was useless. In contrast, some actors who ‘played by the rules’, e.g., 
paying a bribe to have access to the loan by accepting things as they were 
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became more ‘satisfied’ as they received what they expected, which was still 
better than not having any loan. 
These variances should be perceived not only as the result of different 
behaviours but also as the reflection of the different positions in which actors 
found themselves at the time they acted. In this regard, the increase or not of 
an actor’s power was largely related to his/her ability to use this position 
strategically taking a risk and betting on his/her chances of success. This, in 
turn, was largely related to his/her own perception of his/her own power, that is, 
his/her subjectivities. For example, members of the LCs, even though they 
complained about their limited power to change things, still acknowledged some 
ability to influence decisions, especially in the case of the projects, as well as 
leading community work and mobilisation to bring some improvements to their 
villages. More generally, they acknowledged that they were in a different 
position than the rest of the community. The common villagers, on the other 
hand, mostly pointed to their inability to change things especially those that 
matter to them — basic social services and infrastructure – and the feeling of 
fear (both of the ‘structure’ and of the community’s reactions) in the case of 
contesting things. Women, in particular, found themselves in an even more 
limited position, as their power was perceived as naturally smaller than the 
power of men. As for the beneficiaries, there was a significant contrast in terms 
of their power subjectivities, mostly related to the way they obtained their loan 
and whether or not they had been victims of irregularities as well as who was 
involved in the case of the irregularities (e.g., high ranking local authorities or 
members of the LC). 
These variations bring us back to Bourdieu and the concept of strategy (see 
Introduction), that is, decision-making based on practical considerations of an 
actor’s position in society and which takes into account perceived risks and 
uncertainties.  These, in turn, are framed by habitus, which, in this case, can be 
perceived from a dual perspective. On the one hand, there is the habitus related 
to tradition particularly strong at the very local level. On the other hand, there is 
the habitus related to the historical constitution of the Mozambican state 
including colonialism and the socialist experiment. While different, both 
dimensions are ultimately characterised by a strong ‘top-down’ mentality, which 
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persists despite the formal change of the political framework that shapes the 
post-war Mozambican state. 
This brings us to the second question, that is, ‘to what extent has the ‘7 million’ 
contributed to the creation of local critical awareness and the expansion of the 
boundaries of what is deemed possible? Here a distinction needs to be made 
between having critical awareness and the expansion of the boundaries of what 
is deemed possible. As noted in the case study, many participants did show 
critical awareness regarding not only the ‘7 million’, but also towards the political 
and economic system they are subject to. Yet, this awareness did not 
necessarily imply that they felt able to change things. Therefore there is not 
necessarily a correlation between critical awareness and expansion of the 
boundaries of what is deemed possible. 
Indeed, as shown in the case study, the instances of contestation (the 
questioning of the power structure) have been rare precisely because of the 
habitus in which these communities are immersed where fear of contestation 
and the feeling of powerlessness to change things still dominate. That is, whilst 
there is often a manifested desire for things to change, there is also scepticism 
that this will take place, at least in the short term. In this regard, the ‘7 million’ 
has not fundamentally altered people’s subjectivities to the point of instigating 
change. On the contrary, the force of pre-existing dynamics has, in several 
instances, reinforced crucial aspects of the local habitus that persists despite 
several formal and institutional changes occurring not only in the domain of the 
‘7 million’ and the LCs but more generally in Mozambique since the Peace 
Accords. 
This leads us once more to Bourdieu and the dialectical relationship between 
objectivism and subjectivism. As long as subjects think the way they do, they 
will not change attitude. At the same time, as long as the practical conditions 
that surround them (in this case, the informal patterns of social behaviour that 
affect their everyday) remain, they will lack the stimulus to dare to change. 
Therefore, perhaps one of the crucial questions in this case study is ‘What does 
it take for subjects to change their mind-sets?’ (Assuming this is a desirable 
outcome, which, in the context of extreme disempowerment, it is assumed here 
to be). This question is, furthermore, linked to a more general question which is 
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whether social engineering – here, clearly promoted from the top-down – is an 
efficient means for social change. These interrogations will be resumed in the 
section below, but what I would like to emphasise here is that, underneath any 
empowerment promotion policy, and clearly in the case of the ‘7 million’ and the 
several reforms that took place in Mozambique after the war, the conflict 
between those who want change and those who want to resist change is a 
crucial matter. 
In the case of the ‘7 million’, this conflict needs to be assessed taking into 
account multiple levels of analysis. As discussed in Chapter 5, the very design 
of the ‘7 million’ and of the LCs reflected different understandings regarding 
what kind of changes they were supposed to bring about. And these different 
kinds of changes had different implications regarding these instruments’ social 
effects and emancipatory potential. The policy outcome has clearly privileged a 
setting that has retained a strong political component of the policy without 
accountability mechanisms despite its claim to the contrary. In fact, to a large 
extent, and resembling the very process of decentralisation in Mozambique, the 
‘7 million’ and the LCs constitute a change that does not fundamentally change 
power and is therefore non-emancipatory. More generally, this outcome reflects 
one of the downsides of top-down policies aiming at promoting ‘bottom-up’ 
empowerment: their very nature is linked to the maintenance of the status quo – 
a fact that also explains the natural preference for a technical approach to 
empowerment. The section below discusses this aspect in more depth. 
7.2 Problematising the ‘7 Million’s Limitations 
The analysis of the ‘7 million’ and its implementation in the district of Angoche, 
and the acknowledgement that many of the problems encountered there were 
also found in other districts, raise a series of questions regarding the nature of 
the policy as well as its limitations. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, civil 
servants at all levels of the governance spectrum (central government, 
province, district) strongly pointed out that one of the main challenges of the ‘7 
million’ was that it relied on the provision of capacity building, targeting a wide 
spectrum of actors, including the beneficiaries of the fund, the members of the 
LCs, as well as the members of the districts’ TCs. This perspective stems from 
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the understanding that the ‘7 million’ is good policy in its intent, design and 
empowering potential, but its efficiency depends upon its optimum 
implementation, which includes the expansion of technical capacity at the lower 
echelons of the state. 
As shown, the lack of technical capacity (or lack of power-to) is, indeed, a 
problem, one that is recognised by the beneficiaries and members of LCs 
themselves. Yet, if lack of technical capacity is an issue, lack of capacity (in 
particular, financial resources) to provide capacity seems even more 
problematic and reflects a more fundamental problem that is the inadequacy of 
the policy in matching what is clearly an ambitious plan with an unrealistic 
budget and which, in turn, leads to a significant loss of resources into failed 
projects. 
Why such capacity building is lacking is a central question to be asked. The 
argument of trial and error, often repeated to explain the limitations of the ‘7 
million’, whilst appealing is not convincing considering the extensive previous 
experience with participatory planning in several provinces in the 1990s. While 
these previous projects did not relate to credit provision, they were based on 
participatory planning which included, in the case of Nampula, the role of 
consultative councils. These previous experiments had, furthermore, been 
assessed before the inception of the ‘7 million’ and offered a series of lessons 
learned, which included the need for technical capacity and a functioning 
system of monitoring and accountability (see, e.g., ECIAfrica, 2004; Métier, 
2006). Also, besides the reports, several participants in these first experiments, 
who are still working in or with the government, were very aware of some 
aspects that needed improvement in these processes including the need to 
address the problem related to the horizontal/vertical dichotomy discussed 
above in the case of the LCs (Int. 10, 50). Despite this background, these 
problems persisted and were often not adequately addressed in the policy 
instruments that followed. On the contrary, the LC regulation left several 
ambiguities that did not ensure the aspect of horizontality in the process of the 
body’s constitution. Also, it did not provide a clear mechanism of accountability. 
‘Why were these lessons not fully incorporated into the ‘7 million’?’ is a central 
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question to be asked, as it touches directly on the intent of the policy regarding 
its empowering objective. 
The political aspect of the ‘7 million’ has been discussed by some academics 
(Forquilha, 2010; Orre and Forquilha, 2012) and also referred to by several 
interviewees from CSOs in Nampula. Their argument was that the ‘7 million’ has 
been used as a political instrument which means that it was not that its 
implementation has gone wrong, but that the very purpose of the initiative was 
political in nature. Accordingly, the ‘7 million’ is part of a neopatrimonial dynamic 
that is present across spectrum of the Mozambican state (ibid.; Sande, 2010). 
This perspective offers important insights regarding the power dynamics that 
have taken place at the political level, in particular, surrounding the definition of 
the legal instruments and the nature of the ‘7 million’. As discussed in Chapter 5 
there is substantial evidence that indicates that the origins of the ‘7 million’ were 
clearly linked with the political agenda of President Guebuza. The discursive 
use of the initiative, despite its several problems is, in this regard, an indicator of 
its political utility. The arguments become even more compelling if we examine 
the contextual background of decentralisation in Mozambique and the process 
that led to the regulation of the traditional authorities in Mozambique. 
Contrary to the technical analysis of the limitations of ‘7 million’, this political 
interpretation brings power-over to the heart of the analysis, in particular, the 
power-over exercised by the dominant party in order to retain its control of the 
country. This perspective assumes there is no empowering potential arising 
from the ‘7 million’ as the latter is perceived as designed precisely as a tool to 
maintain and reinforce the status quo. 
While more convincing than the ‘lack of technical capacity’ argument, there are 
two aspects that need to be further problematized in the case of the ‘7 million’. 
The variance in behaviour that takes place at the local level is an indicator that, 
despite the strength of the political power-over that takes place in Mozambique, 
there are other dimensions that affect how this power will mingle with local 
dynamics. Local culture and socio-economic aspects may indeed reinforce this 
top-down power, but they do not respond linearly and may, in fact, in 
unexpected ways, contribute to the creation of windows of opportunity for 
change. In this regard, local behaviours may also be affected by parallel events. 
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In Angoche, for instance, there was a notable difference in attitudes between 
members of LDCs who had some kind of regular interactions with specific 
CSOs in comparison to those who did not. This sometimes led to a certain 
degree of conflict between the LCs and LDCs as the former saw the latter as 
“challenging their authority”.59 
While it is important to acknowledge the often very asymmetrical waves of 
power-over that descend from one level of analysis to the other, it is equally 
important to consider the several deviations that these waves may encounter 
until they reach the bottom layers. Ultimately, what influences local behaviour is 
a specific combination of powers that affects each individual differently 
according to where he/she stands in that particular moment. In this regard, 
some people may feel power-over more intensely (e.g., women), whilst others 
may use this power wave as a trampoline to increase their own power-to (e.g., 
whoever has money to pay a bribe and obtain a loan). Consequently, while it 
may be the case that many people are under similar constraints, due to habitus 
and because of their similar position in that social context, it is also the case 
that deviant behaviours may have an influence and be reproduced by others at 
a later stage. 
Therefore, assuming the ‘7 million’ was indeed created with the aim of 
enhancing Frelimo’s power and popularity at the local level, this alone would not 
eliminate the possibility that the policy could (even if ‘accidentally’) lead to some 
kind of emancipatory outcome. As noted by an employee in Nampula who had 
a very positive view about the policy, even if people were complaining about the 
problems of irregularities, lack of enough funds, etc., it was still a positive 
outcome that they were talking about it as this kind of discussion was 
something that did not happen a few years before (Int. 5). The point made was 
that, even if the ‘7 million’ did not work as expected, it helped to make people 
more critical about current events and therefore more engaged in matters that 
affected their daily lives. I agree with the comment to a certain extent, not least 
because critical awareness is indeed a pre-requisite for empowerment (as an 
                                            
59 This was an issue that came up in the bi-district conference of Akilizetho in Moma in 
which I took part in May 2012. 
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emancipatory outcome) to take place. Nevertheless, I disagree that this should 
be understood as a merit of the ‘7 million’ as a policy. On the contrary, such an 
outcome would be precisely the result of the policy’s ineffectiveness both in 
promoting empowerment (from a technical perspective) and in strengthening 
the legitimacy of the current status quo (in particular the legitimacy of the local 
government). Ultimately, as discussed below, a crucial aspect that explain the 
limitations of the ‘7 million’ – and of many other policies targeting local 
empowerment – is its very top-down nature. 
THE PROBLEMS OF PROMOTING BOTTOM-UP EMPOWERMENT FROM 
THE TOP-DOWN 
Different from other programs of micro-credit, mostly run by non-governmental 
(often international) actors, the ‘7 million’ was a national and governmental 
initiative. This means that the ‘7 million’ was, to a large extent, endogenous and 
this is in fact the appeal behind its image — the ‘7 million’ is ‘a Mozambican 
initiative’. That being the case, it would be expected that the initiative would be 
more attuned to local idiosyncrasies and respond better to the local demands. 
Indeed, officially, the ‘7 million’ was a response to local demands. As noted in 
the official discourse, “It was by listening to people’s complaints about their lack 
of resources to run their businesses that President Guebuza responded by 
providing the ‘7 million” (Int. 3). Provided this perspective was unproblematic – 
which, as discussed in Chapter 5, is not the case – several problems still 
remained at the heart of the initiative that compromise its supposed ‘demand-
driven’ character. 
If we take into the account its procedural aspect, for instance, specifically, the 
role of the LCs, despite the claim that these are the expression of a bottom-up 
process, it is also the case that they are embedded in top-down dynamics. First, 
they are linked to the formal administrative structure of the district – which is 
also responsible for setting the meetings and their agendas. Second, with the 
exception of the selection of the projects, the LCs have no decision power, but 
are merely consultative (that is, the one who takes decisions locally is still the 
administrator who is directly linked to the Frelimo party and the provincial 
government). Third, in practice, as shown, the LCs have been largely 
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constituted from the top-down from the local point of view (that is, there was 
very often a pre-selection of its members by community authorities). Fourth, as 
an intermediary channel between the communities and the government, the 
LCs have mostly shown a deficit of interaction with the community. This was 
reflected in the popular view that the LCs were linked to the government. 
Additionally, from the perspective of several LC members even their power to 
decide which projects should be selected is largely restricted by the TC and 
other employees in the administration, who de facto control what comes after 
the meetings. 
Perhaps a key question here is ‘who is the local’ to which the ‘bottom-up’ refers 
to? There is no doubt that the institutional reforms carried after the Peace 
Accords have given more autonomy to the district as a state unit. But who is the 
district? Which people in the district are being empowered as a result of these 
changes? From the macro perspective, it is a fact that more money has been 
poured locally, that more responsibilities have been delegated to the district 
government and even to the LCs. From the perspective of the everyday rural 
Mozambican, nevertheless, these changes are still very limited. The fact that 
local people are not entitled to choose the local administrator is a major 
hindrance to the promotion of a bottom-up channel of representation in the 
districts. The consultative status of the LCs further shows the limitations of this 
process. 
Besides, looking at the ‘7 million’, and regardless of its bottom-up appeal, it is 
not that clear that the fund was a response to local demand. Indeed, every time 
I asked local people what they most wanted that could improve their lives, the 
top answers were (1) access to improved basic services and infrastructure, and 
(2) jobs. And by ‘jobs’, they meant formal jobs with social security and a regular 
salary. And even though the ‘7 million’ has as one of its main purposes job 
creation, it is, at best, unclear, the way it can actually promote this goal at a 
significant scale, at least in the current way it has been implemented. In fact, to 
a significant extent, the ‘7 million’ is based on a logic of stimulating self-reliance 
at the local level which is at the core of the idea of entrepreneurship promoted 
by President Guebuza. 
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And here is where we find a contrast between what people want and what the ‘7 
million’ is promoting. People want secure jobs (which often, in their minds, also 
means a job provided by the state), whereas the government wants to promote 
the private sector at the local level. In this regard, the ‘7 million’ asks for a 
radical change in mentality, a mentality that targets production and self-
employment. But if that is the purpose, and even if it could be justifiable from 
the point of view of economic development and even material empowerment, it 
also means that it is not demand-driven but, instead, a process of social 
engineering. 
As seen in Chapter 3, this attempt to transform mentalities via social 
engineering is not a new event in Mozambique. After independence, Frelimo’s 
socialist program was also based on a widely publicised and radical intent to 
transform Mozambican society, focusing on the very idea of emancipation (as 
linked with the path towards modernity). Perhaps more than anything this 
project showed the key problem embedded in the very idea of emancipation, 
that is, who is to decide what emancipation is? As of today, the empowerment 
agenda suffers from the same problem, as what is empowerment tends to be 
predefined. In Mozambique today, whereas Frelimo has set a series of 
channels of dialogue with the local population, there are clearly defined 
boundaries that may not be crossed when it comes to change, particularly in the 
domain of political change. A major difference between now and the early years 
of independence is the acceptance and incorporation of the traditional 
authorities (now ‘community authorities’) in this process of dialogue. Back then, 
social transformation was more coercive and based on the exclusion of those 
who did not abide by the modern ideal; whereas today, it is based mostly 
(although not exclusively) on incentives and the inclusion (or co-opting) of those 
who could oppose transformation. At the same time, the incorporation of 
community authorities in this process — highlighted in the LCs’ regulation which 
mentions that “preferably” at least 40%” of the LC members should be 
community authorities — does not necessarily translate into the enhancement 
of the bottom-up character of these bodies, as discussed in Chapter 6. 
Another problematic aspect related to the ‘bottom-up’ promoted from the ‘top-
down’, in this case, refers to the chain of accountability. As the government 
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creates these spaces for participation, the only clear channel of accountability 
seems to be the one between the administrator and his superiors (e.g., the 
provincial government). Therefore, the administrator and the district employees 
need to ensure that their work will be positively assessed in the eyes of their 
superiors which is why the open presidencies and provincial visits are deemed 
the only safe place to complain in the eyes of the population (and even 
according to some TC members). That is an expression that the ordinary people 
are not actually being empowered to exercise their rights, but they still strongly 
feel the need to access the higher echelons of authority to have any local 
problem solved. 
This brings us to a crucial aspect that is central to the contrast between 
empowerment that is demand-driven and supply-driven (Easterly, 2006; Turner 
et al., 2011). The first is usually the result of the previous understanding that 
power (in whichever shape it is manifested) is a right; whereas in the second 
case, it is perceived as a concession if not even an act of kindness from 
whoever is ‘providing’ this power — which, in this case, is expressed through 
the participatory spaces in the LCs or even the money that people may obtain 
through the ‘7 million.’ As shown in the comments shared by the beneficiaries of 
the ‘7 million’, the ‘gift/favour’ perception is very common which is why very 
often, and even in the face of several problems linked to the fund, many 
beneficiaries still expressed gratitude for it. Thinking in terms of the different 
approaches to empowerment, the idea of ‘concession’ or ‘enabling’ relates to 
the technical approaches to empowerment, whereas the emancipatory view, 
based on critical awareness, links directly to the idea of ‘rights’ and ‘demand’. 
As noted in Chapter 4, several of the problems discussed here are not 
exclusive to the ‘7 million’. The paternal view of the state revealed in the 
Afrobarometer survey, the very slow-paced development of civil society, and 
the fear of contestation of authority are some of the examples related to the 
obstacles to the consolidation of local empowerment and, more generally, to the 
entrenchment of citizenship as an intrinsic right of any individual within the 
Mozambican state. It is no wonder that, in this context, so often the hope for 
change lies outside, for instance in the hands of donors, NGOs, or even higher 
authorities, and not within. This, in turn, reinforces the idea that empowerment 
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needs help to take place from outside/above, instead of instigating agency for 
change. 
7.3 The ‘7 Million’: Lessons Learned 
Whilst the ‘7 million’ is a Mozambican experiment, which means that it is unique 
in this very format, it also has many features that are common to other policies 
in different countries. First, the policy was designed in the context of 
decentralisation and promotion of local governance, a common agenda in many 
post-conflict settings (Brinkerhoff, 2005 and 2011; Kauzya, 2005; Europe Aid, 
2007; Heijke and van den Berg, 2011). Second, many of the features of the ‘7 
million’ resemble practices of micro-credit initiatives, also extremely common in 
developing countries and which also have a strong empowering appeal placing 
participatory practices at their centre (e.g., Rankin, 2001; Mahmud, 2003; 
Parmar, 2003; Muhumuza, 2005). The ‘7 million’ assessment can thus not only 
highlight certain aspects that may be common to other initiatives, but also bring 
to the surface alternative courses of action that may increase the effectiveness 
of similar policies. 
Below I list and comment on key aspects that had a major influence on the 
current outcome of the ‘7 million’, and which also offer the locus for 
improvement — not only in the case of the ‘7 million’, but also in other policies 
that aim at promoting local empowerment.  
• Clarity of objectives and connection with the country’s political economy 
agenda 
One of the central problems of the ‘7 million’ has been its excessively 
mutant character. Whereas it is important that any policy retains a 
significant aspect of flexibility, adapting to social, economic and political 
changes that inevitably occur in any social context, excessive changes 
bring confusion and inconsistencies that may potentially affect the 
expected outcome. 
Having a clear objective also means that the policy needs to be 
consistent with broader national development and economic policies. 
The dilemma at the local level between ‘giving a big grant’ versus ‘giving 
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more but smaller loans’ reflects his lack of clarity in the case of the ‘7 
million’, and points to the different expectations regarding what the policy 
may generate. In this regard, clarity is needed so at all levels of policy 
implementation there is no doubt about what is to be expected from the 
policy in question. 
• Ambition versus capacity 
As discussed extensively in Chapter 6, there was a big mismatch 
between the ambitious character of the ‘7 million’ and the existing means 
to effectively implement it. Having functional local councils at different 
levels of all the over 130 districts in Mozambique with members 
minimally trained to discuss business projects, members of the TCs 
capable and with resources to do regular monitoring visits and enough 
resources to invest in viable projects entails a large amount of 
investment, far beyond that which has been allocated. 
In the absence of such resources, a more modest policy, focusing, for 
example, on the poorest districts only or on a reduced number of projects 
per district could perhaps show more effective results. 
• Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 
From the perspective of local empowerment, M&E is primordial in order 
(1) to ensure that the resources are used in an optimal way and (2) to 
ensure that implementation problems may be detected as soon as 
possible. The absence of a regular monitoring practice, and the lack of 
an accurate methodological mechanism of assessment have to a great 
extent fostered the perpetuation of weak/failed projects in the case of the 
‘7 million’. As discussed in Chapter 5, the reasons for the perpetuation of 
weak M&E processes in this case require an in depth analysis of the 
political aspects linked to it, in particular, the maintenance of a discourse 
of ‘success’. Nonetheless, lack of capacity, in particular resources, was 
also a major obstacle. Increasing the allocation of resources for M&E, 
even if that meant taking a percentage away from the projects would 
most likely increase the effectiveness of the initiative, in particular if at 
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the same time better mechanisms of accountability were put in place 
(see below). 
• Chain of accountability 
The lack of a clear chain of accountability is perhaps one of the most 
problematic aspects of the ‘7 million’, as without it there is no way that 
problems may be solved in time (or at all) to make the policy functional. 
Many of the problems of irregularities discussed in Chapter 6 were 
reproduced largely because of the absence of such a chain: as noted, 
there was a lack of clarity regarding who is responsible for what and an 
absence of proper channels of public accountability — that is, there was 
no assurance that those at the bottom could check and follow up how 
and if the problems they encountered were actually being solved. Instead 
of only beneficiaries being held accountable for their loans, local 
authorities should be held responsible for their performance on a regular 
basis. 
• The need to discuss power issues, politics and the nature of the state 
In the context of Mozambique, and of any country with a strong history of 
centralism and dominant party, any policy aimed at promoting local 
empowerment should take into account power and politics and how 
people respond to this. It is not enough that legally Mozambicans have 
the right to belong to any party without suffering any kind of 
discrimination. While local authorities officially state that no party 
discrimination should exist in the allocation of the loans, in practice there 
are no clear mechanisms to ensure that such discourse become praxis. 
This problem is largely related to the aspect of accountability highlighted 
above. 
More generally, however, there is a need to acknowledge the political 
aspects that shape any policy and move away from the technical 
perspective that shapes policy projects while incorporating aspects of 
power struggle that will ultimately affect how the policy is implemented. 
This is particularly the case in post-colonial states, where tradition and 
modernity co-exist and directly affect people’s responses to policies (e.g.: 
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how incorporating community authorities in the LCs affect the 
functioning, representativeness and effectiveness of such bodies and the 
decisions related to the ‘7 million’?’ and ‘how local government 
authorities are responding to the new spaces of power created thanks to 
deconcentration?’).  
• Ensure that the policy does reflect a bottom-up approach 
The challenges and contradictions of promoting bottom-up 
empowerment from the top-down have been discussed extensively in the 
previous section. The question that arises here is whether such 
contradiction ultimately means that any such attempt is doomed to 
failure. There is no clear-cut answer to this question. On the one hand, 
because of the very nature of such policies, it is doubtful that they could 
produce emancipatory effects to the extent of significantly shifting power. 
On the other hand, as formal spaces for participation emerge and 
resources are poured into different locations of power, they may 
contribute to a progressive enhancement of the power-to of the 
marginalised and, eventually, in the long term, enable a more profound 
change that could have emancipatory consequences. 
In practical terms, one of the main challenges of such policies is to 
ensure that they reflect the voices of the target population. Which specific 
techniques are needed for this to take place should be considered 
according to the very specific context in which the policy is supposed to 
operate. In the case of the ‘7 million’, engaging different clusters of actors 
(e.g., besides the LC also the LCDs and other local movements), for 
example, could be a way to achieve this goal. 
Whereas some of the aspects above are not novel when it comes to policy 
assessment, I would like to stress that looking at each of them from the 
multilevel perspective offered by the empowerment framework here proposed 
helps in broadening the ways in which they could be addressed. For instance, 
improving the chain of accountability requires not only formal mechanisms, but 
its success is highly dependent on local subjectivities and whether local people 
will take action and indeed use such mechanisms to complain and claim their 
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rights (that is, it is dependent on the change in local subjectivities). In this 
regard, the framework places emphasis on the constant connection between 
variables at these different levels as well as the contradictory aspects that are 
often present in the social context under analysis. 
More generally, the framework contributes to policy evaluation because it brings 
power dynamics into the analysis, facilitating the identification of different 
interests and power relations across the different levels of analysis. By bringing 
power in, it naturally moves the focus from a technical view of empowerment 
and considers the possible emancipatory outcomes of the policy. Finally, by 
connecting multiple levels of analysis, namely the domain of policy-making and 
policy implementation, it facilitates the analysis of policy coherence. 
7.4 Back to Empowerment Theorising 
One of the propositions of this thesis is that empowerment can be a useful 
concept in order to understand social change including peacebuilding 
processes and peace sustainability in the long run. This means, on the one 
hand, moving slightly away from empowerment as a policy outcome and 
focusing instead on empowerment as a representation of the movement of 
power in a given social context. This, in turn, means diving deeper into the 
complex debate on power whilst discussing empowerment. 
The model proposed in Chapter 2 did so by opting for a framework that 
incorporated a dialectical perspective of power centred on the relationship 
between power-to and power-over. This choice was based on the 
understanding that, in any given context where empowerment policies are 
required or implemented, there exist significant asymmetries of power between 
actors, across different fields, which often entail conflict around power. As 
policies aiming at promoting empowerment (a specific group’s power-to) are 
implemented, they may often interfere in these dynamics (in particular, power-
over dynamics that may have caused or contributed to the lack of that group’s 
power-to), possibly intensifying conflict and/or creating resistance or forms of 
policy distortion, interfering in the expected outcome. Therefore, the sooner the 
identification of conflict dynamics are identified, the more realistic the policy can 
be. 
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An important aspect here is that conflict is not deemed necessarily socially 
harmful, neither is it related necessarily with dynamics of oppression. The idea 
of understanding the relationship between power-over and power-to from a 
dialectical perspective is, in this regard, an effort to emphasise the constant 
movement and the intrinsic relation of one kind of power over the other. Indeed, 
the same could apply to the dichotomy of emancipation/oppression — one only 
makes sense in relation to the other. In the context of social relations, and 
thinking in terms of positive peace and life welfare (Pugh et al., 2011), the 
central issue is how balanced these two extremes are in different fields of social 
life. Indeed, the recognition that empowerment needs to be promoted stems 
from the understanding that the power-to of a specific group is extremely 
unbalanced. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2, it is this assumption that is at the base of 
empowerment as a necessary policy. Nevertheless, what differs is the way this 
lacking or imbalance is understood. From the technical perspective, it is often 
due to the lack of clear regulatory frameworks related to state governance 
which, in turn, affect the access to ‘capacity’, both technical capacity 
(knowledge, education) as well as material assets (including access to basic 
social services). According to the emancipatory perspectives, the central issue 
is systemic instead and relates to the nature of the system that regulates social 
relations and which is inherently oppressive (based on power-over). These 
different foci also point towards different levels of analysis as explanatory fields. 
The technical approaches emphasise the national level — where good 
governance is the focus — and the local level — where the ‘recipients’ of the 
policies are located. Conversely, the emancipatory approaches move upwards 
to the global level in their analysis taking a more systemic approach where 
fundamental assumptions of social organisation and their values are called into 
question. Each approach furthermore tends to highlight different aspects of 
power: the technical approaches focus on the increase of power-to, whereas 
the emancipatory approaches concentrate on overcoming power-over. 
If we take into account the case study discussed here, we may see that each 
approach reveals certain aspects of the ‘7 million’. However, by focusing on 
each of them exclusively, many dynamics of power would be ignored, or 
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underestimated. From the technical perspective, the analysis of the ‘7 million’ 
could take into account, for example, the ambiguities in the legislation, the lack 
of funding to invest in capacity building, possibly the effects of corruption (lack 
of good governance and accountability) as factors that contributed to the 
various problems related to the implementation of the ‘7 million’. An 
emancipatory perspective on the matter could focus, for example, on the effects 
of the initiative regarding the more structural dimension of the country’s 
economy and wealth distribution. Also, research focused on gender and the ‘7 
million’ would certainly reveal more subtle issues of power that could also be 
assessed from a gender emancipatory perspective. The challenge addressed in 
this thesis was to open up the possibility to see these and other factors 
combined and how they interact with and influence each other. It reflected, in 
this regard, the concern with a holistic approach also flexible enough to 
consider that any of these factors could have a different weight at a different 
point in time and space, thus, having a different influence in terms of policy 
outcome. 
It is this holistic concern that ultimately justifies the option of not focusing 
exclusively on emancipation as an analytical concept. While emancipation 
clearly concentrates on power and conflict, allowing the identification of 
important power dynamics, ultimately it places emphasis on a systemic 
approach and the vertical axis of power (i.e., how systemic forces condition 
local and individual behaviour) to the detriment of the possible micro-systems of 
power (e.g., localised cultural and traditional patterns) and the horizontal 
dynamics of power (within the same level). While it may be the case that 
systemic power dynamics may overlap with local ones, there is no guarantee 
that they will always be predominant. It is also not a given that power dynamics 
in each level will respond similarly to the systemic context. 
The choice of a model that included multiple levels of analysis was a way to 
enhance this holistic aspect by expanding the possibility to understand the 
different vertical and horizontal waves of power that contribute to the results of 
the policy. It is this multilevel framework that also allows us to understand, not 
only the policy implementation, but the policy formulation, and the power 
dynamics that shape the latter and, consequently, also affect the intention and 
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outcome of the policy in question. In the case of the ‘7 million’, it became clear 
that the way the policy was designed was the result of a series of clashes of 
opinion at the national level which ultimately affected the very nature of the 
initiative. At the same time, whereas at this level, the political power exercised 
by the executive was decisive for the final outcome, in the policy’s 
operationalization across the lower levels, other factors started to play a role, 
that is, more power waves interfered in the policy’s implementation. These 
included, among others, local formal and informal chains of authority (traditional 
and non-traditional), socio-economic factors, as well as the role of parallel 
actors, including CSOs and their work in different locations of the district. These 
factors combined with the different positions of actors in this context largely 
affected the way actors perceived their own power (their subjectivities), and, 
therefore, the way they acted regarding the policy. 
The focus on subjectivities was another important aspect of the framework 
proposed in this thesis. As observed in the case study, the way individuals 
perceive their own and others’ power is the result of a complex geometry of 
factors that is not visible at first and that was not fully captured in the policy 
design. In particular, the different manifestations of fear not only of ‘the 
structure’ (the government power) but also of the local mechanisms of social 
regulation highly influenced actors’ willingness to speak or remain silent, 
criticize or approve, and try or not to obtain the loan. Fear was particularly 
important to explain the non-linear connection between access to information 
(e.g., capacity building regarding the LCs and the ‘7 million’) and behaviour. 
More generally, it became evident how complex the relationship between 
subjectivities, capacity, and agency is, and, therefore, how difficult it is to 
promote empowerment that is not demand-driven. In fact, even when some 
material results were visible thanks to the ‘7 million’, it was not necessarily the 
case that this had implied a change of mentality such as raising people’s ability 
to question the power of the structures that have kept them in poverty. On the 
contrary, as shown, in several instances, as the implementation of the ‘7 million’ 
has incorporated other kinds of problems that had been taking place for a long 
time (e.g., corruption, power abuse); it is plausible to argue that, to a certain 
extent, it may have reinforced the habitus (e.g., by reinforcing the idea that it is 
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good to be linked to the structure to obtain things including the fund and that 
one should not contest the authorities as reprisals may take place and nothing 
will change). At the same time, even when mentality (or the understanding of 
things) changed, this did not necessarily convert into a different action. 
In summary, the model proposed here, due to its holistic and multidimensional 
character, allows us to pay attention to multiple domains where power dynamics 
take place, at the same time, expanding the discussion on empowerment to 
include not only a policy’s expected outcome but its formulation, and the power 
dynamics behind its formulation, as well as the different factors that influence 
power dynamics at the different levels where the policy operates. Additionally, 
and especially because it is concerned with subjectivities of power, it also 
allows us to perceive variance, e.g., why some actors respond differently to the 
same situation or why some situations may be perceived as both problems as 
well as windows of opportunity for change. This, in turn, facilitates the 
understanding of how habitus operates in a given social context and the 
potential spaces for change; or, conversely, what are the factors that more 
strongly hinder the possibility for change. 
Even though the empowerment framework has been used in this thesis mostly 
to assess the ‘7 million’, its utility is by no means restricted to development 
policy analysis. As seen in Chapter 4, this framework is also helpful in the 
analysis of peacebuilding by highlighting the difference between peace as 
institutional reforms — which concentrates on the national level — and peace 
as people’s empowerment — that is, the perceived effects of these reforms 
from the point of view of those who should be its beneficiaries. In this regard, 
bringing empowerment into the analysis of peacebuilding adds to the discussion 
of hybridity and contributes to the exploration of the everyday changes in post-
war contexts (Brown et al., 2010; Mac Ginty, 2011; Richmond, 2011; Mac Ginty 
and Richmond, 2013). In particular, it provides the space to address power by 
taking into account not only the external/internal divide that often prevails in 
these debates but also by addressing how the ‘internal’ or the ‘local’ itself is 
diversified. Moreover, it stresses how the ‘local’ is also subject to power 
asymmetries that may facilitate the production of either resistance and 
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contestation or alignment with peacebuilding policies implemented in post-war 
scenarios, such as democratisation and decentralisation. 
In Mozambique, as shown, peacebuilding reforms have not been able to 
change fundamental dynamics of power that still operate at the local level. 
Indeed, and despite the labelling of this country as a peacebuilding success due 
to its embrace of externally-led reforms, in practice, especially at the local level, 
peace is much more hybrid than liberal. While this is so, the correlation of forces 
that have led to today’s Mozambique can be understood by looking at the way 
power has operated within and between these different levels of analysis. 
7.5 Conclusion 
The hypothesis presented in the introduction of this thesis was that, even 
though the ‘7 million’ had some positive aspects – including promoting a 
discourse at the national level that underlines the relevance of the districts and 
the local community in matters of governance – its effects in promoting local 
empowerment have been far below its potential and, at times, also counter-
productive. 
The analysis of the case study has confirmed that this was, indeed, the case. 
As hypothesised, one of the reasons for this poor outcome was the dynamics of 
power encountered at the local level which, to a great extent, reflect structural 
problems related to the constitution of the Mozambican state as well as the 
peace/state building reforms that followed the 1992 Peace Accords. At the 
same time, part of these dynamics are more fundamentally linked to local 
aspects related to culture and tradition which, nevertheless, also tend to 
reinforce the top-down character that prevails in this social context. 
A second factor for these poor results, as stated in the hypothesis, was the 
misalignment between some basic assumptions behind the empowering 
potential of the policy and the way power dynamics operate at the local level. 
As discussed in this chapter, there are indeed several dichotomies that reflect 
this misalignment. However, a key point that emerged in the research, and that 
was not initially contemplated, was why this misalignment existed in the first 
place. As noted, this misalignment needs to be understood along with the 
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conflict of interests that led to the policy formulation and where political factors 
outweighed the technical experience that preceded the ‘7 million’. 
More generally, the thesis has confirmed that the ‘7 million’ does not address 
the actual sources of local disempowerment focusing, instead, on small scale 
issues that cannot compensate for the bigger structural problems that cause 
disempowerment in the districts in the first place. Indeed, the publicity of the ‘7 
million’ is disproportionally large in relation to its potential effect. Even more 
disproportional is the propaganda of its results, which dismisses several 
methodological problems behind its evaluation as discussed in the previous 
chapters. 
Finally, the thesis has shown that one of the fundamental problems behind the 
limitations of the ‘7 million’ relies on the more general contradiction of promoting 
‘bottom-up’ empowerment from the ‘top-down’. This contradiction further points 
towards the limitations of social engineering attempts of social transformation 
that are not demand-driven and how these may create spaces where power can 
be more easily manipulated by those who find themselves in a better strategic 
position instead of promoting the empowerment of the most marginalised. 
As this thesis comes to an end, a question that arises is whether the ‘7 million’, 
regardless of all its problems, was still better than no ‘7 million’ at all. The 
answers to this would be based on counterfactuals, but may shed a different 
light on the policy and its relevance. On the one hand, no ‘7 million’ would mean 
less money in the districts and less money in the hands of many poor people. 
Indeed, even if it is the case that the ‘7 million’ could have been more effective if 
used in a different or more accountable way, it is undeniable that some people, 
at least for a certain amount of time, benefitted from it and often survived 
because of it. On the other hand, taking into account the problems behind the 
initiative including power abuse, bribes, and overall lack of accountability, the 
question remains whether this initiative has not contributed to the actual 
enhancement of these problems and the consolidation of habitus, reinforcing 
people’s beliefs that things are as they are and most probably will not change. 
This counterfactual analysis, which open up the discussion of the long-term 
effects of the ‘7 million’, could be facilitated by the existence of more quality 
research on the ‘7 million’ and the LCs which, at this stage, are still scarce. 
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While this research has contributed to partly filling this gap and advancing more 
questions regarding the long-term effects of the ‘7 million’, I would also like to 
acknowledge some of its limitations. First, whereas the fieldwork was successful 
in gathering information from a wide range of actors at all levels of analysis, in 
particular, listening to several voices from the very bottom of rural society, it is 
also the case that a more in-depth analysis of the local would have required a 
much longer stay in the district. Indeed, certain ‘invisible’ aspects such as the 
influence of tradition and culture on everyday behaviour would have required a 
stay of at least six months even up to one year in the same place in order to 
gain the confidence of the local people and be able to observe details that in a 
short visit, especially for someone exogenous like myself, are not immediately 
visible. In fact, I only started to be able to observe some of these aspects at the 
very end of my stay largely thanks to my contact with some people that had 
lived in the region for a long time and were open to informally sharing this kind 
of information with me. Undoubtedly, such an anthropological research would 
pose additional challenges in analytical terms, especially in my ability to 
connect the different levels of analysis. Yet it would certainly bring new 
elements into the understanding of local behaviour and its relationship with the 
LCs as well as the ‘7 million’. 
A second limitation that is inherent to this kind of ethnographic research is that, 
no matter how much I tried to diversify my sources, my ability in terms of the 
control of the information was always conditional to my external relationship 
with the context where I was and the stories that I was listening to. 
Unfortunately, there is no way to guarantee that participants will tell their stories 
in full either because of issues of trust or because they want to show only a 
specific view of their narratives. While conducting fieldwork, I did whatever was 
possible to overcome this challenge by double-checking the information shared 
and also by comparing the same events as narrated in different interviews. 
Certainly, any mechanisms, in this regard, could not fully resolve this problem, 
but they reflected my continuous commitment to a reflexive practice and my 
personal posture of being open to reconsider the data obtained as new data 
was collected. In this regard, the follow-up trip in 2013 was precisely an effort to 
do this, especially by sharing my initial interpretation of the 2012 findings and 
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continuing to capture new data that, ultimately, corroborated the previous 
findings. 
Finally, due to space limitation, a significant amount of information obtained in 
the fieldwork was not directly used in, or was actually excluded from, the 
analysis in this thesis, in particular the kind of information that opened up new 
directions for future research and was not deemed fundamental in order to 
respond to the thesis objectives and research questions. These included: (1) 
the information surrounding the development and functioning of the LDCs and 
their relationship with the LCs, a theme also linked to the challenges of creating 
a more local civil society in Mozambique; and (2) the local perceptions 
regarding the changes arising from peace in people’s daily lives, as well as of 
the non-changes. Both topics open new avenues of research that may also 
contribute to the deepening of the discussion on empowerment and peace. 
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Appendix I 
	  
School	  of	  Social	  and	  International	  Studies	  
Division	  of	  Peace	  Studies	  
	  
Research Information Sheet 
(this was translated into Portuguese and presented to participants) 
 
Greetings! 
I would like to invite you to take part on a research study. Before you decide whether to 
participate or not, I would like to share with you some brief information about the nature of this 
study and what your participation would entail. 
Please read the summary below and feel free to contact me for any additional information you 
may require. 




A Multilevel Analysis of Empowerment in Mozambique: the Case of the 













This research is part of a PhD project in Peace Studies, conducted by 
Roberta Holanda Maschietto, under the supervision of Dr. Neil Cooper, at 
the School of International and Social Studies, University of Bradford, 
United Kingdom. 
The research aims to: (1) discuss the concept of empowerment vis-à-vis 
in the peace and development agendas; (2) analyse current patterns of 
empowerment and disempowerment in Mozambique and (3) the effects of 
the District Development Fund (DDF, also known as the ‘7 million’) in 
promoting local empowerment. 
The project focuses on the district of Angoche, in the province of 
Nampula, and the role played by the Local Consultative Councils in the 
use of the DDF. 
This is an independent research and the researcher has no direct link with 
any political party, development organization, NGO and/or institution in 
Mozambique or in the UK, apart from the University of Bradford. 







The results of this research will constitute part of a PhD thesis in Peace 
Studies, at the University of Bradford. The research further contemplates 
the publication of articles in academic journals. In terms of content, the 
research aims to contribute to the understanding of the dynamics of 
empowerment and, thus, how policies aiming at promoting local 








Participants in this research shall include: local people in Angoche, 
members of the Local Consultative Councils in Angoche, beneficiaries of 
the DDF, government officials in Angoche, Nampula and Maputo involved 
in the implementation of the DDF, members of civil society organisations 
in Nampula and Maputo and employees within development agencies that 












Participants is this research are recruited exclusively on an voluntary 
basis. If, for any reason, after deciding to participate, you change your 
mind, you are absolutely free to withdraw from the research and also 
withdraw any statement already given. 
Participation will be based on face to face interviews, which, if you allow, 
will be audio recorded. The timing of the interview will depend on the 
participant availability, but the ideal estimate is at least one hour. The 
place shall be negotiated between the participant and researcher, 











The information you give will be treated confidentially: your name and any 
other identification will not be shared at any time in the output of the 
research (unless you explicitly request so). The only person dealing 
with the information you will give is the researcher (myself) and nobody 
else. Any recording will be saved in password-protected digital files only 
accessed by the researcher. Any direct quotes will be used only in the 
absence of any possible link to its author. If you have any queries about 





My name is Roberta Holanda Maschietto. I have obtained a Bachelor and 
a Masters degree in International Relations, both from the University of 
Brasília (Brazil). Before joining the PhD program at Bradford University I 






was a lecturer in International Relations in Brazil for nearly five years. I 
further worked in several academic researches and developed course 
content both in International Relations as well as in Peace Studies. I am 







This research project has been assessed and approved by the University 
of Bradford Ethics Committee and therefore abides by the ethical 
principles of that institution. If you would like to verify the reliability of the 
researcher, please feel free to contact my supervisor, Dr. Neil Cooper, at 
R.N.Cooper@Bradford.ac.uk. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this. I hope you will be interested in taking part of this 
research. 
If you have any doubts and/or enquiries, please contact me at 




Roberta Holanda Maschietto 
 
_____________________________ 
Doctoral researcher in Peace Studies 
University of Bradford, UK 
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Appendix II 
	  
School	  of	  Social	  and	  International	  Studies	  
Division	  of	  Peace	  Studies	  
	  
Consent Form 
(this was translated into Portuguese) 
RESEARCH TITLE 
A Multilevel Analysis of Empowerment in Mozambique: the Case of the District Development 
Fund 
RESEARCHER 
Roberta Holanda Maschietto, Doctoral Researcher in Peace Studies, University of Bradford, UK 
 
Please read the following statements and mark whether you agree or not. If you have doubts 
while reading this, please feel free to ask the necessary clarifications. 
 YES NO 
I have received a copy of this research information sheet. 
 
! ! 
I had the chance to ask questions and clarifications about the research 
and my participation in it and I agree with the conditions. 
 
! ! 
I am taking part in this research voluntarily and I understand that I can 




I understand that I can withdraw any statement made, even after the 
interview is completed, if I wish so. In this case, the information will be 
discarded and not used in this research. 
 
! ! 
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I agree that this interview will be audio recorded and the only person 
who will have access to it is the interviewer herself. 
 
! ! 
I understand that, unless I explicitly state my wish to the contrary, 
my name and identification will not be exposed in the study, neither 
associated with the information I am sharing during the interview. 
 
! ! 




I would like the interviewer to keep me informed about the study and 
ask any clarification regarding statements I give during the interview. 
 
! ! 
Name of participant: ___________________________________________________________ 
Place and date: ______________________________________________________________ 
Signature: __________________________________________________________________	  
	   	  




1| FOCUS GROUPS 
Participants: local people in the districts 
Estimated time: 2 hours 
Purposes: 
1. Obtain the participants’ understanding of power, (dis)empowerment and power 
dynamics within the community 
2. Obtain the participants’ view of the LCC, its role and representativeness 
3. Understand the participants’ priorities and if they think the latter are taken into account 
by the LCC 
4. Obtain their knowledge/view on the ‘7 million’ and its results 
5. Obtain the participant’s reflection on what has changed for her/him/the community since 
the end of the war. 
Questions 
Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
GENERAL SUBJECTIVITIES AND PRIORITIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN RELATION TO 
THE COMMUNITY 
1. How would you describe your 
current life condition in your 
community? What do you like 
and what do you dislike? 
[Complement, if needed] Do 
you have access to the things 
you need? Are you happy? Do 
you feel safe? Do you feel free 
to do/say what you want? Why 
is it so? 
Can you give an example of 
this kind of situation? 
Identify main life values 
for each individual as 
well as dimensions of 
empowerment (power 
to and agency) 
DYNAMICS OF POWER IN THE COMMUNITY, UNDERSTANDINGS OF ‘POWER TO’ AND 
‘POWER OVER’ 
2. Do you think everybody is 
equal in your community? 
[If needed, specify] Have 
people access to similar 
opportunities (health, 
education, jobs, etc.)? 
Does everybody have the 
Subjectivities ref. 
power dynamics in the 
community 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
same representativeness and 
are listened the same way by 
the authorities? 
3. Do you think everybody should 
be equal or is it 
good/necessary some level of 
inequality? 
Why? Could you give any 
example? 
Values of equality and 
authority (power over) 
4. Who is/are the most powerful 
person/people in your 
community? 
Why are they more powerful? 
Do you think you are powerful 
in the community? 
Subjectivities ref. 
power dynamics in the 
community and 
understanding of own 
power (power over) 
5. What do you think are the main 
needs of the people in this 
community? 
 Subjectivities on 
disempowerment 
VIEW OF THE LCC 
6. What is your opinion about the 
LCC? 
[Specify, if needed] Do you 
know how the LCC works? Do 
you think it works well? Does it 
deliver what you expect it to? 
Do you think it is 
representative? Why? Can you 
give some example? 
Subjectivities on the 
LCC 
7. Did you ever bring a specific 
issue to be discussed in the 
LCC? 
[If no] Why not? 
[If yes] Can you tell me more 
about it (what issue, how it was 




KNOWLEDGE/OPINION ABOUT THE ‘7 MILLION’ AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
8. Are you familiar with the DDF 
(7 million)? 
[If yes] What do you know 
about it? Could you describe 
what it is and how it works? 
 
9. Have you ever applied for a 
loan from the DDF? 
[If not] Why not? 
[If yes] Can you tell me how it 
was (the process, the result, 
etc.)? 
Use of opportunities 
(power to) 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
10. Do you think the ‘7 million’ 
makes a difference in your 
community? 
Why? In which areas? Subjectivities on 
community 
empowerment 
11. What are the weakness and 
strengths of the ‘7 million’? 
Why? [Ask for details] 
Do you think the 7 million has 
contributed to the community in 
general or mostly to some 
people? 
Evaluation of the 7 
million 
REFLECTION ON WHAT HAS CHANGED FOR HER/HIM/THE COMMUNITY SINCE THE 
END OF THE WAR. 
12. If you think about your 
community 20 years ago and 
today, do you think things have 
improved? 
[If needed, specify] Why? In 
which area? Can you give 
some examples? 
Do you think people have more 
power today than in the past? 
Which kind of power? 
General social changes 
in time and power 
dynamics in the 
community 
13. What do you think has NOT 
changed and should have 
changed? 
 Subjectivities of what 
‘ought to be’ 
 
2| SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Participants: key figures in the Government of Mozambique (Ministries in Maputo) 
Estimated time: 1 hour 
Purposes: 
1. Obtain background information about the ‘7 million’ (its origins, rationale and design) 
2. Obtain factual information about the ‘7 million’ implementation 
3. Obtain the participant evaluation of the ‘7 million’ ref. its empowering effects 
4. Obtain the participant understanding of power and empowerment 
5. Understand the structural dimensions underpinning the 7 million 
 
Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
BACKGROUND AND FACTUAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE ‘7 MILLION’  AND ITS 
IMPLEMENTATION 
1. Could you give a brief 
overview of the origins of 
[Get names of Background. 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
the ‘7 million’ (where has 
the idea come from, who 




Would you say this was a purely 
national initiative or was there 
some kind of consultation or 
engagement with donors? 
Was there any local demand for 
this kind of initiative? E.g., did 
people in the districts call for a 
local budget or was this more of a 




Where did the 
‘empowerment’ concern 
came from (bottom-up 
or top-down)? 
2. Putting the 7 million in the 
broader context of the 
national development 
policy, what was the role 
that the ‘7 million’ was 
expected to play? 
When it was designed was there a 
concern in aligning it with other 
policies, e.g., in the area of 
privatisation, banking system? 
Conversely, was there any 
contradiction between the DDF 
and other national policies? 
[If it does not come up] Some 
argue that the ‘7 million’ hinders 
another important pillar in the 
development of the rural areas, 
which is the expansion of the 
banks, as it creates a competitive 
platform for people to get credit. 
How would you respond to that?  
Rationale of the DDF 
(structural dimension) 
3. Since it started, there were 
changes in the 
recommendations on the 
use of the fund. Could you 
talk about this, in particular 
what drove these changes? 
Was there any systematic 
consultation with local people 
and/or systematic assessment of 
the fund before the changes were 
recommended? 
“ 
4. What were/are the main 
obstacles in the 
implementation of the ‘7 
million’, in your opinion? 




EVALUATION OF THE ‘7 MILLION’ REF. ITS EMPOWERING EFFECTS AND 
SUBJECTIVITIES ON EMPOWERMENT 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
5. One of the main purposes 
of the ‘7 million’ is to create 
local empowerment. How 
would you describe the 
understanding of 
‘empowerment’ embedded 
in its perspective? 
 How empowerment is 
understood 
6. Do you think the ‘7 million’ 
has succeeded in this 
regard? 
Why? In which areas? 
Can you give more details, 
examples? 
Evaluation of the ‘7 
million’ 
7. Do you think the 
communities in the district 
have benefitted more or 
less ‘equally’ from the 
fund? 
Is there any ongoing study from 
the government on this? 
Don’t you think sometimes the 
fund may actually increase local 
inequalities as the fund goes to 
specific individuals and not 
community projects? 
“. Focus on local 
inequalities 
8. Thinking at the national 
level, and considering the 
differences between the 
districts, is there any 
government assessment of 
which districts have had 
better results? 
[If yes] What do you think are the 
reasons behind different 
performances? 
Is there any factor related to (1) 
the design of the initiative and/or 
(2) its relation with other national 
policies? 
“. Focus on national 
inequalities 
9. One of the criticism on the 
‘7 million’ is the low rate of 
return? Could you 
comment on that? 
Isn’t this an indicator that it is not 
working as expected? 
Evaluation of the ‘7 
million’ 
10. How can the ‘7 million’ be 
improved in your opinion? 
 “ 
 
3| SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Participant: donors, NGOs, local government officials 
Estimated time: 1 hour 
Purposes: 
1. Understand the participant’s subjectivities on empowerment and disempowerment in 
the district 
2. Obtain information about the ‘7 million’ implementation 
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3. Obtain the participant’s evaluation of the ‘7 million’ ref. its empowering effects 
4. Understand the structural dimensions underpinning the 7 million 
 
Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
SUBJECTIVITES ON DYNAMICS OF EMPOWERMENT AND DISEMPOWERMENT IN THE 
DISTRICT 
1. In your opinion, what have 
been the main problems faced 
by the district? 
[Ask for details and concrete 
examples in areas such as 




its long term patterns in 
the district 
2. If you think about the last 5-10 
years [if possible, last 20 
years), what would you say has 
improved and what has got 
worse? 
Do you think that inequality is a 
problem here? Why? 
“ 
Subjectivities on 
dynamics of power 
THE ‘7 MILLION’: IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION 
3. Do you think the ‘7 million’ has 
addressed the problems you 
have pointed out? 
What do you think about the 
rationale of the initiative? 
Assessing the rationale 
of the DDF 
4. In terms of the implementation 
process, how would you 
evaluate the ‘7 million’? 
What were the main obstacles? 
f you think about the DDF in 
light of other national policies 
for development, do you see 
any contradiction? Or do they 
complement each other? 
Info on the 
implementation of the 
DDF and its structural 
dimensions 
5. How would you assess the role 
of the LCC on this matter? 
Is there any internal conflict on 
the allocation of the budget, 
e.g., different priorities from the 
point of view of its members? 
Do you think the LCC tends to 
represent the general interest 
of the community? [Ask for 
detailed examples] 
Power dynamics at the 
local level 
6. [Question for donors] What 
was the initial reaction of your 
organisation when President 
Guebuza launched the ‘7 
million’? 
[Identify cooperation/conflict] Dynamics of power and 
structural dimension 
7. [Question for local official] 
Before the launch of the DDF, 
[If the case] Was there any Bottom-up x top-down 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
were there other local 
initiatives centred on the use of 
public funds? 
local demand for this kind of 
initiative? E.g., did people in 
the districts call for a local 
budget or was this more of a 
central government initiative? 
empowerment 
8. Do you think the DDF has 
affected the dynamics within 
the LCC? 
E.g., has created more 
‘conflict’, or has centred the 
discussion around the fund 
while minimising other issues? 
 
9. Since it started, there were 
changes in the 
recommendations on the use 
of the fund. Could you talk 
about this, e.g., what drove 
these changes, which were the 
changes, etc.? 
Was there any systematic 
consultation with local people 
and/or systematic assessment 
of the fund before the changes 
were recommended? 
“ 
10. Do you think the ‘7 million’ has 
promoted local empowerment? 
Why? In which areas? 
Can you give more details, 
examples? 
Evaluation of the ‘7 
million’ 
11. How can the ‘7 million’ be 
improved in your opinion? 
 “ 
 
4| SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Participant: members of the Local Consultative Council, rural district 
Estimated time: 1,5 hour 
Purposes: 
1. Obtain factual information about the ‘7 million’ and its implementation 
2. Obtain the participant evaluation of the ‘7 million’ ref. its empowering effects 
3. Capture the participant’s view of power dynamics and patterns of empowerment and 
disempowerment in the community 
4. Obtain the participant understanding of power and empowerment 
5. Obtain the participant’s reflection on what has changed for her/him/the community since 
the end of the war. 
 
Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
FACTUAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE LCC, THE ‘7 MILLION’ AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
1. When and how did you become 
a member of the LCC? 
[If applicable] Was there a 
‘competitive process’ or were 
you appointed? 
Understand the process 
that leads to the 
formation of the LCC 
and the criteria for the 
membership. 
2. Can you tell me about your 
activities in the community 
before becoming a member of 
the LCC? 
 
3. How much time per 
week/month do you spend in 
your work for the LCC? 
What are you other main 
activities (job/work)? 
Are you happy being a 
member of the LCC? Why? 
How the LLC function 
and member’s 
understanding of 
his/her role in the 
community 
4. Can you describe how the LCC 
works? 
[Specify, if needed]: how often 
do you meet? Does every 
participant usually attend? 
How long do meetings last? 
Are there many controversies 
or do people usually agree on 
the issues? 
5. Can you describe the process 
that leads to the loans of the 
fund? 
Do many people apply for the 
loan? How do you decide who 
will get the funding? Can you 
give an example? 
EVALUATION OF THE ‘7 MILLION’ REF. ITS EMPOWERING EFFECTS 
6. Do you think the ‘7 million’ 
makes a difference in your 
community? 
Why? In which areas? 
Do you think the 7 million has 
contributed to the community 
in general or mostly to some 
people? 
[If only some people] Do you 
think this is a problem or is still 
beneficial? 
Subjectivities ref. the 7 
million and 
empowerment 
7. What are the weakness and 
strengths of the ‘7 million’? 
Why? [Ask for details]  
UNDERSTANDING OF POWER AND EMPOWERMENT, AND ITS DYNAMICS IN THE 
COMMUNITY 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
8. Do you think there is a high 
level of inequality within your 
community? 
[If needed, clarify] Inequality of 
resources and opportunities. 
Subjectivities ref. power 
dynamics in the 
community 
9. Who is/are the most powerful 
person/people in your 
community? 
Why are they more powerful? 
How do you see yourself in 
the community? Do you think 
you have more power than 
other people? Why? 
Subjectivities ref. power 
dynamics in the 
community 
Understanding of 
his/her own power 
10. Do you think is good/bad that 
people have different degrees 
of power? 
 Subjectivities ref. power 
over 
11. What do you think are the main 
needs of the people in this 
community? 
 Subjectivities ref.  
disempowerment 
12. Do you think people here are 
free to do what they want? 
Why? 
[If no] What do you think is 
missing so they feel free? 
Subjectivities ref. power 
to 
REFLECTION ON WHAT HAS CHANGED FOR HER/HIM/THE COMMUNITY SINCE THE 
END OF THE WAR. 
13. If you think about your 
community 20 years ago and 
today, do you think things have 
improved? 
Why? In which area? Can you 
give some examples? 
Do you think people have 
more power to do what they 
want, comparing to 20 years 
ago? Which kind of power? 
Power to do what? 
Social and power 
changes in time 
14. What do you think has NOT 
changed and should have 
changed? 
 Subjectivities of what 
‘ought to be’ 
 
5| SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Participants: direct beneficiaries of the DDF 
Estimated time: 1,5 hour 
Purposes: 
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1. Obtain the participants’ understanding of power, (dis)empowerment and power 
dynamics within the community 
2. Obtain information about the process leading to the loan 
3. Obtain the participants’ view of the LCC, its role and representativeness 
4. Obtain the beneficiary assessment of the initiative 
5. Obtain the participant’s reflection on what has changed for her/him/the community 
thanks to the DDF 
6. Obtain the participant’s reflections about general changes in the district since the end of 
the war. 
 
Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
GENERAL SUBJECTIVITIES AND PRIORITIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN RELATION TO 
THE COMMUNITY 
1. How would you describe your 
current life condition in your 
community? What do you like 
and what do you dislike? 
[Complement, if needed] Do 
you have access to the things 
you need? Are you happy? Do 
you feel free to do/say what 
you want in your community? 
Do you feel safe? [If no] Why? 
[If the case] Can you give an 
example of this kind of 
situation? 
Identify main life values 
and dimensions of 
‘power to’ 
DYNAMICS OF POWER IN THE COMMUNITY, UNDERSTANDINGS OF ‘POWER TO’ AND 
‘POWER OVER’ 
2. Do you think everybody is equal 
in your community? 
[If needed, specify] Have 
people access to similar 
opportunities (health, 
education, jobs, etc.)? 
Does everybody have the 
same representativeness and 
are listened the same way by 
the authorities? 
Subjectivities ref. 
power dynamics in the 
community 
3. Do you think everybody should 
be equal or is it good/necessary 
some level of inequality? 
Why? Could you give any 
example? 
Values of equality and 
authority (power over) 
4. Who is/are the most powerful 
person/people in your 
community? 
Why are they more powerful? 
Do you think you have more 
power than other people? 
Why? 
Subjectivities ref. 
power dynamics in the 
community (power 
over) 
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Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
Understanding of 
his/her own power 
5. What do you think are the main 
needs of the people in this 
community? 
 Subjectivities on 
disempowerment 
BENEFITTING FROM THE ‘7 MILLION’: PROCESS AND RESULTS 
6. When and how did you first 
hear about the ‘7 million’? 
 Info about the 
implementation 
7. Can you describe the process 
that lead to your loan from the 
DDF? 
[Ask details accordingly: how 
long did it take, how much, 
how it was paid, etc.] 
Did you have any difficulty in 
this process? Did you know 
exactly what to do? Did 
anyone give you support to 
apply for the fund? 
“ 
8. Once you got the loan, what did 
you do? 
[Ask details about how the 
money was invested] 
Empowerment as 
agency and power to 
9. Would you say things have 
improved for you once you had 
access to the DDF? 
If there was no DDF, how do 




idea of ‘limit-possibility’ 
WHOSE EMPOWERMENT?   
10. Do you think that you getting 
access to the fund has 
benefitted other people in the 
community? 





11. Do you think everybody in the 
community (including women) 
has the same chance as you to 
get a loan from the fund? 
[If not] Why? Understanding of 
power distribution 
(opportunities) in the 
community 
12. What are the weakness and 
strengths of the ‘7 million’? 
Why? [Ask for details] Evaluation of the 7 
million 
13. Do you think the 7 million has 
contributed to the community in 
general or mostly to some 
people? 
[If only some people] Do you 
think this is a problem or is still 
beneficial? 
Subjectivities of power 
distribution and the 7 
million 
	   345	  
Question Instructions Variables/purpose 
REFLECTION ON WHAT HAS CHANGED FOR HER/HIM/THE COMMUNITY SINCE THE 
END OF THE WAR. 
14. If you think about your 
community 20 years ago and 
today, do you think things have 
improved? 
Why? In which area? Can you 
give some examples? 
Do you think people have 
more power to do what they 
want? Which kind of power? 
Power to do what? 
Social and power 
changes in time 
15. What do you think has NOT 
changed and should have 
changed? 
 Subjectivities of what 
‘ought to be’ 
 
